

**Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary**




## **HMIC Inspection Report**

**Sussex Police**

**Major Crime**

**July 2008**



*Sussex Police – HMIC Inspection Report*

*July 2008*

**ISBN: 978-1-84726-741-2**

**CROWN COPYRIGHT**

**FIRST PUBLISHED 2008**

## **Contents**

### **Introduction to HMIC Inspections**

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09  
Programmed Frameworks  
Major Crime  
Future Programmed Inspections  
The Grading Process  
Developing Practice  
Force Overview and Context

### **Findings**

#### **Major Crime**

#### **Recommendations**

#### **Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations**

## Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

## HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

## Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

## Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

July 2008

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

## Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

## The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

### Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

### Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

## **Failing to meet the standard**

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

## **Developing Practice**

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

## **Force Overview and Context**

### **Geographical description of force area**

Sussex Police is responsible for policing the two counties of East and West Sussex, including Gatwick Airport, and the unitary authority of Brighton and Hove, an area of 4,779 square kilometres. Gatwick Airport Limited pays for the policing operation on its property, one of the UK's busiest international airports. There are sea ports at Littlehampton, Newhaven, Shoreham, Eastbourne, Brighton Marina and Rye. The counties are demographically diverse, covering both urban conurbations and rural communities.

### **Demographic profile of force area**

The force area has a resident population (based on the 2001 census) of approximately 1.5 million, which is significantly supplemented by the seasonal influx of visitors to the south coast holiday resorts, particularly Brighton and Eastbourne. More than 35 million passengers pass through Gatwick Airport each year

### **Structural description of the force area**

Sussex Police is made up of 4 Divisions comprising of West Downs, North Downs, Brighton & Hove and East Sussex. Each of these Divisions is commanded by an officer of Chief Superintendent rank, with a total of 77 neighbourhoods identified across Sussex. Within the two tier authorities of East and West Sussex policing districts are aligned with local council areas, each commanded by a chief inspector

### **Strategic direction**

The Force and Authority has agreed a broad range of performance measures for 2008/9, testing delivery in the key strategic areas of 'Neighbourhood Policing', 'Keeping People Safe' and 'Making Best Use of Resources'.

Six service priorities will underpin the Force's delivery:

- Deliver a quality service that is visible and reassures.
- Reduce and detect crime (with emphasis on serious and organised crime).
- Respond to calls for assistance.
- Deliver local policing.
- Improve ease of contact and accessibility.
- Develop our organisational capability.

## **1. Neighbourhood Policing**

Neighbourhood policing provides the foundation upon which Sussex Police delivers many of its services to local communities. Since introducing dedicated neighbourhood policing teams in 2006 the Force has sought to embed them to ensure that its staff and services are responsive and accessible to the needs of local people.

To meet the aim of being accessible, visible and responsive to local people the Force uses surveys to track levels of public satisfaction with its services at district and neighbourhood level. This enables it to make changes to the way it provides policing, ensuring the needs of communities are at the heart of decision making and service delivery.

Sussex Police will be focusing on the following areas over the coming year;

- Delivering a quality service that is visible and reassures.
- Delivering local policing in your area.
- Improving public satisfaction with our service.
- Improving ease of contact and accessibility.
- Responding to calls for assistance.
- Working with partners to tackle alcohol-fuelled violent crime.
- Working with partners to prevent and tackle anti-social behaviour.
- Designing out crime.

## **2. Keeping People Safe**

Sussex Protective Services work closely with neighbourhood policing teams and partners to ensure that the residents of, and visitors to Sussex can feel safe to go about their daily business and be assured that in times of need the Force has the capacity, capability and flexibility to respond to exceptional events and demands.

The Force's long term vision is to build on its very effective teams of crime and operational support police officers and staff, ensuring that they possess the necessary skills, abilities and experience to deal with existing and emerging threats to Sussex's communities.

The Force continues to work closely with colleagues in Surrey and in other police forces in the region to improve collaboration in protective services.

Sussex Police will be focusing on the following areas over the coming year:

- Tackling serious and organised crime.
- Reducing the harm caused by drugs and tackling their supply
- Protecting vulnerable people.
- Safeguarding children.
- Working with partners to tackle domestic violence.
- Protecting the public from the most dangerous offenders.
- Tackling terrorism and violent extremism.
- Policing Gatwick.
- Reducing road casualties and enforcing speed limits.
- Managing our information.
- Collaborating with neighbouring and regional forces.
- Delivering against our 'offences brought to justice' targets.

### **3. Best Use of Resources**

The Force will continue to make best use of its workforce to ensure that it has the right people, in the right place, with the right skills to meet the challenge of policing Sussex over the next three years.

The next three years represents a far tougher financial settlement for the Force compared to previous years and council tax increases are expected to be low. Compared to other parts of the country, Sussex levels of funding are already low.

In common with other parts of the public sector, the police service needs to ensure efficiency savings are released each year and reinvested in service delivery. It will also need to act in a sustainable manner and champion diversity.

Sussex Police will be focusing on the following areas over the coming year;

- Developing our organisational capability.
- The extended police family.
- Diversity.
- Risk management.
- Management of human resources.
- HR strategy.
- Learning and development plan.
- Workforce modernisation.
- Business change programme.
- Environmental strategy.
- Information Systems.
- Efficiency and productivity planning.
- Physical resources and investment plans.

### **Force developments since 2007**

Crime in Sussex fell by 10.3% in 2007/8, representing more than 13,500 fewer victims than in 2006/7.

Burglary of people's homes has halved in the past seven years, with Sussex residents having the lowest risk of burglary of any in the South East (and with the Force ninth safest in England and Wales).

The Force achieved its targets for detecting domestic abuse, preventing its recurrence, and call handling. Sussex also hit its target to improve victim updates on the progress of their investigation – making them more satisfied with that element of the police service.

The Force's neighbourhood policing model was inspected in May 2007 by HMIC, with its achievements recognised by the award of a 'Good' grading, and during the year has continued to embed neighbourhood policing and citizen focus. In February 2008 Sussex Police Authority supported a bid for a further 47 neighbourhood officers to enhance further the delivery of local policing.

The Force is increasing the number of defined neighbourhoods in order to achieve an increased local level of engagement. This is being supported by growth in its consultation team that will enable an enhanced level of local surveying to identify and clarify local concerns.

July 2008

In February the Police Authority also approved further investment to increase Sussex Police's capacity and capability to deal with protective services. This uplift puts the Force in a good position to achieve compliance with the new and challenging requirements in this area.

Operation Nash was a long term investigation carried out by Sussex Police Serious Organised Crime Unit (SOCU) into the large-scale importation of cocaine into the United Kingdom from Brazil and Ghana and the subsequent distribution and supply of cocaine and other drugs in the Brighton and Hove area. As a result 19 defendants were charged with a number of serious drug trafficking and money laundering offences. Drugs, predominantly cocaine, with a street value of 3.5 million pounds were seized and 17 people were convicted of crimes including serious drug trafficking and money laundering offences.

Sussex is the host force for the recently created South East Counter Terrorist Intelligence Unit. The Unit has just moved into tailor made premises within the region. Work will continue to consolidate working practices to ensure the capacity, specialist capability and flexibility to meet the ever increasing demand for this service. This includes a proposal to develop into a full Counter Terrorism Unit co-located in the Thames Valley area, with full investigative capacity.

Under the National CT Delivery Plan the Force is leading on a 'prevent' initiative to ensure that BCU staff are more actively engaged in counter terrorism activities, in particular contributing to the 'Rich Picture' by better awareness of their BCU CT profiles and appropriate pro-active engagement with the community to gather intelligence. Taking best practice from elsewhere in the UK, Sussex is commencing a programme of targeted CT briefings for BCU staff to further raise awareness of the 'prevent' strand of the Home Office Contest strategy.

