


Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Suffolk Constabulary Major Crime

July 2008



Suffolk Constabulary – HMIC Inspection Report

July 2008

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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

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procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical description of force area

Suffolk Constabulary is responsible for policing an area of 939,510 acres with a population of 702,037, which has grown by 33,484 (5%) since 2001. Suffolk is a rural county and has large areas of low population density, principally in Mid-Suffolk. The long coastline stretches from Felixstowe in the south to Lowestoft in the north, and the county is renowned for its rural businesses, such as farming, light industry, brewing and tourism. The county has some notable landmarks, such as the headquarters of British horseracing at Newmarket and the largest container port in Europe at Felixstowe. It has a number of military bases, two of which – Lakenheath and Mildenhall – are home to the United States Air Force and approximately 20,000 dependants. The county town of Ipswich poses the greatest policing demands, many of which relate to the night-time economy.

Demographic profile of force area

As Suffolk is a predominantly rural county, it is perhaps not surprising that its economic growth is lower than the national and regional averages. Suffolk also has a relatively low level of working-age population (59.2%), and this is closely related to the fact that some parts of the county are popular locations for retirement. This figure is below the proportion for the East of England (60.9%) and significantly less than that for England and Wales as a whole (65.0%). The proportion of people of working age reflects the generally older age structure in the county. The number of young people in Suffolk (aged 15–19) is the second lowest in the region generally, suggesting that young people are inclined to move away from the area on reaching working age.

The National Index of Multiple Deprivation (2007) shows that Ipswich and Lowestoft are the most deprived areas in the county. In April 2008 there were 7,327 unemployed persons in the county, representing 1.8% of the total working-age population.

Some significant developments will impact on the county in the foreseeable future. The A14 corridor between Cambridge and Ipswich has been identified as a key area for development in terms of investment in science, technology and small businesses. Equally, there will be substantial increases in student populations as the University of East Anglia and Essex University continue to come together to underwrite an enhanced higher education provision in Suffolk. This expansion of University Campus Suffolk alongside Suffolk New College will see a growth in students from outside the county living and studying in Ipswich. Planning consent has been granted for the Snoasis development at Great Blakenham, which will have a substantial impact on the infrastructure of the county in terms of service and transport requirements. All these developments pose major challenges for the force.

Strategic priorities

Following extensive consultation, in 2001/02 the police authority (PA) adopted a three-year programme to increase spending on policing in the county – primarily through the recruitment of additional front-line police officers and the development of scientific support services. The Suffolk First initiative was designed to make people **feel** safe as well as making sure that they **are** safe in terms of the actual risk of crime.

This additional investment was completed in 2007, along with a range of other initiatives designed to meet the Suffolk First aim of becoming the safest county in the country. The Suffolk First programme was updated in 2005 to Suffolk First For You (SF4U), the aim of which is 'to provide Suffolk people with the safest local communities and highest-quality services compared with similar areas in the country'. The style of policing is also summed

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up by the SF4U slogan, 'Taking pride in keeping Suffolk safe', which will become the key banner from 2008 as SF4U develops under an enhanced vision, mission, and values statement.

The strategic direction of the force was reviewed at the start of 2008 and a joint PA and Suffolk Constabulary three-year plan developed. The plan sets out the activities the constabulary will undertake to meet the authority's expectations for policing Suffolk during the next three years. The plan includes the vision, mission and values of the authority and constabulary, as well as targets for measuring the constabulary's progress. It also contains information about the finance and resources available to police the county, and how these will be used.

Suffolk Constabulary's vision

"We take pride in keeping Suffolk safe, while ensuring our communities value and trust what we do."

Suffolk Constabulary's mission

"A proud county served by a constabulary trusted by all to keep our communities safe."

To achieve this Suffolk Constabulary will:

- be highly responsive to local needs;
- work with our partners to build strong, safe and cohesive communities;
- deliver high performance;
- reduce crime and disorder;
- make the best use of public funds; and
- deliver the highest quality of service.

Suffolk Constabulary's values

Suffolk Constabulary will:

- treat everyone with fairness and respect;
- be open and honest;
- listen and be responsive;
- act with integrity at all times;
- maintain the highest professional standards;
- make a positive difference in all we do; and
- be innovative in delivering our services.

Key initiatives to improve performance during 2007/08

The most recent data in support of the performance indicators contained within the SF4Y performance management framework shows that the constabulary continues to improve in many areas. Overall crime fell in 2007/08 as compared to 2006/07, while the overall sanction detection rate and level of victim satisfaction both improved. Continued performance improvement is expected in 2008/09, through the establishment of tougher targets in key areas.

To achieve the increase in performance the force plans to:

- continue with the Strategic Review project;
- instigate a new volume crime model;
- continue with the Police Investigation Centre project;
- develop and implement a new duty management system;
- implement new offender management units at our main custody stations;
- embed the performance delivery board (PDB); and

- continue collaboration with Norfolk Constabulary, our 'Preferred Partner'.

Force developments since 2007

In the 2007 HMIC Phase 1 report, the force received a Poor grading in respect of child abuse investigation. In the period following publication of the report, the force has made considerable strides to secure the necessary improvement. Management responsibility for child abuse investigation, along with all other aspects of protecting vulnerable people, has been moved away from basic command units (BCUs) and now rests with a centralised public protection directorate.

In March 2008, a central referral and tasking unit was established and now covers the three victim care centres (VCCs). This, combined with ongoing increases in staffing, has ensured a greater consistency around the receipt, recording and subsequent investigation of child abuse referrals. The force has worked closely with HMIC throughout and made significant progress in this area. As a result of a recent visit to the force by HMIC it is clear that the force now meets the standard in this area.

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Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Suffolk Constabulary's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Number of Life-threatening and gun crimes per 1,000 population	0.242	0.205	-15.29%	0.271
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.000
% of abductions detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.101	0.043	-57.43%	0.074
% of attempted murders detected/convicted	28.57%	66.67%	+38.10pp*	82.03%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.607	0.130	-78.58%	0.106
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	16.67%	33.33%	+16.66pp*	37.51%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.419	0.101	-75.89%	0.209
% of kidnappings detected/convicted	41.38%	128.57%	+87.19pp*	64.06%
Number of manslaughters per	0.029	0.000	-100.00%	0.018

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10,000 population

% of manslaughters detected/convicted	0.00%	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.159	0.101	-36.48%	0.079
% of murders detected/convicted	81.82%	85.71%	3.89pp*	93.74%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	2.904	2.341	-19.39%	2.157
% of rapes detected/convicted	22.39%	17.90%	-4.49pp*	22.64%

*‘pp’ is percentage points.

***Most similar forces (MSF group for Suffolk is Cambridgeshire, Devon & Cornwall, Gloucestershire, Norfolk, North Yorkshire, Warwickshire and Wiltshire.*

From the statutory performance indicator (SPI) data in the table above it can be seen that the crime types of blackmail, murder and rape pose a potential threat to Suffolk Constabulary. The rates of offences per 10,000 population for these crime types all fell in 2007 but remain above the MSF average. However it should be noted that none of the three rates is high when compared to the whole of England and Wales.

The SPI data also indicates that major crime investigation in Suffolk is less effective than that of the rest of the MSF group. Suffolk Constabulary is performing at a level below that of the MSF average for all crime types with the exception of the sanction detection rate for kidnapping, which is in excess of the MSF average following a significant increase in 2007.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT) published in September 2007 indicated that Suffolk was facing either a low or a medium demand with regard to homicide, rape and kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Suffolk Constabulary has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types is initially mapped. It is currently estimated that 27 OCGs impact the force area, across a number of major crime types.

The force strategic assessment demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified organised crime and high-risk domestic abuse cases as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force

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strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on domestic abuse, particularly in emerging communities.

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and addressed.

The force is investing suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and to inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates signs of initial development in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with the Norfolk, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire forces and the UK Border Agency are recognised.

Intelligence

Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, and to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force is in the process of committing to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- The force has recently published a homicide reduction strategy. The underlying work to build this strategy involved analysing all homicides in the force area over the last ten years, considering contributory factors such as domestic abuse, geographical location and possible links to night-time street violence. It was found that 30% of all homicides were linked to domestic abuse, which led to its consideration in the force strategic assessment (FSA), and domestic abuse has now become a control strategy priority. This will not only serve to reinforce to staff the significance of domestic abuse risk identification, but will build on the ongoing work of specialist domestic violence courts and multi-agency risk assessment conferences (MARACs).
- The current process for allocating analysts is fully accountable through the force tasking process, with the meeting chaired by the deputy chief constable (DCC). This meeting also oversees the process for requesting and producing analytical profiles. The inspection revealed that much of the work commissioned in this way related to cross-basic command unit (BCU), OCG or cross-border criminality.
- The principal analyst sits as a member of the performance delivery board (PDB), which is also chaired by the DCC. While this meeting has a focus on volume crime performance, it provides the DCC with a strategic overview of force activity. An example was given of the PDB requesting analytical work which detailed the volume of burglaries relating to insecure premises. Crime prevention work was commissioned as a result of this analysis.
- If analytical support is required for a major crime investigation, the senior investigating officer (SIO) will request resources through the force tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TTCG). Invariably, if approval is given, such resources will be provided from the intelligence directorate. However, with the forthcoming introduction of a major investigation team (MIT), the staffing establishment will include two dedicated analysts. The value of having analysts dedicated to a major investigation was evident during Operation Sumac when analysts played a significant role in gathering intelligence and assessing evidence in preparation for the trial.
- The force has a total of 19 analysts, of whom five are dedicated to protective services work (including two for major investigations, one in special branch and two working on serious and organised crime).

Work in progress

- A report has been submitted to the strategic operations group (SOG) concerning the force analytical structure. In reaching recommendations within the report,

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consideration was given to disaggregating the effect of Operation Sumac, namely by seeking to identify what constitutes exceptional demand. The conclusion reached in the report is that the number of analysts required for serious and organised crime work is not too far removed from the present establishment, but some growth in this field and in major crime investigation is suggested.

- The soon-to-be-formed MIT includes an establishment of two dedicated analysts. This should lead to a reduction in demand on the level 2 analysts and should create more proactive capacity in respect of OCGs.
- Analytical work has been commissioned on undetected rape offences spanning the last ten years, in an attempt to identify any patterns – not only to solve these crimes but also to inform future prevention activity.
- All centralised analytical staff, in addition to those within the intelligence directorate, namely those within the professional standards department (PSD), special branch and the MIT (when established), are to be line-managed by the principal analyst in the near future.

Areas for improvement

- The analytical structure incorporates one principal analyst, one senior analyst, three level 2 analysts and one assistant who performs a researcher's role. These analysts together serve the organised crime directorate (OCD), the intelligence directorate and the investigations directorate (although area analysts are also drawn in to support major crime). The headquarters (HQ) level 2 analysts also prepare force tasking documents. This represents a significant workload on such a small number of analytical staff.
- Analytical products across the force are not always standard in terms of content and style. The principal analyst acknowledges this and has identified remedying it as a priority.
- There is considerable scope to develop results analysis within the force, as very little is carried out at the present time. Reasons offered for this ranged from insufficient capacity to the need to move on to the next operation. It is planned to make such analysis mandatory, though the force may also wish to highlight the benefits of such work, as the inspection found little knowledge of its potential value among investigators and intelligence staff.
- While analysts are deployed to major crime investigations through the level 2 tasking process, the inspection found that they are not always subsequently kept fully informed of what is going on during live operations; for example, the surveillance unit may be deployed without the analyst being aware. While the need for operational security is acknowledged, this situation severely limits what an analyst can offer an operation. This could be remedied by the analyst and the SIO agreeing terms of reference, which should be reviewed on a regular basis.
- There is limited research capability to support the force analysts. This must be addressed and a clearly defined role for researchers set out.

Summary – The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed as being effective. The force’s community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crime are extensive.

