



**HMIC**

Royal Military Police  
Special Investigation Branch  
inspection

August 2006





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## 1. Introduction

1.1 This report was commissioned by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Director General (Security and Safety), Robert Rooks, who requested an inspection of the investigative function of the Special Investigation Branch (SIB) of the Royal Military Police (RMP).

1.2 The commission was accepted on the understanding that the inspection would not review individual operations or cases, but would instead focus on an assessment of processes and procedures of high level 3 investigations.<sup>1</sup>

1.3 I am honoured to have been invited to conduct this inspection and trust it will serve as an indication of how Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) may be able to support the MoD in the wider context of service policing in the future.

### Terms of reference

1.4 The terms of reference were drawn from correspondence and direct communication with the Office of the Director General (Security and Safety) (DG(S&S)) and the Office of the Provost Marshal (Army) (PM(A)). They are as follows:

- To inspect SIB specialist policing functions in the investigation of major and serious crimes, including investigations conducted on operations and to identify any areas for improvement (in the context of current good practice, where applicable).
- To identify any other transferable good practice emerging from the inspection.
- To alert the Deputy Provost Marshal (Investigations) to any issues that may have an impact on the conduct of a live investigation.
- To deliver a draft report to the PM(A) for his consideration on behalf of the Adjutant General and in parallel to DG(S&S).
- To deliver a final report for the attention of the PM(A) and the DG(S&S).

### Methodology

1.5 The methodology underpinning this report can be broken down into three distinct areas:

- analysis of written documents supplied;
- interviews with RMP officers and personnel; and
- interviews with those who engage with or impact upon the SIB in the course of investigations.

1.6 These phases were conducted by the inspection team using current practitioners who are experts in their relevant disciplines and the best practice applicable.

<sup>1</sup> Level 3 investigations deal with offences or incidents reported to or detected by the RMP that by nature of their gravity or complexity normally require investigation by SIB trained investigators.

1.7 Before the inspection, the SIB gave HMIC a very helpful selection of documents, including a self-assessment of SIB investigations into major and serious crime. This was supplemented by additional documents as the inspection progressed.

1.8 The SIB interview stage was conducted during May 2006, using a team of officers with specialist knowledge. These included a member of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Homicide Working Group (Dr Peter Stelfox, Head of Investigative Practice, National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE)) and two members of the Police and Crime Standards Directorate (Simon Iveson, Head of Performance Management, and Bob Green, Head of the Forensic Science Unit).

1.9 Interviews of other parties took place from April to July 2006. I recognise that interviews can be disruptive and am grateful to all concerned for finding the time to see the inspection officers.

## Acknowledgements

1.10 I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the assistance provided by the Office of the Provost Marshal, and in particular the services of Warrant Officer Class 1 Michael Harrison, who acted as liaison. The branch officers and personnel exhibited a strong sense of duty, professionalism and public service, as well as a commitment to positive change in the public interest. This report is intended to contribute to a process that will enable them to make an even greater contribution to the MoD and the communities they protect.

1.11 In presenting these findings it is appropriate that the valuable support from Assistant Inspector of Constabulary Huw Jones and his core inspection team be recognised in addition to those named above. The team comprises:

- Assistant Inspector of Constabulary Everett Henry
- Superintendent David Harris
- Detective Superintendent Kim Hunter
- Detective Superintendent Mark Lewindon
- Superintendent John MacDonald
- Detective Superintendent Tim Stevens (Lead Staff Officer)
- Inspection Support Manager Louise Ledger.

## 2. Background and context

2.1 While this is an inspection of the SIB capability and capacity to reactively investigate major and serious crime and to proactively gather information to prevent such crime occurring, it is not a review or reinvestigation of any single SIB inquiry. The Army is currently responding to issues raised by the Deepcut report. This inspection is not a review of that report. In conducting the inspection, it is recognised that the RMP is not a Home Office (HO) police force and, as such, is not subject to statutory inspection by HMIC. The inspection criteria upon which HO police forces secure their initial assessment are not universally applicable to this inspection. HMIC recognises that the SIB serves the MoD within a unique and challenging context. This inspection recognises the policing services provided by the SIB and the need for these to be the subject of regular inspection by a competent authority.

2.2 The request for this particular inspection arose from an MoD review of service policing. A voluntary request for this level of scrutiny by an external body is rare.

### **Provost Marshal (Army) headquarters**

2.3 The PM(A) is responsible to the Chief of the General Staff and the Army Board through the Adjutant General for the provision of efficient and effective policies for the development and execution of Provost support to the Army. Within this provision the PM(A) is required to conduct and direct all RMP investigations (under the Army Act 1955 and Queen's Regulations for the Army), which are investigated independently of the chain of command. The Provost mission is to provide the necessary military police, custodial and guarding service to the Army in order to ensure military effectiveness.

2.4 In order to deliver this police function effectively, the RMP serves in units of General Police Duties and SIB. The SIB exists to conduct investigations into serious criminal offences committed by or against British service personnel or other persons subject to the Service Discipline Acts.

2.5 The Military Criminal Justice System (MCJS) disciplines serious criminal offending through the Court Martial system, which complies with the European Convention on Human Rights.

2.6 The headquarters of the RMP is located in Wiltshire. The RMP operates an intelligence centre and crime specialist capability alongside the other two Armed Forces. These are separately located from the headquarters, as is the Defence Police College (DPC), which provides investigative training.

2.7 The experience of HO police forces in the UK is available to the SIB through direct liaison with such forces and its links with the MoD Police, the NCPE, the Police Information Technology Organisation and the ACPO Homicide Working Group. The SIB also sends representatives to a number of ACPO national conferences in the field of major and serious crime.

2.8 The SIB is organised into two units operating from bases in the UK and Germany, with outstations in Canada, Cyprus, the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. The SIB units are separated into regions and subdivided into detachments and specialist units. The numbers of officers and staff are set centrally within budgetary confines.

2.9 The SIB (UK) provides investigative services for all operational areas outside Europe, both on fixed bases and on exercise.

### **The Special Investigation Branch (Germany)**

2.10 The unit based in Germany operates to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. The agreement places a responsibility on the RMP to investigate all offences involving the military community where the German authorities waive their right to jurisdiction. The military community, both service and civilian, serving and dependants, and including visitors, is subject to military jurisdiction.

2.11 The senior investigating officer (SIO) and the investigative team are exposed to a full range of crime types, up to and including murder. The SIB has created a police and social worker Joint Response Team (JRT) to meet the public protection needs of the garrison and its community.

### **Operational environments**

2.12 Both the SIB (UK) and the SIB (Germany) provide services to garrisons on operations, including the current theatres of Iraq and Afghanistan. Investigating crime overseas, particularly in operational environments, presents challenges rarely experienced by HO police forces:

- The SIB deploys alongside the fighting force in locations where levels of hostility place investigators under deadly threat.
- The maintenance of crime scene security requires a major logistical exercise if examiners are to achieve even a limited search opportunity. Some scenes are not accessible for days, with consequential loss or degradation of evidence.
- The cultural aspects of caring for the dead place an obligation on the SIB to understand issues of language, faith and custom.
- The political implications of action have to be considered to account for areas of conflict.
- The activity of the SIB is open to interpretation by the media both locally and back in the UK.
- In addition to the specific Rules of Engagement set for a particular theatre, service personnel are subject to the laws of England and Wales wherever they are serving, by virtue of the Army Act 1955.

2.13 The operating conditions in Iraq were seen at first hand by a member of the inspection team.

### 3. Major crime investigation

3.1 This section deals with the SIB response to critical incidents and major crime. ACPO defines a critical incident as one:

- where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, his or her family and/or the community;
- that is beyond the capability of a basic command unit; and
- that has the potential to generate grave public concern at a local, regional, national or international level.

3.2 Major crime includes homicide and other serious crime that normally requires the deployment of an SIO, a major incident room (MIR) and other specialist assets.

3.3 In completing the assessment, the inspection team recognised that the first response to incidents that are critical or likely to become so may be provided by soldiers who are not trained police officers. This makes it harder to compare the SIB's ability to manage major crime with that of HO police forces.

3.4 Normal HMIC assessment would consider the levels of homicide, attempted homicide, abduction, blackmail, kidnapping and rape investigated and the detection of those offences as a quantitative measure. However, it is not appropriate to compare the small numbers of offences investigated by the SIB with those investigated by an HO police force, given the different operating environments. The rate of conversion of investigations to convictions is a statistic that can help evaluate investigative success, but this figure was not available to the inspection team as it is not collected within the normal course of business. Any analysis of the investigated offences must take into account the fact that, by agreement, the SIB has full primacy over the direction of investigations in Germany<sup>2</sup> and, to a lesser degree, in Iraq and Afghanistan.

3.5 Elsewhere, the SIB gives the local police service support that ranges from liaison and guiding investigators through military procedures to interviewing witnesses and gathering other evidence.

3.6 The following chart reveals that in 2005 the SIB led investigations into allegations of homicides of 11 people, 9 attempted homicides, 12 threats to kill and 18 rapes. In 15 of these investigations, either the case was withdrawn or no crime was established. The SIB supported another 114 major crime investigations where other forces retained primacy.

<sup>2</sup> See 'The Special Investigation Branch (Germany)' on page 8.

### SIB major crime workload, 2005

Offence	Offender detected			Offender undetected			No crime established			Cases under investigation			Total SIB cases investigated			Cases investigated for/by agencies				
	UK	G	O	UK	G	O	UK	G	O	UK	G	O	UK	G	O	Sub total	UK	G	O	
UK = United Kingdom G = Germany O = Out of area																				
Homicide	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	11	0	0	11	11	5	1	1	
Attempted homicide	0	0	0	0	0	8*	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	9	9	8	1	4	
Threats to kill	2	0	3	2	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	6	3	3	12	7	0	0	
Kidnap/abduction	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	0	
Rape	0	8	0	0	0	2	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	12	6	18	74	4	2	

\* Includes offences arising from roadside bomb attacks.