Sussex will continue to develop plans for collaboration within the South East region in specialist areas of protective services. It is leading on the work-stream concerning the provision of air support and confidential units within the region and we will continue to work to agree a future set of collaborative arrangements within the South East region for the provision of specialist protective services.

The Force has revised its Safer Roads Partnership (SRP) which now oversees not only the work of the Safety Camera Group, but also focuses on other road safety and casualty reduction strategies across the Force area. Operation Crackdown ([www.operationcrackdown.org](http://www.operationcrackdown.org)) is a new on-line partnership approach which allows people to report the activities of road users who regularly present a risk.

Sussex Police continues to make best use of its physical and financial resources. The 2007-08 year-end position showed a total efficiency gain of over £20m (comprising efficiency gains of £6.950m achieved in the 2007-08 year and £13.366m of gains carried forward from 2006-07). Of this £12m is related to cashable efficiency gains.

The Force and the Police Authority achieved strong grades in the Audit Commission's Use of Resources Evaluation published in October 2007, achieving an overall auditor's judgement of level 4 (defined as well above minimum requirements – performing strongly). The auditors commented that Sussex Police costs were below average when compared to other similar authorities when adjusted for local factors (such as the impact of Gatwick Airport and higher costs in the south east of England) and stated that the Authority "demonstrates that it shifts both revenue and capital resources to its priority areas."

July 2008

## Major Crime

<b>GRADE</b>	<b>Meets the Standard</b>
--------------	---------------------------

### Context

This element of the inspection report details Sussex Police capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

Ref:	Indicator	2006	2007	Change	MSF** Ave
SPI5e	Life-Threatening & Gun Crime per 1,000 Population	0.191	0.144	-24.61%	0.276
	Number of Abductions per 10,000 Population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.000
	% of Abduction Crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
	Number of Attempted Murders per 10,000 Population	0.026	0.059	126.92%	0.072
	% of Attempted Murder Crimes detected/convicted	125.00%	55.56%	-69.44pp*	72.50%
	Number of Blackmail per 10,000 Population	0.659	0.152	-76.93%	0.113
	% of Blackmail Crimes detected/convicted	13.00%	34.78%	21.78pp*	26.66%
	Number of Kidnappings per 10,000 Population	0.257	0.297	15.56%	0.230
	% of Kidnapping Crimes detected/convicted	53.85%	37.78%	-16.07pp*	43.11%
	Number of Manslaughters per 10,000 Population	0.020	-0.007	-135.00%	0.024
	% of Manslaughter Crimes detected/convicted	66.67%	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
	Number of Murders per 10,000 Population	0.059	0.053	-10.17%	0.068
	% of Murder Crimes detected/convicted	66.67%	112.50%	45.83pp*	91.94%
	Number of Rapes per 10,000 Population	2.676	2.293	-14.31%	2.307
	% of Rape Crimes detected/convicted	13.79%	17.24%	3.45pp*	21.19%

\*\*pp" is Percentage Points.

\*\*Most Similar Family (MSF) for Sussex is: Avon & Somerset; Devon & Cornwall; Dorset; Essex and; Gloucestershire.



From the SPI data contained in the table above it can be seen that the crime types of blackmail and kidnapping pose a potential threat to Sussex Police. The rates of offences (per 10,000 population) are above the MSF average (despite a significant decrease in 2007 in the case of blackmail offences) but it should be noted that neither rate of offences is high when considering the whole of England and Wales.

July 2008

The SPI data also indicates that Major Crime investigation in Sussex is comparable with the rest of the MSF group. Sussex is performing at a level above the MSF average in some areas (blackmail and murder) but below the MSF average in other areas (attempted murder, kidnapping and rape).

**The National Protective Services Analysis Tool, released on 25 September 2007, revealed that Sussex Police faces a high level of demand in respect of the policing response to homicide offences.**


Homicides (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS



In the long term the force is below the national average and after a decrease in 2007 is below the MSF average.


Sussex is bordered by 2 other forces which also indicate raised demand for this crime type.

**The National Protective Services Analysis Tool, released on 25 September 2007, revealed that Sussex Police faces a high level of demand in respect of the policing response to rape offences.**



**In the long term the force is comparable to the national average and after a decrease in 2007 is below the MSF average.**

Rape (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS



**Sussex is bordered by 2 other forces which also indicate raised demand for this crime type.**

While OCG mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Sussex Police has made initial inroads into the problem and its resident groups have been mapped. It is currently estimated that 65 OCGs impact the force area across 5 crime types.

The FSA reveals a clear understanding of the historical, current predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified rape as major crime priority. The force strategic intelligence requirement (SIR) has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on criminal networks.

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and addressed.

The force has invested suitable resources in the interventions needed to maximise harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and inhibit serious, organised crime. In particular, Sussex Police's role in the provision of covert resources to regional/national partners is noteworthy.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a maturing process in its approach to tackling major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements existing with the South East Regional Consortium, are recognised.

## Intelligence

**Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, supplying dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.**

### Strengths

- The major crime branch (MCB) has six dedicated analyst posts (and one vacancy) supporting HOLMES-led operations. Further resilience would be resourced from within headquarters criminal investigation department (HQ CID) and basic command unit (BCU) intelligence units.
- Analytical support is directed in major inquiries by the senior investigating officer (SIO), who documents decisions on tasking for analytical products within the SIO policy book.
- Analysts within MCB are HOLMES trained and react to current workloads in preparing association charts, telephone analysis and timelines. In addition, analysts assist in identifying potential lines of enquiry for major incidents and attend management meetings and case conferences with counsel.
- The force principal analyst has the strategic overview of level 1 and level 2 criminality and is a key member of the force scanning group, which develops and prepares the FSA for endorsement at Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) level
- As an example, Operation Inroad was an inquiry into a series of distraction burglaries which was managed on HOLMES and where analysts researched current intelligence to identify evidential opportunity. The senior analyst within HQ force intelligence bureau (FIB) produces a fortnightly bulletin to inform the force picture of threats.
- Operation Avalanche provides evidence of effective analytical input into a contract killing where links produced by the analyst from exhibits recovered from the victim established the identity of the offender.

### Work in progress

- None identified.

### Area(s) for improvement

- With the exception of certain specific targeted operations, level 1 intelligence priorities and analytical products predominantly focus on volume crime, which can create the effect of departments working in isolation.
- Analytical work is reviewed in a live inquiry by the major incident room (MIR) receiver. Benchmarking of products will be against the tasking policy set by the SIO on a case-by-case basis. Neither individual is accredited in analytical work.

**Summary – The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force’s community impact assessments (CIAs) to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.**

### **Strengths**

- MCB relies on locally established partnerships within BCUs crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) or other specialist departments (e.g. the child abuse investigation department) to progress investigations and intelligence.
- The force enjoys an effective working relationship with the independent advisory group (IAG), demonstrated following the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London. In assessing community risk, consultation took place with BCU-level IAGs. This identified that young people from the Muslim community were fearful of being targeted at school. The force immediately responded by implementing a plan, using neighbourhood team staff to engage educational premises to monitor and report on tension and provide reassurance.
- A quarterly South East regional heads of crime meeting, representing Kent, Hampshire, Sussex, Thames Valley and Surrey Police, provides a forum to discuss major crime threats across the region. The South East kidnap forum also provides a facility to share best practice and regional support to investigations. The South East protocol for hostage negotiation provides further resilience and agreement for the provision of trained hostage negotiators.
- A full range of specialist resources and covert assets is available and used within the MIR at the discretion of the SIO and documented within the SIO policy book.
- CIAs are a standard feature of major crime investigation. BCU commanders delegate this responsibility, which provides for cohesive links to any MCB investigation. As an example, Operation Annscroft was an assault with fatal injuries. Wide community consultation took place and the BCU managed the CIA to support the crime investigation.
- The force is aware of the drivers of homicide and in November 2007 published a homicide prevention strategy, which reflects the UK SA of homicide. The force strategy details a high-level consideration of the drivers of homicide and the policy and procedures against each strand of risk. This is communicated at BCU level and tracked through the Keeping People Safe programme board, which is chaired by the assistant chief constable protective services.
- The Sussex homicide SA (June 2006) was produced by the FIB senior analyst and provides a detailed breakdown of demand within Sussex from 1996 to 2005. The homicide SA examines homicide across a broad spectrum of assessment criteria, for example profiles of sex and age of the victim and the offender, inter-relationships, modus operandi, weapons used, alcohol, victim type, geography and residency. Overall, it provides a detailed statistical overview of threats to the force with intelligence gaps and recommendations.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### Area(s) for improvement

- While there are some specific protocols for engaging partners (i.e. health) in major crime information sharing, reliance was largely placed on personal relationships and on the use made of the Crime and Disorder Act legislation to effectively exchange information.