Strengths

- Effective partnership working, including sharing of information, exists in respect of investigations into domestic violence and child abuse, both of which contribute significantly to homicide in Suffolk. Protocols exist for safeguarding children and for daily operational business in respect of child abuse investigations, particularly surrounding case conferences. The county has recently begun a pilot scheme for specialist domestic violence courts. Running alongside these are MARACs, which review the most high-risk domestic violence cases and share information to ensure effective risk management. Strategies are then developed for victims to prevent escalation and repeat victimisation.
- BCU operational managers, in consultation with the SIO, routinely complete community impact assessments (CIAs) in all major crime investigations. The depth of each CIA depends on the circumstances of the incident, but the SIO and BCU manager will meet when required to update and review the assessment. A comprehensive risk assessment form will be completed for homicide, stranger rape and kidnap offences, detailing the people consulted and the classification of risk, together with the management plan to be implemented by the BCU commander and the SIO.
- There has been a drive to use the National Intelligence Model (NIM) and analytical products more extensively to support homicide and major crime work. For example, analytical work carried out in the area of rape and domestic abuse revealed that 60% of rape cases recorded as ‘no further action’ were domestic in nature. A tendency for rape and domestic abuse to be underreported, particularly among emerging communities, was also identified. The force is additionally considering a proposal to complete some analytical work on precursor offences to child abduction.
- The force can demonstrate strong intelligence-sharing arrangements with partners, although occasionally force intelligence has been inappropriately graded too high to share. The inspection saw examples of good intelligence-sharing protocols with housing departments, which have helped to identify problem families. In Bury St Edmunds, there are strong links with YMCAs and hostels, whose staff complete and forward change of occupancy forms to the area intelligence unit (AIU). Furthermore, strong links between A&E units at Bury St Edmunds and Ipswich and their respective safer neighbourhood teams (SNTs) mean that officers are confident that they will be informed at a local level of any significant increase in knife or other injuries among a particular community.
- SNT inspectors are routinely involved in the completion of CIAs, as they are a first line of force management and have regular contact with partners. The force diversity unit has held a seminar for inspectors and partners to assist in the completion of CIAs and the understanding of their relevance. Measuring community impact during Operation Sumac has considerably improved the force’s thinking and response around CIAs. SNTs formed a large part of the reassurance strategy around Operation Sumac and are now seen as having a key role in assessing community

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reaction to major investigations. SNTs are regularly tasked to carry out reassurance patrols and visits to gauge public feeling and distribute key messages.

- The constabulary has close working links with the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), evidenced through Operations Sumac (an investigation into the murder of five prostitutes) and Wager (a drugs operation), and it has also worked closely with the Metropolitan Police and British Transport Police on counter-terrorism and Operation Gable, a murder investigation involving criminals from the London area.

Work in progress

- The force is well informed by partnership data but there is scope for this to improve. Difficulties arise due to some partners not using datasets; for example there is no provision to overwrite drug and alcohol abuse team (DAAT) data with drug-dealing hotspots. The crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) have recently completed their own strategic assessments and the intention is for the police and CDRPs to produce the next one jointly.
- The force is scheduled to meet with Suffolk County Council representatives to obtain a better mutual understanding of what information is, or can be, shared.
- The force has drawn up an agreement with Suffolk County Council under which two information officers from the council are about to commence work within the intelligence directorate at force HQ to improve working partnerships and exchange of information through access to partnership data. This arrangement was due to take effect from January 2008, but has been delayed because appropriate accommodation has yet to be arranged.
- All information-sharing agreements with partners are currently being examined to ensure that they comply with the requirements for the management of police information (MoPI).

Areas for improvement

- There is no formal process to ensure that any issues identified during the completion or monitoring of CIAs are fed back to the SIO or the force in general. Although this may happen on an ad hoc basis or when a gold group has been formed, there should be a formal feedback process to ensure issues arising are addressed and lessons learnt.
- Issues persist around access to partnership data. While it is acknowledged that the force is endeavouring to address this problem (see above), it is nonetheless a source of frustration to many. An example was given of the drawing-up of a profile into what led some women into prostitution in the force area. Force analysts are seeking to include information such as early childhood events, intervention, criminal involvement and drug history, but they are experiencing difficulty in securing data from partner organisations. This situation must be addressed as a matter of some priority if tackling organised criminality is to become embedded in police and partnership activity, as there is a widely-held belief within the force that CDRPs and

other partners tend to focus disproportionately on Level 1 and neighbourhood problems, with little understanding of the impact of OCGs.

- The prison intelligence gathering procedure document explains how the force will obtain and use intelligence from within prison establishments. However, the full content of the procedure is classified as confidential. Access can therefore only be granted via the compliance and authorities bureau (CAB) supervisor in the crime management department, thereby limiting the readership of the intelligence.
- Information-sharing protocols must be developed for all partners, as localised individual arrangements between post-holders are relied on at present.

Summary – The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime comprehensively. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly thorough. Problem profiles are satisfactory, with links to force- and BCU-level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- The 2007/08 FSA contains specific sections on domestic abuse, child protection, public protection, vulnerable adults, serious sexual offences and homicide. Each crime area identifies emerging issues, intelligence gaps and future issues. The section on homicide shows evidence of an analysis of domestic-related murder and attempted murder, identifying the need for further research to support the homicide reduction strategy.
- The FSA includes reference to homicide offences, but these do not feature in BCU documents, as the number of such offences is so low. However, other major crime offences, such as domestic abuse, child protection, public protection and serious sexual offences, do feature within the FSA and BCU strategies and are considered when deciding on the control strategy priorities.
- The FSA uses a priority assessment scoring system, incorporating police performance, CDRP performance, community priorities, government priorities, seriousness and emerging trends in respect of each business area. The highest-scoring areas are then adopted as the control strategy priorities. While this provides an element of rigour, it is accepted that it is by and large a subjective process. Nonetheless, the FSA is of a particularly high standard.
- Using the scoring assessment matrix, the identified control strategy priorities for the November 2007 FSA are: organised crime; criminal damage and anti-social behaviour; domestic abuse; road safety; and community knowledge. Each priority area has an identified plan owner and sets out intelligence, prevention and enforcement (IPE) priorities along with an individual intelligence requirement. Progress is monitored fortnightly via the force TTCG.
- The force has an increasing awareness of the threat of gun crime, as demonstrated through its involvement in education work with youth groups. The force has identified ball bearing guns and samurai swords as being particular threats to public safety, and is working to educate youth groups on the dangers and threats such weapons pose to their own safety and that of the wider public. In prevention activity, the use of less lethal options such as the Taser is considered when authorised firearms officers (AFOs) are deployed to persons posing a threat with such weapons.
- Firearms intelligence is managed, assessed and prioritised through a dedicated intelligence officer in the force intelligence bureau (FIB). In addition, a firearms incident analysis system has been developed to identify intelligence in terms of times and locations so as to enable the prioritisation and targeting of resources. At the same time, intelligence is fed to a project and performance supervisor within the protective services directorate who works with an analyst. The supervisor and analyst then report to a firearms strategic risk and threat assessment group, which meets on a regular basis.
- The force management board (FMB) has met to ratify the proposed control strategy.

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At this meeting representatives of numerous partners were present, including district and county councils, the probation service and the fire service. Their input was sought and obtained throughout the discussion.

- The force has a good understanding of the level of criminal access to firearms. This has been enhanced since Operation Gable (the investigation of a fatal shooting incident in a nightclub in December 2006) and its links to Operation Trident in the Metropolitan Police area. This has resulted in one firearm being recovered. The force is also aware of the seasonal nature of the threat of the use of firearms, for example in post office and cash-in-transit robberies, and specific operations have been established to tackle these threats.
- Open sources are widely used by the force to inform activity, both reactively and proactively. GB Accelerator (a software application designed to capture, verify and retrieve UK name and address data into call centres or other database applications) is used extensively by the FIB on major crime enquiries, although there is still room to broaden the knowledge of this type of application across the force. Open source intelligence has also been used to good effect on:
 - Operation Chandler – an investigation carried out by the online investigation team (OLIT) into the use of websites and chatrooms for the viewing and sharing of illicit images;
 - Operation Gable, in which intelligence was obtained from YouTube; and
 - Operation Academy, in which subjects were featured with firearms and drugs on YouTube.
- The force homicide reduction strategy has been considered through the NIM process and force tasking has identified further analytical work to be commissioned on domestic-related homicide. Additionally, cold case reviews are considered and commissioned through NIM processes, an example being Operation Atrium (a cold case review of a stranger rape from January 1990).

Work in progress

- The force has assessed the threat posed by kidnap offences as low, given the extremely low number of such offences in the county. Nonetheless, the force is in the process of reviewing its response to kidnap offences to ensure the effective provision of service to such crimes.
- The Suffolk Police Authority (PA) strategic plan 2005/08 mentions Project Respond. This is a project spearheading the enhancement of the three victim care centres (VCCs). They will provide a centre of excellence in response to victims and witnesses of sexual offences, child abuse, domestic violence, hate crime and other forms of severe violence, and to cater for all other vulnerable and intimidated victims or witnesses.
- A rape action plan is ongoing in line with the recommendations of HMIC and Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate. Work on this has included the creation of a problem profile in order for the force to improve its understanding of the profiles of rape victims, locations and offenders.
- There is an acknowledged gap between level 1 and level 2 activity. The move from

three BCUs to two should help to lessen the impact of this, as the force will have to recognise the importance of level 1 activity and its impact on level 2, and vice versa. The DCC chairs both the force performance and level 2 tasking meetings; this helps with linkage to some degree, but while there remains such a push for volume crime performance, this gap may prove difficult to overcome.

Areas for improvement

- Although the control strategy is formally reviewed twice a year, informal reviews are carried out at every force tasking meeting. However, the process for amending priorities in response to demand or circumstances is less clear.
- At the present time, little or no analytical work is undertaken to identify drug markets or 'near miss' offences; neither is any environmental scanning carried out.
- Many staff, particularly at SNT level, are not aware of the content of the control strategy, even though it appears at the top of each page on the Suffolk tasking and briefing system (STABS) briefing document. There is thus the inherent risk of staff operating 'in silos', with insufficient understanding of how their area of business impacts elsewhere in the organisation.

Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are shared with partners and BCUs when appropriate. There is an emerging trigger plan for ‘hot briefing’ whenever a significant change in either the major crime threat or the nature of the analysis demands a fast response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners exist. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full MOPI compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- Returns to the Serious Crime Analysis Section (SCAS) are submitted through a single point of contact in the protective services directorate. The force achieved an 83% compliance rate with the code of practice in respect of submissions to the SCAS in 2007. The national average is 72%. During this period, the force made 18 such submissions, 15 of which were made within the allotted timescale of 14 days.
- Evidence was also found of good use of the National Injuries Database and pro formas to the SOCA anti-kidnap and extortion unit (AKEU) are forwarded as and when incidents occur.
- Strong examples can be found of measures to enhance multi-agency intelligence-sharing arrangements. Within the VCCs the force hosts vulnerable adult safeguarding managers and consideration is being given to co-locating social care service staff within the child abuse central referral and tasking unit. The detective sergeant (DS) for public protection is located within probation service headquarters. All these measures significantly enhance information-sharing mechanisms.
- Effective partnerships are in place for domestic and child abuse, including information sharing through case conferencing. This position is also replicated through vulnerable adult case conferences and through the multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) process, which looks at sex offenders and potentially dangerous offenders across the community. Each of these processes considers the most serious cases, with the aim of preventing victims from becoming subject to further criminality and thereby of reducing the major crime threat.
- MAPPA and MARACs are being used effectively to inform the risk posed by individuals, a system further improved since the public protection directorate came into being. MAPPA meetings are held monthly and the director of intelligence insists that managers representing AIUs attend to ensure wide awareness of risks and issues concerning dangerous persons or registered sex offenders (RSOs).
- The MoPI implementation project benefits from a sound governance structure with regular project board meetings. A full-time project manager is committed to delivering MoPI, as is the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) team.
Strengths identified by the inspection were as follows:
 - A dedicated, enthusiastic and driven project manager has been in post since March 2007. The force lead has embraced regional structures and been actively engaged in collaborative working at every opportunity.
 - The force has invested considerably in the implementation of MoPI to date. Budget bids have been accepted through a projected three-year spending cycle to achieve compliance.
 - The project team has identified a number of information technology (IT) developments that will have significant wider business benefits across the

- force, such as electronic document management solutions (EDMSs).
- Training strategies have been completed to a high standard; the force intends to train all members of staff in the MoPI guidance through a number of different approaches, and there is a strong commitment to delivery.
- The force has a comprehensive communications strategy allied to a tactical plan for delivery. A large amount of marketing has already taken place to highlight various aspects of the MoPI project across the force. In particular, there are plans to send mail-shots to specialist members of staff about emerging MoPI issues and for the innovative use of screensavers on the crime intelligence system (CIS) to prompt users.