3.7 In addition, the SIB receives referrals following shooting incidents in theatre to ensure that, where Rules of Engagement have been breached, these offences are investigated. Furthermore, Her Majesty's Coroner places a duty on the SIB to act as his officer in theatre regarding any deaths of service personnel. This duty includes identification continuity, investigation of the cause of death, and the provision of inquest evidence.

3.8 The inspection team found that SIB enquiries into major crimes are led by SIOs of warrant officer class 1 rank and above, trained to HO force standards. SIB investigators receive training for their role<sup>3</sup> – courses include basic crime investigation, race and diversity, crime scene investigation and family liaison. This results in some investigators acting as investigator, crime scene examiner and family liaison officer (FLO), whereas these roles would be performed by separate officers in HO forces. This makes it even more important for supervisors to monitor the workloads of individual staff.

### Practical experience

3.9 While a solid grounding in crime investigation was revealed in Germany and the UK, the inspection team found that experience gained by SIOs and their investigative teams when deployed in theatre has allowed them to develop and demonstrate a wider range of skills in major crime investigation.

3.10 SIB investigators often work in isolation from other SIB resources. Though in telephone communication with supervisors, they are self-reliant in terms of completing investigative procedures.

<sup>3</sup> See Section 9: Training and development.

3.11 The major and serious crimes investigated by HO police forces are more varied than those currently investigated by the SIB, and HO forces allow inexperienced SIOs to learn through shadowing opportunities. The benefits of this cross-fertilisation cannot be overestimated. It is the opinion of HMIC that if the opportunity were afforded to SIB SIOs to shadow more experienced HO force SIOs, they would improve their investigative skills while sharing their own experience with those they shadowed.

**Recommendation 1: HMIC recommends liaison between the SIB and the ACPO Homicide Working Group, with a view to identifying exchange opportunities.**

### Investigative support

3.12 During the inspection, staff reported a difficulty in arranging identification parades with HO forces; this was believed to be due to other parades taking priority. The SIB has responded by introducing VIPER (the video identification parade electronic recording computer system). It has purchased two systems, and installation is under way. This is a positive move that will speed up investigations.

3.13 The SIB has also invested in a TV and imaging unit that enables investigators to access CCTV footage and is a crucial element of its investigative strategy. The unit head deals personally with investigators, sometimes at scenes of crime, and so liaison tends to be case-led.

3.14 Fingerprint expertise is secured through the Fingerprint Bureau of the Metropolitan Police Service. Inked suspect and elimination prints<sup>4</sup> and photographed scene marks are forwarded to New Scotland Yard for processing.

3.15 The inspection team was pleased to find that the full range of forensic support, including specialist advisers, is available from the Forensic Science Service and Forensic Alliance. The SIB uses HO pathologists for post-mortem examinations where homicide is alleged.

3.16 Inspectors received evidence of extensive planning and resourcing requirements needed to allow scene examination during operations. An example was provided of an exhumation in Iraq. The deployment of investigators, pathologist, radiologist, ballistics expert and forensic warrant officer (FWO) with helicopter and considerable protection support indicated the difficulties presented. In order to improve the product of scene examinations, the SIB has purchased two Leica 3D scene surveyors. This reveals innovative problem solving by the leadership team.

<sup>4</sup> Inked printing indicates manual rather than electronic fingerprinting processes.



3.17 Evidence was provided of the use of the NCPE Operational Support Unit (formerly the National Crime and Operations Faculty). This included reports from the Serious Crime Analysis Section (SCAS) of appropriate contact, swift notifications and a high standard of submitted documents. HMIC examined records to support this. A code of practice requires the submission of complete papers to SCAS within 28 days of the notification to SCAS of a crime. While only small in number, all the submissions were inside the agreed timescales for delivery, for which the SIB is to be congratulated. The monitoring processes for submission of notified cases will need to be robust, as the delivery timescale will halve in January 2007.

3.18 The inspection team found that the SIB does not operate a witness protection team to manage threats to witnesses. Rather, the SIB and garrison commanding officers reported that the SIB manages witness care issues by arranging military postings either for those posing the threat or, where appropriate, for witnesses and their families. It should be noted that the RMP is not subject to the national witness arrangements for HO forces within the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.

## Investigative practice

3.19 The SIB provides an on-call service 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Periods of duty for on-call officers are sometimes extensive – 14 days in one cited example. Most incidents outside theatre are initially reported to the RMP general police duty officers, who then request the on-call SIB officer. The on-call officer carries out an assessment of the incident and requests further resources as required. The on-call investigators interviewed displayed a good understanding of the issues influencing a successful conclusion to investigations. In the event of limited resources, the inspectors confirmed that other SIB sections could be called upon for support. Commanding officers requiring SIB services described the system as a whole as effective.

3.20 Those with experience in Iraq described a different procedure: an SIB unit is on call, and, rather than a single individual, a team of four SIB investigators can be deployed. It was clear to the inspectors that the nature of the deployment is dictated by the security situation. In many cases there is only a limited time in which to assess a scene and conduct a basic recovery of evidence.

3.21 Referral of serious crime to the SIB is likely to continue. The Armed Forces Bill 2006 contains a clear proposal to require, by statute, that commanding officers pass such cases to the service police for investigation.

3.22 The SIB has negotiated the use of MIR facilities operated by the MoD Police following consideration of review advice regarding HOLMES MIR staff requirements. However, there is little evidence of this facility being employed or tested by the SIB. There are examples of homicide and rape investigations being conducted from paper-based or 'case file diary' systems. While this is not necessarily inappropriate, the SIO must assess each case for MIR suitability, and record the ensuing policy decision. The experience of HO forces shows that the HOLMES system reduces risks of missed links or investigative opportunities. The early deployment of the MIR in the next suitable case would provide benefits if paper-based investigation is not to become the default position.

### **Recommendation 2: HMIC recommends the early deployment of the HOLMES MIR in the next suitable major crime investigation.**

3.23 The ACPO guidance on MIR standard administrative procedures (MIRSAP) gives advice on the roles and responsibilities of personnel within an MIR. This guidance was updated in 2005 and HO police forces are expected to comply with it even on paper-based enquiries. This latest edition allows for reduced staffing, with individuals holding multiple functions where investigations do not demand full MIR deployment. There may be opportunities for staff within the newly formed Service Police Crime Bureau (SPCB) to receive training in MIR skills.

<sup>5</sup> See Section 9: Training and development.

3.24 The inspection team found that a major incident room was available, not to operate a HOLMES-based computer system, as the name might suggest, but to complete enquiries that are unfinished at the end of a section's tour of duty abroad.

3.25 It was pleasing to find evidence of homicide investigation training standards being developed appropriately, with the first of several SIOs receiving formal accreditation.<sup>5</sup> This is an essential stage of development for every SIO.

3.26 HMIC found evidence that the SIB is aware of high-risk offending and the potential for escalation into major crime. In April 2002 the SIB created its JRT in Germany, with an establishment of three SIB investigators and three social workers co-located within one team. The JRT has a child protection function, and while the responsibility for investigating crimes against children lies with the individual SIB section, the JRT provides practical, highly skilled support. The inspection team found that the JRT:

- arranges forensic medical examinations;
- carries out video witness interviews;
- conducts risk assessments; and
- attends multi-agency strategy meetings, including those of the Area Child Protection Committee.



3.27 The activities of the JRT are fully auditable through a Children and Young Persons Plan, registration of all social service cases and records of strategic discussions. The

latter are documented on a form designed to: a) prompt consideration of key areas; and b) acknowledge actions and timescales.

3.28 The co-location of agencies in the JRT has provided swift and efficient communication between those agencies and an increased willingness to co-operate, which, according to the social workers, is more effective than that experienced in local authority environments.

3.29 **HMIC recognises the good practice of this co-located unit.**

3.30 However, although the JRT monitors incident logs for investigations involving children, including missing-from-home reports and domestic violence, it is unable to observe case progress for these issues unless it is tasked to do so within the investigation.

3.31 The PM(A) may consider widening the remit of the JRT to ensure that the precursors to major crime such as domestic violence receive the same degree of attention from the JRT regardless of whether children are involved.

3.32 While the Army keeps victims' families informed through casualty notification officers and casualty visiting officers, the SIB also trains some of its investigators as FLOs, who report to the SIO. It was reported that the SIB prefers to recall its FLOs once the file is submitted to the commanding officer, and this echoes the policy of sensitive engagement of other victim and witness care partners by HO forces.

3.33 The SIB central investigation team (CIT) manages all long-term serious crime investigations in the UK and the rest of the world outside Germany and mainland Europe. It relies on others, in the vicinity of the incident, to respond initially. Even though SIB case investigation teams are given priority in attending scenes, their arrival is sometimes delayed owing to risks in theatre or to the remote location of some scenes – if in fact a scene still exists.

3.34 Cases are managed through an effective direction and action computer system known as REDCAPS. Warrant officers conduct weekly supervision meetings with investigators to ensure that actions are being progressed.

## Case reviews

3.35 HMIC is aware that, during one recent trial, a judge advocate levelled adverse comments at SIB investigations. These comments related to investigative strategy, forensic procedures and statement quality.

3.36 The inspection found that peer reviews have been conducted. However, the decision to conduct these has historically been made to assist SIOs on specific cases, rather than it being a matter of policy for all investigations. The review documents were not easily located and measures are now in place to create a complete archive of lessons

learned. On a tactical level, the reviews were complimentary about the investigations themselves and provided further practical guidance on the progression of enquiries.

3.37 HMIC examined these documents alongside other service reviews and identified strategic issues relating to sufficiency of staff, management systems and review policy.

