

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Staffordshire Police Major Crime

July 2008



Staffordshire Police – HMIC Inspection Report

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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical description of force area

Staffordshire is a diverse county encompassing Stoke-on-Trent and the Peak District in the north and curving above the urban West Midlands in the south. With a total population of approximately 1.062 million, the county has pockets of high-density housing as well as large expanses of countryside. The single largest seats of population are Stoke-on-Trent and Newcastle-under-Lyme in the north, the county town of Stafford in the centre of the county, and the towns of Burton and Tamworth in the east.

Pockets of affluence exist in the commuter belt in the south, but there are also areas of extensive deprivation in the Stoke-on-Trent and Burton areas.

Staffordshire benefits from a number of key transport routes – the M6, M6 Toll, M42 and M54 motorways all pass through the county. However, while these bring prosperity, they also assist cross-border crime – from the West Midlands in the south and from Manchester and Merseyside in the north – and are a source of major congestion, road traffic accidents and strategic roads policing challenges.

To address the diverse needs of such different communities, Staffordshire Police delivers its services from four basic command units (BCUs), which are, in turn, divided into 21 neighbourhood policing units (NPU's).

Chase Division

Stretching from Trentham in the north to Kinver in the south, Chase Division includes Stafford, Stone, Cannock, Rugeley, Penkridge and Wombourne. The division is home to around 323,000 people, covers 419 square miles and has three crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs), which work with the police to address local concerns.

North Staffordshire Division

Covering large areas of the Peak District National Park, North Staffordshire Division has around 219,000 residents, mostly in Newcastle-under-Lyme, Leek, Kidsgrove, Cheadle and Biddulph. There are two CDRPs, which work with the police to tackle issues of local concern. The division covers 303 square miles.

Stoke-on-Trent Division

Stoke-on-Trent Division covers 36 square miles, has a population of just over 239,000 and is the most densely populated of the force's four divisions, creating a major policing challenge. It covers the six historic pottery towns of Stoke, Hanley, Burslem, Longton, Tunstall and Fenton. The division is coterminous with the unitary authority of Stoke-on-Trent.

Trent Valley Division

Trent Valley Division covers 300 square miles of East Staffordshire and has a population of around 279,000 people. With headquarters (HQ) at Burton, it is split into five NPU's. These units work from five main police stations at Burton, Tamworth, Lichfield, Chasetown and Uttoxeter. There are three CDRPs within this area.

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Demographic profile of force area

The following table contains a breakdown of the population and households of Staffordshire. Figures are presented at CDRP, division and force levels.

From mid year estimates 2006	Population	Households
North Staffordshire Division	219,097	91,306
Staffordshire Moorlands	95,322	39,514
Newcastle-under-Lyme	123,775	51,792
Chase Division	323,836	132,251
Cannock	94,301	38,066
South Staffordshire	106,165	42,498
Stafford Borough	123,370	51,687
Stoke-on-Trent Division	239,669	103,647
Trent Valley Division	279,859	112,712
East Staffordshire	107,691	44,270
Lichfield	96,745	38,612
Tamworth	75,423	29,830
Grand total – force	1,062,461	439,916

Ethnicity – from 2001 census	Population	Percentage of total
White	787,620	97.63%
Mixed	4,952	0.61%
Asian or British Asian	9,406	1.17%
Black or Black British	2,625	0.33%
Chinese or Other Ethnic Group	2,141	0.27%
All	806,744	100.00%

Unemployment at 10 May 2007	Male	Female	All	Percentage of working-age population
Staffordshire	5,815	2,336	8,151	1.6%

Strategic priorities and direction

Staffordshire Police's priorities for 2008/09 focus on delivering quality services – tailored to the needs of individuals – and building trust and confidence among Staffordshire communities. Through the continued reduction of bureaucracy and more proportionate approach to performance, the force will free up time to deliver a better service and focus on the issues that really matter to communities.

Priority areas are as follows:

- Improve understanding of what really matters to people.
- Improve the way anti-social behaviour and crime are dealt with.
- Improve the satisfaction levels for victims of crime.
- Improve the satisfaction levels for victims of anti-social behaviour.
- Reduce serious and violent crime.
- Reduce serious acquisitive crime.
- Reduce business-related crime.
- Increase the sanction detection rate for serious violence.
- Increase the sanction detection rate for serious acquisitive crime.

Key initiatives to improve performance during 2007/08

The past year has been one of transition, as the force has moved forward into the trust and confidence strategy.

The focus on the delivery of the force's trust and confidence strategy through quality services has brought about a massive change, which permeates right through the force. Underpinning the whole strategy is the Chief Constable's pledge to free up more time for officers to be deployed on front-line duties by reducing the amount of time lost through bureaucratic systems.

Addressing the amount of paperwork officers have to complete has begun in earnest. The introduction of a new slimline crime report for lower-level crime is estimated to save more than 41,000 hours a year of officer time. The domestic investigation log, which is completed more than 7,000 times a year, has been reduced from 26 pages to just seven, and a 16-page traffic collisions report, filled out at least 10,000 times a year, has been reduced by half to just eight pages.

The use of technology has also been explored to cut bureaucracy. Trials have been running of hand-held, mini-computer devices to give officers on patrol instant access to the force's information systems and to complete administration.

Sir Ronnie Flanagan's *Review of Policing* highlighted the fact that the 'risk averse' attitude of the service as a whole contributed to the amount of unnecessary bureaucracy it faced. To combat this, the Chief Constable and the police authority undertook to support and encourage officers in Staffordshire Police to exercise greater professional judgement and make greater use of discretion. This should be achieved through 'value-based' decision making – using discretion and judgement in ways consistent with the values of the force.

The government's deadline for the introduction of neighbourhood policing was 31 March 2008. Neighbourhood policing was introduced by Staffordshire Police well before this date and has now been embedded fully in the force. Every neighbourhood has visible, contactable officers responsible for its policing, who work with the community to keep it safe. The force's contribution to the development of this type of policing was recognised by a visit from the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, in February 2008. Mr Brown spoke to call-

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handling staff as he toured the area control room before taking part in a discussion with officers representing each of the force's four divisions.

A stocktake of protective services has been undertaken with other forces within the West Midlands ACPO Region (West Midlands, West Mercia and Warwickshire). This stocktake has identified where current collaborative arrangements exist, those being developed and identifies further opportunities.

Operation Nemesis, the force's campaign to defeat drug dealers, has been rolled out across the divisions during the last year. Several arrest days, involving up to 350 officers, have been staged, resulting in the arrests of dozens of people and the seizure of hundreds of thousands of pounds of drugs and cash.

Nemesis encourages members of the public to pass on information to the force, either directly or through Crimestoppers, regarding the activities of drug dealers. It is a joint effort between the force and community residents to try and improve their quality of life.

The force's approach to policing Stoke City and Port Vale football fixtures has again ensured the vast majority of peaceful supporters enjoyed games free from hooliganism. It is anticipated that this record will be maintained in the coming year, as Stoke City enjoys its promotion to the Barclays Premier League.

Force developments since 2007

The force had the highest rating in the country in the Audit Commission's police use of resources audit. Staffordshire was the only force to get top scores in four of five financial performance areas evaluated by the Audit Commission. In addition, Staffordshire was one of only two forces featured as best practice case studies in the commission's police use of resources report, and among only seven said to have performed strongly in 2006/07.

The Audit Commission report went on to single out Staffordshire for "delivering value for money through improved efficiency and productivity", and detailed how the force and authority were working together to deliver outstanding services.

Further strides were made in the force and authority's bid to make diversity a mainstream issue with the publication of a joint equality scheme in December 2007. The scheme brought together details of policies and action plans for all six strands of diversity. The main policy document remains current for three years and the action plans are 'living documents' updated regularly. Further developments have seen the drafting of separate, but fully integrated equality schemes for both the force and the police authority, outlining the responsibilities of each. Efforts to drive forward diversity will remain joint and co-ordinated.

October saw the official opening of the new Rowley Building at Weston Road, Stafford. Scientific support, crime and operations (now known as protective services) and a number of support departments relocated from HQ into new, purpose-built offices and accommodation in the weeks prior to the opening, presided over by four former Chief Constables, Mr Sims and representatives of the police authority.

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Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard.
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Contextual factors

Staffordshire Police has a deserved reputation for high performance and innovation. A recent example is the creation of a protective services division comprising the former crime and operations divisions under one line management structure. Nationally, the force has a comparatively low level of threat from major crime; however, it has suffered two high profile offences, one of grave desecration by animal rights extremists and the other a high-profile, 'gangland-style' execution. The force conducted complex investigations into both of these offences and successfully brought the offenders to justice. The force has made a significant investment in its capacity and capability to deal with the threats posed by major crime and has identified where further investment is needed, working with the police authority to secure funding for the additional growth. The force is working with Warwickshire Police, West Mercia Constabulary and West Midlands Police (WMP) to further enhance regional collaboration and it also has strong arrangements in place with the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) to combat the threat posed by major crime. The force response to these threats is well led and supported by competent and motivated staff.