Work in progress

- An information-sharing template, which complies with national guidance, has been developed with Trading Standards, which complies with national guidance. If approved by the two parties, this will become the basis of an information-sharing agreement with other partners, although a separate national information-sharing agreement is being developed for firearms information.
- The most critical risks identified within the force MoPI action plan relate to: the review, retention and disposal of information, for which funding of £100,000 has been requested; and funding itself, with an investment of £360,000 over three years needed in order to obtain the solutions required for MoPI compliance.
- Each of the leads for the key MoPI business areas have been required to inform the MoPI project manager of who they share intelligence with and where information-sharing agreements are located, or where the authority to share exists. An information-sharing template that complies with national guidance has been developed with Trading Standards. When approved, this will form the basis of information-sharing agreements with other partners.
- The force is in the process of reviewing all information-sharing protocols that exist in each of the six key business areas outlined by MoPI. The constabulary is also reviewing what protocols either exist or are missing in CDRPs, Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) and SNTs. The constabulary is working on a detailed plan to ensure that over the next year all the required information-sharing agreements are in place, in the correct format and that they are endorsed by the relevant chief officer. All information-sharing agreements will be available via a central repository on the intranet to all appropriate constabulary employees.
- The MoPI project team is identifying a number of IT developments through the MoPI project that will have significant wider business benefits across the force, for example EDMSs.
- Training strategies have been completed to a high standard and the force intends to train all members of staff in the MoPI guidance through a number of different approaches; there is a strong commitment to delivery.
- There remains an issue with the CIS in terms of the management of the weeding of intelligence. In the absence of national guidance, the MoPI manager has submitted a report to the DCC to determine when current data, flagged for weeding, will indeed be weeded.

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- The force runs a separate intelligence management system, the intelligence source register (ISR), onto which all intelligence is inputted. The need for a revised specification has been identified, particularly in respect of 5x5x5 intelligence submissions; this was to be in place by December 2007. While ISR does not currently present a significant risk in terms of MoPI compliance, it will become so in 2010 when all forces have to confirm that their systems are MoPI-compliant.

Areas for improvement

- In the twelve months to January 2008, the force made 116 requests for advice and assistance to the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) Specialist Operations Centre. This is a relatively low figure when considered alongside the other forces in the Eastern Region, and the force should consider improving its publicising and use of this service.
- The 2007 MoPI peer review identified a number of areas for development:
 - The review, retention and disposal of information were the most challenging area of MoPI for the force. The current plans to deliver this area are dependent on the force delivering a technical solution and the timescales for implementation of this application. The force should be aware of co-dependencies between the projects and the impact that one could have on another, and consider raising a risk and mitigation plan around this issue.
 - The project manager has made considerable progress but the force may wish to consider the level of staffing in the project team to ensure delivery of MoPI within the specified time periods.
 - In respect of identifying other business areas to be included in MoPI, the force may wish to ensure engagement from specialist areas with sensitive information, such as special branch, professional standards and the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES), to ensure that they have risk-assessed their information and, where necessary, included it for future referral.
 - The force may wish to consider undertaking a formal audit to establish what information is held for policing purposes in business areas outside the original six, in order to allow balanced and risk-assessed decisions to be made on expansion. The use of the sensitive information project questionnaire may be of value to this process.

Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is incomplete, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is only partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are not identified sufficiently early.

Strengths

- The introduction of Neighbourhood Policing has seen an increase in community intelligence and all first-line supervisors have been briefed by the director of intelligence as part of the Suffolk First for You (SF4U) leadership briefing days. The AIUs are currently assessing the increase in community intelligence to establish whether they have the capacity to process the intelligence being generated.
- It is acknowledged that this increase is part of a staged approach to the 'rich picture' which aims to increase the quality of community intelligence submitted. A community cohesion strategy identifies the need to encourage increased quantities of such intelligence before building towards the next stage, which will see a greater focus on the quality of submissions. This work is beginning to inform the profiling and mapping of vulnerable communities.
- Communities within Suffolk have been profiled within the FSA. This process has been supported by the creation of 47 neighbourhood profiles following the introduction of Neighbourhood Policing. This is an ongoing piece of work, which links directly with the force's community cohesion action plan, which is led by the assistant chief constable (ACC) and supported by the diversity unit.
- The ongoing programme of community cohesion was developed from the rich picture work undertaken by the force, in an attempt to gain a broader understanding of the various communities resident in Suffolk.
- BCUs and SNTs have been tasked with intelligence requirements concerning community make-up. The force views this as an invaluable means of identifying potentially key contacts in advance of any major investigation. The force diversity unit has also been tasked to explore the feasibility of promoting and publicising the work of the new MIT to a range of different communities.
- The homicide reduction strategy marks the early stages of potential links with SNTs, in that it serves not only to reinforce the need for intelligence on domestic abuse but also to highlight the seriousness of such instances and their potential to become homicides. The establishment of the MIT will allow the development of working relationships with SNTs and improve proactivity around the prevention of major crime.
- Operation Impression has been in existence since January 2007, providing support to prostitutes in the Ipswich area. This is a multi-agency approach to street prostitution that has helped significantly to reduce the number of working prostitutes, while supporting them on drug and day-to-day issues.

Work in progress

- Work is ongoing to identify key contacts within emerging communities. This is led by an inspector, who holds regular meetings with emerging communities to identify

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issues and needs, and is closely linked with local and other trade associations to encourage contacts to come forward. The next stage will be for SNTs to develop their own community events with support from the force community safety department. Support will be available on the force intranet in the form of leaflets which can be downloaded and used. It is hoped that such activity will lead to a greater understanding of issues facing vulnerable communities, including the impact and reach of major and organised crime.

- The force and the county council are currently working together on a vulnerable localities index, using a nationally recognised method to help identify and map emerging communities.

Areas for improvement

- Community knowledge appears as a control strategy priority and is an amalgamation of intelligence requirements in a number of areas of business appearing in the FSA. It is acknowledged that there is a lot of detail in SNT community profiles, but a key issue remains regarding what the force actually does with this information, as SNTs receive little or no feedback on the data that they are being asked to gather and provide.

Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed every month by the Assistant Chief Officer (ACO) (finance). Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.

Strengths

- The strategic risk register contains the six most serious identified risks. ACPO-level officers oversee a risk register for each separate portfolio, including protective services, and consider what items should be elevated to the strategic risk register.
- Separate risk registers exist for the PA, the force (strategic risk register) and departments/BCU commands. The force strategic risk register contains no more than seven or eight identified risks. It is formally updated every three months but reviewed every month by the ACO.
- All risk registers appear on the force intranet.
- The force has produced, for the first time, a separate organisational strategic assessment which sits alongside the operational FSA and identifies key issues on the strategic agenda, referred to as the 'top 22'. A scoring matrix has been utilised incorporating the following areas: operational imperative, business imperative, chief officer or police authority imperative and political, environmental, social, technological, economic, legal and organisational (PESTELO) imperative. From this, a 'top 6 issues' have been highlighted as being of the most concern. They are:
 - the Sumac trial;
 - maintaining and improving force performance;
 - contact management;
 - embedding SNT structure within core working;
 - strategic review; and
 - addressing custody management.

The document will be formally reviewed in April 2008.

- The force has established a business continuity working group, comprising a number of middle managers and chaired by the head of protective services. Core business activities have been identified and a business impact assessment carried out. A critical activity checklist has been created upon which protective services elements feature, although this essentially relates to staffing/resilience and the ability to carry on business as usual.
- The force strategic risk register identifies the risk of not investing in training to enable staff to acquire the nationally recognised professional qualifications that they require to fulfil their roles, for example accreditation in accordance with professionalising the investigative process (PIP). The crime management risk register also identifies the lack of financial investment to enable the force to investigate level 2 and organised criminality. Control measures and action plans have been put in place to address these issues.
- Other protective services risks include the investigation of major crime and the ability to deal with cold case reviews. However, these should be addressed with the implementation of the MIT in April 2008.

Work in progress

- It is intended to create business continuity plans with departmental heads as the nominated owners.
- The protective services directorate has its own risk register, but this has not been subject to significant work since the recent formation of the directorate, which saw the bringing together of various departments. Existing risks on the protective services risk register do not necessarily inform the force strategic risk register; for example, the top two risks on the protective services risk register do not appear on the strategic risk register. Review of the protective services risk register is due imminently, although it is also an agenda item at the monthly senior management team meetings.

Areas for improvement

- Files relating to archived enquiries are stored in fireproof safes. Live enquiries are not copied, which creates a risk of loss in the event of fire or flood damage to the premises where they are held. No reserve premises have been identified, and while the force would rely on an insurance claim to replace lost equipment, the organisational impact of losing such files would be significant.

Summary – The force is creating ways of collaborating with some other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Some of the operational databases are searchable from the Eastern Region intelligence unit (ERIU). The recommendations of the Bichard Inquiry have been implemented.

Strengths

- The investment in automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) has led to an increase in mobile and static sites across the county. Its use as an investigative tool is now well established, with good awareness demonstrated by SIOs. ANPR was used effectively during Operation Sumac to narrow down the movements of one victim and to identify witnesses and the suspect.
- The director of intelligence sits as a member of the ANPR project implementation team and, through this involvement, knowledge of ANPR has also increased noticeably across the protective services directorate.
- The force ANPR lead attends the intelligence managers' meetings to promote the capabilities of ANPR as an investigative and intelligence tool. A dedicated force 'champion' conducts ANPR awareness training for AIU staff and detective inspectors (DIs), and the ANPR investigation manual is circulated around the force.
- The force has an integrated IT system that links crime, intelligence and custody and also has direct links to the ANPR back-office facility (BOF).
- The introduction of ANPR around the red light district of Ipswich forms part of the vice strategy. The force is also seeking to use private ANPR (for example in supermarket car parks and filling-station forecourts) to assist with criminal enquiries, as well as extending ANPR coverage by further equipping armed response and traffic vehicles.
- There is a three-counties (Cambridgeshire, Norfolk and Suffolk) ANPR project manager who develops and oversees the collaborative opportunities offered by ANPR as well as monitoring work in the remainder of the Eastern Region (Bedfordshire, Essex and Hertfordshire). This project has enabled the force to benefit from regional funding to purchase specialist equipment such as ANPR cameras on laptops. A further benefit of the regional work has been the sharing of equipment between forces.
- STABS is the main method used by SIOs to task officers to fill intelligence gaps during major investigations. Other methods include general emails and inviting SNT staff to briefings.
- The ERIU has full access to Suffolk's CIS.
- The force works closely with the probation and prison services as the responsible authorities involved in MAPPA activity. This work serves to identify potentially dangerous offenders and mitigates the risk they pose to public safety. There is evidence of strong force and partner attendance at MAPPA meetings.
- As a member of the HOLMES regional user group, the force's relationships with other regional forces are good, and informal agreements exist between the Eastern

Region forces to share HOLMES accounts where appropriate or when requested by the SIO or officer in overall command (OIOC).