3.38 The MIRSAP guides SIOs through the stages of incident management, from initial to mature assessment. HMIC would encourage a policy of reviews by SIOs in conjunction with their line management to ensure appropriate resourcing, followed by an independent case review if undetected after 28 days. This will require appropriately trained and experienced officers to conduct the reviews competently.

**Recommendation 3: HMIC recommends the creation of a major crime case review policy.**

3.39 It is noted that a subgroup of the ACPO Homicide Working Group is considering review procedures nationally. As the SIB is now represented on the Working Group, it has an ideal opportunity to benefit from the latest developments.

## 4. Serious crime and organised criminality

4.1 Section 5: Managing criminal intelligence discusses the clear RMP/SIB desire to adopt the principles of the National Intelligence Model (NIM). A key feature of the NIM is the overarching strategic assessment of crime and disorder that may be committed by military personnel or may have an impact on the organisation. At the time of inspection, no strategic assessment had been prepared. It is therefore impossible to assess clearly and scientifically the nature and extent of crime, including serious and organised crime, that may be taking place. A strategic assessment would allow for priorities to be identified as a control strategy<sup>6</sup> and, in a similar vein, it was unclear how the priorities identified were reached or how a range of tactical options would affect those priorities.

4.2 There are opportunities for the SIB to enhance its ability to collect, collate and analyse information and intelligence around crime and disorder. But this will need to be properly structured, strategically managed and appropriately resourced. If the SPCB and the Regional Intelligence Offices (RIOs) are able to develop and grow, thereby linking up to effectively become the intelligence infrastructure, and are supported by a fully functional IT system, then a clearer understanding should begin to emerge. The benefits of this commitment by the tri-services will be revealed as intelligence and expertise are shared. Any delays to completion of this initiative will increase the risks to the organisation and to public confidence in its abilities.

4.3 Interviews with SIB personnel, particularly those within covert units, provided some evidence of serious and organised criminality either involving military personnel or affecting military deployments.

4.4 The very nature of military deployments, particularly but not exclusively overseas postings, potentially makes them ideal recruiting grounds for serious and organised criminal enterprises. Military personnel often travel internationally, have access to official transport, and apparently receive less scrutiny at border controls than perhaps would be the case if they did not have the identification documents relating to their position.

4.5 Another feature that attracts potential recruiting by criminal agencies is the military training that gives soldiers the familiarity and competency required for handling firearms, ordnance and explosives. Add to this their deployment to areas of the world where drugs, guns and people trafficking are more commonplace, and they become an even more attractive target for recruitment. The vast majority of serving personnel and their families pursue a legitimate and rewarding career, but while the full nature and extent of serious and organised crime remains unclear, the actual numbers of offences are unknown.

<sup>6</sup> The control strategy is the product of the strategic tasking and co-ordination meeting. Its purpose is to set operational priorities so that policing activity throughout a force or command unit is focused on delivering the targets and objectives set by that force or unit. It does not seek to describe all activity but defines the immediate priorities for policing activity and, specifically, intelligence-led tactical operations under the categories of intelligence, prevention and enforcement.

4.6 Should there be any large-scale criminal activity, it could do serious harm to UK and other communities and damage the reputation of the military.

**Recommendation 4: HMIC recommends the formal adoption of the NIM and the urgent creation of a comprehensive strategic assessment to fully understand the nature and extent of serious and organised crime.**

4.7 The initial and emerging structures created within the SIB, including the SPCB, RIOs, dedicated source units (DSUs) and fraud teams, provide a limited yet highly effective capability in tackling serious and organised crime. This would improve if the actual nature, extent and consequences of criminality were better understood, as it would be easier to intervene earlier, before an issue becomes a threat to the organisation. For example, the RIO in Germany receives approximately 1,200 intelligence reports a year, of which 60% are submitted by the DSUs, which have small teams and represent a very small proportion of the overall intelligence-gathering capability. An invigoration of 'intelligence-led' thinking across the whole RMP estate and beyond could significantly increase this output and help the move towards a more comprehensive understanding of what crimes are taking place.

4.8 The covert operations team (COT) estimates that it spends about half its time deployed on test purchase operations and the other half on surveillance. Though based in Germany, this team is also required to service the UK, and it would be further stretched should the intelligence picture indicate that far more deployments than are currently serviced were necessary.

4.9 The limited information that is available from some intelligence reports, from agencies such as Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and from details of persons arrested indicates that there are links through the military estate to serious and organised criminality. While the SIB's own control strategy is not necessarily informed by a comprehensive strategic assessment, the priorities are, not surprisingly, related to drugs, firearms and people trafficking. It also features smuggling of other commodities, including cigarettes and alcohol, as well as organised fraud and theft.

4.10 The SIB does not have the benefit of an effective intelligence system to enable analysis of trends and hotspot locations for serious and organised crime. In addition, the extent to which it is properly notified by other agencies and some police forces is dubious. For example, an HO police force that had arrested a soldier for a serious sexual offence decided it was inappropriate to notify the Army because of concerns about data protection, despite the fact that he was due to be posted to a family base overseas.

4.11 The inspection team visited the fraud units of the SIB (Germany) and the SIB (UK). These units deal with account and allowance fraud within the Army. They reconstruct service fund accounts, conduct financial analysis and profiling, and then supply packages of evidence to the investigation teams.

4.12 The SIB does not train its staff as accredited financial investigators, preferring to use the services of the MoD Police and the Serious Organised Crime Agency. There is a perception that this crime type is increasing, but more detailed analysis is required to reveal the true picture.

4.13 It is noted that the service police does not currently have access to the investigative benefits of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, although adoption of a statutory instrument to rectify the position is planned. Despite this, the fraud unit has enjoyed considerable success; one example was given of a conviction of personnel for obtaining over £37,000 by deception from local contractors in Basrah, Iraq.

4.14 As in HO forces, the inspection team found the SIB has a hi-tech crime unit that is increasingly being called upon for technical investigation support, including forensic examination of computer-based material such as indecent images. This area of work is particularly stressful, due not only to the nature of the images viewed but also the increasing workload of the limited number of staff with such skills.



## 5. Managing criminal intelligence

### The National Intelligence Model

5.1 Law enforcement agencies across the world are facing the challenge of tackling ever increasing and more sophisticated serious and organised criminality by making more effective use of existing resources. There is also evidence of crossovers between all levels of criminality and terrorism. This makes it even more imperative for agencies to understand their respective roles and work in a complementary and co-ordinated manner.

5.2 Operational effectiveness can be maximised only if it is supported by a sound intelligence infrastructure that comprises effective systems and procedures, managed by sufficient skilled and trained personnel who are equipped with appropriate technical resources and not abstracted to perform other roles.

5.3 The NIM, created by ACPO and Centrex, is a model for managing law enforcement activity based on multi-agency information. It has been adopted by all the HO police forces. The NIM identifies patterns of crime to provide an accurate understanding of crime and incident problems and the methods by which they can be tackled.

5.4 As previously indicated, one of four key intelligence products of the NIM is the strategic assessment. It gives an accurate overview of the current and long-term issues affecting policing. It makes recommendations for prevention, intelligence and enforcement priorities for the scale of crime and disorder problems it identifies. A strategic tasking and co-ordination group uses the assessment to set the control strategy and intelligence requirement.

### Leadership

5.5 In 2004 a report was submitted to the SIB commanding officer, setting out the benefits for the RMP of adopting the principles of the NIM. The report suggested that this would underpin investigative output and could reduce delays in some cases. The concept was agreed and the author of the report was tasked with implementing the change, albeit using existing staff and without any additional funding.

5.6 With the requisite investment, the NIM has the potential to improve business planning and increase effectiveness in identifying and targeting underlying problems before they present a significant risk to an organisation. Its effective implementation demands significant management investment and appropriate levels of resourcing.

5.7 Under the leadership and direction of the author of the NIM report, a DSU consisting of five people was established, along with a three-person RIO. There is also a COT, as previously mentioned, equipped to provide surveillance capabilities.

5.8 The SPCB has been established in the UK to act as a tri-service central intelligence bureau and co-ordinate the intelligence activities of the RIO (Germany) as well as the RIO (UK), which is due to be set up in summer 2006. A UK-based DSU of three personnel has also been established.

5.9 The inspection team found that a statutory instrument was being drafted to place disclosure on the same footing as the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 applies to HO forces. In addition, the inspection revealed that further mechanisms had been created to ensure appropriate disclosure and protection of information in the interim.

### **Adopting the principles of the National Intelligence Model**

5.10 There is clearly an appetite within the SIB for adopting the NIM. However, this appetite is limited to a small number of people, including those working in specialist units, who have varying degrees of exposure to all the facets of this business model. There is little evidence of wholehearted commitment to the implementation of the NIM. This is particularly clear from the lack of funding, implementation strategy or dedicated roles for enabling its formal introduction. Apart from a number of specialists, SIB staff display little awareness or understanding of the concept of the NIM and its potential benefits for the RMP and the service police as a whole.

5.11 In contrast, HO police forces have fully committed to the implementation of minimum standards. They have appointed lead senior officers, supported by dedicated personnel, to oversee policy, strategy and implementation.

5.12 The creation of the SPCB, and the plans for it to co-ordinate the activity of the RIOs, is a step in the right direction and is encouraging. However, there is still some way to go – particularly in terms of resourcing, systems and procedures, and clarity of roles and responsibilities. If the SPCB is to succeed in providing a hub for all service police intelligence structures, it will need the commitment of the whole service police community.

5.13 Specialist units such as the DSUs, the COT, the RIOs, and the fraud and hi-tech crime units are staffed by highly committed, knowledgeable and well trained personnel who regularly praised the individual leadership displayed by their command teams. However, greater recognition of their worth and a greater commitment to the principle of intelligence-led operations could significantly improve the notable results these units are already achieving.

5.14 The SIB is to further develop a tactical assessment, a second key product of the NIM which will inform decision making relating to the prioritisation and tasking and co-ordination of resources. Without these assessments, the organisation cannot scientifically assess intelligence on the nature and extent of criminality or the risks it presents, nor can it go on to make rational decisions about resource allocation and the development of appropriate tactics for mitigating the risks.