This element of the inspection report details Staffordshire Police's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.178	0.237	+33.15%	0.333
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.001
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.038	0.047	+23.68%	0.090
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	125.00%	80.00%	-45pp*	88.87%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.332	0.114	-65.66%	0.174
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	20.00%	58.33%	+38.33pp*	42.45%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.275	0.123	-55.27%	0.311

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% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	17.24%	107.69%	+90.45pp*	53.30%
Number of manslaughters per 10,000 population	0.028	0.047	+67.86%	0.019
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	100.00%	80.00%	-20pp*	Not applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.114	0.104	-8.77%	0.102
% of murders detected/convicted	108.33%	72.73%	-35.6pp*	96.38%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	2.739	2.341	-14.53%	2.525
% of rapes detected/convicted	24.91%	22.27%	-2.64pp*	21.33%

*pp' is percentage points.

**Most similar force (MSF) group for Staffordshire is Cambridgeshire, Cheshire, Derbyshire, Hampshire, Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Warwickshire.

From the statutory performance indicator (SPI) data in the table above, it can be seen that the crime type of manslaughter poses a threat to Staffordshire Police. The rate of offences (per 10,000 population) rose significantly in 2007 and is above the MSF average. It is also among the highest in England and Wales.

The SPI data also indicates that major crime investigation in Staffordshire Police is strong when compared with the rest of the MSF group. Staffordshire is performing at a level above the MSF average in most cases, though it should be noted that after significant drops in 2007, the sanction detection rates for attempted murder and murder have fallen below the MSF average.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT), published in September 2007, indicated that Staffordshire was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to homicide, rape and kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Staffordshire Police has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types is thoroughly mapped. It is currently estimated that 135 OCGs impact the force area across 18 crime types.

The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified counter-terrorism as its major crime priority within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on terrorism and the emerging issue of gun crime.

Within the documentation provided, the issues have broadly been identified and addressed.

The force has invested substantial resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, minimise risks to the public and inhibit major crime. In particular,

Staffordshire Police's role in the development of intelligence from prisons at a regional level is noteworthy.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a high level of sophistication in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with WMP, SOCA, HMRC, the UK Border Agency and Her Majesty's Prison Service (HMPS) are recognised.

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Intelligence

Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime and to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- The force has a dedicated major investigation department (MID), which is responsible for the investigation of all major crime incidents in the force.
- The force defines major crime as any reactive police investigation concerning actual or suspected murder, manslaughter or other homicide, terrorism, product contamination, kidnap and extortion, stranger abduction, stranger series rape and certain categories of armed robbery with significant aggravating factors.
- Additionally, it has adapted the national homicide categories to prioritise major investigations, namely:
 - Category A – a major crime of grave concern where the identity of the offender is not apparent or ample evidence has yet to be secured.
 - Category B – a major crime where the identity of the offender is not apparent or ample evidence has yet to be secured.
 - Category C – a major crime where the identity of the offender is apparent or ample evidence can easily be secured.
 - Category D – any incidents where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, the family and/or the community.
- The protective services divisional commander decides on the category of an investigation, in consultation with the assistant chief constable (ACC) (operations)

Major crime demand since 2005/06 has included;

	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08 (not incl March 08)
Homicide*	14	13	12
Rape	292	285	219
Kidnap	30	21	22
Total	336	319	253

*The number of homicides relates to the number of deaths in the force area and not the number of homicide investigations, as one investigation could involve more than one death.

- The force has an appropriately resourced MID, comprising 123 staff divided into four syndicates. The syndicates are currently based at three separate locations across the force area and a typical syndicate comprises a detective chief inspector (DCI), a detective inspector (DI), three detective sergeants (DSs), 17 detective constables (DCs), three indexers, two typists, one analyst and an administrative staff member. There are four tier 5 interview advisers in the MID.
- Each syndicate is self-sufficient in respect of Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) document management and indexing staff, as well as

disclosure and exhibits officers.

- The MID has four analysts, two of whom are police officers, who on occasions are used for other roles within a major investigation. The MID analysts provide analytical support to ongoing investigations and force intelligence bureau (FIB) analysts complete the homicide problem profile.
- FIB analysts produce a range of knowledge products that contain prevention, intelligence, enforcement and reassurance (PIER) recommendations.
- The rationale for the creation and size of the MID was based on a three-year average of the number of staff precepted to major crime investigations.
- Force policy requires the host BCU to support any major investigation for the first 72 hours and meet its own costs. After this time, the MID takes responsibility for staffing and funding the investigation. This approach works well and is supported by both BCUs and protective services division staff.
- On average, the MID undertakes 30 new investigations each year, including all homicide offences.

Work in progress

- The MID is piloting a dedicated intelligence cell comprising 11.5 full-time equivalent (FTE) posts to support major investigations, and this is likely to lead to the creation of a permanent intelligence cell in the MID of 18 posts. It will fulfil the intelligence requirements of future major investigations, reducing the need for staff from the FIB to support major crime investigations, allowing them to concentrate on the core tasks.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force’s community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.

Strengths

- The force maintains a strong partnership relationship with other law enforcement agencies.
- The force has effective relationships with SOCA and the counter-terrorism unit (CTU), which enable it to share intelligence to manage the threats posed by OCGs operating at levels 2 and 3.
- Staffordshire Police special branch is working with the Midlands community engagement rich picture team within the CTU to deliver ‘rich picture’ intelligence requirements; these help to identify people with the potential to radicalise others, and those who may be susceptible to radicalisation.
- One example is Operation Incendio to combat the threat of people being radicalised while in prison.
- The force shares intelligence about levels 2 and 3 crime with partners, where appropriate. An example is the consolidation phase of Operation Nemesis, a major operation to combat the threat posed by OCGs engaged in Class A drug supply. The operation involved information and intelligence sharing with the CDRP, the drug action team (DAT), the primary care trust (PCT) and social services. This was important, as it allowed partners to assess any potential increase in demand for their services.
- The force has developed Operation Acontine, a partnership group which meets quarterly to tackle VAT fraud. The group, which includes representatives from Cheshire Constabulary and HMRC, commissioned Project Walnut, a problem profile on VAT fraud. This has enabled the group to develop operational responses to specific threats.
- Each of the six CDRPs in Staffordshire has its own dedicated analyst, employed by Staffordshire Police. The analysts have full access to Staffordshire Police’s main IT systems.
- Level 2 knowledge products are commissioned by the level 2 tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TTCG), where decisions are made about sharing products. If a product is to be shared with BCUs or CDRPs, it is emailed to their analysts.
- The force shares intelligence about offences that are seen as precursor offences to homicide. BCUs manage multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) and multi-agency risk assessment conferences (MARACs) locally. The DCI chairs MAPPA meetings and a DI attends the MARAC meetings.
- Community impact assessments (CIAs) are routinely conducted by neighbourhood policing team supervisors in respect of all major crime investigations and reviewed daily by a member of the BCU senior management team (SMT).

Work in progress

- The force is leading collaboration between HMPS, WMP, Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Constabulary to develop a regional approach to enhancing the use of intelligence from prisons. The project involves the 14 prisons in HMPS's Midlands region. It also includes a service level agreement for the exchange of information with the probation service. This should ensure that forces continue to gather intelligence about OCG activity while members are imprisoned.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly adequate. The homicide risk analysis is extensive, with links to force and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- The force records, on average, eight homicide offences per year, of which some 38% (about two in five) can be categorised as ‘domestic’ – ie, where the death has been caused by the violent act of a knowing partner or ex-partner. It has completed a homicide risk analysis, based on recorded homicide offences over a five-year period. The analysis compared the force homicide profile with the national profile and found that the two were generally similar.
- Homicide was included in the 2007/08 control strategy, resulting in the creation of an action plan using the PIER model to address the issues identified. The action plan has been completed and the force is confident that it has a detailed understanding of its homicide level and profile.
- This led to a recommendation in the 2008/09 FSA that domestic violence-related deaths remain the largest single category of homicide and should be managed as part of the strategy for dealing with vulnerable people. It recommended that homicide be removed as a priority for the next period; this recommendation was accepted.
- The force has completed a problem profile that demonstrates a clear understanding of the threat posed by domestic violence.
- The force has revised the PIER approach, to reflect the Chief Constable’s ‘trust and confidence’ priority. It now uses TIPE as a framework for action plans:
 - T – trust and confidence;
 - I – intelligence;
 - P – prevention; and
 - E – enforcement.
- All control strategy priorities and intelligence requirements have a TIPE action plan, which is managed by the level 2 TTCG.
- The force clearly differentiates between level 2 control strategy priorities and performance priorities. Performance priorities are managed through the force performance management group. There is evidence of integration between the level 2 control strategy and level 1 control strategies. Domestic violence features in all BCU control strategies; Stoke-on-Trent BCU control strategy also includes community cohesion, high-risk acquisitive crime and Class A drugs. Trent Valley BCU control strategy includes community cohesion, while Chase BCU control strategy addresses the misuse of drugs.
- Each BCU has a TIPE action plan and intelligence requirement for its control strategy priorities, ensuring that intelligence and prevention opportunities are always considered. The level 1 TTCG manages action plans.