Work in progress

- There is currently no intelligence system interoperable with neighbouring forces and key partners, except for national systems such as the IMPACT nominal index (INI). However, the FSA feeds into the regional strategic assessment and information is thereby shared with regional forces and on a national basis.
- The force recognises that significant amounts of intelligence rest within the HOLMES database and that currently there is no IT system capable of extracting this information efficiently. Approval has been given for the force to acquire an IT system which will assist in creating a data bridge, allowing intelligence managers to interrogate HOLMES systems. This issue was recognised during the NPIA strategic debrief of Operation Sumac, which identified the lack of a robust, practical mechanism to extract intelligence from HOLMES as a national issue.
- Access to the ANPR BOF for research purposes is restricted to staff at AIU and FIB level, although access is to be extended to supervisors within the force operations room (FOR). This is a deliberate decision, as it will not only ensure that auditing of the system is easy to conduct, but will also prevent overuse of the IT infrastructure, which might well be adversely affected if access were unrestricted.
- A standard operating procedure is being drawn up in conjunction with Cambridgeshire and Norfolk Constabularies to standardise roles and responsibilities in ANPR processes across the three forces. Norfolk and Suffolk Constabularies have already linked the BOF and there are plans to extend this to include Cambridgeshire Constabulary and possibly Essex Police.
- The data administrator for ANPR sits within the FIB, although there are plans to expand this role to be not only an investigator, but also the force single point of contact for ANPR enquiries internally and externally.
- It is planned to develop a proactive ANPR strategy to support police and partnership activity in the red light districts across the county, with ANPR being used as both a preventative and an investigative tool.
- The force is due to submit its return against the NPIA ANPR capability assessment. The issues identified for consideration from the earlier assessment have all been (or are being) addressed.
- Project Trouve is part of the protective services three-year plan (for delivery in 2010) to replace the force CIS, which dates from 1991.

Areas for improvement

- The IT platform from which ANPR operates in the force is unstable, so the force is working through a solution with IT experts. An interim solution is currently in place but it does leave the force vulnerable, for example in respect of the transfer of data from its ANPR vehicles to a secure network.

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- HOLMES and ANPR BOFs are not routinely accessed for intelligence. In respect of HOLMES, it is recognised that there are huge searchability opportunities not presently being exploited.
- Downloading of intelligence from HOLMES at the close of investigations does not routinely happen. Officers are encouraged to ensure that intelligence gained during the course of an investigation is fed into the force intelligence system, but it is unclear whether this routinely happens.
- The current force intelligence system is inadequate. The weakness lies in ISR, which is a system for housing 5x5x5 logs. This is split into three folders, one for each BCU, in which logs are stored depending on their location/BCU. It is not possible to cross-research on ISR. The operator requires access to more than one folder but this creates an operational security issue, particularly as community intelligence is located and stored on ISR. ISR does not 'talk' to the CIS, so there is a need for data held on ISR to be transferred to the CIS as required.
- The transferring of data from ISR to the CIS is conducted by clerks within AIU. Although AIU supervisors are tasked to monitor all intelligence submissions, the inputting is often one or two days behind, and with that comes the risk of key intelligence not appearing on force systems as quickly as it should.
- Front-line staff do not have access to ISR, only to the CIS; staff therefore have to request AIU to access ISR on their behalf should they wish to interrogate the system. Out of hours, the FOR is the point of access for ISR enquiries.
- Analysts have received no training in HOLMES and cannot therefore access the system for research purposes.

Summary – The force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is efficient.

Strengths

- A review policy, compliant with ACPO guidelines, is in place that stipulates 72-hour, 7-day or 28-day review requirements for current major crime investigations. The ACC commissions a review in consultation with the head of protective services. In the event of a category A homicide investigation, an outside force will always be invited to carry out the review. For category B or C investigations, the review will usually be carried out internally. In such cases, an accredited SIO will always be used and there are two SIOs who have received formal review training.
- Reviews are fed back by way of a formal report or presentation to the ACC, the head of protective services and the relevant SIO. Informal reviews will also be held by the head of protective services after 48 or 72 hours, to ensure that the investigation is being directed in the right way and that appropriate lines of enquiry have been identified and are being pursued.
- The policy also identifies other review opportunities depending on the status of the investigation:
 - A progress review may be held to assess longer-term undetected investigations, usually after six months.
 - A concluding review may be commissioned immediately prior to the closure of an investigation to confirm that all productive lines of enquiry have been concluded appropriately. The concluding review will follow the same methodology as set out for formal reviews.
 - A thematic review is designed to focus on a particular aspect of an investigation that gives cause for concern or is of an unusual nature. A thematic review will follow a similar methodology as that for a formal review, but will clearly be of a more restricted nature.
 - A detected review may be commissioned, at the discretion of the ACC, into a case where a prosecution is withdrawn or all persons charged are acquitted. The reason for discontinuance or acquittal will usually dictate the type of review to be pursued, ie thematic, formal or merely a debrief of the SIO. The rationale for a detected review will be to identify any existing investigative opportunities which would lead to the identification of a suspect or further suspects, or to identify lessons learnt which have an impact on the force or the police service as a whole.
- There is a collaborative arrangement with Norfolk Constabulary in respect of major crime reviews after 28 days, but other forces can be invited to review investigations when the force considers it appropriate. For example, the Metropolitan Police reviewed Operation Gable, which had links to Operation Trident nominals in London. It was also intended to invite Kent Constabulary to conduct an overarching review of Operation Sumac, but this was cancelled when a suspect was charged.
- There is no regional review group, although regional SIO seminars have recently begun at which good practice and lessons learnt from reviews are presented as case studies. The opportunity for learning from others is also taken through Suffolk SIOs being invited to review investigations in outside forces.

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- Crime scene managers carry out informal reviews of each other's work during major investigations. Furthermore, before a major crime scene is released, the crime scene manager for that case will invite one of his/her colleagues to review the forensic strategy and forensic work carried out to ensure that no forensic opportunities have been missed.

Work in progress

- The introduction of the MIT in April 2008 will include the creation of a review team. This will consist of four police staff, including a supervisor. To provide a degree of independence, they will not be based within the MIT at force headquarters, but at one of the other major incident room (MIR) locations in the county.
- The force policy document relating to reviews of live enquiries is being rewritten to include the role of the MIT. There will also need to be changes to reflect the timing of reviews and the fact that the DCC is now the holder of the protective services portfolio at ACPO level.

Areas for improvement

- Reviews should be instigated at the request of the DCC, who currently receives subsequent findings. At present, they are instigated by the head of protective services, who informs the DCC that a review has been commissioned.
- Line managers undertake reviews of rape investigations informally. There is no formal review or system to monitor the quality of review as advocated in Recommendation 5 of the HMIC thematic inspection of rape investigation and prosecution *Without Consent* (January 2007).

Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to managing major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a reasonable understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The force is compliant in respect of tasking and co-ordination within NIM processes, and the recent work undertaken on the homicide profile for the county has led to the commissioning of detailed analysis in respect of domestic-related homicides.
- The force TTCG meeting is chaired by the DCC. The meeting outlines and examines existing control strategy priorities, as each has a nominated lead. Colour coding is used to highlight current and emerging issues separately.
- Current major enquiries feature as a standing item on the force tasking and co-ordination document and are discussed at the fortnightly TTCG meeting. This is the forum where bids for specialist resources are discussed and decided upon, depending on the force and control strategy priorities. A separate meeting is chaired by the DCC to deal with resourcing issues concerning current major investigations.
- The fortnightly TTCG meeting is supported by a tasking and co-ordination document which forms the basis of discussions at the meeting. The document begins with a review of current tactical activity, all of which is pursued in line with the control strategy priorities. Emerging issues are discussed, which could include MAPPA subjects followed by OCG activity. Major investigations are then discussed, with a brief update on the status of each live investigation. At the conclusion, specialist resources are allocated and priorities set.
- The force has considered NPSAT, which supports forces in their process of risk-assessing the status of their own protective services; however, it considers that the tool does not add value to the picture surrounding major crime, as it portrays data already known to the force. The force has carried out its own protective services gap analysis, which was more detailed and informative, although there is still room to add more objectivity to the process as it evolves.
- When not involved in firearms operations or training, the operations support group is tasked through the daily tasking process to support level 2 activity or major crime. The group has also been deployed to react to firearms intelligence, for example for Operation Arctic (ram raids) and the monitoring of vulnerable post offices.
- The level 2 daily management meeting (DMM) is attended by the director of intelligence (chair), operations (roads policing), special branch, the FIB, analytical resources and the dedicated source handling unit (DSHU). The agenda includes: results from the previous tasking meeting; significant events/critical incidents requiring level 2 consideration or response; level 2 prisoners relevant to the control strategy; resource demands, including planned events; planned firearms operations; other planned operations; ANPR update/activity/results; media issues; intelligence requiring level 2 consideration, including any significant rave information; Osman issues; Organised Crime Unit (OCU) deployment; SCAS offences; and the review of tactical plans.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- There needs to be improved communication between the SIO and the analyst at the beginning of a major investigation, so that both parties understand which analytical services are to be provided. While some analysts will show the SIO how creative and informative their products can be, others will only provide the products asked for. The force's aim is that analysts should provide the SIO with an explanation of which products can be provided and are best suited to the investigation, from which terms of reference will be prepared and agreed by both parties.
- The force is still learning about its intelligence requirements, particularly those pertaining to emerging issues and trends. Little analysis appears within tactical assessments at the present time. Intelligence gathering should happen with level 1 and level 2 tasking meetings informing the DMM process, but this is not the case. DMMs are reviews of the previous 24 hours, for example addressing resource issues. Level 1 and level 2 tactical assessments must be driven more by analytical work and generate inferences and actions.

Summary – Due to appropriate training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.

Strengths

- The Suffolk Inter-faith Resource has produced a very helpful booklet on different cultural aspects of matters such as birth, marriage and death. This document is available to all members of the force, although in reality it is probably not used as widely as it could be.
- Members of the recently established independent advisory group (IAG) have been involved in raising cultural awareness through in-force training.

Work in progress

- All staff receive generic diversity training, but the MIT action plan includes the delivery of a bespoke package involving an input by the family liaison officer (FLO) trainer on cultural differences across communities. This will include subjects such as naming protocols, honour-based violence and how different communities deal with bereavement.
- New members of police staff receive values and equality training, while more developed diversity training is provided to student police officers. Difficulty exists with those officers of 15–20 years service, as there is no specific programme to introduce further diversity and community engagement training. However, the opportunity to introduce such training has been identified in the stop-and-search training programme scheduled for 2008.
- The force diversity unit, through its ‘under-representation group’, is seeking to develop a skills database of staff to include linguistic skills and cultural knowledge. This will be a valuable source of information for SIOs and FLOs when dealing with new or emerging communities.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Prevention

Summary – The force has a network of key individuals and this is frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- The force and PA have worked closely to form an IAG, which provides access to key individuals and support networks. Although this group does not currently provide operational advice in respect of major crime policy and lines of enquiry, the force is able to access other such groups on a dynamic basis to assist in this regard. For example, during Operation Sumac, a group was established by the southern area operations manager utilising existing groups, such as the vice working group, the health authority and non-statutory agencies, including charities. This group assisted in the implementation of a community reassurance strategy, and this mechanism was recognised as being effective by the NPIA strategic debrief.
- In the event that a gold group is formed in response to a counter-terrorism or homicide incident, a member of the force citizen focus group will sit on the group to assist with the CIA. Sitting below the gold group is a county council development group, which addresses wider community issues and concerns. This group requires a number of county and district council personnel to be on call, thereby demonstrating the strong commitment and relationships that exist between partners.
- While the IAG is in its early stages, BCU commanders are nonetheless satisfied that they can seek out relevant members of a number of different communities for advice and assistance if required. Key individual networks (KINs) have been established through SNTs and there is a strong element of engagement with them at BCU level. The diversity unit can also provide details of community contacts in the event that additional and/or alternative community advice is required. Nevertheless, the force continues to progress this area of work, identifying and engaging with emerging communities.
- The force worked with the Ipswich and Suffolk Commission for Racial Equality (ISCRE) to seek assistance from the Afro-Caribbean, community following the fatal shooting of a young black man at an Ipswich nightclub in December 2006. This working relationship has proven extremely beneficial and the force is seeking to develop further work with the ISCRE to improve contact with this particular community, where relationships have historically been strained.
- IAG members are recruited by way of an open advertisement, word of mouth or networking with partners. A presentation has been given to the race and faith forum to promote the work of the IAG. A role specification has been prepared, which includes the activities and decisions in which potential members can expect to be involved. The force has recognised the need to have representation from all age groups, and has recruited a young Asian female member to offer views from among the younger community. The force diversity unit provides ongoing support for IAG members.