5.15 The SIB has established a tactical tasking and co-ordination group. At the time of inspection, however, the chair of this group was also a commanding officer and an authorising officer for applications under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, with the potential for a conflict of roles. The timings of meetings were irregular, with some slippage, attendance was ad hoc, and there was a lack of robust accountability for actions arising.

**Recommendation 5: HMIC recommends that the Office of the Provost Marshal commits to and invests in full adoption of the NIM, including the establishment of a fully planned and resourced implementation programme. The NCPE has agreed to advise the Office of the Provost Marshal in this regard.**

**Recommendation 6: HMIC recommends that the Office of the Provost Marshal develops an internal communication strategy to increase knowledge and awareness of the NIM and its benefits.**

5.16 A common concern related to the lack of IT support for some activities, including intelligence and source management. Electronic systems are far more effective and efficient at dealing with systems and processes than paper-based systems. They also afford greater accountability to those charged with command roles.

**Recommendation 7: HMIC recommends that the Office of the Provost Marshal reinvigorates the IT strategy to support intelligence and covert operations.**

## 6. Forensic services

6.1 For this section the inspectors interviewed FWOs in the UK and Germany, along with Professor Peter Vanezis, the RMP's senior consultant forensic practitioner. SIB investigator interviews and corroborative documentation completed the picture. The framework was based on a pre-inspection inquiry completed by the HO Police and Crime Standards Directorate (PCSD).

### Forensic science in the police service

6.2 In recent years, UK forensic science has focused on improving performance for volume crime areas such as burglary, robbery and motor vehicle crime. It has done so by maximising opportunities throughout the chain of forensic investigation. The PCSD has introduced an effective performance management system that monitors force forensic performance, starting with scene attendance levels and working through to detection rates. This initiative is directly linked to the Government's public service agreement target to reduce crime by 15% overall. HMIC has focused its own forensic science assessment framework on this target.

6.3 In addition, HO and UK policing resources have been directed towards cold case reviews. This has led to significant success in prosecuting previously unsolved cases, particularly for offences of rape and homicide. Forensic performance in these areas is assessed through the HMIC major crime framework.

### Forensic science in the Special Investigation Branch

6.4 The forensic inspection team was acutely aware of the variety of environments within which the SIB has to deliver forensic services. The comments and recommendations in this report take this diversity fully into account.



6.5 The forensic science requirements of the SIB cover the full range of crimes encountered in HO forces. However, the SIB's delivery of these services differs widely in a number of ways. Most importantly, forensic skills are not supplied by separate specialists but by the investigation team members. As a result, individual investigators find themselves dealing with the forensics of a barrack room locker theft one week, and a multiple homicide inquiry in theatre the next.

## Operational capability

6.6 The observations on deployment to crime scenes relate specifically to Germany, where the RMP may not always have the capacity to deal with all the volume crime offences. In order to match demand and supply, crime screening and subsequent removal of the requirement for scenes of crime officers (SOCOs) is not uncommon. While HMIC fully accepts the differences in the work of the RMP, the service offered to victims of crime should remain paramount.

6.7 Moreover, in Germany at least, not all fingerprints found at crime scenes are submitted to fingerprint bureaux. **It is clearly detrimental to investigations if the fingerprints found at crime scenes are not submitted for checking. The prevalence and impact of this practice should be reviewed.**

6.8 Over and above these distinctions is the fact that the work is sometimes carried out in a climate of armed combat. Clearly, in these circumstances the operational imperative is one of safety. Forensic recovery becomes a lesser concern. Nevertheless, it can sometimes be critical. We make no comment on this, as the SIB clearly holds the access to expertise in this field.

6.9 The SIB differs from the HO force model in that it trains its investigators in forensic science. After joining the SIB, staff undertake the standard scenes of crime course. Figures indicate that only about half of SIB investigators are trained SOCOs. The exception to this approach is Germany, where there is a small, dedicated SOCO capability of three staff.

6.10 The SIB approach raised initial concerns around the risk of cross-contamination, specialist knowledge and organisational capacity. The inspectors therefore tested the processes through intensive interviews with front-line and support staff. In addition, cases were dip sampled and quality assured by forensic specialists from the PCSD.

6.11 The inspectors concluded that the SIB forensic approach is fit for purpose within the operational environment in which it delivers services. The quality of the forensic work examined was high. In particular, HMIC acknowledges the quality of the work performed under extreme circumstances in conflict zones.

6.12 There were clear examples of forensic awareness of cross-contamination and other issues. There was also evidence of high levels of victim care when dealing with sexual offences. The forensic pathologist indicated that evidence was captured correctly at

scenes and recovered for laboratory or post-mortem analysis. Post-mortem facilities in theatre were of a good standard and fit for purpose.

6.13 At an operational level, SIB staff make appropriate use of DNA, fingerprint and other scientific methods, according to the circumstances. No major concerns were raised by staff interviewed or in the detailed case inspections conducted by HMIC staff.

### Performance management

6.14 While individual cases are conducted well operationally, the connection between the RMP vision, corporate objectives and the forensic response was somewhat equivocal. It was difficult to recognise a 'line of sight' between organisational vision and RMP forensic strategy and how, if at all, this cascades through local line management to the individual targets and annual confidential report.

6.15 The diverse and constantly changing demands placed on the SIB make the application of a performance management system more difficult than in HO forces. However, there is no performance management report. Forensic work is largely managed on the basis of quality of submission, with good line management and with additional supervision and quality assurance by the FWOs. However, there is little quantitative performance information to identify trends and take strategic action.

### Capture of criminal justice DNA and fingerprints

6.16 The SIB has clear guidance on the taking of DNA and fingerprints for persons involved in the criminal justice system, although it is recognised that the SIB does not retain ownership of the case after submission of the case papers and that the police forces for the Armed Forces do not currently have the power to take samples on arrest, as do HO forces. However, there are concerns that a large number of potential subjects are not having their samples taken. The SIB has supplied the following figures:

	Number of convictions	Number of fingerprint samples taken	Number of DNA samples taken
2005	544	187	183
2006 (to April)	171	75	79

6.17 The fact that a number of convicted offenders who may have committed other serious offences for which they should have been investigated are residing in both the Army and civil communities is a clear risk to the British Army's reputation.

**Recommendation 8: HMIC recommends that the SIB should review its methods for capturing and submitting criminal justice DNA and fingerprint samples.**

## Sharing of DNA and other forensic samples with other jurisdictions

6.18 The geographical spread of SIB activity means that it has more significant investigative crossovers with other jurisdictions. For example, a significant number of rapes were committed in Germany last year. Experience tells us that some of the perpetrators may be serial offenders committing offences both within and outside the military environment. The SIB does not currently share DNA and other forensic samples with local police authorities. In addition, samples are not checked against local databases covering the area in which the offender resided.

6.19 Inspectors also found that a number of military offenders come from countries other than the UK, to which they may return following Courts Martial. No mechanisms are in place to ensure that the receiving jurisdiction is aware of the person and receives samples for database comparison if appropriate.

**Recommendation 9: HMIC recommends that the SIB should establish protocols with all jurisdictions with which it has interfaces to ensure appropriate sharing of investigative and criminal justice samples.**

## Welfare of Special Investigation Branch staff

6.20 The nature of the SIB, and particularly its forensic work, means that personnel are often exposed to the most traumatic scenes. These range from images of paedophilia to multiple fatalities in theatre. Individual SIB staff support each other well and are cognisant of welfare issues. There are also good professional services available to staff who formally ask for help. However, there is concern that there is no provision for personnel who need to speak to professional staff informally and in confidence.

## Organisational learning

6.21 The SIB has an organic learning process with regard to forensic issues. There are few clear processes that identify learning on the front line and link this back into organisational and personal development. There are a number of approaches that the SIB could develop to increase its learning opportunities:

- SIB and Army Boards of Inquiry;
- Office of Operational Law;
- Courts Martial;
- theatre debrief reports; and
- forensic medicine analysis and research.

6.22 SIB forensic investigators undertake accredited crime scene examiner courses, but there is little in the way of development or refresher courses to keep investigators up to date with advances in forensic science. SIB FWOs are allocated periods of refresher training at the National Training Centre in Durham.

6.23 Of paramount importance is the issue of accreditation to the Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners (CRFP). Competency assessment and CRFP endorsement are substantial issues in the domain of forensic investigations and the SIB does not currently hold accreditation. There can be little doubt that, in the fullness of time, this will call into question the expertise of forensic investigators, either at Courts Martial or in the civil legal process. **As a matter of priority, the SIB should consider the issue of CRFP accreditation for officers engaged in forensic science tasks.**

6.24 The turnover of senior managers may hinder the effective management of forensic science in the SIB. FWOs serve for two-year (extendable) periods. This relatively short term of office raises a number of problems. The first concerns the need for business continuity and stability of roles in the rapidly advancing area of forensic science. The second, which is equally important, is that CRFP accreditation will be difficult to accomplish given a regular turnover of key management staff. **The RMP may wish to benchmark its stability ratio<sup>7</sup> against those of other MoD services and their civilian counterparts.**

### Best value

6.25 HO forces have a regular programme to review all their services, including forensic services, over a three to five-year cycle to ensure that they are offering best value for money. The SIB provides a number of forensic services that are naturally amenable to the best value review process. In particular, SIB management should set out a timetable to conduct a best value review of delivery for the following services:

- photographic development and processing;
- chemical laboratory services;
- management of forensic services; and
- opportunities arising from the tri-service collaborative working initiative (Purple Policing).