**Summary – The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy has been found to be similarly adequate. Problem profiles for major crime issues are satisfactory, but with inadequate links to force and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.**

### Strengths

- The FSA is formulated from a review of the existing control strategy, identifying current areas of risk to the force, organisational risk recorded within the force strategic risk register (SRR) and consideration of the local policing plan.
- The FSA, commissioned annually in October and reviewed every six months, includes a high-level overview of current risks presented by major crime. This document provides a detailed rationale and problem profile for nominated major crime types: rape, homicide, human trafficking and counter-terrorism. It details predicted impact and recommends whether to include specific crime types in an updated control strategy, with a linked strategic intelligence requirement (SIR) that then links to the BCU SIR.
- As an example of the link with BCU activity, the BCU SIR for West Downs sought intelligence on firearms offences, prostitution, human trafficking and Class A drugs supply. The SIR for East Sussex focused on local priorities, with a reference to intelligence linked to gun crime. In contrast, the SIR for North Downs made clear reference to intelligence being sought in relation to counter-terrorism, firearms and Class A drugs supply. All documents had a clear link to the force SIR.
- Gun crime incidents are reported to the Home Office on a monthly basis. The latest monthly figure for November 2007 was 10. This excludes air weapons offences and possession of weapon offences (where there was no threat or intent). FIB contributes to the strategic firearms assessment and the force intelligence manager is part of the strategic firearms forum.
- Operation Chrysler is the force-led operation to gather intelligence on firearms incidents to inform enforcement activity co-ordinated by FIB. Operation Chrysler meetings are held on each division every fortnight. In addition, a force-level Operation Chrysler meeting is planned to start in February 2008.
- The force has an established process in place with core partner agencies at three levels and chaired by senior officers, to manage multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) subjects who present public danger.
- The force has effective contingencies that respond to threat to life issues and crimes in action offences.
- A bespoke questionnaire has been created and adopted by the dedicated source unit that specifically seeks to gather intelligence from covert human intelligence sources that focuses on firearms crime linked to Operation Chrysler.

July 2008

### **Work in progress**

- In the first quarter of 2008, the force plans to introduce a formal strategic tasking and co-ordination group (STCG) process chaired by ACPO that will set clear targets and intelligence requirements linked to the control strategy. At the time of inspection, the setting of targets and intelligence requirements took place during the force scanning meeting.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

### **Developing practice**

- None identified.

**Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are only recently being shared with partners and BCUs. There is an emerging trigger plan for ‘hot briefing’ either when there is a significant change in the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as CDRPs, SOCA, HMRC, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), Trading Standards and the Joint Ports Intelligence Unit (JPIU) exist. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information (MoPI) compliance by 2010.**

### **Strengths**

- Sussex Police has in place a generic partnership agreement with other agencies, including SOCA, HMRC, DWP and the JPIU. SOCA staff work alongside force personnel at the JPIU, in the operations and intelligence branch (OIB) and on BCU at Brighton and Hove.
- The force is fully cognisant of the benefit of specialist support to investigations and has regularly accessed specialists through the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) to progress investigations. As an example, the national injuries database was consulted in a murder where the victim had sustained unique injuries, and a practitioner who held specialist knowledge in this field was identified.
- The adoption in the South East region of the Street Level Up initiative, a national Class A drugs supply operation, led to Operation Reduction, a partnership drugs operation in Brighton and Hove that demonstrated a significant and sustained input to intelligence sharing from partner police forces and other judicial and non-judicial partners.
- The force submits Serious Crime Analysis System and National Crime Recording Standard returns, co-ordinated via FIB. Field interviews with MCB staff demonstrated effective understanding of specialist knowledge assets available through NPIA, i.e. Catchem, the injuries database and kidnap and extortion assets.
- Operation Parkham is an example where an officer suggested by the Black Police Association provided a detailed briefing to inform staff about cultural issues and forced marriage.

July 2008

### **Work in progress**

- The MoPI programme began in March 2007 and is resourced by 2.1 staff (FTE). It is led by a retired SIO superintendent who has a detailed knowledge of the force infrastructure. The programme is governed by a MoPI project board and ACPO oversight is managed through the force IMPACT programme board. A detailed plan is in place to achieve compliance by year end 2010. The MoPI project team updates the strategic risk register as it progresses the workstreams.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- While some formal protocols exist for sharing information, the force relies on locally developed relationships as the primary basis on which to share information.

**Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.**

### **Strengths**

- Demographic profiles are undertaken within neighbourhoods to inform the neighbourhood policing response. Geographical and demographic data is profiled using Mosaic software. This information informs the local policing response and aligns to the strategy articulated within the BCU SA.
- The force is well positioned in identifying community vulnerabilities following the rollout of neighbourhood policing within its 77 geographical neighbourhoods, which are policed by 53 neighbourhood specialist teams.
- The force control strategy defines the policing of emerging communities as a force priority.
- The SA for Brighton and Hove and West Downs illustrated appropriate consideration of community profiling, which was linked closely to the work of its neighbourhood teams. The mapping of community vulnerabilities is largely linked to local crime and disorder priorities.
- During 2007, the force undertook a community vulnerability profiling exercise that was made available to BCUs. This identified a number of emerging communities of migrant workers, residing temporarily in the region to undertake seasonal work.
- The MAPPA process is fully embedded within Sussex Police and offenders are managed at three levels in compliance with national standards under the legislation. The force ACPO lead delegates' authority to HQ special investigation branch (SIB), which carries professional oversight to level 1 and 2 and chairs level 3 meetings.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force intelligence system, CIS, does not record nationality. There is a need to develop existing processes to ensure full integration of intelligence from vulnerable communities at neighbourhood level on the threat from serious and organised crime and major crime.

- The FSA does not profile communities specifically but does comment in brief on victim profiles or geographical hotspots under each crime type; these are examined from a high-level perspective. The FSA would benefit from clear reference to community threat and risk for each crime type and additional information from aligned force documents.

## **Recommendation 1**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force review community mapping and profiling to ensure that all available information is appropriately shared.**

**Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the force SRR is reviewed every quarter by a dedicated risk manager who reports to the organisational development meeting. The meeting is chaired by the deputy chief constable (DCC) who oversees the force risk committee. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.**

## **Strengths**

- Sussex Police has invested in an intranet-based strategic risk register which guides trained users through a progressive risk assessment process. This system was designed specifically to meet the force's requirements in managing organisational risk. Through the input of risk-related data into the system, the responsible officer nominated for each risk area arrives at an automated risk status scored against a risk prioritisation.
- The force risk manager co-ordinates updates on 200 risks listed on the database. Risks are grouped under three key themes: organisational risks, crime and disorder and decision-making boards. Each BCU and specialist department has a nominated and trained risk co-ordinator.
- The organisational development meeting (ODM) is the forum at which the SRR and strategic risks are considered and processes developed to manage risk. The meeting takes place on a quarterly basis, is chaired by the DCC and attended by heads of departments.
- An examination of the register demonstrated appropriate entries and updates with respect to major crime, including the following areas: sufficient resources, critical incident response, professionalising the investigative process (PIP) training, resilience, sensitive information, compromise and anti-corruption.
- Incomplete risks are notified electronically to the responsible officer every three days until control entries are inserted.
- The risk management software developed for Sussex Police in close consultation with the force risk manager is viewed as an innovative solution to progress and track force organisational risk issues.