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- The threats posed by rape and kidnap and extortion offences were considered in the FSA. The scale of the threats does not require a separate problem profile for either of these crime types.
- The force shares intelligence about offences that are seen as precursor offences to homicide. BCUs manage MAPPA meetings and MARACs locally; the DCI chairs MAPPA meetings and a DI attends the MARAC meetings.
- The force has a low level of threat from kidnap offences; however, it recognises the threat facing WMP from such offences and is working closely with the force to identify any collateral increase in the threat posed to Staffordshire Police at an early stage.
- The force has a number of strong partnership arrangements, which enable intelligence products to be informed by data from partners. Each of the six CDRPs in Staffordshire has its own analyst, and data from the CDRPs was one of the sources scanned during preparation of the strategic assessment.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The level 2 TTCG meeting is used to decide whether force trend analysis and problem profiles are shared with partners and BCUs. There is a full trigger plan for hot briefing whenever a significant change in either the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as SOCA, HMRC, the UK Border Agency, HMPS, CDRPs, DATs and PCTs exist. The force can amply demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- The deputy chief constable (DCC) chairs an information management group (IMG), which oversees the comprehensive management of police information (MoPI) action plan. The force has completed its first year action plan and is on track for full MoPI compliance by 2010.
- The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) peer review completed in November 2007 recognised the strong project management approach taken by the force, the benefits of ACPO and police authority representation on the IMG and that the action plan was fully up to date.
- The force has documented information-sharing protocols (ISPs) with a range of partner organisations. A number exist primarily to combat the threat posed by OCGs, including the protocols with SOCA, HMRC and the UK Border Agency. The force also has internal ISPs between the confidential unit and operational teams to ensure safeguards specifically in relation to the use of highly sensitive covert intelligence gathering techniques.
- Decisions about other hot taskings are made by the duty detective superintendent and are reviewed at the level 2 TTCG.
- The force has a number of strong partnership arrangements which enable intelligence products to be informed by data from partners. Each of the six CDRPs in Staffordshire has a dedicated analyst, and data from the CDRPs was one of the sources scanned during preparation of the strategic assessment.
- Level 2 knowledge products are commissioned by the level 2 TTCG, where decisions are made about sharing products. If a product is to be shared with BCUs or CDRPs, it is emailed to their analysts.
- At the outset of a major investigation, the force reviews the need for ISPs and creates them, as and when necessary, according to the specific needs of the investigation. A specific example is an ISP agreed at the gold support group, including members of the banking industry, set up for Operation Sanctio, an investigation into an armed robbery at a cash-handling facility.

Work in progress

- The force intends to introduce a new operational intelligence system called OIS 2, which should be implemented across the force by August 2008. This should resolve a number of MoPI issues it faces, particularly in relation to the retention, review and disposal of data.

- The force is developing a policy on information sharing and is reviewing its ISPs to ensure corporacy and consistency. This activity, together with issues raised in the NPIA peer assessment report, is contained in the MoPI action plan and will be managed by the IMG.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.

Strengths

- In April 2007 the force produced a report titled *An assessment of vulnerable groups within Staffordshire*, which examined a wide range of vulnerable groups, including: young people; looked-after children; the elderly; infirm people or those in ill-health; victims of hate crime and domestic violence; missing persons; homeless people; substance misusers; asylum seekers; and refugees. The key thematic findings for several groups are:
 - the risk of sexual exploitation;
 - inaccurate reporting and recording of incidents involving vulnerable people;
 - failure to comply fully with policy, specifically in respect of domestic violence and missing people;
 - the inability to identify ‘at risk’ groups, such as homeless people and incoming communities;
 - no generic training to identify vulnerable people and conduct risk assessments; and
 - recognition of the duty of care to act to protect vulnerable people.
- The force developed an action plan and an intelligence requirement to address the issues highlighted in the report. As a result, ‘vulnerable people’ feature in the force control strategy as a priority. The priority, and its intelligence requirement, have a TIPE action plan, which is managed by the level 2 TTCCG.
- Staffordshire Police special branch is working with the Midlands community engagement rich picture team within the CTU to deliver ‘rich picture’ intelligence requirements, identifying people with the potential to radicalise others and those who may be susceptible to radicalisation. One example is Operation Incendio, which aims to combat the threat of people being radicalised while in prison.
- Two of the four BCUs have completed joint strategic assessments with their CDRP partners, which include profiling communities down to neighbourhood level. In addition, the force completed neighbourhood profiles as part of the roll-out of neighbourhood policing, although these are not always regularly updated. The Stoke-on-Trent BCU has a police-led partnership community cohesion group which aims to maintain up-to-date community profiles that will help the force to identify risks and threats at an early stage.
- The force has conducted a long-term community infiltration exercise to develop high-quality intelligence about the impact of OCGs in one part of the force area. It considers this a tactic in which it will continue to invest, as it provides high-quality intelligence in a cost-effective way. The use of this proactive target has ensured that the force can identify emerging OCGs and associated threats at an early stage, and thus target enforcement activity on those posing the greatest risk.

Work in progress

- The force is enhancing its approach to understanding the impact of OCG activity

on communities. The four forces in the West Midlands region have agreed that they will all use the national harm matrix to assess the threat posed by OCGs, which should result in greater consistency across the region.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed twice yearly by the risk management group. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.

Strengths

- The director of resources chairs the force risk management group, which has been in place for more than three years. The group reviews and updates identified strategic risks annually.
- The force holds a strategic risk register identifying the 22 strategic risks, of which the top ten are actively reviewed; lower ranked risks are monitored. Each risk has a strategic owner responsible for developing an associated action plan. Strategic risks in the top ten include:
 - the loss of any IT system or critical software that the force depends on to deliver its services;
 - the failure of business continuity plans;
 - being able to provide services for new and incoming communities; and
 - damage to the reputation of the force.

Lower ranked risks include:

- the financial implications of a protracted, high-profile major investigation;
- information security breaches; and
- inappropriate vetting which could hinder service delivery.

Work in progress

- The force acknowledges risks about its capacity and capability to combat the threats posed by major crime and serious and organised criminality. The protective services division growth bid for 2008/09 identifies the need for 23 new posts, at a cost of £700,000. The highest priority posts, costing £220,000, are:
 - three FIB researchers;
 - 1.5 (FTE) FIB intelligence officer posts;
 - two telephone examiners; and
 - one telephone examiner administration post.
- The appointment of additional staff to the FIB and the hi-tech crime unit (HTCU) should reduce the identified risk by enhancing the force's capacity to develop more predictive intelligence, to identify potential level 2 operations and to examine mobile telephones and other data storage devices in a more timely manner.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force is fully collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access to and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Most of the operational databases are searchable from ‘Custodyweb’. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been fully implemented.

Strengths

- The force uses a system called Custodyweb, which searches a number of current and former force systems; however, the main omission from Custodyweb is the force command and control system, STORM.
- The force is piloting an advanced search engine known as ‘Active Intelligence’, which will link all of the key force systems. Phase 1 should be implemented in summer 2008, followed by later implementation of phases 2 and 3. Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) and HOLMES are included in the phase 3 scope.
- The force has access to the WMP force linked intelligence system (FLINTS) intelligence database, enabling it to access intelligence held by WMP, Warwickshire and West Mercia to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the threats confronting Staffordshire. Future development of FLINTS is led by the regional FLINTS steering group and regional ISP meeting.
- The force has developed Operation Acontine, a partnership group which meets quarterly to tackle VAT fraud. The group includes representatives from Cheshire Constabulary and HMRC; it commissioned Project Walnut, a problem profile on VAT fraud. This has enabled the group to develop operational responses to specific threats.
- The force has a number of strong partnership arrangements, which enable intelligence products to be informed by their data. Each of the six CDRPs in Staffordshire has its own analyst and data from the CDRPs was one of the sources scanned during preparation of the strategic assessment.
- The force shares intelligence about offences which are seen as precursor offences to homicide. BCUs manage MAPPA meetings and MARACs locally. The DCI chairs MAPPA meetings and a DI attends the MARAC meetings.
- The DCC chairs an IMG, to oversee the comprehensive MoPI action plan. The force has completed its first year action plan and is on track for full MoPI compliance by 2010.
- The NPIA peer review, completed in November 2007, commended the robust project management approach taken by the force, noted the benefits of ACPO and police authority representation on the IMG and confirmed that the action plan was fully up to date.