6.26 During the inspection, HMIC considered the opportunity for the SIB to engage civilian staff as SOC0s. As they would need to be deployed in theatre, this was discounted. One way forward, however, would be to employ a civilian in the role of head of profession for forensic services. HMIC would encourage an open process that might recruit an individual from outside the Armed Forces, with knowledge of best practice in the changing and developing forensic world. Such an individual would be responsible for developing the SIB's forensic strategy. And, with agreement, he or she could bring cost benefits by providing skills to all three Armed Forces.

**Recommendation 10: HMIC recommends that the SIB considers recruiting a civilian head of profession for forensic services.**

<sup>7</sup> The stability ratio is calculated as the number of employees recruited into the role (in a given time) divided by staff leaving the role in the same period (as a percentage).

## Capture of DNA and fingerprints of staff joining the Royal Military Police

6.27 All HO forces now have a policy of checking the DNA and fingerprints of applicants before accepting them for duty. In addition, existing officers are encouraged to voluntarily provide DNA samples to allow easy elimination from crime scenes.

6.28 It is noted that the SIB does not have similar procedures. The military authorities must consider their current approach against the risk that serious offenders will come to light as serving members of the RMP.

**Recommendation 11: HMIC recommends that the Office of the Provost Marshal should consider taking fingerprints and DNA from all potential RMP applicants, for speculative search against fingerprint and DNA databases in both the UK and the applicant's country of residence.**

**Recommendation 12: HMIC recommends that the SIB should develop a forensic science delivery plan for the next five years, taking into account:**

- future proofing for the predicted environment;
- the tri-service Purple Policing initiative;
- best value delivery of services; and
- organisational learning.

## 7. Criminal justice processes

### Leadership

7.1 The Deputy Provost Marshal (Investigations), Colonel Forster-Knight, is the lead officer for criminal justice processes within the military police.

7.2 The inspection team found that all criminal justice business is governed by the Provost manual, which is available electronically and on CD-ROM to all staff engaged on investigative work. Any subsequent amendments or deviations are communicated to the RMP via general orders, which are accessible by the same methods.

7.3 The inspection revealed that SIB criminal justice processes are the subject of close scrutiny by the lead officer within the headquarters of the PM(A). The position directed by this officer is cascaded via the leads within the SIB in the UK and in Germany.

7.4 Senior officers of the Army Prosecuting Authority (APA) and the RMP hold minuted meetings. They discuss processes to improve working practices, including early APA consultation, APA input on training, and the highlighting of any trends in file defects.

### Investigative independence

7.5 The Armed Forces Bill 2006 seeks to require the SIB to refer investigations into inherently serious crimes directly to the APA rather than to commanding officers. If ratified, this will require amendments to the *Manual of Service Law*.

7.6 As previously stated, all SIB investigations are independent of the chain of command of the Field Army. Instead, investigators report to the PM(A), who is designated as operational commander for SIB units on operations. This position was confirmed on 14 October 2005, when the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Michael Jackson, directed the PM(A) to conduct all RMP investigations independently.

7.7 Investigative independence has been the subject of ministerial and media attention, and HMIC received confirmation from all quarters that any influence by officers in positions of command had been consigned to history.

### Performance<sup>8</sup>

7.8 Success for the SIB is predominantly measured by the quality of case files produced and the timeliness of the submission. These two measures are applied through exception reporting at various stages as the case papers pass through SIB supervisors and management; Army Legal Services; unit commanding officers; brigade or garrison command; the APA; and the Military Court Service. The checks are rigorous and extra work is requested where necessary, though this normally relates to the specific needs of lawyers or prosecutors.

<sup>8</sup> See Section 12: Performance management and continuous improvement.

7.9 The inspection team spoke to the head of the APA, Brigadier Vowles, who reported that his examination of SIB files and those of his staff revealed a “high to very high standard”. He said this standard was delivered no matter what type of offence was being investigated.

7.10 Colonel Miskelly of the APA in Germany described the investigators as tenacious in their efforts to identify suspects and witnesses. A process for additional requests for evidence exists, but no examples could be provided other than those created on the changeover of a prosecutor. One commanding officer spoke of the first-class standard of investigation papers presented to him across a range of cases.

7.11 The length of time spent in creating files of this quality was a subject of comment. Creators and recipients alike frequently questioned the need to produce all the contents on every occasion, particularly in the case of minor criminal allegations.

7.12 Time delays are monitored outside the SIB by the Office for Standards of Casework (Army). The latter assesses and monitors cases against expected delivery through all the components of the MCJS, not just the RMP. Its Deputy Director, Colonel Deucher, reported significant improvements in submission times of files from the RMP – particularly in cases older than six months, which represented only 8.5% of live cases in 2005 (out of a total of 2,254 cases), compared with 20.9% in 2002 (out of 1,020 cases).

7.13 The inspection team learned of logistical difficulties in a large number of cases, reportedly due to the movement of witnesses and the distances investigators have to travel. However, these problems must be robustly challenged if delays are to be reduced further. For example, the use of local officers to secure evidence may be a quicker and more cost-effective option.

7.14 The SIB works closely with its criminal justice partners at various levels, and inspectors noted the decision to place an APA lawyer in a forward position, i.e. within operational theatre. This role provides guidance on the application of the law, the likelihood of conviction and the necessity of enquiries. All interviewees believed that this could only improve standards and prevent unnecessary investigative activity.

7.15 Section 118 of the Armed Forces Bill 2006 seeks to strengthen the principle of early APA engagement. The experience of HO police forces in pre-charge access to the Crown Prosecution Service supports this intention. The deployment of RMP officers at the APA in a liaison role has improved contact and delivery of advice and investigative product.

7.16 Given the rising levels of demand on the SIB and expected increases in investigative activity, inspectors sought to identify opportunities to improve performance with the numbers of staff available.

7.17 One possibility is a caution system for minor criminal offences committed by military personnel, which would reduce the size of such case files. This is accepted practice in HO police forces, where it is recognised as a sanction detection subject to strict acceptance criteria, including an admission of guilt. HMIC notes the contents of a 2004 discussion paper on the subject. HMIC believes that, with clear guidance, it may result in swifter justice. Early resolution in minor cases will allow greater scope to investigate more serious matters.

**Recommendation 13: HMIC recommends that, as a matter of urgency, the Office of the Provost Marshal identifies with the relevant authorities the compelling case for alternative case options.**

7.18 When the deceased are repatriated from Iraq and Afghanistan, they are usually flown into RAF Brize Norton. They are therefore under the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Coroner at Oxford. Having conducted 120 inquests, he praised the service provided to him by SIB investigators in identification procedures and cause of death investigations. He described statements taken by SIB investigators as lengthy and highly detailed.

7.19 He recognised the professionalism with which SIB officers presented court evidence in a confident yet sympathetic manner that was appreciated by victims' families.

**7.20 HMIC notes as good practice the excellent service that the SIB provides to Her Majesty's Coroner in its delivery of identification and investigation evidence in the difficult and sensitive area of repatriation of the deceased.**

### Information sharing and the Police National Computer

7.21 SIB investigations are reported to the SPCB and then to the HO police forces where the offences are alleged to have taken place. On conviction of military personnel, summarily or at Court Martial, an Army post-trials unit updates the Police National Computer. The inspection found a protocol confirming expected procedures is being developed by the MoD on behalf of defence policing. This will include guidance on reporting, recording and investigation of crime.

### Legislative arrangements

7.22 In some cases, though not all, the inspection team found that some legislation affecting criminal investigation was enacted without fully considering the RMP/SIB need. Two typical examples were asset seizing under the Proceeds of Crime Act and the HO police force ability to take samples on arrest, neither of which currently applies to the Armed Forces police. HMIC notes that the SIB has recognised the need for consultation to include the Provost Marshals. It is clear that if the PM(A) considers the

impact of future legislation at drafting, this could prevent the creation of lengthy statutory instruments and avoid delays in military use. The Armed Forces Bill team has been designated as policy lead for co-ordinating the response of the Armed Forces police to future consultation.

7.23 The team has actively considered opportunities to include existing policing legislation where it would benefit Armed Forces policing. This is a considerable piece of work.

**7.24 HMIC commends the decision to include the Provost Marshal (Army) in HO police legislative consultations.**

## 8. Human resources

### Resourcing

8.1 The numbers of SIB personnel are set in line with the annual Army assessment of essential elements of its business, future context, and current strengths and weaknesses. With the exception of a reduction in 2005, the number of level 3 crimes investigated by the SIB is on the increase.

Year	Investigations	Investigators
2002	1,901	217
2003	1,983	235
2004	2,156	235
2005	1,909	235

8.2 It is noted that the RMP has successfully bid for 14 additional staff through the 2006 Army Liability Arbitration Tribunal. Although some have been gained through redistribution of staff, this will provide an extra deployable section, and more staff in the CIT and hi-tech crime unit.

8.3 The deployment to two operational theatres has created additional demand for SIB services, and HMIC frequently heard that the resources were now spread thin and wide. The SIB numbers deployed are set to meet the needs of the light, medium or heavy fighting force they are attached to. Where fixed templates of proportional staffing still exist, these have recently been developed to allow the increase in resources through joint working with the SIB (RAF). RAF resources have been deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is an excellent opportunity to test different configurations of tri-service working.

8.4 The introduction of the SPCB is promoting further economy of effort in the area of records, intelligence and specialist crime capability. The benefits of the Armed Forces working together cannot be overstated, given that each service is seeking the same outcome. HMIC commends this practice.

**Recommendation 14: HMIC recommends further development of tri-service working of SIBs.**

8.5 The additional investigative demand placed on the SIB (Germany) through its primacy agreement<sup>9</sup> has led to this garrison feeling under-resourced. Although its live cases were low in number compared with those of HO forces, it was explained that the large geographical area covered by the unit meant that investigators could spend a great deal of time travelling between tasks.

<sup>9</sup> See 'The Special Investigation Branch (Germany)' on page 8.

8.6 RMP management's response was for UK SIB sections to take twice as many deployments as Germany. This resulted in 50% of Iraqi deployments and 100% of Afghanistan deployments resting with the SIB (UK), and suggested a mechanism for ongoing assessment of the police estate.