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Work in progress

- The next phase of the development of the IAG should be to move to a more operational role and develop the ability to support an SIO. The investigations directorate, in consultation with the diversity unit, is currently considering how to take forward this aim.

Areas for improvement

- Despite the good work of SNTs in identifying and developing KINs, SNT staff have little awareness of the role of the force IAG. An improvement in their level of awareness is important if the force is to improve the community profile of the IAG.
- At present, there is little or no representation from the Afro-Caribbean, Eastern European and Portuguese communities, and SNTs must play a crucial role in making contact with these communities to identify not only their concerns but also potential IAG or KIN members.

Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- All first response officers and call management staff receive training in golden hour principles during their initial training programmes; awareness of the principles is therefore very good.
- Senior detective officers and scenes of crime officers (SOCOs) considered the response to initial major crime scenes to be good on their arrival, with cordons and scene logs being used effectively.
- Critical incident awareness is also good, with most inspectors or above having received critical incident awareness training. Events that have the potential to escalate to this level are identified at an early stage through daily tasking and management procedures.
- Call-out procedures for major or critical incidents are robust, with call-out rotas being available and up-to-date within the FOR. In most cases, the first point of contact is the area DI, who, having assessed the circumstances, will consider whether a force SIO should be contacted.
- The process of calling a SOCO to a scene out of office hours is controlled through the senior SOCO, who will assess whether the circumstances require a SOCO to be called out.
- Knowledge of the core investigative doctrine among new detective constables (DCs) is good, as it forms a major part of the Initial Crime Investigators’ Development Programme (ICIDP), although existing DCs may not be as conversant with the doctrine if they have not undergone this programme.
- The Initial Police Learning and Development Programme (IPLDP) is based entirely around the doctrine, and therefore awareness among constables is good. A DI from the investigations directorate provides training on golden hour principles as part of the IPLDP.
- The force investigations procedure document provides guidance for the development of force investigation policy, setting the requirements for post-holders in each category of homicide. The head of protective services decides whether an MIR should be established, and whether the incident should go onto HOLMES or be managed by way of a manual index system. There then follows a period of negotiation with BCUs to arrange staffing of the incident room to meet the requirements of the category of incident. (However, this will change with the implementation of the MIT, with dedicated resources being readily available).
- Contingency and business continuity plans have been well rehearsed through Operation Sumac and demonstrate the force’s ability to deal with the escalation of incidents to extreme levels. This includes the use of appropriate planning, the creation and utilisation of a logistics cell to tackle resourcing of major issues, and the deployment of a message assessment centre to manage the vast volumes of

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information often associated with such incidents. The force now also has extensive experience of the deployment of mutual aid resources through PNICC.

- Knowledge is good among call-takers of the actions to take when a kidnap is reported. In the event of a kidnap being reported, call-takers in the FOR have access to a menu to guide them through certain points to cover with the caller, as well as to ensure that they carry out certain actions. These include making sure that the command and control serial is restricted, and providing the caller with a codeword for future contact with the force.
- The responsibility for conducting house-to-house enquiries falls to BCU sergeants on area support teams, who are trained as co-ordinators. The SIO advises the co-ordinator of the house-to-house strategy. It is the responsibility of the BCU to deploy staff to implement the strategy, overseen by the co-ordinator. SIOs and MIR staff consider the quality of house-to-house enquiries to be good, based on the pro formas completed and returned to the MIR.
- A business continuity plan exists for upgrading the HOLMES system through regional agreements with Norfolk and Cambridgeshire Constabularies. These forces will be informed whenever the Suffolk system is being upgraded and will therefore be prepared to support the force by providing a HOLMES facility, should the need arise at that time. There is also an internal contingency plan in place for a number of MIRs to be commissioned across the force in the event that one or more is disabled for any reason.

Work in progress

- At the start of a major investigation, a matrix is used to determine the required staffing levels. Responsibility then falls to the BCU crime manager to identify suitable resources, which are usually drawn from uniformed and criminal investigation department (CID) teams, with various investigative skills. The impact on area CID is that posts are backfilled from other area departments, attachments are extended or overtime is incurred. This is an issue that should be resolved with the implementation of the MIT in April 2008.
- The mix of skills among staff supplied to the MIR means that thorough initial briefings are required from the SIO and key supervisors, so that staff are familiar with the rules of the major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP). Administrative support is also lacking, with responsibility for arranging stationery, vehicles or hotel accommodation falling to a DS. However, it is acknowledged that these difficulties will be overcome with the creation of an administrative function within the MIT.

Areas for improvement

- There is a possible area of weakness in the force contact centre in identifying potential critical incidents at an early stage. While there is no expectation that contact centre supervisors should read every incident report there is an expectation that inspectors or supervisors in the FOR will do so. This is exacerbated by the two rooms being located at different sites. There is also a reliance on the call-taker identifying the call as potentially critical and alerting the supervisor, who should in

turn inform the FOR inspector.

- A significant issue arose within the force call centre during Operation Sumac, concerning the volume of calls received from the public. While the call centre was inundated with calls, no guidance had been given to staff on where to refer them and how to prioritise them. As a result, for each call received an incident was created on the command and control system as well as a form being completed which was emailed to the relevant MIR. While it is accepted that this was at a time of extraordinary demand for the force, the prioritisation of messages should be considered as a fast-track policy decision by the SIO in the event of a similar future instance.

Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.

Strengths

- A force homicide reduction strategy has analysed homicides in the county over the previous ten years. This work has stimulated further and more detailed analysis of domestic violence incidents. Other issues such as sex offenders, potentially dangerous offenders, counter-terrorism and firearms have been included in the FSA and contribute to the setting of the control strategy and operational priorities. The MARAC process also identifies near-miss domestic violence offences and puts strategies in place to protect vulnerable victims.
- The force vice strategy, led through Operation Impression, has involved profiling street workers by age, place of residence and nationality. The outcome of this strategy has been a considerable reduction in the number of street workers: prior to Operation Sumac, there were over 30 actively working the red light area, whereas recently there were fewer than five. The force is now moving to tackle off-street prostitution. Awareness of the problem of off-street prostitution has been improved through national operations such as Operation Pentameter and Operation Pentameter 2, which are aimed at rescuing and protecting victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation.
- Although there is preventative work ongoing around gun crime (Operation Academy), the reality is that there is no intelligence to suggest ready access to firearms in the county. Among all the Operation Academy activity and seizures of drugs, only a handful of firearms have been recovered. The key for the force is in ensuring it properly assesses the intelligence it does have. Gun crime is not the main driver in the county; drug crime is, with firearms being a part of it.
- Effective partnership working, including sharing of information, is conducted with other agencies in respect of the investigation of domestic violence and child abuse, both of which are significant contributors to homicide in Suffolk. Protocols exist for safeguarding children and for day-to-day operational business in respect of child abuse investigations, particularly surrounding case conferencing.
- The county has recently begun a pilot of specialist domestic violence courts, running alongside of which are MARACs, which review the most high-risk domestic violence cases and share information to ensure effective risk management. Strategies are put in place for individuals in order to prevent escalation and repeat victimisation.
- Understanding emerging drug markets is seen by the force as a high priority, as drugs are acknowledged as the most significant threat in the county. Work on drug markets has been commissioned through the FSA at both force and BCU level, and knowledge in this area has improved considerably as a result. Preventative and enforcement action has been taken through Operation Wolf and Operation Adrenalin, supported by the mapping of hotspots using partnership data.

Work in progress

- The next phase of the work around homicide reduction will be to focus on near-miss

offences, particularly domestic violence. This will help the force to understand the profile of domestic homicides, so that prevention strategies can be implemented.

Areas for improvement

- At present, near-miss offences are identified through the DMM process at level 1, but the force has recognised that there remains a gap in receiving this type of information, particularly concerning domestic violence. This is despite vulnerable victim incidents being flagged for the DMM by the FOR. Improved information sharing is one area identified by the force to widen its scope to identify these types of offences, for example receiving details of referrals to GPs where domestic violence is involved.
- It is not certain that the DCC is routinely informed of all near-miss offences. However, in relation to children issues, it is likely that this information would be received through the safeguarding children's board or the Children's Trust, where a number of reviews have recently been requested following adverse incidents. In one such incident, a child was abducted by her father following his recent release from prison. While a number of agencies were aware of his imminent release, preventative plans put in place by the force proved insufficient. All such offences must be identified and appropriate preventative strategies employed where necessary. Thereafter they should inform analytical work around precursor events.

Summary – The policy covering threats to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably well understood and implemented. Examples of joint/regional/cross-border/multi-agency operations are present.

Strengths

- There is a clear and comprehensive force policy and procedure in respect of threats to life. This document sets out, with supporting flowcharts, the procedure to be followed in the event of intelligence being received to indicate such a threat. Initial responsibility falls to the inspector/duty officer, who makes an assessment of all available intelligence and briefs the on-call superintendent. This officer in turn reviews the intelligence grading, risk assessment and tactical options in place or under consideration. The superintendent has to ensure a number of actions are undertaken. These include nominating an SIO, creating a tactical plan, starting a policy file, informing ACPO and completing a community impact assessment.
- AIUs oversee each application and a risk assessment/care plan process is carried out through the application form. All Osman warnings are recorded on the AIU O drive and a central database retained by the CAB, based at force HQ. Osman warnings require the authority of the director of intelligence and the SIO.
- Overall, there is a good level of awareness among senior and detective staff of the concept of Osman warnings and why they are used. Most staff, after taking initial action where appropriate, know to contact the AIU DI for advice.
- A DMM is conducted at level 2, chaired by the director of intelligence, which includes Osman warnings as a standing agenda item. AIUs submit details of Osman warnings issued in the previous 24 hours on a daily basis.
- Operation Academy was the force's response to the firearms threat in Ipswich. This was a successful operation, targeting drug activity with clear links to gun crime emanating from London. This issue was clearly identified within the FSA, as well as by the protective services gap analysis. While the success of Operation Academy has been measured through there being no further incidents of gun crime since a fatal shooting in December 2006, proactive preventative work continues in this area.

Work in progress

- The administration of Osman warnings does not extend to the creation of markers on the CIS to identify individuals as being subject to such a warning. This information is therefore not routinely available to officers responding to the address of someone who has received such a warning. The force is working towards creating a system whereby key staff will have access to threat-to-life information, which will also be provided to front-line officers when required.

Areas for improvement

- The force does not proactively utilise Osman data as much as it could, for example to inform preventative activity. Each case tends to be dealt with in isolation, with the details then held on a central database but not further explored.

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- The inspection found that analysts were unaware of the existence of the Osman database. As it is a secret/restricted database it does not inform other OCG activity.
- SNT staff have received an email concerning Osman warnings, but during the inspection were unable to recall the details of it. Few, if any, SNT staff interviewed were able to explain what Osman warnings are.

Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by dedicated but numerically insufficient covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to and understood by most staff. The force is partially collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- The force has a witness protection unit (WPU), with a small number of officers dedicated to the role. They comply with national standards and this is an area of work which is currently being enhanced through the collaboration process with neighbouring forces.
- Overall awareness of staff has been raised by providing input on the work of the WPU during detective training days. This has included a presentation detailing the Van Colle case from Hertfordshire.
- WPU officers also give presentations to the advanced witness course, the source handling course, ICIDP courses, CID courses, SIO courses and SF4U first- and second-line managers days. The WPU has also prepared an article for a quarterly publication issued online through the protective services directorate.
- Witness protection officers described an excellent working relationship with partners in their specialised area of work.
- The DCC is the force ACPO lead on witness protection issues and is both knowledgeable in this field and up-to-date with force witness protection cases.
- A matrix is used to identify reasons why a client is taken on or refused, as part of the lessons to be learnt from Van Colle case.
- The force has recent experience through Operation Sumac of providing protection to an individual who did not fall within the definition of a protected witness and national advisers commented on this favourably.

Work in progress

- An ongoing WPU case is linked to honour-based violence, which represents a relatively new area for the force. Lessons learnt in relation to this case will be fed back into the force when appropriate.