## **Work in progress**

- The force recognises the need to scan the organisation proactively and is holding an organisational workshop in late February 2008 to review current risks and identify new risks for inclusion in the register.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The SRR relies on proper detailed data entry that fully articulates a particular risk, but the quality and timeliness of updates are inconsistent.
- The minutes and core members list provided did not detail a level 2 representative attending on behalf of major crime.
- The SRR displayed gaps whereby risk holders who had moved post were still receiving prompts for updates rather than the prompts being directed to their replacements. The overview and monitoring of all risks are maintained by the force risk manager.

**Summary – The force is creating ways of collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Most of the operational databases are searchable from across the force. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been partially implemented.**

### **Strengths**

- Access to other department, force or agency intelligence systems featured as a daily business process. Where necessary, access to some force systems can be restricted and is affected by the requestor's security access status. Core databases (crime and command and crime management) are routinely accessible.
- The regional intelligence unit (RIU) has access through an IT link to the main intelligence force systems in Sussex.
- The force has a robust approach to automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) and the back office facility can service national requests for information within 24 hours. Criminality profiling and vehicle-stopping opportunities are two of the critical ANPR deployment factors applied. ANPR is an everyday consideration as an investigative technique for major crime and is used to support operations such as Operation Inroad (distraction burglary). The force maintains 'hotlists' within each BCU and specialist operations departments, which are supported by trigger plans.
- Intelligence collection points are in place through meeting processes at BCU, level 2 and RIU which service intelligence sharing and collection from MAPPAs, CDRPs, SOCA, drug action teams and HMRC. Intelligence sharing is enabled through a mix of established professional relationships or protocols/memoranda of understanding and legislation (CDRPs and MAPPAs).
- The ACC (protective services) chairs the IMPACT programme board that oversees progress on Bichard recommendations. This board links to the national programme run by the NPIA that conducts health checks.
- The force Data Protection Act registrar is based at HQ and is supported by four staff. The annual audit of force systems is assessed on risk, graded against a 13-point questionnaire which determines whether an audit is sanctioned. Audit results are reported to the information management board chaired by the DCC. In 2007/08, the Data Protection Act team examined four databases for compliance and carried out a further four Police National Computer audits.

### Work in progress

- HOLMES does not have a facility to distil intelligence into other force systems; this requires a manual download. An IT solution is expected to be in place by April 2008 and will enable limited links with some other force systems such as the new crime information management system (CIMS).

### Area(s) for improvement

- Access to and availability of intelligence from partner systems is inhibited by the need to make a formal request.
- The force has a number of databases of variable size. With current resources and other demands on the department (subject access, freedom of information, civil processes, etc), Data Protection Act compliance across this volume is limited and carries risks.

### Recommendation 2

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force review the number of databases in use within the force to ensure appropriate management of information.**

**Summary – The force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is efficient.**

### Strengths

- The major crime review team is staffed by a detective superintendent with a team of a detective chief inspector (DCI), a detective inspector (DI), two detective sergeants (DS), a researcher and three police staff. In addition, a senior scene of crime officer (SOCO) assists with the review of forensic opportunities on each case.
- The major crime review policy was updated in 2007 and outlines the process for homicide review in accordance with major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) and the ACPO homicide working group. There are six categories; each has defined terms of reference within a prescribed and fully accountable structure:
  - **Initial review** – conducted after 24–48 hours, sanctioned by the head of crime in consultation with the SIO.
  - **Progress review** – undetected investigations beyond 7 and 28 days.
  - **Detected case review** – case review following court verdict.
  - **Case deferral review** – undetected homicide that has been fully investigated.
  - **Thematic review** – investigation that exposes potential systemic or judicial failing.
  - **Unresolved case review** – unresolved murders every two years.
- A new policy on the review of rape was introduced in 2007 after approval by the force executive board.

July 2008

- A monthly review, contingency and planning meeting, chaired by the ACC (protective services), is the forum where all unresolved cases are formally reviewed. This meeting is attended by the heads of relevant departments and provides an effective management forum for cases under review. All review documents are stored electronically and promulgated to target audiences.
- A weekly management meeting chaired by the head of profession for major crime provides an additional mechanism for the review of current cases.
- Fieldwork identified that SIOs and major crime review teams were aware and made use of accessing and feeding into the NPJA database to identify good practice.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force does not have a threshold for external review by another force, the decision lies with the ACC.

**Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.**

### **Strengths**

- Tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TTCG) meetings are held on a fortnightly basis, with the BCU level 1 TTCG feeding into the force TTCG. The force TTCG is chaired by the ACC and attended by senior managers from both level 1 and level 2. The meeting provides a platform for information sharing, oversight and resource decisions to support major crime priorities.
- A level 2 tasking and co-ordination group (L2 TCG) meeting also takes place. A dip sample of minutes confirmed that this meeting focuses on current serious and organised crime and FIB intelligence development operations in relation to serious and organised crime. Major crime is managed through the force TTCG with appropriate attendance. Attendance at force TTCG and BCU TTCG is linked to updates on current operations and proactive tasking in response to force-level threats.
- The head of crime holds a meeting each week with senior officers concerning current major crime operations and requests for assistance. In addition, resource support decisions are managed through the MCB weekly tasking meeting, which feeds into the formal tasking processes.
- MCB is predominantly a reactive unit, responding dynamically to homicide, crimes in action and any complex inquiry which carries a potential risk to force reputation, in accordance with its standard operating procedures.
- The force tactical assessment, which is prepared by the senior analyst, is a comprehensive document which considers current regional crime patterns, dangerous offenders, critical incidents and BCU crime demands. This document allows a detailed overview of short-term, high-level threats to the force.

July 2008

- Force-level meetings apply an oversight process to issues highlighted in the force tactical assessment.
- The FSA provides a high-level commentary on crime type problems, fully articulating and supporting the rationale to include them in the Control Strategy. The document includes predictions and recommendations, based upon previous offending or incidence prevalence.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

## **Summary – Due to inadequate training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is limited.**

### **Strengths**

- All newly recruited police officers, police community support officers and police staff receive diversity training in their induction programmes.
- The force does not provide bespoke training for major crime needs; however, examples were provided demonstrating engagement with relevant community groups to enhance cultural understanding when engaged in major crime investigations. Brighton and Hove has funded a race case worker and, through external funding, has lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender case workers attached to the anti-victimisation unit.
- MCB engaged in a programme of community awareness training before being deployed on Operation Hurling, the re-investigation into the death of a young male after an assault by two assailants. This incident caused significant community tension and attracted sizeable media interest that required a sensitive and professional approach; this was helped by close consultation with key community members and a detailed understanding of the lessons from the Macpherson report.

### **Work in progress**

- The force has engaged in a rolling programme of delivery of diversity training that meets the National Occupational Standard AA1. The programme has been delivered to management and supervisors, a total of 1,750 individuals to date, and the force will continue the rollout to all staff (3,200 individuals) to achieve the delivery target date of 2009.
- Supervisors who have been trained will become responsible for assessing their staff against the National Occupational Standards and recording training needs within individual professional development reviews (PDRs) for progression.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force does not provide bespoke diversity training for major crime investigation; tailored diversity training is needed for those staff engaged in this area of policing.