Work in progress

- The force is working with the three other forces in the region to explore opportunities for furthering collaboration.

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- The four Chief Constables have agreed the following principles, which act as a framework within which to pursue collaborative opportunities:
 - The aim of collaboration is to achieve resilience and effectiveness through greater interoperability and appropriate common standards, which deliver better outcomes for the people of the region.
 - Arrangements should be pragmatic, avoiding the proliferation of extra structures and governance arrangements, and be subject to continuous review and development.
 - Regional collaboration should not displace the routine processes of mutual support between forces.
 - Application of those principles will enable the region to exercise a growing influence on national policing issues.

- The regional protective services group (formerly known as the ACPO regional operations and crime meeting) is responsible for setting the regional strategy.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is efficient. (*This refers to organisational learning*)

Strengths

- The force has a documented policy for major crime reviews; it also has an appropriately resourced, dedicated crime review and crime audit team. The force recognises that additional staff would have to be seconded to the team to undertake a 28-day review of a homicide investigation.
- The team's terms of reference include:
 - major crime reviews;
 - serious case reviews, including part 8 reviews of child protection/abuse cases;
 - reviews of missing persons;
 - Criminal Cases Review Commission requests;
 - other reviews identified by ACPO; and
 - co-ordinating referrals from Operations Cube and Advance, which re-examine forensic evidence from unsolved, historic offences to exploit developments in forensic technology.
- Reviews are commissioned by either the chief officer team or the principal SIO. The chief officer team commissioned a review after an officer was assaulted and sustained serious head injuries in order to identify any organisational lessons. The review recommendations resulted in a new call-out rota for BCU-based criminal investigation department staff and a revised process for supporting staff and securing their evidence if they have been involved in a traumatic incident.
- The force employs a peer review process seven days into a major investigation. This is strongly supported by SIOs, as it provides an opportunity to identify or reprioritise lines of enquiry.
- The force has not needed to complete a 28-day review for over two years, as all homicide offences have been detected within 28 days.
- The review team has completed six multi-agency part 8 reviews, commissioned by the local safeguarding children board, since 2006.
- An increasing area of work is the review of missing persons enquiries; the review team reviews missing persons investigations after three, six and twelve months. It also provides a weekly report to the principal SIO, identifying people who have been missing for over seven days, to ensure that the investigation is being managed effectively.
- The force identifies other serious crime investigations, which are usually dealt with by BCU-based staff and require review by a divisional DCI or DI. These include:
 - homicide-related offences;
 - Section 18 woundings;
 - undetected rapes;
 - armed robbery, including attempts (firearms or imitation only);

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- blackmail (where serious harm or loss may result);
- aggravated burglary;
- criminal damage with intent to endanger life/involving serious loss (£100,000); and
- any other incident considered serious.

Work in progress

- The principal SIO reviews SIO policy files when assessing professionalising the investigative process (PIP) accreditation and re-accreditation for MID SIOs, providing feedback on strengths and areas for improvement.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although the principal SIO reviews all major and serious crimes that have occurred during the previous 24 hours, there is no corporate oversight or review of serious crime investigations carried out by BCUs after this time. There is also an absence of a process to ensure that BCU-based DCIs and DIs review investigations that meet the criteria for review in the force policy. The force recognises this issue and is developing plans to align each MID DCI with a BCU to mentor its SIOs and to provide scrutiny of major and serious crime investigations conducted by the BCU. It is also considering the use of the review team to dip-sample BCU-based investigations. The force would benefit from introducing such oversight and review, to satisfy itself of the quality and consistency of serious crime investigations conducted by BCUs.
- The principal SIO reviews all current major investigations on a weekly basis with the SIO, giving direction and guidance where appropriate. The outcome of these reviews is documented in a number of different ways, sometimes in notes of the meeting, sometimes by an entry in the policy file by the SIO. The policy files themselves are not routinely reviewed and signed off. The force has not commissioned any 28-day reviews of homicide investigations for over two years, as all homicide investigations have been concluded within that timescale. Consequently, SIO policy files are rarely subject to any form of internal scrutiny. The introduction of internal scrutiny could provide a rich, additional source of information to review the performance of SIOs, to inform their performance development reviews (PDRs) and to ensure that the force is not exposed to any reputation risks that may undermine public trust and confidence in the force.

Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined revealed a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The force has developed a comprehensive level 2 TTCG, chaired by the ACC (operations), that operates at three levels:
 - secret – dealing with counter-terrorism issues;
 - confidential – reviewing deployment of sensitive policing techniques; and
 - restricted – reviewing and approving level 2 operations.
- This process ensures that the chair is aware of all available information to inform effective decision making, including the tasking and deployment of all specialist assets.
- The meeting is attended by key managers who lead staff or manage assets capable of being deployed to manage identified threats.
- A detailed briefing document is produced to update the meeting about ongoing operations, including updates on outstanding actions, any change to the original operational objectives and recommendations about future activity.
- A written record captures details of operations discussed at the meeting.
- There is a clearly defined process to deal with ‘hot’ intelligence. A request is passed to the ACC (operations) or, in his absence, to the detective chief superintendent or the duty detective superintendent, who makes a decision. Decisions are recorded in the level 2 tactical assessment and reported on at the next level 2 TTCG.
- Each control strategy priority and intelligence requirement is allocated an owner, who is responsible for developing an action plan. The force has revised the PIER approach to reflect the Chief Constable’s ‘trust and confidence’ priority; it now uses TIPE as a framework for the action plans:
 - T – trust and confidence;
 - I – intelligence;
 - P – prevention; and
 - E – enforcement.
- The level 2 TTCG meeting reviews progress against the action plans for control strategy priorities and intelligence requirements, using a traffic-light system.
- The principal SIO holds a weekly meeting with all MID SIOs to review the progress and costs of all current major crime investigations. The review results in each operation being designated as priority one, two or three, with priority one investigations being the most pressing. As a result of prioritisation, staffing levels are adjusted so that priority one investigations progress in a timely manner.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – Due to appropriate training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.

Strengths

- The force has a strong commitment to diversity, led by the ACC (operations). All staff have undertaken either distance learning or online diversity training.
- It has received awards from Stonewall for the last three years in recognition of its commitment to supporting lesbian, gay and bisexual staff.
- The force has a tactical diversity group, which includes representatives of support networks and oversees progress against the force’s equalities schemes.
- The MID liaises with the force diversity unit or an independent advisory group (IAG) to obtain advice for any particular type of investigation, enabling the SIO to brief the investigation team on the relevant religious or cultural issues.
- Details of advice given are recorded in either the SIO’s policy file or the minutes of a gold command group, if one has been convened.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Prevention

Summary – The force has IAGs and key individual networks for each of its BCUs and they are frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- The force has recently created an equalities, trust and confidence board, which focuses on its policing style and the impact that the style has on communities. It also acts as a strategic IAG for the force.
- The force has recently recruited an IAG for each of its four BCUs, which will provide support for managing critical incidents as well as focusing on the BCU's policing style and the impact that the style has on its communities.
- A member of the SMT has responsibility for maintaining contact with its IAG, to ensure that constructive relationships are forged.
- The force used an IAG to provide advice during an investigation into serious disorder involving members of a local community and members of the travelling community. The use of the IAG helped to prevent further escalation of the incident and reduced community tensions significantly.
- The chair of the IAG attends the gold support group and details of IAG advice are recorded in the minutes.
- The force also has a tactical diversity group, which includes representatives of support networks, to oversee progress against the force's equalities schemes.
- The force has made a significant investment in the development of key individual networks (KINs) as part of the implementation of neighbourhood policing. KINs are maintained by neighbourhood policing teams and are routinely contacted whenever a CIA is required.