8.7 At periods of peak demand, additional resources are available as a 'surge' to deployed staff for a period of up to a month. Events such as the helicopter crash in Iraq stretched resources, in particular for staffing scene of crime roles.

8.8 Within its Territorial Army (TA) section, the RMP has a number of serving HO police officers. In the past, the deployment of these resources has not always made best use of their skills and experience. HMIC recognises the intended development of a register of TA skills to improve this situation.

## Recruiting

8.9 To aid recruiting, the SIB operates three-month familiarisation attachments for junior commissioned officers, followed by six-month attachments leading to two-year secondments. All interviewees saw this as a good opportunity for potential senior officers to gain a better understanding of the role and functions of the SIB. This will benefit them as individuals, the SIB when interacting with them later, and the Army as a whole.

8.10 The inspection revealed a concern that the constraints of recruiting non-commissioned officers to the SIB only from within the RMP might deny the SIB opportunities to secure specialist skills and knowledge from the wider Army pool. However, a system of specialist advisers and direct recruiting would solve the problem. A system of engaging advisers is available for short term consultation but direct recruiting could solve the problem more long term. This would allow for approaches to individuals who desire to become police officers.

**8.11 HMIC commends the SIB's use of soldiers from the wider Army pool who are suitably qualified and who have skills or attributes to help build specific knowledge where gaps exist.**

## Workforce planning

8.12 HMIC notes the promising development from fixed posting periods to negotiated extensions for specialist posts. The need to balance the obligation to give staff career opportunities with organisational return on lengthy and costly training requires workforce planning between the SIB and the Army Personnel Centre. The RMP has gained approval for 70% of extensions. There is potential for a specialist career path to preserve training and other skills in areas such as computer forensics, where skills take several years to develop.

**Recommendation 15: HMIC recommends that the Office of the Provost Marshal reviews tenure policies for all specialist postings.**

8.13 An area of concern for the inspection team was the number of vacancies in key posts. For example, one forensic officer was posted to the SIB and completed intensive training, only to be promoted and posted away from the SIB before live operational forensic deployment could commence. A replacement was not immediately available and, even when selected, would not be deployable until trained. Similarly, from November 2005 until June 2006, the second-in-command in Germany had also been acting as temporary commanding officer, thus covering two senior roles.

8.14 Succession planning needs to take account of the impact on the remaining team, their performance and their welfare.

8.15 A template for the bare minimum staffing levels that a section would need in order to meet day-to-day demands was:

- one captain;
- one warrant officer class 1 crime manager/SIO;
- one warrant officer class 2 DSIO;
- one staff sergeant;
- four sergeants; and
- two six-month training appointments.

8.16 This could not be tested by HMIC, given the current lack of knowledge of criminality.

8.17 When this template was applied to each of the five sections in Germany – 70, 72, 74, 76 and 87 – there was a shortfall of one captain and three warrant officers class 1. The impact on capability for day-to-day service provision is significant. The inspection team did not see any detailed plans to reduce this shortfall.

8.18 As previously stated, the SIB (Germany) is also responsible for providing the investigative function to the whole garrison community, including visitors, even when the military units are away on exercise or operations. HMIC therefore recognises the impact that operational postings into theatre have on the workload of SIB sections remaining on base, particularly in Germany. HMIC also notes that each six-month tour abroad creates a total abstraction of ten months, counting pre-deployment leave and training.

8.19 The comment was made to the inspection team that there was insufficient resource, “but that is part of being in the British Army today. It is not just a case of there not being enough staff, more a case of too many demands made on those resources that do exist.” **Once again, a NIM approach would produce the benefits of a better prediction of demand and improved performance through more informed tasking.**

8.20 The workload of the UK investigators, as opposed to those in Germany, was reported to be manageable with existing personnel. However, this is to be expected given the number of troops currently posted overseas. HMIC noted that the SIB (UK) carried a greater number of staff who are due to leave the Army than the units based in Germany. As a result, personnel taking resettlement courses reduced investigative resilience during their abstraction.

## Sickness

8.21 HMIC was saddened to find that two SIB investigators, a captain and a staff sergeant, were reported to have taken their own lives while on operational duty in Iraq.

8.22 While unable to comment on those individual cases, the inspection team found that the type and level of work carried out by the SIB, not surprisingly, had an adverse impact on the well-being of some staff. HO police forces recognise that the result of repeated exposure to death, post-mortems, indecent images, incidents of child abuse and the like places an obligation on employers to provide appropriate medical services as a matter of routine. Making these services available directly to officers removes the stigma sometimes experienced by staff who put in a formal request for support, either on their own behalf or through a management referral.

8.23 Given the relatively small number of officers engaged in this type of high-risk activity, and the reduced resilience that follows, the provision of quality support services to maintain fitness and availability can only be a positive step in the protection of both staff and the organisation.

8.24 Some HO police forces have introduced an independent and confidential counselling service to allow self-referral without any perceived career risk. For some specialist areas, mandatory counselling enables welfare monitoring and removes the need for even self-referral and any possible associated stigma.

**Recommendation 16: HMIC commends the consideration of support services for SIB staff, and strongly recommends the early review of any development to assess needs for more structured services for staff in high-risk areas.**

8.25 HMIC recognises that the SIB is one small part of the Army and that, consequently, its ability to influence policy change may be limited.

## 9. Training and development

### Context and structure

9.1 The DPC has resided at Southwick Park, Portsmouth, since late 2005 and is part of the larger Defence College of Police Personnel and Administration. Following its move from a single service institution at Chichester it now encompasses the RAF Police and the Royal Navy Regulating Branch. HMIC understands that these changes have exerted considerable pressures in the development of a new cohesive unit across the three Forces, and congratulates all staff on their accomplishments to date.

9.2 The newly formed college delivers all forms of service police training to the Forces, from the basic initial course through to the specialist curriculum. The latter includes crime scene management and training for entry into the SIB. HMIC's remit for this inspection focused tightly on the higher order investigation courses. HMIC will not therefore offer comment or observation on basic military police officer training, except to say that it acknowledges and recognises that others have conducted significant inquiries into such areas and that a defence training review is under way.

### Doctrine and strategy

9.3 Doctrine can be described, within the policing context, as:

“what we do and how we do it best ... it is the heart of defining standards, raising professionalism and influencing standardisation of practice.”<sup>10</sup>

9.4 Doctrine is owned by the PM(A) and is translated into the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT), which states:

“Training is appropriate and progressive throughout an individual's career. This includes training in Provost specialist skills and management ...”

“Where appropriate, training should be accredited to a civilian body to demonstrate professional competence ...”<sup>11</sup>

9.5 HMIC was pleased to find that robust structures are in place to support the training cycle, from the development of customer-generated requirements, through training-needs analysis, design and delivery, to evaluation, and that these structures are fully supported and annotated within the DSAT, enabling individual roles and processes to be defined clearly and concisely.

### Client and provider

9.6 It is recognised that any form of police training should be informed by clearly defined client and provider roles and responsibilities. This view, and compliance with the identified processes, has been consistently applied throughout HMIC's many inspections of HO and other police forces.

<sup>10</sup> *Horizons* (Centrex journal), Issue 10, September 2004, page 18, Assistant Chief Constable Ian Humphreys.

<sup>11</sup> PM(A) Army Quality Assurance Statement. *HQ training manual*, Issue 1, July 2005, Brigadier C A Findlay.

9.7 The client is responsible for identifying and commissioning the training requirement, and for ensuring that an effective quality assurance process is in place and that high-level impact evaluation is catered for.

9.8 HMIC was pleased to note that this was the case with the DPC. Inspection revealed that it was the PM(A) who acted as the customer interface.

9.9 The provider is responsible for the supply and delivery of the curriculum.

9.10 The operational customer referred to as the 'field army' identifies its needs and thus informs the DPC directly. This clear delineation of roles ensures that the field army client requirements are met and that the provider is responsive to its customer's needs.

## Training delivery

9.11 Delivery methodology is based on strategic decision making in consultation with the field army customer. Thus the training is informed and dynamic in terms of updating the curriculum. The college's portfolio is extensive, and inspection reveals that the delivery plan looks forward some three years, enabling a consistency of process and practice.

9.12 The training cycle is dealt with by staff with appropriate DPC qualifications. Perhaps uniquely, each part of the training cycle is dealt with by individual staff members. This system is cemented robustly by the DSAT, which specifically states what process is to be used for each element of the training cycle. HMIC is concerned, however, to find that there are identified training gaps, for example some elements of refresher training. Following a risk assessment, the PM(A) became aware of these issues.

9.13 Further inspection activity revealed a reliance on classroom inputs, the preferred method being PowerPoint presentations. While this is appropriate, HMIC believes that greater use could be made of computer-based 'blended learning' (distance learning by computer).

9.14 The Army has the use of an operational computer system, the PM(A) portal, which can despatch policy and doctrine across the world within 24 hours. This system, with appropriate software, could facilitate blended learning packages across the organisation under a managed learning environment, thus removing training gaps entirely or at least partially, and making managed distance learning available to all who require it.

**Recommendation 17: HMIC recommends a full review of the Defence Police College course portfolio through the Office of the Provost Marshal (Army), to identify suitable products for blended learning delivery.**

9.15 HMIC is pleased to note that the classroom facilities available are excellent. Environmental training is extremely well resourced and contained within the Southwick Park grounds. This allows the privacy and freedom of training that a military establishment requires. HMIC acknowledges the significant financing and resources that

have been provided within the new crime scene building, Locard House. While this is principally for the use of crime scene investigator (CSI) students, HMIC would encourage further extensive use of this investment across suitably identified areas of the college curriculum.