### **Recommendation 3**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force introduce bespoke diversity training for major crime branch staff.**

## **Prevention**

**Summary – The force has an IAG and this is frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has a strategic IAG and an IAG in each of the four BCUs. This structure has developed over the past four years. The strategic IAG meets six times each year and representatives from each BCU IAG attend, ensuring that strategic considerations are aware of the impact of policing on the variety of diverse communities within Sussex.
- The strategic group has a documented standard operating procedure that outlines fully its role and contribution to building community trust, setting clear aims and supporting terms of reference. The strategic IAG is consulted about new policy being adopted by the force and is appropriately consulted by BCU senior management in formulating the policing response to dynamic incidents or planned activity.
- IAG members articulated strong support from the force command team, with representatives attending strategic meetings. Examples were provided of positive engagement with IAG members at a local level and from SIOs within MCB.
- During Operation Raven (homophobic violence), the IAG was fully consulted and provided advice to inform the response strategy. In addition, Operation Fanwood (the relocation of a high-profile former prisoner to Sussex) was another example where the force sought advice from the IAG at an early stage to manage a sensitive incident of international interest.
- IAG members gave examples of being included in critical incident training by the force. The force has supported twice-yearly seminars, sharing good practice and enabling networking opportunities.
- In May 2007, the diversity team undertook a thorough review of the role of the IAG, which resulted in 29 recommendations for improvement that have been adopted and are being tracked by a time-bound action plan administered by the corporate development department.
- MCB staff were very aware of the positive contributions to be made by the IAG.
- The force has a number of staff and network associations in place.

### **Work in progress**

- The force has welcomed input from the IAG to the forthcoming SIO conference in February 2008.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Concerns were expressed in field interviews that IAGs formed to respond to spontaneous incidents have included members who are not vetted.

July 2008

- IAG members interviewed had a mixed understanding of whether they had been vetted.
- While there are support networks and associations in place, there is no formal network for women in policing.

**Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were fully understood by call management staff and first responders.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has in place a cadre of gold commanders (superintendent rank and above) providing cover between 8 am and 2 am daily with ‘on-call’ provision outside those hours. All are trained via the joint accredited training programme with Kent Constabulary. Accreditation is maintained annually and recorded within PDRs, with an ‘exercise-based’ re-grading every three years. Gold commanders have access to an on-call ACPO officer.
- Firearms incidents are managed by an accredited silver commander in accordance with the code of practice on the police use of firearms. Force control centre (FCC) inspectors (Ops 1) are also silver commander and critical incident trained.
- All specialist disciplines (kidnap, casualty bureau, hostage negotiator and firearms) are recorded on a central electronic register which is updated daily to reflect the relevant on-call manager.
- MCB has committed to provide an SIO (DCI rank) within 15 minutes by telephone and within two hours to any scene in the force area. MCB staff at all ranks are also on a call out roster to manage any critical incident in accordance with their standard operating procedure.
- The decision about whether to open an MIR is taken by the SIO and evidenced in a policy book entry. In Sussex, all homicide investigation is managed on HOLMES within an MIR. Incidents that are initially managed on a paper basis are placed on HOLMES in cases where MCB undertakes the investigation.
- Field interviews with MCB, BCU and FCC staff identified a clear understanding of the ‘golden hour’ principles. FCC staff further demonstrated good understanding of critical incident management.
- Major crime incident response was found to be well supported, with contingency menus with documented prompts that could be followed on the command and control system for incidents such as kidnap, suspicious death and sexual assault.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.**

**Strengths**

- The FSA fully examines the threats posed by drugs markets, alcohol misuse and public place violent crime (PPVC).
- The force tactical assessment is a comprehensive document which considers regional crime threats, dangerous offenders, critical incidents, PPVC, drugs supply and BCU crime threats/demands.
- BCU and force drugs market profiles are produced along with other problem profiles relating to knives, PPVC and alcohol misuse. Market profile information features in strategic documents such as the tactical assessment and SA at force and BCU level.
- Operation Chrysler has been adopted as a strand from the National Policing Plan to identify the threat to the force from gun crime. Clear processes for intelligence and information sharing between level 1 and level 2 are established and progressed on a fortnightly basis. Gun crime incidents are reported to the Home Office on a monthly basis; the latest figures (November 2007) revealed that ten incidents were notified.
- The OIB monitors drug crime trends and the *Sussex Drugs Market Profile* is produced quarterly by FIB. The document provides a detailed force overview of drug trends supplemented by key partner data (from the ambulance service and drug and alcohol action teams) with recommendations relating to future response activity.
- The force has robust policies around child protection and domestic violence with dedicated investigators. The force homicide reduction strategy acknowledges the threat from domestic violence and informs a number of headline strategies. The strategies are underpinned by robust supervision and close partnership working, most notably risk assessment at scenes, positive arrest policy and specialist domestic violence courts.
- The force-led Operation Inroad (distraction burglary) has detailed trigger plans and is reviewed at force level to identify trends and threats. Each BCU has been encouraged to adopt prevention strategies to support often elderly victims, which has resulted in leaflet drops and the creation of 'no cold calling zones'.

**Work in progress**

- None identified.

**Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – The policy covering threats to life is fully accessible to staff and thoroughly understood and implemented. Examples of joint, regional, cross-border and multi-agency operations are abundant.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has tracked the outcomes in the Van Colle case (Court of Appeal, April 2007) and has reviewed its existing threat to life policy. The new policy has clear lines of responsibility and accountability and a supporting risk assessment process. The draft policy is awaiting endorsement by the force policy board. The existing policy, which is available on the force intranet, has signposts that explain the policy changes, a hyperlink to the draft document to enable viewing, and a facility to record any observations.
- The force has developed an intranet-based flowchart to guide users through threat to life incidents. The process is easy to follow and outlines tactical options.
- The force response to the threat and suppression of gun crime is incorporated within the strategic document produced to support Operation Chrysler. The force firearms SA makes clear reference to this operation within its executive summary.
- The force has a cadre of nationally accredited kidnap-trained SIOs who support a 24/7 call-out rota, and there are contingency plans to manage ransom demands. Operation Gator is an example where a Sussex resident was abducted out of the country and subjected to a ransom demand. The case required close liaison with SOCA and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. A covert operation ensured that the victim was safely recovered and the offenders were arrested.
- Operation Tribe is an example of a cross-border investigation undertaken with Kent Police and SOCA which required covert tactics across a range of disciplines, utilising conventional surveillance and a mobile armed surveillance team. The subject of the operation was arrested in possession of section 1 firearms.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force should review processes in relation to the storage of threat to life information/intelligence to ensure that all facts are readily accessible to inform decision making.

**Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by dedicated covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to all staff. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.**

### **Strengths**

- Sussex Police witness protection unit (WPU) is contained within the special branch department and is staffed by two dedicated witness protection officers, managed by a DS with joint responsibilities. All have attended the NPIA protected persons course. The accountability structure is through an inspector, reporting to a superintendent.

July 2008

- The ACC (protective services) has overall responsibility and authorises and reviews entrants to the scheme. The scheme has an immediately accessible cash reserve of £2,000 that can be increased on application. A control structure of authority for payments is in place.
- WPU staff provide regular training and awareness inputs on witness protection to senior detective forums and to BCU CID personnel.
- Individual response plans and notification processes exist for each case with covert markers placed on the force intelligence system to notify the duty officer in the event of an incident with individuals upon the scheme.
- Placements of witnesses under protection from other force areas into Sussex are notified at Chief Constable level, supplemented by a written risk assessment. In addition, the force can access reciprocal arrangements outside the county.
- The existing witness protection policy is available on the force intranet and will signpost users to policy changes, a hyperlink to the document to enable viewing, and a facility to record any observations.
- Reality checking within BCUs identified that there was variable understanding of witness protection issues and processes but most staff had some knowledge and felt confident that they could access information and advice.