Work in progress

- Each BCU is reviewing the composition of its IAG to ensure that it is representative of local communities. In effect, this is an ongoing process.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were fully understood and tested by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- The force has a comprehensive daily scanning process to identify potential critical incidents, such as high-profile incidents, deaths, high-risk missing persons, hate crime and high-risk acquisitive crime. The duty officer in the area control room (ACR) completes the process. The FIB also completes a scan of all high-risk acquisitive crime, as this is a specific level 2 control strategy priority. Both the duty officer and the FIB report to the principal SIO, who produces a briefing paper that is circulated to the chief officer team and other senior managers.
- The force produces a daily Crimson report, which includes details of any incidents with the potential to lead to an increase in community tensions. BCUs report incidents to a bulletin board, managed by the ACR duty officer, who is responsible for highlighting significant events to the principal SIO.
- Call management staff and first responders demonstrated a sound understanding of the golden hour principles. ACR staff have access to standard operating procedures for calls relating to major and serious crime. The standard operating procedures open up an automated link to the contingency plan for the incident being recorded. Police vehicles have major crime equipment boxes containing, among other things, scene logs and scene preservation tape. The boxes are checked on a daily basis.
- The force has an effective call-out procedure which also provides access to specialist advice; a detective superintendent, DCI and DI are on call. The initial call is received by the DI, who decides how to deal with the particular issue. If the call relates to a crime in action, it is routed directly to the duty detective superintendent.
- The force has commissioned SOCA to create and deliver a kidnap and extortion exercise for the benefit of ACR staff; a further exercise will take place during 2008 and delegates will include divisional duty officers. The training should provide staff with the competence and confidence to manage effectively the initial response to crimes in action.
- The force has comprehensive business continuity plans, which are tested regularly. Each division is responsible for updating its plans, which are overseen corporately by officers in the protective services division, who prioritise which plans need to be tested.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.

Strengths

- The FSA contains an assessment of the threat confronting the force from counter-terrorism. As a result, it is a control strategy priority and has a TIPE action plan, which details the operational response.
- The force has effective relationships with SOCA and the CTU; these enable it to share intelligence and better manage the threats posed by OCGs operating at levels 2 and 3.
- The county faces a low level of threat from offences involving the criminal use of firearms; however, it recognises the much higher threat facing WMP from such offences and has an intelligence requirement to identify any increase in the threat posed at an early stage.
- In April 2007, the force produced a report titled *An assessment of vulnerable groups within Staffordshire*, which highlighted:
 - the risk of sexual exploitation;
 - inaccurate reporting and recording of incidents involving vulnerable people;
 - failure to comply fully with policy, specifically in respect of domestic violence and missing people;
 - an inability to identify 'at risk' groups, such as homeless people and incoming communities;
 - no generic training to identify vulnerable people and to conduct risk assessments; and
 - recognition of the duty of care to act to protect vulnerable people.
- The force developed an action plan and an intelligence requirement to tackle the issues highlighted in the report. As a result, 'vulnerable people' is a force control strategy priority. The priority and its intelligence requirement have a TIPE action plan, which is managed by the level 2 TTCG.
- Homicide precursor offences are primarily dealt with by BCUs. Domestic violence features in all of the BCUs' control strategies and is the subject of TIPE-based action plans, which are informed by the domestic violence problem profile. This ensures that intelligence and prevention opportunities, as well as enforcement opportunities, are considered. Progress is managed by the level 1 TTCG process.
- The major crime and crime audit team reviews high-risk missing persons after 28 days, to ensure that the investigation has complied with force policy.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force has not completed a problem profile on the threat posed by offenders managed by the MAPPA process. It would benefit from producing a problem profile to ensure that effective, co-ordinated action is taken to manage the threat posed by these offenders.

Summary – The policy covering threats to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint, regional, cross-border and multi-agency operations abound.

Strengths

- The force has a documented threat-to-life policy, which is recognised and reasonably understood by a wide range of staff.
- The Osman process is used regularly and managed at BCU level. A member of the BCU SMT makes decisions about Osman warnings; constables or sergeants deliver the warning itself. The decision-making process includes research to establish whether this tactic has been used previously for a particular individual. Details of warnings given are recorded on SPIN, and divisional intelligence units maintain a spreadsheet recording all Osman warnings issued, using this as the basis for regular review of threat and risk. This is based on the established process for dealing with firearms risk assessments.
- The force issued 57 Osman warnings, including five reverse Osman warnings, during 2007. The offences for which Osman warnings were issued included:
 - 20 relating to domestic violence or forced marriages;
 - 20 relating to gang activity;
 - 14 relating to firearms or drugs offences; and
 - 3 relating to sexual offences.
- The force has a comprehensive daily scanning process to identify potential critical incidents, such as high-profile incidents, deaths, high-risk missing persons, hate crime and high-risk acquisitive crime. The duty officer in the ACR completes the process. The FIB also completes a scan of all high-risk acquisitive crime, as this is a specific level 2 control strategy priority. Both the duty officer and the FIB report to the principal SIO, who produces a briefing paper that is circulated to the chief officer team and other senior managers.
- The force has a low level of threat from offences involving the criminal use of firearms; however, it recognises the much greater threat facing WMP from such offences and has an intelligence requirement to identify at an early stage any increase in the threat posed.
- The force is committed to working with partners and other police forces to combat the threats posed by major and serious and organised crime.

Examples include:

- **Complex, gang-related murder**
 - The victim was murdered by members of an OCG operating in the West Midlands, following a dispute over Class A drug dealing. The wide-ranging investigation involved creating a HOLMES link to access intelligence held by WMP about Operation Ventara – its investigation into gang-related crime – together with liaison with the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), West Mercia Constabulary and contacts in Scotland. The operation resulted in the seizure of firearms and significant amounts of Class A drugs. Five defendants were found guilty of murder and imprisoned for a total of 135 years.

- **Operation Sanctio**

- This operation followed an attack on a cash centre in October 2006 in which £1.85 million was stolen. Staffordshire Police worked closely with WMP and the Bank of England to identify that a Coventry-based OCG was responsible for the offence. Sufficient evidence was gathered to arrest seven suspects, all of whom lived in the Wood End area of Coventry. A significant amount of property was seized. Four of the OCG members who were charged pleaded guilty to conspiracy to burgle; each was sentenced to six years imprisonment. Three other OCG members were later acquitted following trial.

- **Operation Nemesis**

- The operation lasted for 18 months and resulted in the seizure of over £300,000 worth of predominately class A controlled drugs. A total of 73 offenders have been charged in three separate arrest phases. The standard of evidence has provided a pattern of guilty pleas, which is expected to continue removing the cost of significant case preparation and court time. The operation has also had a very successful consolidation phase involving both partner agencies and members of the community.

Work in progress

- The threat-to-life policy is currently under review and the force recognises the importance of ensuring corporate oversight of the management and review of Osman warnings by BCUs to provide greater corporacy and consistency in the use of Osman warnings.
- The force also recognises the need to enhance the way that threats to life that cross force boundaries are dealt with, to ensure clear ownership and accountability. This will be addressed by the ongoing review of the force policy.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force has a witness protection capability, supported by dedicated covert resources. It has procedures that are promulgated to and understood by all staff. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners.

Strengths

- The force has an appropriately resourced witness protection capacity and capability and effective witness protection policy and procedures.
- Operational staff showed a good understanding of witness protection issues and the need to refer matters to the relevant BCU public protection team, in the first instance.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- Each control strategy and intelligence requirement is allocated an owner, and the owner is responsible for developing an action plan using the TIPE model;
 - T – trust and confidence;
 - I – intelligence;
 - P – prevention; and
 - E – enforcement.
- This enables the force to develop a balanced response to the threats confronting it with trust and confidence, intelligence and prevention options being considered equally with enforcement options
- The level 2 TTCG meeting reviews progress against the action plans for control strategy priorities, intelligence requirements and preventative activity, using a traffic-light system. This approach ensures that level 2 assets remain focused on control strategy priorities.
- Community contact records (CCRs) are completed by NPU staff to identify harm in local communities; the force then uses safer neighbourhood interview questionnaires (SNIQs) in the area in which the harm has been identified to develop a deeper understanding of the detail of the problem identified in the CCRs. NPU team members complete the CCRs and SNIQs by interviewing members of the local community. Information from the SNIQs is then used to develop an action plan to address the harm. When the police believe the problem has been resolved, NPU staff conduct face-to-face interviews with members of the public, using a SNIQ2, to assess the effectiveness of police activity
- Safer neighbourhood environmental visual audits are used in areas where CCRs have identified particular harm and are linked with the results of SNIQs to ensure a more detailed understanding of the harm to be addressed.
- A citizens' panel comprising 1,200 people from across the county is used as a sounding board for key strategic decisions. It is also used to examine the reasons why people do or do not have confidence in policing in the county and what their concerns are.
- The force now uses the same market research company as WMP to conduct surveys to assess levels of confidence, satisfaction and harm among people in the county. The surveys, known as '*Feeling the Difference*', involve interviews with 4,000 people per year, in each BCU, providing data that is statistically significant down to NPU level.
- The force has a comprehensive daily scanning process to identify potential critical incidents, such as high-profile incidents, deaths, high-risk missing persons, hate crime and high-risk acquisitive crime. The duty officer in the ACR completes the process. The FIB also completes a scan of all high-risk acquisitive crime, as this is a specific level 2 control strategy priority. Both the duty officer

and the FIB report to the principal SIO, who produces a briefing paper that is circulated to the chief officer team and other senior managers.