Areas for improvement

- Area supervisors are aware of the WPU and its role in protecting witnesses. However, it was acknowledged that it can take some time for the WPU to take full responsibility for a witness. This creates difficulty for area CID officers, who have to retain responsibility for the witness, including for their safety and welfare until handed over to the WPU. It can take up to ten days before a witness is handed over to the WPU, again demonstrating the lack of resilience within the unit.
- There is a lack of awareness among SNTs as to the support available to protect intimidated and vulnerable witnesses. While some guidance had been received through email, more comprehensive training could be provided on dedicated training days.

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- The force is urged to review the WPU budget. The cost of maintaining a client averages £8,000 per case. This is set against an overall budget of only £40,000 for 2007/08. This aspect of policing has the potential to prove very costly and the force must demonstrate a greater awareness of this fact.
- The WPU DS is currently abstracted to Operation Sumac. A DC from DSHU has therefore been seconded to provide support, but this is not yet a permanent role.
- There is a comprehensive force policy detailing the main issues around witness protection and the procedures to be adopted in referring, managing and monitoring such cases. However, this policy must be formally reviewed, as a review has not taken place for two years and significant developments have occurred within that time.
- The force recognises that the WPU needs to be relocated to off-site premises.
- Witness protection collaborative arrangements are in place, with Norfolk Constabulary taking the regional lead. While securing such assistance from Norfolk is formalised, in practice there are difficulties in obtaining assistance due to Norfolk's taking on, for payment, responsibility for Cambridgeshire Constabulary's witness protection arrangements.
- If true collaboration is to be taken forward, off-site accommodation will be required close to all three borders.
- The force WPU structure is comparatively small, with one DS (currently abstracted) and one DI. Both the DS and the DI, however, have other roles and 'day jobs' and therefore manage the WPU on an irregular basis. There were 12 witnesses within the five live cases carried by the WPU at the time of inspection, all of whom were intensive and demanding in terms of officer time. This represents a tremendously heavy workload for the WPU officers.
- There are real concerns around resilience in terms of supervision of witness protection staff. The DS, given his current commitments, is unable to provide effective management, a fact amply demonstrated by the current caseload. Although the DI is already heavily involved in the oversight of the WPU, the force is seeking to have the WPU formally report to the DI and take the DS out of the equation (due primarily to that individual taking up a role within the MIT). This is far from ideal and the force urgently needs to build in a degree of resilience for the supervision of the WPU.
- If the WPU IT system breaks down, the force must contact Lancashire Police (from which it purchased the database) in the event that its current contractors cannot resolve the problem. All data is backed up, although the vetting of IT repair staff is an issue, as it is currently addressed on an ad hoc basis.

Summary – The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets is partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The force currently has a community cohesion action plan in which a strand of activity is to identify community tensions. Where these are identified, details are submitted on intelligence logs and actioned by AIUs. In addition, this information is secured by the special branch analyst, who reflects it in the form of community tension indicators to the National Community Tension Team and the UK Border Agency.
- During Operation Sumac, the CIA identified the need for a concerted multi-agency effort to address on-street prostitution in Ipswich. This led to the inception of Operation Impression. A gold group was formed and a number of key agencies were invited onto the group. Smaller subgroups were created from the ongoing dialogue, with one overseeing the writing of a long-term strategy to remove on-street prostitution from the town.
- From another CIA during Operation Sumac, affected residents, the borough council, county council, police, IAG members and the vice steering group have been brought together to measure the community impact following significant events such as the ongoing trial of the suspect.
- SNTs play a key role in monitoring the impact of police activity in communities, as well as being part of reassurance strategies identified from this monitoring process. Their role in this area was particularly important during Operation Sumac and has been acknowledged as such by the SIO.

Work in progress

- The force is considering using more specific indicators to measure harm in communities. This will include interpreting existing indicators in the context of major crime, for example measuring public perceptions of safety after dark in areas that have both high and low levels of major crime. Also to be considered are the numbers of victims of major crime and the percentage of repeat victims.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. However, there is no security policy in place to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The force has an integrity policy to deal with inappropriate use of the intranet, internet and other force databases. There is a facility to monitor inappropriate use of the CIS by flagging either individual nominals, police officers, police staff or locations. Checks are made on a monthly basis on the top 30 internet users and the results are passed to BCU managers to determine any necessary action. The PSD has its own integrity and intelligence unit (IIU) which is involved in proactively monitoring lawful business activities such as internet gambling sites, as it is recognised that these have the potential to create financial problems which can in turn lead to criminal association.
- The IIU is staffed by a detective chief inspector (DCI), DS and DC with a police staff investigator and an analyst. The IIU sources work from: the DSHU (with which there is a protocol in place); confidential telephone lines and email addresses; reports from area managers; and Bebo or MySpace accounts.
- A civilian investigator within the IIU takes the regional lead on integrity testing, aiming to conduct two tests a year. Integrity testing has been used on specific operations as part of operation tactics, with test purchase officers or undercover officers being deployed when required.
- There are good links between the PSD, the OCD and the investigations directorate, with the provision of SIO support to the PSD when required. The PSD attends level 2 tasking meetings to identify any inappropriate staff links to operations or situations where information leaking could be an issue.
- Confidentiality agreements or inclusion notices are signed by all staff involved in sensitive operations, regardless of rank or role. This also includes representatives from partner agencies, however brief or infrequent their involvement may be.
- The force confidential reporting line, promoted through the force intranet, is becoming increasingly used. Confidence in both the telephone and the email facility is reflected in equal use.
- Access to MIRs is restricted to only those members of staff who require access for particular operations, and is controlled by keypad or swipe card systems. A clear desk policy is in place, so that all confidential or sensitive material is locked away at the end of the working day.
- Six posts requiring developed vetting have been identified. These are the ACPO team, the head of protective services and the DS and DI in special branch. PA members are vetted to a basic level, and if any member should fail this process then the final decision as to whether they remain on the authority rests with the chief executive.
- The force is a member of the Eastern Region anti-corruption group and attends quarterly meetings. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) is in place for the

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provision of specialist resources. Suffolk's IIU does not necessarily seek to use the force surveillance unit, and seeks regional support instead if required.

Work in progress

- The MIT implementation plan involves establishing a protocol around integrity testing to emphasise the professional standards required from staff. This may involve dip-sampling of expense and overtime claims.
- Access to individual HOLMES accounts is determined by the SIO and arranged by the system administrator. At present, the access rights of a member of staff are removed when they cease to work on an operation. While this method will continue with the implementation of the MIT, the challenge for the force will be to continue to control HOLMES access for investigations other than those within the MIT.
- A number of small-scale PSD collaboration initiatives exist between Norfolk and Suffolk Constabularies, including standardisation of policies and procedures. The expansion of this collaboration arrangement across the region has already been considered, with some joint integrity testing taking place, but it was found to be expensive.
- A larger collaboration arrangement across the six regional forces would require the setting up of a joint intelligence unit; but cost, the number of resources required and governance have been identified as major issues. The development of a regional proactive unit with surveillance capability would also then be required. This remains at the discussion stage among the six forces, but its benefits are already recognised.
- The central vetting unit has been in place since August 2007, but a vetting policy has yet to be introduced. The force is waiting for version two of the National Vetting Policy to be published in April 2008, but in the meantime the unit is working to comply with the requirements of version one. The vetting unit is currently identifying posts and the vetting level required for each, in accordance with national guidance. Once a force policy is in place, staff in high-risk roles will be vetted to an enhanced level. It is recognised that this will require co-operation from the staff associations and discussions are ongoing.
- The force expects that it will take at least six months to reach the position it aspires to with regard to vetting. A budget bid for support has been submitted and its outcome is awaited. The need to develop and embed a vetting unit in the force has also been acknowledged by the PA.
- IAG members have been vetted to the same basic level as PA members. At present, IAG members only see policy documents. If members were to become involved in operational matters, then further consideration would have to be given to their vetting status. A challenge for the force is how to deal with an IAG member in the event that they have a criminal conviction.

Areas for improvement

- There is an experienced SIO on the force PSD anti-corruption unit, but for some enquiries the PSD will co-opt an area DI or seek external assistance. Not all PSD

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staff have an investigative background; the force may accordingly wish to consider training PSD inspectors to PIP level two or three.

- Staffing of the force vetting unit is limited to a vetting manager and two assistants. The terms of reference do not include criminal records bureau (CRB) recruitment checks but do include vetting of all police officers, police staff and police community support officers, and issues of national security. Since January 2007, there have been 2,500 cases to process, half of which have related to personnel and estates matters. The staffing level is insufficient to manage this demand.
- The force should seek to consolidate and, as resources become available, extend the scope of the vetting unit to include management and financial vetting, thereby ensuring that all national requirements are met in full.
- The force must ensure that the list of security clearance (SC) vetted posts/individuals is current.
- Management vetting does not take place at all in advance of considering applications for SC. To do so will require an increase in resources in the vetting unit.
- No identification of high-risk/designated posts has been carried out or management vetting introduced for them. Consequently, there is no system in place to keep the list of SC vetted posts/individuals under review.
- There is no structured 'aftercare' regime for designated and other posts, although all staff are encouraged to report changes in circumstances.
- The force should examine whether HQ is the best location for the IIU. There has already been a situation where staff were compromised during a covert operation in 2007.
- Given the small size of the IIU, any requirement for additional specialist resources invariably has to be requested through regional collaboration arrangements.

Enforcement

Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are effective, with appropriate use made of advisory groups and community membership of gold command support groups.

Strengths

- The DCC has responsibility for protective services and takes an active role in the creation of a gold group when necessary. For example, Operations Sumac and Gable required the force to establish gold groups to meet extraordinary demand. The groups were also able to facilitate access to community advice.
- The force does not have specific or rigid criteria for the establishment of a gold group. Rather the decision tends to be based on a mature assessment of the circumstances of each incident, the need for community advice and the potential or likely impact of the incident. The decision is taken by the DCC in consultation with the SIO and/or BCU commander in whose area the incident has happened.
- PA members are prepared to challenge financial expenditure on investigations if they consider it to be excessive. Access to the financial management information system helps in this regard, and there are close links between the PA treasurer and the ACO (finance).
- There is a lead PA member for protective services who meets regularly with the respective leads and is briefed on broad strategic issues. She receives a limited input on operational matters. The member was an active participant at the recent protective services planning day on service provision and gaps.
- The PA has received a briefing on level 2 crime and protective services and in November 2007 considered a paper outlining the force's work in identifying the protective services gap and the actions put in place to address this.

Work in progress

- The PA improvement plan for 2008/09 includes an action to consider the introduction of a vetting process for members.

Area(s) for improvement

- PA members have only basic vetting and enhanced CRB checks. There is a PA member who leads for protective services but has yet to receive any specific vetting. At present, she relies on her military background to know that certain information should not be disclosed further. This is an area that the force must address to protect both itself and the individuals concerned.

Summary – The ACPO lead and the head of crime are trained in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The DCC has completed the SCIMITAR course and as a result of recent experience is now a guest speaker on the course. She is not on the ACPO OIOC list, although the head of protective services performed this role during Operation Sumac.
- The head of protective services has trained for the role of OIOC. He has also completed the management of linked and serious crime course.
- Recent experience from Operation Sumac, and quality-assurance work carried out by the ACPO homicide working group, have validated the ability of the force to deal with linked and series crimes. The NPIA review of Operation Sumac also highlighted the quality of management of the linked series of murders.
- Members of BCU command teams are trained in critical incident management. Some BCU commanders have also undertaken 'policing in partnership' training as part of the senior leadership development programme.
- All front-line supervisors have been briefed on critical incident management during the recent round of SF4U seminars. The recently received NPIA guidance on the management of critical incidents is currently under review.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force’s performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, cost, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- Monitoring and management of current major investigations is carried out in accordance with the force’s review policy. Operational debriefs are held at the conclusion of an investigation where considered necessary. The outcomes of reviews and debriefs are shared with force SIOs at a major crime policy procedure conference, which is held twice yearly.
- The force has recently created an electronic library of good practice for access by SIOs. This is managed by the director of investigations and includes examples of investigative strategies and good practice from within the force and beyond, although it could be further improved by introducing national good practice identified through the NPIA *Homicide Journal*.
- Part 8 reviews are dealt with by the public protection department and any lessons learnt are fed into the force, either through the major crime conferences, by changes to force policy, or at training days for various ranks.
- The head of protective services holds the budget for major crime investigations. Allocation of funding to a new investigation is made following assessment of a budget forecast, and a bid is made by the SIO. This is then subject to regular and ongoing review by the head of protective services or the head of the investigations directorate as the enquiry progresses.
- The force has carried out some preliminary work to cost each category of homicide to enable an SIO to make a realistic budgetary request in the early stages of an investigation. It is acknowledged that each investigation is different, but this does at least enable the SIO to have some indication of the likely initial budget required.
- Until the arrival of the new financial management system, budgets were set on the basis of historical data. BCU commanders and strategic leads are now given an overall budget, which can be allocated across their areas of responsibility as they consider necessary. They are also able to vire funds from one unit to another within their allocated budget as required.