### **Work in progress**

- WPU was the subject of an informal external peer review conducted by Greater Manchester Police in April 2007. Recommendations from the review are being implemented. Sussex Police has advanced a regional response to witness protection, seeking active collaboration through a formal memorandum of understanding. The memorandum of understanding is currently in a draft format, and work is continuing towards formal sign-off.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- WPU files are managed on a paper system that raises issues of access out of hours and Data Protection Act compliance/auditing. Covert markers are placed on the force intelligence system to notify the duty officer in the event of an incident.
- There is a variable understanding of the work of WPU, with specialist officers generally more aware of processes and procedures as a consequence of receiving targeted briefings delivered by WPU.
- Existing policy (2001) is posted on the force intranet but is outdated.

**Summary – The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.**

### **Strengths**

- Neighbourhood profiling is a key component of the force neighbourhood policing response, recording details of vulnerable communities on a centrally provided template, supplemented by Mosaic software.

July 2008

- A problem-solving toolkit is available on the force intranet that tracks action on local problems and has a facility to research previously identified problems. When a problem is registered, owners can be notified of incidents to inform future policing activity.
- The crime and disorder data and information exchange (CADDIE) is a multi-agency funded and supported partner website that allows users to view information about a particular geographical area.
- At BCU level, signal crime data connected to acquisitive crime, in addition to hate crime and crime and disorder, is closely monitored and communicated through presentations delivered at joint agency groups. This informs the local policing response.
- Local trends are captured at daily management meetings and BCU TTCG meetings, where control strategy priorities are benchmarked. BCU intelligence requirements were focused on local volume crime issues, although serious crime articulated in the FSA was included with consistent themes emerging around Class A drugs supply.
- Operation Reduction has an update bulletin provided at regular intervals, providing evidence of the force monitoring the effects of major crime on vulnerable communities.
- Community harm is monitored and measured through the growth of key individual networks and local area teams. Level 2 teams can link into intelligence and information to progress inquiries.

#### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

#### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force should consider how its community engagement mechanisms could be enhanced to develop a better understanding of measuring harm in communities.

#### **Recommendation 4**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that BCU intelligence products should contain greater focus and emphasis on the Level 1 contribution towards tackling major crime and serious and organised crime.**

**Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force sometimes considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a developing security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted, commensurate with exposure.**

#### **Strengths**

- The force professional standards department (PSD) is managed by a DCI and staffed with two DSs, a detective constable (DC) and an analyst. In addition, HQ OIB has access to mutual aid assistance from neighbouring forces. An example was given where resources from a neighbouring force were recently used in a corruption investigation.

July 2008

- The PSD has a covert operations capability and all covert operations are managed on a stand-alone database. The PSD has policies in place that govern the management of covert operations and has access to the covert source database. This system is used to track deployments of officers and to ensure that identity protection audit trails, and covert bank accounts are appropriately in place.
- The PSD has policies in place to provide robust management of covert operations.
- The PSD pursues its own operations with major crime staff supporting operations where there is a likelihood of compromise to the force reputation or where significant resource is required.
- The force has covert resources which can be deployed to support PSD operations; they are professionally managed by HQ operations and intelligence and have access to mutual aid assistance from neighbouring forces.
- The force reacts positively to anti-corruption concerns and has a facility whereby an anonymous email can be sent to register corruption or malpractice concerns. Reality checking identified that the force has publicised information to staff about corrupt practice.
- The force vetting unit manager is supported by two staff and line managed by the head of the PSD. The unit is responsible for police officer vetting and reviews of enhanced vetted staff.
- All MCB staff are management vetted or above, and this is reviewed annually. Vetting for the lead Sussex Police Authority (SPA) member is at the basic level. Police staff vetting is undertaken by human resources .
- The force has appropriate processes and systems in place to manage professional standards issues and to take a proactive approach to anti-corruption, as evidenced by the development of the covert email reporting system.

### **Work in progress**

- ACPO has agreed funding for a central vetting unit (CVU) to be implemented from 1 April 2008. This will result in two extra staff being appointed and the provision of a bespoke database to draw all vetting functions into the CVU within six months of inception.
- The PSD is in consultation with forces in the South East region to produce a joint working protocol for mutual support to operations.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force lacks a corporate vetting system. This issue will be resolved with the new CVU, as detailed in Work in progress above.

## Enforcement

**Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.**

### Strengths

- ACC (protective services) leads on major crime and has been in post since April 2007. The ACC sits on key regional groups such as the ACPO drugs committee.
- SPA and ACPO have worked closely together to achieve effective protective services resilience. A joint programme with Surrey Police was agreed in May 2006 to scope the joint funding and alignment of eight key business disciplines including major crime. While a decision was made not to progress to a fully integrated command, the work to date is informing future development within the force.
- The ACC chairs the force TTCG and the Keeping People Safe programme board, which meets every six weeks to provide strategic direction to the £1.7 million investment in protective services. These meetings allow the ACC to scrutinise the work of MCB. SPA is also represented on the board by the vice chair and assistant chief executive of the authority. In addition, the ACC chairs the monthly review and contingency planning meeting where major crime operations are discussed in detail and funding decisions agreed.
- The lead member (SPA) for major crime is committed and knowledgeable about the force direction and has effective links to strategic boards. There was clear evidence of regular meetings with heads of profession and the head of crime. SPA lead member provides business area progress reports to the full SPA via the planning and performance steering group.
- Gold groups were evident across the force for major and critical incidents. As an example, Operation Anagram was an investigation into homicide offences outside the county. A gold group was convened to scope the potential impact on Sussex in preparation for further intelligence being received about additional offending. Additional examples were provided of gold groups being convened for sensitive issues, ie professional standards enquiries likely to impact on the force.
- The IAG has specific terms of reference and members receive induction training to ensure a thorough understanding of their role and requirements.

### Work in progress

- None identified.

### Area(s) for improvement

- A review of vetting levels for members will ensure that current levels are appropriate.
- The Joining Forces programme with Surrey Police, which the force has used to track the progress of the £1.7 million protective services uplift programme, will not be progressed. The continued development of protocols and service level agreements, although creditworthy, does not adequately represent the investment and return this programme was expected to deliver.
- The force provided evidence of robust IAG inclusion within gold groups, and also informal IAGs being formed from members of the community to respond to spontaneous incidents.

**Summary – The ACPO lead and the head of crime are fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime and the ACC has completed the Serious Crime Intelligence Management Information Technology and Resources (SCIMITAR) course. These officers are supported by staff that have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, CIAs and policing in partnership.**

### **Strengths**

- The ACC lead for major crime and the head of crime have both successfully completed the NPIA Management of Linked Serious Crime course.
- The ACC has recently completed the SCIMITAR course.
- The force gold structure is supported by BCU and HQ-based senior officers who would support the effective management of critical incidents through deployment of MCB staff, specialist assets or community engagement via CDRPs. There is a well-established process and policy around the use of community impact assessments CIAs, including the engagement of community or diverse groups and the IAGs.
- The force is sufficiently resilient to cope with existing and projected demand. In the event of extraneous demand, appropriate resources would be drawn from across the force.
- While the Joining Forces programme will not be progressed, working relationships with regional forces, in particular Surrey Police, have developed as a result.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force does not have a policy for officer in overall command; however, the ACC lead for major crime is an accredited SIO and would provide the necessary leadership in this case.

**Summary – The force’s performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, cost, inputs and outputs.**

### **Strengths**

- The major crime review team is staffed by a detective superintendent with a team of a DCI, a DI, two DSs, a researcher and three police staff. In addition, a senior SOCO assists with the review of forensic opportunities in each case.
- The force has a robust policy of reviewing homicide investigations that is applied consistently to each category (A, B and C). Initial reviews are sanctioned by the head of crime within 24 hours and undertaken by the major crime review team. All reviews are supported by documented terms of reference. The major crime review team has also been sanctioned to review non-homicide investigation on direction of the ACC such as Operation Caaham, a series of robberies.