- The force also produces a daily Crimson report, which includes details of any incidents with the potential to lead to an increase in community tensions. BCUs report incidents to a bulletin board, managed by the ACR duty officer, who is responsible for highlighting significant events to the principal SIO.
- The force has also recently created an IAG for each of its four BCUs. A member of the SMT has responsibility for maintaining contact with its IAG to ensure that constructive relationships are forged. IAGs are an effective way of understanding harm in communities.
- The force has made a significant investment in the development of KINs, as part of the implementation of neighbourhood policing. KINs are maintained by neighbourhood policing teams and are routinely contacted whenever a CIA is required, so that the force understands the impact that an incident has had on the community.

Work in progress

- Operation Nemesis is the force-wide brand for Class A drugs enforcement activity. It has secured funding from the Government Office for the West Midlands to conduct a detailed results analysis of the operation. One product of the results analysis will be the development of a model to measure harm in communities, which will be used in subsequent operations.
- Each BCU is reviewing the composition of its IAG to ensure that it is representative of local communities. In effect, this is an ongoing process.

Area(s) for improvement

- Without a systematic application of results analysis, the force's ability to assess the impact of preventative and enforcement activity against OCGs is constrained

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a comprehensive policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The force has a dedicated anti-corruption unit (ACU), comprising one DCI, two DSs and two assistant investigators. The team shares an analyst and a researcher with the professional standards department (PSD).
- The PSD has completed a strategic assessment, identifying the four main threats as officer/staff problems around:
 - criminal association and intelligence leakage;
 - loss of integrity;
 - dishonesty; and
 - misuse of drugs and alcohol.
- There are clearly defined structures and processes to ensure that the PSD or the ACU are involved in appropriate level 2 investigations, including ACU attendance at the level 2 TTTCG and a separate monthly meeting chaired by the DCC and attended by the heads of the PSD, the ACU, the FIB and the detective superintendent level 2.
- Operation Wasp is a good example of the effectiveness of this approach. The investigation led to an officer being imprisoned for ten months for improper disclosure of information to the Outlaws motorcycle group. A significant tactic was the deployment of a UCO.
- All police officers and OCG nominals involved in level 2 operations are checked against the ACU database, to identify, assess and manage any potential vulnerability to corruption.
- The force has an information security group, chaired by the DCC, which oversees vetting issues. It has a vetting policy that identifies the level of vetting required for each post and this detail is included in the post profile for identified vulnerable posts.
- Central recruiting or divisional human resource (HR) staff complete vetting for new staff. All vetting decisions relating to posts requiring SC or developed vetting are made by the force vetting officer to ensure corporacy and consistency.
- The force has a comprehensive approach to auditing its intelligence system (known as SPIN), particularly looking for examples of the inappropriate use of people who should be registered as CHISs. Any concerns are reported directly to the PSD.
- The DCC chairs the IMG, which oversees all information and security issues.
- All corporate IT systems are protected by user name and domain pass codes, which are changed every three months.
- The building security officer undertakes physical assessments of building security

and any identified enhancements are made. An example is a significant amount of work undertaken to upgrade physical security when public protection teams were set up on BCUs.

Work in progress

- The force is undertaking an ambitious project to implement a single 'log on' to IT systems that is integrated with a building access authority. In effect, staff will not be able to access corporate IT systems unless they have used a swipe card to access the building in which the screen is located. Initial work will begin in 2008/09 and will take up to three years to implement.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force has identified the level of vetting required for each post, but this will only be completed when a person changes post. It has made a decision not to apply the policy retrospectively. However, in certain circumstances, where operational requirements dictate, retrospective vetting is undertaken at the request of a line manager for the relevant individual or department. Therefore, people in identified vulnerable posts will not routinely be vetted unless they change posts. The force should consider adopting a more appropriate and consistent way of managing any potential vulnerability to corruption.

Enforcement

Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriate use made of IAGs but no community membership of gold command support groups.

Strengths

- The Chief Constable and chair of the police authority meet on a monthly basis to discuss any significant major or serious crime issues.
- Good governance arrangements are in place, led by the ACC (operations), who provides clear, enthusiastic leadership of the force response to the threats posed by major crime.
- The police authority has recently created a serious and organised crime group to oversee this area of work. The group receives appropriate briefings about major investigations and works closely with the divisional commander to develop the growth bids for the development of the protective services division.
- The ACC (operations) holds a monthly meeting with the divisional commander to review a range of performance issues, including HR and financial aspects. This meeting highlighted the high level of spending undertaken in respect of telephone examinations and acted as a catalyst for a growth bid in this area.
- The force provided evidence of gold support groups being convened to oversee critical incidents. Examples include three homicides in one small village during the same weekend and serious disorder involving members of a local community and members of the travelling community.
- A police authority member does, on occasions, sit as a member of the gold support group.

Work in progress

- The police authority is represented on the West Midlands regional group of police authority chairs and chief constables. The group ensures that appropriate governance arrangements are in place to manage delivery of the projects intended to enhance regional collaboration.
- The police authority and the force have agreed in principle that authority members should be subject to a criminal records check; this will be completed during 2008.
- Although the force rarely includes a community representative as a member of a gold support group, it revised its IAG policy in December 2007 to include the fact that the chair of a divisional IAG will be invited to sit as a member of a gold support group. It recognises the benefit of having community representation to ensure that the impact of the incident on the community is fully understood.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The ACPO lead and other senior detectives in the protective services division are fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training and testing in CIAs and policing in partnership. However, the force has only a small number of staff who have attended nationally accredited training for dealing with critical incidents.

Strengths

- The ACPO team has a significant amount of operational experience in respect of major and serious and organised crime. The ACC (operations) has attended nationally accredited training for managing linked and series crime, SCIMITAR (serious crime, intelligence management, information technology and resources), critical incident gold command, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear gold command training and public order and firearms gold command training.
- The on-call ACPO officer is accompanied by his/her personal assistant, if necessary, so that, as gold commander, he has immediate secretarial support available to record minutes of meetings and decision making
- Two detective superintendents and three DCIs have completed the training in managing linked and series crime.
- The force has the capacity to link homicide investigations, although it does not currently have any linked series investigations.
- The force has a cadre of experienced divisional commanders, all of whom have significant experience of working with a wide range of partners and overseeing completion of CIAs.

Work in progress

- The newly appointed divisional commander and recently appointed principal SIO are due to attend the managing linked and series crime course during 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- Only two senior officers have attended nationally accredited training for dealing with critical incidents. The force should review its leadership capacity and capability at silver and bronze command levels to ensure that it has a sufficient amount of trained staff to deal with predictable demand.

The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of cost, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- All major investigations completed by the MID are allocated an initial budget of £5,000. The SIO is required to develop his/her costed investigation strategy and to agree this with the principal SIO. Once agreed, funding is allocated for the investigation. Cost information is recorded on a database held by the protective services division.
- The principal SIO holds a weekly meeting with all the MID SIOs to review the progress and costs of all current major crime investigations. The review results in each operation being designated as priority one, two or three; priority one investigations are the most pressing. As a result of prioritisation, staffing levels are adjusted so that priority one investigations progress in a timely manner.
- The force has employed a forensic submissions manager and has developed a closer relationship with the forensic science service, with the intention of exercising greater cost control over forensic submissions. The forensic submissions manager scrutinises proposed forensic submissions to ensure that only the potentially most productive items are submitted for examination.
- The ACC (operations) holds a monthly meeting with divisional commanders to review a range of performance issues, including HR and financial aspects. This meeting highlighted in one case the high level of spending undertaken in respect of telephone examinations and acted as a catalyst for a growth bid in this area.

Work in progress

- The principal SIO reviews all current major investigations on a weekly basis with the SIO, giving direction and guidance where appropriate. The outcome of these reviews is documented in a number of different ways, sometimes in notes of the meeting, sometimes by an entry in the policy file by the SIO. The policy files themselves are not routinely reviewed and signed off. The force has not commissioned any 28-day reviews of homicide investigations for over two years, as all homicide investigations have been concluded within that timescale. Consequently, SIO policy files are rarely subject to any form of internal scrutiny. The introduction of internal scrutiny could provide a rich, additional source of information to review the performance of SIOs, to inform their PDRs and to ensure that the force is not exposed to any risks that may undermine public trust and confidence in it. The force recognises this issue and will address it during 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Performance management and resilience

Summary – The inspection teams found a strong investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands. Collaborative agreements with SOCA and HMRC exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide partial protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- The force has a definition of major crime as any reactive police investigation concerning actual or suspected murder, manslaughter or other homicide, terrorism, product contamination, kidnap and extortion, stranger abduction, stranger series rape and certain categories of armed robbery with significant aggravating factors.
- It has adapted the national homicide categories to prioritise major investigations, namely;
 - Category A – a major crime of grave concern where the identity of the offender is not apparent or ample evidence has yet to be secured.
 - Category B – a major crime where the identity of the offender is not apparent or ample evidence has yet to be secured.
 - Category C – a major crime where the identity of the offender is apparent or ample evidence can easily be secured.
 - Category D – any incidents where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, the family and or the community.