### **Special Investigation Branch qualifying course**

9.16 The level 3 investigator course, effectively the SIB entry course, is integral to the effective investigation and management of major police incidents falling under the remit of the RMP. There is a process that demands that staff selected for this course are of sergeant rank or have passed the requisite military promotion course.

9.17 A developed distance learning package is then despatched to individual students before their attachment to an operational SIB unit for the purpose of vocational experience.

9.18 Once through the formative assessment stage, students access the nine-week course. The course is DSAT compliant and is well received by all involved. Following its recent customer-driven redesign, it is held up as the flagship course and the first success following the move to Southwick Park.

9.19 HMIC is, however, concerned that individual students have opportunities to acquire unconnected and diverse experiences during the attachment phase. This could create a disparity of knowledge. A substantial number of SIB staff acting as mentors or coaches feel uneasy about the vocational experience assessment criteria for learners during the vocational phase.

9.20 HMIC has advised senior military staff of this apparent lack of criteria within the holistic assessment strategy. It was agreed that it should be reviewed in the future. The course is appropriately quality assured and evaluated by the use of the DSAT Inval (quality assurance) and Exval (evaluation) processes.

### **Crime scene investigation**

9.21 Good quality crime scene investigation is a fundamental tenet of incident crime scene management. It relies heavily on the acquisition of good quality knowledge, complemented by experiential and environmental practice. After initial training, individuals should be supported by structured refresher training encompassed within continuous professional development, the preservation of core competence, and maintenance and enhancement of skills and knowledge.

9.22 HMIC accepts that the national asset of choice for the provision of crime scene investigation courses is the National Training Centre at Harperley Hall, Durham, which is managed by Centrex, the Central Police Training and Development Authority. In late 1999, the DPC and Centrex signed a licensing agreement allowing the DPC to use the Centrex crime scene investigation course materials for the sole purpose of training RMP staff in crime scene investigation techniques.

9.23 HMIC has been informed that, while the licence agreement cannot currently be found, it articulated the process of quality assurance and the need for structured refresher training every 18 months. HMIC has been informed that this does not occur. Centrex assessors undertake limited quality assurance. Further, in terms of curriculum development, it was suggested that the Army sees engaging with the crime scene management standard as 'desirable' and not a necessity.

9.24 While HMIC notes the field deployment issues, it is concerned that non-engagement with refresher training during peacetime duties at home leaves individual CSIs and the organisation at risk of significant exposure to the legal system in the event of error.

### **Special Investigation Branch senior investigating officers**

9.25 SIOs in the military police fulfil the same role as their civilian counterparts. HMIC is aware that the low numbers required make it efficient and effective to outsource training.

9.26 SIO training is undertaken with HO forces, in particular South Wales Police. This is a Centrex-accredited provider requiring all learners to follow a prescribed route to accreditation. However, this has only just started. While HMIC supports this kind of partnership with HO forces, the DPC, as the customer, should guard against any complacency and the conclusion of all relevant training leading to accreditation.

## 10. Race and diversity

10.1 Under its responsibilities as set out by the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000 (RRAA 2000), and in order to assess compliance against other equality duties, HMIC conducted a race and diversity impact assessment using an independent advisory group.

10.2 The assessment identified a “potential for the operations of the SIB to have a differential and/or adverse impact on staff members and consequently on the perception of and quality and nature of service delivery in the investigation of major and serious crime”.

10.3 HMIC determined to use the inspection process to promote race and diversity equality by ensuring that services, and in particular the SIB, meet the requirements of the race equality duties and other provisions that promote equality.

10.4 The inspection team found that the SIB is a family-oriented organisation where individuals seek to protect one another in a potentially stressful investigative role that requires secrecy, and where the sense of camaraderie was found to be strong and empowering. It is recognised that SIB personnel live and work alongside the communities they serve when not on operations.

### Legislative compliance

10.5 While the need for compliance with the RRAA 2000 by all public bodies, including the SIB, is understood, duties regarding the other strands of diversity, particularly disability, religion and belief, are also applicable.

10.6 There is an obligation on the SIB to comply with these duties. It is understood that military policing is very different from HO policing. However, as the RMP SIB is part of the MoD, which has to comply with all equality legislation, the SIB has an obligation to comply with these duties as well. It is recognised that responsibilities relating to gender are also applicable, subject to an exception where the aim of the discrimination is to ensure combat effectiveness.<sup>12</sup>

10.7 When inspecting legislative compliance, the inspection team found a heavy reliance on the MoD taking the lead, without full engagement of the SIB to ensure full oversight of their responsibilities under these duties.

10.8 The MoD policies are sound, but its race equality scheme lacks an action plan to monitor the SIB’s own specific response. Consequently the scheme is not as robust as it should be. HMIC would expect an HO force to have a localised diversity action plan, building in objectives, nominated leads and clearly defined timescales.

10.9 Although the number of staff within the SIB is small, HMIC found that there is an awareness of duties under the RRAA 2000, **with a clear desire to treat all equally**. Embracing the full breadth of all diversity strands is challenging when promoting equality and community engagement. The inspection team recognises that some places within units are barred to women by derogation. However, some places within the Army provide opportunity, and the SIB is one of these.

<sup>12</sup> Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Application to Armed Forces etc.) Regulations 1994.

10.10 Training is undertaken annually in accordance with the RRAA 2000 and other equality duties. While the key focus is primarily on gender, further recognition of other diversity issues is required. The inspection team found that the SIB has access, through the Army chaplaincy, to a multi-faith group.

10.11 The SIB function requires specialist training and skills and currently acquires its recruits from an extremely small pool. To raise its profile, the RMP may wish to consider promoting the attractions of the SIB to individuals from diverse backgrounds. The SIB may also wish to consider how it promotes itself to those who may add greater knowledge to its skills base. The inspection team did find the RMP and the SIB working to identify potential recruits at an early stage in their military career. This appears to provide an excellent opportunity for targeted action. However, the inspection did not assess the fairness of the recruitment process. During such considerations it may also be opportune for the RMP to consider how it supports diverse groups within its structures.

10.12 Due to a lack of monitoring, the SIB was able to provide only limited evidence of how it was addressing issues relating to sexual orientation and religious belief.

10.13 The Disability Discrimination Act is due this year. The SIB needs to recognise this fact, and any exemptions afforded, and include it within its race equality scheme and associated action plan.

## **Policies and functions**


10.14 The SIB relies on the MoD to ensure that its policies are relevant and impact assessed. HMIC believes these policies and functions have an adverse effect, particularly in relation to diversity of staff. It is important for the SIB to seek to create an impact assessment that relates to it specifically, providing an insight, oversight and scrutiny to ensure that the SIB application of local policy conforms to the overarching MoD stance. The inspection team found that there were aspirational changes set for five years, but these were not recorded on paper. HMIC noted the take-up of impact assessment training by the SIB to develop this area.

10.15 A robust harassment policy was in existence, as was an internal hate crime policy, and there was evidence that sexual harassment issues were appropriately challenged and reported.

## **Recruitment, retention and progression**

10.16 The SIB has made significant changes for female officers, and these should be acknowledged and applauded. As can be seen from the chart below, the SIB has a greater percentage of female personnel than the Army as a whole. However, there is still room for improvement for female representation within the senior ranks.

### Army/RMP/SIB gender comparisons



10.17 The question raised is whether progression is available to women at the same rate as it is to men. There is an indication that work/life balance and the interest and variety of roles have encouraged opportunities for women. The most common reason for women to leave the SIB is maternity. The average length of service of all staff within the SIB is four years.

10.18 It was reported to the inspection team that challenges remain in recruiting black and ethnic minority staff. The SIB is not the employer and has little control over choice.

10.19 The inspection team found a lack of policy on positive action to improve equality of numbers and diversity of the workforce. The SIB has recognised the need to build a diverse group and to develop a different approach to acquiring the necessary skills. Any developing action plan should include such items. The employment of an external adviser may assist the development of positive action opportunities, but they need to recognise that the MoD governs the overarching policies.

## Leadership

10.20 While there is a hierarchical structure within the SIB and the RMP with clear leadership, there is no identified leader to drive forward diversity issues. The PM(A) seeks a more inclusive organisation with greater diversity to engage the diverse arenas of investigation and to build trust and confidence. It is recognised that activity is constrained within budgets, by the overarching MoD policy, and by the current lack of targets within any associated scheme.

## Structure

10.21 The inspection team did not find a diversity meeting group to drive forward the strategic action plan. There were no race and diversity objectives within personal achievement plans or support groups, and no diversity champions, so delivery of and accountability for equality issues was limited.

## Monitoring

10.22 While the MoD action plan, to which the SIB and the RMP are held accountable, is in existence, data is not available to show that it is being driven forward. No evidence was provided as to whether the SIB undertakes impact assessments on local policies.

## Cultural awareness

10.23 The SIB engages with race and diversity training on a yearly basis. There is a post-deployment debrief following attachments, and this learning is passed to other staff due for deployment. By this method the SIB has gained some learning of the cultural aspects of the environment in which it is operating. There is, however, a need to create cultural protocols with other partner organisations to develop awareness in the long term.

10.24 HO police forces have found that the use of independent advisory groups has contributed to the development of policy and practice, bringing about greater trust and confidence in the communities they work with.

10.25 Evidence was received of the formation of a local advisory panel after the war in Iraq. This panel, made up of a police commander, a judge, a politician, a doctor and a businessman, was reliable and trustworthy. This panel of volunteers advised on law, police, courts and prisons, and was permitted full access to such locations at any time.

## Human resources

10.26 The inspection team found that race and diversity was absent from the agenda for meetings and that consequently there was minimal focus on disability or the other diversity strands. The management was not required to meet objectives regarding race and diversity issues. Data on the employment of diverse groups is not readily available.

It is recognised that the SIB operates family-friendly policies that attract women, and also that it is looking to increase tenure for specialist posts. While good welfare plans, including the provision of FLOs, are in place to support staff, they are still being developed and are not sufficient to support all staff.