- The force has a robust review policy. A request for an external review would be considered and endorsed by the ACC and sanctioned through the monthly review and contingency planning meeting.
- The ODM, chaired by an ACPO officer, examines issues where learning points are identified. The meeting allocates actions in response to key issues affecting the force to ensuring appropriate sharing of learning points.
- Whilst the force did not provide specific examples of exposure to judicial hearings, appeals or public inquiries, organisational learning was evident. As an example, Operation Bobcat was an investigation into a series of sexual offences where the force adjusted its policy and procedures in respect of the processing of DNA samples.
- As an example of organisational learning, following a review, learning points were identified regarding scene preservation. An aide-memoire was produced to ensure that appropriate action was taken.
- All MCB activity and operations are monitored at a weekly management meeting. The monthly contingency and planning meeting is the forum where review reports and updates on current demand are examined by the ACC. In addition, the head of crime chairs the monthly crime managers meeting where BCU-based major crime issues are examined and progressed.
- Homicide investigation is financially supported by the BCU in the first instance to a total of £7,000. The ACC endorses further funding at the review and contingency meeting and can authorise financial claims from the BCU to draw back some costs.
- The scientific support branch holds a separate budget to progress major crime inquiries. All submissions are graded in close consultation with senior officers for their probative value to the investigation before expenditure is authorised.
- The head of crime has established a financial structure to track, control and scrutinise expenditure by setting tiered departmental limits delegated to heads of department. Testing of this structure found that it was effective and decisions were made in a timely manner. All financial expenditure is tracked by a business support manager within HQ CID who can provide a detailed cost breakdown to any operation. Overall expenditure is monitored at the monthly force executive board.

### **Work in progress**

- Funding has been secured to expand the force review team to provide an additional three police staff investigator posts.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force ensures that key learning is communicated within specialist areas in the form of focused bulletins and specific briefings, but in places inconsistent learning processes exist across the organisation.
- Major incidents managed on HOLMES contain a closure report, but debriefing was found to be based on the needs of the investigation and included those resources who have a key role. The focus is centred on being able to respond to any future demand on the investigation, eg an appeal.
- All reviews are published and forwarded to target audiences, as well as being accessible electronically on force systems. As an example, Part 8 reviews are

July 2008

conducted by HQ SIB and promulgated through management meetings, with a focus on key learning points to inform operational response. The force does not have a central repository for capturing learning points.

### **Recommendation 5**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force review working practices to ensure that all major crime best practice and learning opportunities are centrally captured and shared.**

## **Performance management and resilience**

**Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with SOCA and neighbouring forces exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide extensive protection for the investigative capability.**

### **Strengths**

- Sussex MCB is headed by a detective superintendent, with four DCI SIOs, four DIs, five DSs and a total of 24 DCs. The HOLMES unit is staffed by a DS, six system supervisors, seven police staff indexers and four typists. The branch has an administrative support function of one police staff member and a DS. The department works to a documented standard operating procedure and is designed to ensure minimal abstraction from BCUs. MCB staff are available 24/7 via a call-out roster. Each BCU provides CID cover out of hours.
- MCB syndicates are geographically located to cover the county from four MIRs, at Eastbourne, Littlehampton, Horsham and Brighton. Each MIR is well equipped and has the capacity to manage up to four major incidents simultaneously, which provides significant accommodation for the force.
- An unexplained death in the community would initially be attended by the duty detective supervisor, with a facility to call out an SIO to review the circumstances and dictate which department would lead the inquiry. Operation Brookland (the suspicious death of an elderly male in a care home) is an example where an MCB SIO led an investigation with resources provided by the BCU-based anti-victimisation unit.
- The scientific support branch is line managed by the head of crime and has a substantial resource to cover the whole range of forensic services. A call-out roster is in place out of hours with provision for attendance by a crime scene manager and crime scene co-ordinator.
- The force has developed an inspectors' (critical incident) command course (2007), a four-day course with a strict pass/fail outcome. To date, five courses have been run with 60 attendees, and there are plans for a further eight courses in 2008.
- Call-out procedures are well established and accessible, providing a timely response 24/7. FCC and BCU staff articulated good understanding of the 'golden hour' principles in terms of the practical response to secure and preserve evidence. SIOs

July 2008

have supported locally delivered training through the provision to front-line staff of inputs focusing on the 'golden hour' priorities.

- The force has four SIOs who are PIP 3 accredited with a fifth in the process of completing accreditation. There are nine tier 5 interview adviser/co-ordinators. HQ learning and development has staff dedicated to ensuring the required resilience by supporting the completion of programme portfolios. PDR support via line managers is the enabler to access training. Within MCB, all DSs and DCs are required to be PIP 2 accredited; at present three DCs remain to be trained and are completing accreditation programmes.

### **Work in progress**

- The force has some formal protocols in place with neighbouring forces and, following suspension of the integrated specialist operational command programme, has stated its intention to drive formal protocols with regional forces. This would provide additional resilience to major and serious crime resources at times of exceptional demand.
- The force is intent on realigning police staff to MCB in order to perform Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act duties, thereby relieving the future demand on BCUs.
- Nominated DCIs within MCB are undergoing silver firearms training to further enhance resilience and capability.
- In the case of a major incident (homicide), in the first instance the host BCU is required to provide the key roles of disclosure officer, family liaison officer and exhibits officer, resulting in significant abstraction for an indeterminate length of time. A funding bid is in place to recruit police staff for disclosure and exhibits officers within MCB.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- All DIs are accredited to PIP 2. On occasion, and to cover extraneous demand, DIs effectively lead investigations. Consideration should be given to PIP 3 accreditation for these officers.
- SIOs are not trained on HOLMES but have a viewing facility. Consideration should be given to the provision of this training to ensure effective prioritisation of tasks on the HOLMES system and proper audit and scrutiny.

**Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that has proved effective. Elements of covert resourcing are delivered through written collaborative agreements that are sound. The inspection found evidence of the proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has three surveillance teams that are multi-skilled and managed by three sergeants; two of the teams are aligned to level 2 and the other supports level 1. The force is resilient in surveillance staff numbers. There is a foot surveillance capability within BCUs. Armed support to operations is provided by the firearms unit and supported by a tactical adviser who is available 24/7.

- SOCU teams have operatives trained in rural surveillance, method of entry, covert rural observation post and covert monitoring; the teams are all tasked via the TCG.
- There are dedicated source handling controllers who carry professional responsibility for a team of handlers who are accredited and based between each BCU in order to develop level 1 and 2 intelligence, with an emphasis on level 2. All tasking is assigned by the Level 2 TTCG process.
- The force has a substantial number of TP officers who are deployed through the Level 2 TTCG. The OIB retains professional oversight on a risk basis and provides mutual aid where requested.
- The force has significant ANPR capability with both mobile and static options. A dedicated team of staff are deployable through force tasking bids. The back office facility services national requests for information within 24 hours.
- **Hi-tech crime** – Staff within the unit examine seized computers. The current focus is on child pornography.
- **Witness protection** – WPU is staffed by dedicated officers (WPOs) managed by a DS who carries joint responsibilities. Daily management issues are managed by a DI who answers to the superintendent, head of profession.
- **Management of investigation** – All operations led by SOCU are subject to an intensive scrutiny regime; at the point of commission an operational report sets short-term objectives aligned to the SIO policy. The investigation is reviewed weekly and tracked monthly on the Sharepoint database by a departmental supervisor. A three-month review is undertaken by the branch DCI, who follows a prescribed template. The operations and intelligence TCG also examines current performance to inform further commissioning decisions (see SGC SO18).
- **Family liaison officers (FLOs)** – There are a significant number of FLOs within Sussex Police, of whom 11 are family liaison advisers and 2 are family liaison co-ordinators. Deployment is via requests routed through the family liaison database (FLOCS), which has restricted access.
- **Case preparation** – All SOCU led operations are managed from initial point of commission to conclusion by dedicated staff that are supported by a process of close liaison on a needs basis with the CPS (pre and post charge). The process is underpinned by a more formal meeting with SOCU DIs held monthly.
- **Kidnap** – The force response to kidnap is managed nationally accredited SIOs who are PIP 3 trained, based within HQ CID. Extra support is provided by a team of accredited hostage negotiators. The force is a member of the south east kidnap forum, which was formed in October 2007 and meets quarterly. It links to the ACPO practitioner meeting.
- **TSU** – A dedicated DI leads the force TSU, with a team of technicians and administrative support. All support a call-out rota and the department has been recently restructured to address gaps identified by the OSC.
- **RIPA** – In June 2007, the Interception of Communications Commissioner's office assessed the force as meeting the standards set. The Office of Surveillance Commissioners recently assessed the force as meeting and exceeding benchmark standards (July 2007).
- Staffing levels were regarded as acceptable within the OIB. Equipment across the specialist disciplines was regarded as 'fit for purpose'.