Major crime demand since 2005/06 has included;

	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08 (not incl March 08)
Homicide*	14	13	12
Rape	292	285	219
Kidnap	30	21	22
Total	336	319	253

*The number of homicides relates to the number of deaths in the force area and not the number of homicide investigations, as one investigation could involve more than one death.

- The force has an appropriately resourced MID.
- Force policy requires the host BCU to support any major investigation for the first 72 hours. During this period, each party is responsible for meeting its own costs. After that, the MID takes responsibility for staffing and funding the investigation. This approach works well and is supported by both BCUs and the protective services division staff.
- On average, the MID undertakes 30 new investigations each year, covering all homicide offences, deaths in care homes and deaths involving alleged medical negligence.
- The force has an effective call-out procedure, with a detective superintendent,

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DCI and DI on call. The initial call is received by the DI who decides how to deal with the particular issue. If the call relates to a crime in action, it is routed directly to the duty detective superintendent.

- The force has a policy for managing kidnap offences. In 2007, it submitted 53 SOCA 100 forms, relating to 21 offences of kidnap and 32 offences of blackmail.
- There is a developing capacity and capability to deal with the threat posed by kidnap offences, with sufficient trained SIOs, red centre commanders, negotiators and technicians. It also has the capacity to implement a green room facility.
- The force invited SOCA to a live kidnap investigation to quality assure the force response, and the force was pleased with the 'positive feedback'.
- SOCA provided one awareness session on kidnap and extortion offences for 70 staff in 2007.

Work in progress

- None of the force's SIOs is accredited to PIP level 3. Although all the MID SIOs, except the most recent appointee, have attended the nationally accredited SIO course, the force has not yet resolved its internal procedures for verifying and signing off SIOs' portfolios. The PIP steering group is dealing with this issue.
- The PIP peer review report, completed in December 2007, recommends the development of a "clearly defined policy providing corporate standards for investigations at all levels and supported by appropriate audit and monitoring provisions". The PIP steering group will oversee development of the policy during 2008.
- Chief officers have started to implement a succession plan to ensure that middle to senior ranking staff are provided with challenging roles to meet both their own and the force's future needs. All key moves should be implemented during 2008. However, there is no documented, transparent succession planning strategy. The force would benefit from developing such a strategy.
- The force has identified a central location where the entire MID can be based, recognising the opportunity to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of its response to major crime still further. All staff should be based at the new site by summer 2008.
- Recognising the need to ensure that SIOs and staff undertaking other key roles in a kidnap investigation have sufficient access to live investigations and exercises to develop their competence and experience, the force has an agreement with WMP for its SIOs to shadow WMP SIOs during a live kidnap investigation.
- The force recognises the need to provide kidnap awareness training for operational staff. Following the success of one awareness input provided by SOCA in January 2007, the agency is due to provide a second input in March 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- The MID has started to encounter difficulties in recruiting staff; reasons given include the fact that uniformed officers enjoy an additional 31 rest days per year and protective services staff do not receive a special priority payment. The challenge of recruiting is a significant one for the force, given that one-third of the protective services division staff will have completed 30 years service within the next five years. The force would benefit from developing plans to migrate this potential risk.

Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be highly effective. Elements of sensitive policing techniques are delivered through verbal collaborative agreements, which are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.

Strengths

- The force is committed to working with partners and other police forces to combat the threats posed by major and serious and organised crime.

Examples include:

Complex, gang-related homicide

- The victim was murdered by members of an OCG operating in the West Midlands, following a dispute over Class A drug dealing. The wide-ranging investigation involved creating a HOLMES link to access intelligence held by WMP about Operation Ventara – its investigation into gang-related crime – together with liaison with the MPS, West Mercia Constabulary and contacts in Scotland. The operation resulted in the seizure of firearms and significant amounts of Class A drugs. Five defendants were found guilty of murder and imprisoned for a total of 135 years.

Operation Sanctio

- This operation followed an attack on a cash centre in October 2006 in which £1.85 million was stolen. Staffordshire Police worked closely with WMP, the Bank of England and the Royal Bank of Scotland to identify that a Coventry-based OCG was responsible for the offence. Sufficient evidence was gathered to arrest seven suspects, all of whom lived in the Wood End area of Coventry. Four of the OCG members who were charged pleaded guilty to conspiracy to burgle; each was sentenced to six years imprisonment. Three other OCG members were later acquitted following trial.

Operation Nemesis

- This operation lasted for 18 months and resulted in the seizure of over £300,000 worth of (predominately) Class A controlled drugs. Some 73 offenders have been charged in three separate arrest phases. The standard of evidence has provided a pattern of guilty pleas that is expected to continue, reducing the cost of significant case preparation and court time. The operation has also had a very successful consolidation phase, involving both partner agencies and members of the community.
- The force has an appropriately resourced and trained CHIS and UC capacity and capability. It has developed a confidential unit to receive, assess and disseminate intelligence from all sensitive policing techniques.
- The force has an appropriately resourced and trained witness protection capacity and capability.
- The force has an appropriately resourced and trained technical support capacity

and capability. The COTS team also includes the TSU.

Work in progress

- The force does not have an in-house facility for covert forensic retrieval; this service is provided by another agency. However, the force plans to train staff to provide this facility in-house.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force has a full-time and dedicated case review team that is always deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is highly efficient. (Refers to impact on cases)

Strengths

- The force has a documented policy for major crime reviews and a dedicated crime review and crime audit team, The force recognises that additional staff would have to be seconded for the team to undertake a 28-day review of a homicide investigation. The team's terms of reference include:
 - major crime reviews;
 - serious case reviews, including part 8 reviews of child protection/abuse cases;
 - reviews of missing persons;
 - Criminal Cases Review Commission requests;
 - other reviews identified by ACPO; and
 - co-ordinating referrals from Operations Cube and Advance, which re-examine forensic evidence from unsolved, historic offences to exploit developments in forensic technology.
- Reviews are commissioned by either the chief officer team or the principal SIO. The chief officer team commissioned a review after an officer was assaulted and sustained serious head injuries, in order to identify any organisational lessons. The review recommendations resulted in a new call-out rota for BCU-based criminal investigation department staff, and a revised process for supporting staff and securing their evidence if they have been involved in a traumatic incident.
- The force employs a peer review process seven days into a major investigation. This is strongly supported by SIOs, as it provides an opportunity to identify or reprioritise lines of enquiry.
- The force has not needed to complete a 28-day review for over two years, as all homicide offences have been detected within 28 days.
- The review team has completed six multi-agency part 8 reviews, commissioned by the local safeguarding children board, since 2006.
- An increasing area of work is the review of missing persons enquiries; the team reviews missing persons investigations after three, six and twelve months. It also provides a weekly report to the principal SIO, identifying people who have been missing for over seven days, to ensure that the investigation is being managed effectively.
- Effective partnership working with HMPS is evident through the regional project led by Staffordshire Police to develop the police use of intelligence from prisons. The force is committed to providing two staff to the RIU to undertake this work.

Work in progress

- BCU chief inspectors (operations) are responsible for reviewing fatal road traffic

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collision investigations after seven and 28 days. The force recognises that three of the four postholders have received no training to fulfil this important role, and training will be provided during 2008.

- The principal SIO reviews SIO policy files when assessing PIP accreditation and re-accreditation for MID SIOs, providing feedback on strengths and areas for improvement.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although the principal SIO reviews all major and serious crimes that have occurred during the previous 24 hours, there is no corporate oversight or review of serious crime investigations carried out by BCUs after this time. There is also an absence of a process to ensure that BCU-based DCIs and DIs review investigations that meet the criteria for review in the force policy. The force recognises this issue and is developing plans to align each MID DCI with a BCU to mentor its SIOs and to provide scrutiny of major and serious crime investigations conducted by the BCU. It is also considering the use of the review team to dip-sample BCU-based investigations. The force would benefit from introducing such oversight and review, to satisfy itself of the quality and consistency of serious crime investigations conducted by BCUs.
- The principal SIO reviews all current major investigations on a weekly basis with the SIO, giving direction and guidance where appropriate. The outcome of these reviews is documented in a number of different ways, sometimes in notes of the meeting, sometimes by an entry in the policy file by the SIO. The policy files, themselves are not routinely reviewed and signed off. The force has not commissioned any 28-day reviews of homicide investigations for over two years, as all homicide investigations have been concluded within that timescale. Consequently, SIO policy files are rarely subject to any form of internal scrutiny. The introduction of internal scrutiny could provide a rich, additional source of information to review the performance of SIOs, to inform their PDRs and to ensure that the force is not exposed to any risks to its reputation that may undermine public trust and confidence in the force.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force is predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the *Murder Investigation Manual* and major incident room standardised administrative procedures.