Work in progress

- The ACO (finance) is responsible for monitoring the force major investigations budget and providing updates to the ACPO team. The force finance system was upgraded in November 2007; this will undoubtedly improve the quality of finance reports but it is expected that it will take until April 2008 for initial problems to be overcome.
- The ACO holds monthly and quarterly meetings with the head of protective services to review the department budget, while the chief accountant also reviews spending on a monthly basis. The introduction of the MIT will see the appointment of a dedicated finance officer within its structure to provide a more regular update of

spending on major investigations.

- The new financial management system has enabled a more open financial process in discussions at the FMB, with all budget holders aware of each other's allocation and current spending position. In 2008, the finance team will be able to drill down to base budgets so that budget holders can be held to greater account.

Areas for improvement

- There is a need to formalise the process of cascading lessons learnt so that these reach not only specialists but also other areas of the force. FOR staff are not routinely invited to major investigation debriefs and are seldom offered feedback on their involvement in these investigations.
- Separate debriefs for HOLMES staff are routinely held at the conclusion of a major inquiry. However, it is not clear whether any lessons learnt are shared formally or informally among other HOLMES staff across the various MIRs, other than by being introduced into future HOLMES training programmes.

Performance management and resilience

Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force and available through regional agreements to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; in addition, collaborative agreements with SOCA exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide partial protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- The structure of the scenes of crime department offers strong resilience to support major investigations. Both the scientific support manager and the principal SOCO are trained to perform the role of crime scene co-ordinator. The three area senior SOCOs (crime scene managers) are also trained as crime scene co-ordinators and a number of experienced area SOCOs are trained as crime scene managers. This means that at times of high demand the department is well placed to provide forensic management support across a number of major crime scenes, as well as providing a professional response to the 'golden hour' of an investigation.
- Excellent use has been made of the specialist advisers within the major crime service section of the Forensic Science Service (FSS). During Operation Sumac, advice was readily available in relation to forensic strategies, relevance of lines of enquiry, access to FSS laboratories and performing out-of-hours work. However, the force has taken the decision not to use the sexual offences service within the FSS as it does not represent value for money based on the low number of force submissions in this crime area,.
- The authority to call out a Home Office pathologist is held by the head of protective services and the director of investigations. Whenever it is considered appropriate, a pathologist is invited to attend a major crime scene.
- Familiarity with golden hour principles among FOR staff is good. Call-out procedures for SIOs and SOCOs work well and contact sheets are easily accessible within the FOR. In most cases it is the area DI who is contacted first to make an initial assessment of a major crime scene, before consideration is given to contacting a force SIO.
- A review of how rape is investigated by the force began in September 2007, as part of the protective services directorate three-year plan. The review will be revisited in April and September 2008 and takes account of National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) guidance and the national rape stock-take.
- All allegations of stranger rape are investigated by a force SIO and invariably placed on the HOLMES system. All rape allegations investigated on BCUs are dealt with by a DS or DC, but overall management remains the responsibility of the area DI.
- The force has three VCCs located across the county. These centres enable victims of rape or other serious sexual assault to be examined and interviewed under one roof, rather than having to be transported to different locations. As well as medical examination rooms, there are also video interviewing facilities set in an atmosphere

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that is designed to make the victim feel they are not in a police environment.

- There is a dedicated force rape champion at DCI level as well as a rape action plan in place to drive improvements in the quality of investigation and victim care. This includes the trialling of rape surgeries where investigating officers can meet with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). In addition, the rape champion meets with his CPS equivalent every two months; and post-trial feedback is received from prosecuting counsel through the quarterly rape forum. The force is also looking to introduce rape champions at a senior level on each BCU.
- Evidence of effective succession planning and training for major crime can be found in the minutes of various meetings, including those of the CID resource allocation group. This group regularly reviews succession planning for the CID and plans training with the force training officer, who is a member of the group.
- The force has a dedicated detective training department, which runs a number of courses to support all detective staff. The training department is accredited and co-ordinates a number of regional courses, including a regional surveillance course.
- All HOLMES training is carried out by the major investigations HOLMES team, and a standard approach is adopted whereby all attendees on the HOLMES course receive the same training. This ensures a degree of familiarity with the different functions and roles of the system. SIOs receive a two-day bespoke awareness course on HOLMES.
- There are three indexing supervisors, who have additional responsibility for matters such as HOLMES training and administration issues.
- The force is flexible in the way roles are assigned to HOLMES staff, and the assessment of this is based on the nature of the incident being investigated. For example, in a category C homicide investigation, there may be some staff who perform more than one role, such as document reader and receiver. This is a consideration for the SIO, who will take advice from the HOLMES manager, but there are no combinations of roles that the force considers mutually exclusive. While this approach is not necessarily in accordance with MIRSAP, the assessment of each case on its merits offsets the risk of combining roles. The appointment of an office manager for every major investigation also ensures that a supervisory role is provided to the HOLMES functions.
- The HOLMES Eastern Region user group meets regularly to share good practice and engender consistency across the regional forces in terms of training. This ensures that, at times of mutual aid, regional officers are able to operate consistently. There is also an agreement to share training resources, so that for example if Cambridgeshire Constabulary was running a HOLMES course and Suffolk Constabulary had one indexer to be trained, the Suffolk officer could attend the Cambridgeshire course to avoid having to wait for one in force.
- In times of exceptional demand the force has experience of collaborating with regional forces to provide and manage MIRWEB (a web-based message input facility directly linked to the HOLMES2 Incident room database). During Operation Sumac, the force effectively employed a message assessment centre to handle all information.

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- A total of 60 trained call takers is available for the casualty bureau, of whom four have been trained in HOLMES. The force has undertaken to resource eight call lines on a short-term basis for the casualty bureau, though this number would fall to six if they were required over a longer period. All call takers are police staff; a small number are taken from the contact centre and operations room, but these staff will only be deployed on their rest days so that abstractions do not impact on the FOR.

Work in progress

- There are plans to draw up protocols for unexplained deaths in prisons, hospitals or care homes. A protocol has recently been drafted for deaths on military establishments, and this awaits ratification. The force has experience of dealing with deaths in medical establishments, adhering to NHS and ACPO protocols.
- A major crime procedure document outlines the command structure for major investigations and the procedures to be followed for major crime inquiries, in accordance with the force major investigation policy document. It states that a detective superintendent will be responsible for major crime investigations, and this is currently the director of investigations. The document also sets out the actions to be taken by the first officer at the scene of a major crime. However, this document was last reviewed in 2004 and will require rewriting with the introduction of the MIT.
- The force has reviewed the number of accredited SIOs that it needs and has decided upon a total of five; they are now working towards accreditation at PIP level 3. They are the director of investigations together with two DCIs and two DIs responsible for major investigations they are identified on the interim SIO register held by the NPIA. A number of other senior officers cover the SIO rota and provide the initial response to call-out for major investigations, but are not then responsible for leading the subsequent investigations and therefore do not require PIP status.
- The force lead for PIP is the director of investigations. Significant progress is being made to ensure that the force is on target to meet the implementation date of April 2009.
- The head of roads policing is aiming to establish a road death investigation team, with staff trained to PIP level two. The absence of officers trained to this level has sometimes caused difficulties in interviewing suspects and significant witnesses.
- While the force has sufficient trained staff, equipment and accommodation to meet predictable demands, it is acknowledged that at present these resources are not dedicated and therefore impact on BCUs. However, this issue will be addressed with the implementation of the MIT in April 2008. Staff selection processes have already begun and a transition period for selected staff was introduced in January.
- The force position in relation to a duty management system and related skills database is currently being reviewed, with a budget and project team allocated. The force will use a web-based IT system, developed in-house, as an interim measure prior to purchasing a dedicated system.
- There is scope to improve the basic investigation of rape cases, for example by attaching a copy of the victim's account when submitting items for forensic analysis

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to the FSS. The force rape champion is preparing a checklist based on NCPE guidance on investigating sexual offences. It is hoped that this will improve the quality of BCU investigations of these offences, as the force has identified knowledge in this area to be poor.

- It is intended that the MIT will continue to support BCUs with serious crime issues when officers are available. MIT officers will perform weekend duties and are to be made available to BCUs as additional resources, if there are no major crime investigations to be dealt with. An MOU between the MIT and BCUs is being prepared to include lines of responsibility and issues of deployment and communication.
- There is a perception within the force that the introduction of the MIT will mean that BCUs will never have to provide detective resources to MIT investigations. This is not correct, as in periods of excessive demand the provision of some additional resources to the MIT may be necessary. The force may wish to revisit the way the MIT is being marketed across the force, and ensure that the staffing of the MIT when demand is excessive features within the proposed memorandum.
- The force has five interview advisers trained to tier 5 standard. There are plans for the MIT to have its own small cadre of such officers.

Areas for improvement

- There is no minimum standard or policy in relation to supervisors or CID officers responding to sudden deaths, although a DS will attend all potentially suspicious deaths. This situation needs addressing, as there is the danger that possible homicide cases are being missed at an early stage and potential evidence lost.
- The force does not keep records to monitor the number of unexplained or sudden deaths responded to or the percentage investigated.
- The FOR has not taken up the opportunity for the SOCA AKEU to conduct a health check to assess its ability to respond to a kidnap situation. This would be a benefit and the force may wish to review the advantages this opportunity would bring.
- The golden hour principles are familiar to SNT officers but there has been little or no formal training beyond initial courses. Any training that officers receive is through email, which many officers interviewed said they disregarded owing to the sheer volume of information sent by email that they have to deal with.
- The patrol directory contains a section on major incidents and scene preservation, but this has not been updated for over two years. Response and SNT officers were familiar with the use of scene logs but had not received any formal training on how to complete them, despite asking for it. Officers also commented on how they never receive feedback on the standard of scene logs completed and submitted to the MIR.
- In the event of a major investigation starting, HOLMES staff from the investigations directorate will be appointed to the positions of office manager and indexing supervisor. The remaining HOLMES staff will be provided by BCUs. This creates

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difficulties between the MIR and BCUs, as staff are generally released on the basis of their availability rather than their ability to perform the role required. It is acknowledged, however, that this situation should be overcome in April 2008 with the introduction of the MIT, which will include a dedicated HOLMES team to deal with all MIT investigations.

- The role of office manager for a major investigation is allocated to one of three DCs, while a DS will usually perform the receiver role. Although this means a constable is in fact checking a sergeant's work, the force is satisfied that this arrangement works and staff interviewed had no issue with this. However, this may be due primarily to the experience of the post-holders. The force should therefore consider the long-term sustainability of allocating important HOLMES roles in this way.
- There are often difficulties in securing the release of a serious sexual offence-trained officer during the daytime to deal with victims, as these officers are located on BCUs, which are reluctant to make staff available. This is less of a problem at night or weekends when a call-out rota is in operation. This difficulty needs to be addressed to ensure that the quality of service to victims is not diminished.
- A plan for investigating kidnap and food contamination offences appears as an appendix to the 2003 major investigations policy document. This needs to be reviewed and updated, as it refers to departments and organisations that no longer exist.
- The force moved to version 12 of HOLMES in December 2007. While new changes are communicated to staff working on current operations, other HOLMES-trained staff and SIOs are not included in this circulation. The force needs to ensure that all appropriate staff are informed of changes that any HOLMES update brings.
- DCs from BCU CID are routinely abstracted to support major investigations. Their current workload is either taken with them or redistributed across the department. Backfilling of roles is achieved by moving officers from BCU proactive units, or alternatively officers are not replaced at all. This increases the workload and pressure on the remaining CID officers. While it is acknowledged that this situation will be overcome with the implementation of the MIT, it is nonetheless currently an area for improvement.

Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Elements of equipment and resources are delivered through written collaborative agreements, which are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.

Strengths

- In August 2007, the force commissioned a project team to conduct a microanalysis and risk assessment of the projected gaps in Suffolk's protective services capability and capacity. The project team's terms of reference included a requirement to assess the demands likely to be made on the force in the future. The project team considered the demands for the next 12 months, identified any gaps in the provision of protective services and made suggestions regarding the most appropriate means of closing them. A summary of its findings was presented to the FMB and PA by way of a formal paper in November 2007.
- While the gap analysis work has improved understanding, it remains very much an ongoing and dynamic process of risk assessment and management. A variety of options remain under consideration in order to address the gaps both internally and externally through collaboration. This work is now overseen by the protective services directorate in the form of a dynamic action plan.
- Following both the force operational strategic assessment and the organisational strategic assessment in November 2007, protective services have achieved a high priority. Specifically, in respect of the operational strategic assessment, organised crime, public protection (domestic abuse), road safety and community knowledge have all been highlighted as operational priorities for the force in the coming year. In addition, protective services feature as a high priority within the organisational strategic assessment.
- In response to the National Community Safety Plan 2006–09 (Key Priority 4), areas detailed in the force 2007/08 local policing plan to achieve this priority have now been delivered. These were the creation of an organised crime directorate to lead investigations into organised criminal activities across the county and in partnership with neighbouring forces and other agencies; and the creation of a public protection directorate to strengthen the strategic management and monitoring of RSOs and potentially dangerous offenders in Suffolk. The latter directorate will also enhance the constabulary's response to safeguarding children and vulnerable adults, including from online, internet-based criminality. Finally, the local policing plan outlines the will to utilise the ANPR data centre to enhance the prevention and detection of serious and organised crime and terrorism offences.
- The force is heavily involved in a number of collaborative ventures with sister forces in the Eastern Region under the auspices of the six counties collaboration (serious and organised crime) group.

Work in progress

- The force training manager is involved in the co-ordination of collaborative training arrangements to the benefit of the force. This is evident through the initial CID programme and work in progress on the initial management of serious crime course,

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together with a number of internal courses such as the advanced suspect, witness and family liaison courses. The force also receives support from Essex Police as the regional lead for undercover and test purchase (TP) work.

- The protective services directorate has a three-year plan, within which each individual directorate (investigations, scientific support, firearms services, roads policing, contingency planning, organised crime, intelligence and public protection) has its own priorities.

Areas for improvement

- There are issues of supervisory resilience within some departments of the OCD. There is no sergeant to line-manage the four new investigators attached to the OCU; instead, a DS on the OCU itself carries out this role. Furthermore, there is no sergeant on the TP/undercover unit; instead, another DS on the OCU carries out this role. In addition, there is one DI to look after the OCU/technical support unit/financial investigation unit functions. In the event of high demand from major crime enquiries this could prove to be an area of vulnerability.
- A number of key policies are out-of-date and have not been reviewed for over two years. Policies and procedures are currently 'owned' by departments, which allocate the production and revision of the documents to staff within their domain. This process is overseen corporately by executive services, which provides standard templates and guidance. A quality assurance process is undertaken when the documents are passed to executive services to be uploaded onto the intranet, although this is primarily concerned with format compliance. The strategic options group is reviewing a number of major processes within the force, and this activity includes a review of how the force corporately manages policies and procedures. Nonetheless, the force must address this issue as a priority.

Summary – The force is in the process of establishing a full-time and dedicated case review team that will be deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is in development.

Strengths

- The force applies a three-tier system to the investigation of fatal road traffic collisions. Tier three comprises the most serious or complex cases, such as those in which the driver failed to stop or there is a potential manslaughter factor. In such cases, a crime SIO will be deployed to either lead the investigation or have an advisory capacity to the roads policing SIO.
- The size of the investigation team for tier three cases will depend on the circumstances and the number of inquiries required. Some cases will need HOLMES support, in which case staff will be provided from the HOLMES team.
- For fatal road traffic collisions there are ten trained FLOs supported by two trained co-ordinators. There is a mandatory referral system to the occupational health unit for traffic FLOs on an annual basis, although each deployment is risk-assessed by the co-ordinator, who monitors deployments and individual workloads. While road policing FLOs do occasionally support crime investigations, the same does not apply in reverse to crime FLOs.
- If a decision is made to re-open a cold case inquiry, the matter will go before the force TTCG to determine what, if any, resources will be allocated. An example of a recent case is Operation Atrium, an unsolved sexual offence from 1991. This enquiry has now been placed onto HOLMES and resources secured through the TTCG process.
- The head of protective services meets on a monthly basis with the Chief Constable to brief him on major crime issues and to consider ongoing investigations. A template is used which includes brief details of the crime, costs to date, outcomes, community issues and any aggravating factors. This is a useful forum for any strategic intervention deemed necessary by a chief officer.

Work in progress

- The new MIT will include a review team with responsibility for reviewing both live and cold cases, but without an investigative capability. The process for cold cases will be to identify suitable cases and place them before a review board, comprising the head of protective services, the director of investigations and a BCU commander. When a cold case has been assessed as suitable for reinvestigation, it will be presented to the TTCG meeting for ratification. Resources will be provided from within the MIT, including the SIO.
- All historical unsolved homicide enquiries are to be the responsibility of a nominated SIO within the MIT and will be formally examined at least every two years. This is to ensure that any new potential lines of inquiry are not overlooked.

Areas for improvement

- The new review team consists of a support staff supervisor and two support staff,

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located at Bury St Edmunds, separate from the MIT. The rationale for this is to retain staff at this location who were at risk of being made redundant through the strategic options process of moving various departments, and for whom travelling elsewhere would prove difficult. This decision has caused a degree of tension in the force over the location of the new team and the suitability of its staff. Given the key role that this unit will play, the force must actively ensure that those recruited hold appropriate levels of skill and expertise.

- The role of the new review team will be to examine cold cases and consider the potential to exploit forensic or other investigative opportunities. If a case is identified as suitable, responsibility for its reinvestigation will fall to the MIT. The review team will therefore not actually be a dedicated review team, as its function will be to assess whether cases are suitable for review rather than to carry out the actual review process.
- While the force has responded to referrals from Operation Advance (a review of undetected serious sexual offences from the 1990s), commitment has been variable. New major investigations will take priority for resourcing, meaning that Operation Advance cases will be kept pending until they can be revisited. This is a risk, in that potential suspects could be reoffending while there was the possibility of identifying them. There is also the matter of quality of service to the victim, who may be informed that a case has been reopened only to be told later that it has been suspended.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force is predominantly compliant with the relevant ACPO standards of the *Murder Investigation Manual* and Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures.

Strengths

- A policy file is completed for every major investigation, whether this is a HOLMES or manual index inquiry. Force policy requires policy files to be examined after the first five, 12 and 19 days of an investigation and thereafter every 14 days. The officer examining will depend on the rank of the SIO. If the SIO is the head of investigations, then the examining officer will be the ACC. If the SIO is below the rank of superintendent, the examining officer will be the head of investigations. In practice, and in addition to force policy, the head of protective services or the head of investigations will examine policy files and countersign them during the first few days of an investigation.
- Doctrinal guidance documents from the NPIA are distributed to each relevant business lead, who determines how findings or recommendations should be disseminated. There is no formal system to confirm that the force complies with or responds to doctrinal documents, although the force is considering introducing one.
- Force SIOs displayed a sound awareness of the principles and component parts of the ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual*.

Work in progress

- The force plans to review MIRSAP against existing force procedures to ensure compliance.
- The force intends to review how it resources house-to-house enquiries as well as the quality of this key area of investigation.

Areas for improvement

- The use of DCs as office managers within MIRs does not comply with MIRSAP, which states that office managers should be of a supervisory rank. Although the use of DCs in this role has not created any difficulties for the force so far, it may wish to revisit this arrangement to ensure that it stands scrutiny in the event of an external review or a public inquiry.
- The decision to use HOLMES on a major investigation rests with the head of protective services or the head of investigations. There are occasions when a manual index will be used to manage a large inquiry, for example a category C homicide. The force must be satisfied that the reasons behind such decisions are robust, as there have been occasions, albeit not recently, when investigations have begun on a manual system but circumstances have changed in such a way as to require the use of HOLMES. This has caused duplication of effort and confusion among staff.
- There are occasions when the force uses the combined roles of HOLMES staff for smaller investigations. The inspection team found that in such cases one individual

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could act as both office manager and indexer, with the SIO performing the quality control duties of the office manager. The force may wish to re-examine this combination, which is contrary to MIRSAP. MIRSAP recommends that in the case of combined roles, two separate individuals should perform the roles of SIO and office manager.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACO	assistant chief officer
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
AFO	authorised firearms officer
AIU	area intelligence unit
AKEU	anti-kidnap and extortion unit
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition

B

BCU	basic command unit
BOF	back-office facility

C

CAB	compliance and authorities bureau
CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CEOP	Child Exploitation and On-line Protection Centre
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CIA	community impact assessment
CID	criminal investigation department
CIS	crime information system
CMP	covert monitoring post
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CRB	Criminal Records Bureau

D

DAAT	Drug and alcohol action team
DC	detective constable

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DCC	deputy chief constable
DCI	detective chief inspector
DI	detective inspector
DMM	daily management meeting
DMS	duty management system
DS	detective sergeant
DSHU	dedicated source handling unit

E

EDMS	electronic document management solution
ERIU	Eastern Region intelligence unit

F

FIB	force intelligence bureau
FIU	financial investigation unit
FLO	family liaison officer
FMB	force management board
FOR	force operations room
FSA	force strategic assessment
FSS	Forensic Science Service

G

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HQ	headquarters
HTCU	high-tech crime unit

I

IAG	independent advisory group
ICIDP	Initial Crime Investigators' Development Programme
IDO	intelligence development officer
IIU	integrity and intelligence unit
IMPACT (Yes)	intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking
INI	IMPACT nominal index
IPDLP	Initial Police Learning and Development Programme
IPE	intelligence, prevention and enforcement
ISCRE	Ipswich and Suffolk Commission for Racial Equality
ISR	intelligence source register
IT	information technology

K

KIN	key individual network
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M

MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MARAC	multi-agency risk assessment conference
MAST	mobile armed surveillance team
MIR	major incident room
MIRSAP	major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MIT	major incident team
MoPI	management of police information
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MSF	most similar force(s)

N

NCD	National Compromise Database
NCPE	National Centre for Policing Excellence

NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NPSAT	National Protective Services Analysis Tool

O

OCD	organised crime directorate
OCG	organised crime group
OCU	organised crime unit
OIOC	officer in overall command
OLIT	online investigation team

P

PA	police authority
PCT	primary care trust
PDB	performance delivery board
PESTELO	political, environmental, social, technological, economic, legal and organisational
PIP	professionalising the investigative process
PNC	Police National Computer
PNICC	Police National Information and Co-ordination Centre
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
PSD	professional standards department

R

RIG	regional intelligence group
RRD	review, retention and disposal
RSO	registered sex offender

S

SAR	suspicious activity report
SC	security clearance

SCAS	Serious Crime Analysis Section
SCIMITAR	Serious Crime Intelligence Management Information Technology and Resources
SF4U	Suffolk First For You
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SNT	safer neighbourhood team
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SOCO	scenes of crime officer
SOG	strategic operations group
SPI	statutory performance indicator
STABS	Suffolk tasking and briefing system
T	
TP	test purchase
TPO	test purchase operative
TSU	technical support unit
TTCG	tactical tasking and co-ordination group
V	
VCC	victim care centre
W	
WPU	witness protection unit
Y	
YOT	youth offending team