### Work in progress

- A draft FLO policy is in progress and is supported by an established memorandum of understanding for the South East region forces in response to any major crime or mass disaster request for support.

### Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

**Summary – The force has a full-time and dedicated case review team that is always deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is efficient.**

### Strengths

- The force major crime review team is staffed by an experienced detective superintendent with a team of a DCI, a DI, two DSs, a researcher and three police staff, all former police officers with major crime experience in operational and forensic levels. The police staff work exclusively upon cold case reviews of historical homicide.
- The major crime review team is independent of major crime investigation and undertakes reviews in accordance with force policy. The review team can be commissioned by the head of crime or the ACC as directed in documented terms of reference for each review. All reviews are presented to the ACC lead at the review and contingency planning meeting for further commissioning or discharge.
- All cold case homicides, which in the case of Sussex Police stretch back to the mid-1940s, are administrated on a spreadsheet that tracks all previous review activity and main lines of enquiry. A rolling two-year programme of review has been scheduled as documented in policy.
- Cold cases, which number 37 at present, are reviewed to identify lines of fresh enquiry; these are passed to an SIO for further enquiry or are filed and tracked with a covering report that highlights the key investigative priority for any future review. To date, the force has undertaken six cold case reviews.
- Operation Marshside is an example of an historical homicide (1965) where key forensic evidence has been identified using modern technology.
- All reviews undertaken by the major crime review team check, validate and report on compliance with MIRSAP and the Murder Investigation Manual (MIM) as a standing item.
- Any requirement to instruct a review by an external force lies with the ACC and is documented within the policy.
- The roads policing unit (RPU) has a dedicated review team of an inspector and two sergeants and conducts reviews of fatal and serious injury road traffic collisions (RTCs). Reports are presented to the review and contingency planning meeting with recommendations tracked through this meeting and the monthly road death investigation meeting chaired by the head of profession (HOP).
- A memorandum of understanding underpins support to the roads policing unit by MCB. In the event of a complex road traffic collision, the roads policing unit senior investigating officer liaises with the MCB SIO to co-ordinate resources. A recent fatal 'fail to stop' RTC in Bognor Regis demonstrated joint working

between RPU and MCB, with a team of investigators from the major crime branch providing investigative support.

### **Work in progress**

- RPU is developing a database, CRIMS, which is due for inception mid-2008. This will provide an electronic repository for tracking review recommendations and storing and processing strategic intelligence that drives operational activity and populates the corporate memory.
- The heads of profession for major crime and the major crime review team are established, accredited detectives who are refreshing their skill base through completion of the PIP 3 programme.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The major crime review team does not have plans in place to undertake cold case rape investigation. It is noted that the head of crime chairs a rape strategy group, but this group focuses on current performance priorities.
- The major crime review team does not routinely undertake or oversee reviews of serious and organised crime or fatal/fail to stop RTCs.

## **Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force is fully compliant with relevant ACPO standards in MIM and MIRSAP.**

### **Strengths**

- Staff at all levels (ACC, HOC, HOP, SIO) were knowledgeable about the functions of homicide investigation as documented within MIM. The commitment of the force to achieving full PIP accreditation is well advanced and a clear sign of compliance with ACPO standards. An examination of operations demonstrated consistent adherence to the standards expected.
- The ACC lead for major crime and the head of crime are both trained in the Management of Linked Serious Crime course provided by the NPIA.
- Doctrine documents are available within MIRs and used as reference tools to formulate strategy for each investigation.
- Incident rooms are staffed according to the size of the inquiry; this decision was found to be an early policy entry by an SIO. MCB staff felt that senior management were considerate of individual demand and capacity, which were addressed through the weekly meetings chaired by HOP. It was evident that the principles of MIRSAP were followed.
- Policy files are kept for all major inquiries by the SIO; this was found to be a consistent feature within BCU led operations. However, it was noted that the major crime review team has identified that the standard of completion outside MCB can be variable; the force addresses this through the twice annual SIO conferences.
- Policy files examined demonstrated clear written articulation of decisions taken by the SIO and the justification for decisions was appropriately recorded.
- The force keeps a separate policy file for sensitive decision making where major inquiries dictate such a need. This assists the processing of any future public immunity interest hearing.

- MCB HOP attends the force TTCG and, where appropriate, ensures that staff attend BCU TTCG when a live inquiry is being run within that particular BCU.

**Work in progress**

- The force is developing a policy to formalise the management of linked and series crime.

**Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

## Recommendations

### Recommendation 1

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force review community mapping and profiling to ensure that all available information is appropriately shared.

### Recommendation 2

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force review the number of databases in use within the force to ensure appropriate management of information.

### Recommendation 3

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force introduce bespoke diversity training for major crime branch staff.

### Recommendation 4

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that BCU intelligence products should contain greater focus and emphasis on the Level 1 contribution towards tackling major crime and serious and organised crime.

### Recommendation 5

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force review working practices to ensure that all major crime best practice and learning opportunities are centrally captured and shared.

## Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

### A

ABC	Activity-based Costing
ABE	Achieving Best Evidence
ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
APA	Association of Police Authorities
ASB	Anti-social Behaviour

### B

BANES	Bath and North East Somerset
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic Command Unit
BME	Black and Minority Ethnic

### C

CAIT	Child Abuse Investigation Team
CDRP	Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
COG	Chief Officer Group
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service

### D

DC	Detective Constable
DCC	Deputy Chief Constable
DCI	Detective Chief Inspector
DI	Detective Inspector
DS	Detective Sergeant
DDA	Disability Discrimination Act

DV Domestic Violence

DV Domestic Violence

**E**

ECM Every Child Matters

**F**

FIG Force Intelligence Group

FTE Full-time Equivalent

**G**

HMI Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HQ Headquarters

HR Human Resources

**I**

ICIDP Initial Crime Investigators Development Programme

ICT Information and Communications Technology

**K**

KPI Key Performance Indicator

**L**

LSCB Local Safeguarding Children Board

**M**

MAPPA Multi-agency Public Protection Arrangements

MARAC Multi-agency Risk Assessment Conference

MSF Most Similar Force(s)

**N**

NBM	Neighbourhood Beat Manager
NCPE	National Centre for Policing Excellence
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency

**P**

PACT	Police and Communities Together
PCSO	Police Community Support Officer
PIM	Performance Improvement Meeting
PIP	Professionalising the Investigative Process
PPAF	Police Performance Assessment Framework
PPU	Public Protection Unit

**Q**

QoSC	Quality of Service Commitment
------	-------------------------------

**R**

RSO	Registered Sex Offender
-----	-------------------------

**S**

SARA	Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment
SDVC	Specialist Domestic Violence Court
SGC	Specific Grading Criteria
SMB	Strategic Management Board
SMT	Senior Management Team
SPI	Statutory Performance Indicator
SPP	Special Priority Payment
SSN	Safer Stronger Neighbourhood

**T**

TTCG      Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Group

**V**

ViSOR      Violent and Sex Offenders' Register