Strengths

- The ACC (operations) is the ACPO lead officer for homicide and other major investigations.
- The force has a very clear approach to call out. A detective superintendent, DCI and DI are on call. The initial call is received by the DI, who decides how to deal with the particular issue at hand. If the call relates to a crime in action, it is routed directly to the duty detective superintendent.
- Force policy requires the host BCU to support any major investigation for the first 72 hours, meeting its own costs. After that time, the MID takes responsibility for staffing and funding the investigation. This approach works well, and is supported by both BCUs and protective services division staff.
- Each MID syndicate is self-sufficient in respect of HOLMES document management and indexing staff, as well as disclosure and exhibits officers.
- The force completed a self-assessment of compliance with major incident room standardised administrative procedures and produced an action plan to address identified issues. The action plan has been completed.

Allocation

- The force has a clear definition of major crime: “any reactive police investigation concerning actual or suspected murder, manslaughter or other homicide, terrorism, product contamination, kidnap and extortion, stranger abduction, stranger series rape and certain categories of armed robbery with significant aggravating factors”.
- Additionally, it has adapted the national homicide categories to prioritise major investigations, namely:
 - Category A – a major crime of grave concern where the identity of the offender is not apparent or ample evidence has yet to be secured.
 - Category B – a major crime where the identity of the offender is not apparent or ample evidence has yet to be secured.
 - Category C – a major crime where the identity of the offender is apparent or ample evidence can easily be secured.
 - Category D – any incidents where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, the family and/or the community.
- On average, the MID undertakes 30 new investigations each year, of which eight are homicides.
- The principal SIO is responsible for ensuring that the SIO for any particular investigation has the necessary experience to lead the investigation.
- The principal SIO holds a weekly meeting with all the MID SIOs to review the progress and costs of all current major crime investigations. The review results in each operation being allocated a priority one, two or three; priority one investigations are the most pressing. As a result of prioritisation, staffing levels are adjusted so that priority one investigations progress in a timely manner.

Oversight

- The line manager of each SIO is responsible for the ongoing supervision of investigations. This is co-ordinated and reviewed at the weekly meeting chaired by the principal SIO.
- The force routinely uses CIAs for major investigations. They are conducted by neighbourhood policing teams and reviewed by the relevant BCU SMT.

Work in progress

Strategic structure

- The force does not have any SIOs accredited to level 3 PIP. Although all the MID SIOs, except the most recent appointee, have attended the nationally accredited SIO course, the force has not yet resolved its internal procedures for verifying and signing off the SIOs' portfolios.
- The PIP peer review report, completed in December 2007, identified that "internal verification, or 'moderating' processes, are seen as an important factor in providing guidance on quality and quantity of evidence to meet the standards. Early consideration of how the force plans this approach will ensure that effective assessments are conducted through PDRs, helping to reduce bureaucracy, time and effort of the staff and supervisors". This will be actioned by the PIP steering group.

Oversight

- SIO policy files are not routinely reviewed and signed off by a line manager. The force has not completed any 28-day reviews of homicide investigations for over two years, as all homicide investigations have been concluded within that timescale; consequently, SIO policy files are rarely subject to any form of internal scrutiny. The introduction of internal scrutiny should also provide a rich, additional source of information to review the performance of SIOs and to inform their PDRs. The force recognises this weakness and will address it during 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- Responsibility for casualty bureau arrangements is split between the communications department and the protective services division. The force would benefit from reviewing its approach to casualty bureaus to ensure clear ownership of this area of business.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ACR	area control room
ACU	anti-corruption unit
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition

B

BCU	basic command unit
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C

CCR	community contact record
CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CIA	community impact assessment
CII	covert internet investigator
COTS	covert operations tactical support
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CROP	covert rural observation post
CTU	counter-terrorism unit

D

DAT	drug action team
DC	detective constable
DCC	deputy chief constable
DCI	detective chief inspector
DI	detective inspector
DS	detective sergeant

DSU dedicated source unit

F

FIB force intelligence bureau

FLO family liaison officer

FSA force strategic assessment

FTE full-time equivalent

G

GOWM Government Office for the West Midlands

H

HMI Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HMPS Her Majesty's Prison Service

HMRC Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

HOLMES Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

HQ headquarters

HR human resources

HTCU hi-tech crime unit

I

IAG independent advisory group

ICT information and communications technology

IMG information management group

ISP information-sharing protocol

K

KIN key individual network

M

MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MARAC	multi-agency risk assessment conference
MID	major investigation department
MoPI	management of police information
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
MSF	most similar force(s)

N

NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NPSAT	National Protective Services Analysis Tool
NPU	neighbourhood policing unit

O

OCG	organised crime group
-----	-----------------------

P

PCT	primary care trust
PDR	performance development review
PIER	prevention, intelligence, enforcement and reassurance
PIP	professionalising the investigative process
PNC	Police National Computer
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act
PSD	professional standards department

R

RART	regional asset recovery team
RIG	regional intelligence group

RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act

RIU regional intelligence unit

S

SAR suspicious activity report

SB special branch

SC security clearance

SGC specific grading criteria

SIO senior investigating officer

SMT senior management team

SNIQ safer neighbourhood interview questionnaire

SOCA Serious Organised Crime Agency

SOCO scenes of crime officer

SPI statutory performance indicator

T

TCD technical collections department

TIPE trust and confidence, intelligence, prevention and enforcement

TPO test purchase officer

TSU technical support unit

TTCG tactical tasking and co-ordination group

U

UCO undercover operative

W

WMP West Midlands Police

Appendix 2: Developing Practice

INSPECTION AREA: Serious and Major Crime
TITLE: Part 8 Review – Agency Report.
PROBLEM: The format of reporting as advocated by the multi-agency panel was limited in some aspects and over complicated in others. The report did not necessarily provide a commentary behind the standard chronology completed by all agencies involved.
SOLUTION: The major crime review team developed a simplified version of the report with standard headings as follows: <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. introduction;2. family background;3. police involvement with the family;4. analysis of police involvement;5. the incident;6. conclusion; and7. recommendations.
OUTCOME(S): This style of reporting provided more cohesive information to support the multi-agency review process and was subsequently recognised as good practice following an Ofsted inspection.
FORCE CONTACT: DI Martin Yates, Staffordshire Police Major Crime Review, 01785 218612

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INSPECTION AREA: Major Crime
TITLE: Regionalisation of Prison Intelligence.
<p>PROBLEM:</p> <p>The current way of doing business limits the force’s opportunities to proactively gather intelligence in prisons in support of policing (levels 1, 2 and 3) and the prison service. Responsibility for the deployment of prison intelligence officers rests with the force in whose area prison establishments are based.</p> <p>Only a small percentage of the prisoner population is from that same policing area, therefore providing little incentive for investment. However, an estimated 66% of the prisoners in the region’s 14 prisons are from Staffordshire’s ACPO region.</p>
<p>SOLUTION:</p> <p>Regional collaboration has been agreed as the way forward. The following delivery plan has been approved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create jointly staffed NIM-compliant intelligence units in each of the region’s prison establishments. They will deliver the agreed priorities for both the police and prison service. • Establish a tasking and co-ordination process. • Provide an information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure. • Develop closer working relationships between agencies, including HMPS, the police, SOCA, the CTU and HMRC. • Carry out a review of progress against performance/success to inform year two recommendations for further growth.
<p>OUTCOME(S):</p> <p>To date:</p> <p>An increase in establishment of 5.5 posts; across the region there will now be 13.5 staff and a sergeant.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The regional prison intelligence unit forms part of the RIU structure. 2. A regional management board has been established to oversee implementation. 3. Funding has been secured for the ICT infrastructure. 4. NIM scoping work has been undertaken at HMP Featherstone and a strategic assessment produced. 5. Regional policies/service level agreements have been produced.
<p>FORCE CONTACT:</p> <p>Detective Chief Inspector Paul Winstanley, 01785 235199</p> <p>Detective Inspector Donna Evans, 0121 2512050</p>