### Operational delivery

10.27 This inspection must be considered in the context of the military deployments abroad. While this builds trust and confidence under stressful circumstances, the relationships built with local officials and policing services require constant monitoring.

**Recommendation 18: HMIC recommends the urgent development of an action plan to progress the race equality scheme as it impacts on the SIB.**

## 11. Leadership

### Succession planning

11.1 In considering this section, cognisance should be taken of the leadership comments placed within other specialist elements of this report to retain their context.

11.2 There is a level of stability within the command structure, given the posting periods of two to three years, but this is not universal and an overlap would be expected to provide continuity. Additionally, RMP officers often return to the RMP/SIB for further postings as their careers progress. While the degree of succession planning is normally good, there are instances of key posts being vacant for several months.<sup>13</sup>

### Mission, vision and values

11.3 The RMP/SIB command team communicates the mission, vision and values of the SIB through published written and electronic documents. The latter are available through the PM(A)'s portal, a web-based intranet location. This same method is used to alert staff to new processes and procedures. One example was the recent release of the Core Investigative Doctrine from the NCPE. This was converted into PowerPoint format and shared across the RMP and SIB terminals for all SIB staff to read.

11.4 The inspection team found that the response of staff to the latest policies is understood and fed through the chain of command in the form of briefings by line managers.

### Visibility

11.5 The PM(A) and his headquarters staff are highly visible. He makes scheduled visits to all RMP and SIB locations. The same process is applied by the SIB commanding officers, although abstractions have affected some officers' ability to make visits to all staff.

### Marketing strategy

11.6 The command team is conscious of the perception of staff and the public. The Office of the Provost Marshal (Army) funded a series of wall posters to explain the role, experience and commitment of RMP officers. The SIB was featured as one of this series.

### Policy formation and use

11.7 HMIC found that many of the SIB policies accorded with the aims and objectives of the Army because their documents were a reproduction of army documents. These were then applied without question.

<sup>13</sup> See Section 8: Human resources.

11.8 The protocol relating to the investigation of deaths on land or premises owned, occupied or under the control of the MoD was created by the ACPO Homicide Working Group with the tri-service Provost Marshals in November 2005. HMIC found that it was circulated within one week of its publication. It has been used on several occasions and has brought about swift resolution of issues of primacy.

### Meeting structure

11.9 The PM(A) attends a strategic policy forum known as the Defence Policing Co-ordination Committee. This is attended by the Provost Marshals of the other two Armed Forces, and seeks to:

- develop a more integrated approach towards policing;
- advise stakeholders of departmental policing priorities;
- address strategic issues;
- maximise opportunities for interoperability between defence police forces;
- facilitate common standards and best practice; and
- ensure close liaison with the MoD Police Committee and the Defence Police Chiefs' Forum.

11.10 The Defence Police Chiefs' Forum also allows the promotion of effective and efficient co-operation between defence police forces.

## 12. Performance management and continuous improvement

12.1 As revealed in earlier sections, the SIB is measured by its ability to create investigative files of a set quality and submit them in a timely manner.

12.2 HMIC sought to obtain details of levels of conversion from an investigation to a successful conviction in court, but the information was not easily accessible.

**Recommendation 19: HMIC recommends the development of a suite of performance measures that include the outcome of investigations, to reveal the SIB's support to the Army and assist the identification of good practice and areas for improvement.**

12.3 It was reported to the inspection team that the SIB's desire to consistently deliver case files with every conceivable action completed, in order to present a thorough investigation, is sometimes compounded by prosecution demands for what is perceived as excessive levels of proof. The question of when sufficient evidence is obtained will be answered by closer supervision of investigations by management and earlier APA consultation. HMIC noted that the forward deployment of an APA lawyer should improve this position. The Armed Forces Bill also supports earlier APA engagement and can only help reduce unnecessary action.

12.4 Timeliness of file submission from the RMP as a whole is the subject of scrutiny at a delay action group chaired by the Adjutant General and attended by the PM(A). This is supported by analysis of case tracking within RMP headquarters.

12.5 The APA has commenced a case-reporting feedback system to ensure that staff are advised of issues relating to their investigation. This is in addition to supervisory feedback through the RMP REDCAPS computer system, which is used to monitor investigations and to advise on and direct the actions of investigators.



## 13. Conclusion

13.1 HMIC found a Special Investigation Branch of dedicated and professional investigators operating in a very difficult working environment, with different rules of engagement to consider and under the high-profile scrutiny of the media, both in the UK and abroad. The SIB delivers its investigative service within a much larger organisation, the MoD, and it does so as part of a tri-service policing capability. This requires the SIB to operate to a structured and sometimes inflexible policy.

13.2 The individual leadership found throughout the SIB is engaging and motivational, while its staff work to a high standard in an extremely pressurised situation.

**13.3 HMIC assesses the SIB as having the capability and capacity to run a competent level 3 reactive investigation.**

13.4 However, the capability of the Army to proactively use resources does need urgent improvement. This requires a formal NIM structure to identify strategic threats and place dedicated resources at an early stage, so as to prevent future critical incidents and potential risk to the reputation of the Army.

13.5 In drawing this conclusion it should be recognised that such proactivity has not traditionally been expected of the SIB.

13.6 It is HMIC's view that performance could be enhanced by a strategic performance regime that extends beyond file submission and places greater emphasis on outcomes.

13.7 In recognition of the need to treat the RMP as a policing service in its own right, it should be inspected on a regular basis by a competent authority. A voluntary request for this level of scrutiny is rare, and this is indicative of the willingness of the SIB to learn and develop.

## Recommendations

### 3. Major crime investigation

Recommendation 1: HMIC recommends liaison between the SIB and the ACPO Homicide Working Group, with a view to identifying exchange opportunities (page 11).

Recommendation 2: HMIC recommends the early deployment of the HOLMES MIR in the next suitable major crime investigation (page 13).

Recommendation 3: HMIC recommends the creation of a major crime case review policy (page 16).

### 4. Serious crime and organised criminality

Recommendation 4: HMIC recommends the formal adoption of the NIM and the urgent creation of a comprehensive strategic assessment to fully understand the nature and extent of serious and organised crime (page 18).

### 5. Managing criminal intelligence

Recommendation 5: HMIC recommends that the Office of the Provost Marshal commits to and invests in full adoption of the NIM, including the establishment of a fully planned and resourced implementation programme. The NCPE has agreed to advise the Office of the Provost Marshal in this regard (page 22).

Recommendation 6: HMIC recommends that the Office of the Provost Marshal develops an internal communication strategy to increase knowledge and awareness of the NIM and its benefits (page 22).

Recommendation 7: HMIC recommends that the Office of the Provost Marshal reinvigorates the IT strategy to support intelligence and covert operations (page 22).

### 6. Forensic services

Recommendation 8: HMIC recommends that the SIB should review its methods for capturing and submitting criminal justice DNA and fingerprint samples (page 25).

Recommendation 9: HMIC recommends that the SIB should establish protocols with all jurisdictions with which it has interfaces to ensure appropriate sharing of investigative and criminal justice samples (page 26).

Recommendation 10: HMIC recommends that the SIB considers recruiting a civilian head of profession for forensic services (page 27).

Recommendation 11: HMIC recommends that the Office of the Provost Marshal should consider taking fingerprints and DNA from all potential RMP applicants, for speculative search against fingerprint and DNA databases in both the UK and the applicant's country of residence (page 28).

Recommendation 12: HMIC recommends that the SIB should develop a forensic science delivery plan for the next five years, taking into account:

- future proofing for the predicted environment;
- the tri-service Purple Policing initiative;
- best value delivery of services; and
- organisational learning (page 28).

## **7. Criminal justice processes**

Recommendation 13: HMIC recommends that, as a matter of urgency, the Office of the Provost Marshal identifies with the relevant authorities the compelling case for alternative case options (page 31).

## **8. Human resources**

Recommendation 14: HMIC recommends further development of tri-service working of SIBs (page 33).

Recommendation 15: HMIC recommends that the Office of the Provost Marshal reviews tenure policies for all specialist postings (page 34).

Recommendation 16: HMIC commends the consideration of support services for SIB staff, and strongly recommends the early review of any development to assess needs for more structured services for staff in high-risk areas (page 36).

## **9. Training and development**

Recommendation 17: HMIC recommends a full review of the Defence Police College course portfolio through the Office of the Provost Marshal (Army), to identify suitable products for blended learning delivery (page 38).

## **10. Race and diversity**

Recommendation 18: HMIC recommends the urgent development of an action plan to progress the race equality scheme as it impacts on the SIB (page 45).

## **12. Performance management and continuous improvement**

Recommendation 19: HMIC recommends the development of a suite of performance measures that include the outcome of investigations, to reveal the SIB's support to the Army and assist the identification of good practice and areas for improvement (page 48).

## Glossary

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
APA	Army Prosecuting Authority
Centrex	Central Police Training and Development Agency
CIT	Central investigation team
COT	Covert operations team
CRFP	Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners
CSI	Crime scene investigator
DG(S&S)	Director General (Security and Safety)
DPC	Defence Police College
DSAT	Defence Systems Approach to Training
DSU	Dedicated source unit
FLO	Family liaison officer
FWO	Forensic warrant officer
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HO	Home Office
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
JRT	Joint Response Team
MCJS	Military Criminal Justice System
MIR	Major incident room
MIRSAP	Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NCPE	National Centre for Policing Excellence
NIM	National Intelligence Model
PCSD	Police and Crime Standards Directorate
PM(A)	Provost Marshal (Army)
RAF	Royal Air Force
REDCAPS	RMP crime recording and management computer system
RIO	Regional Intelligence Office
RMP	Royal Military Police
RRAA 2000	Race Relations Amendment Act 2000
SCAS	Serious Crime Analysis Section

SIB	Special Investigation Branch
SIO	Senior investigating officer
SOCO	Scenes of crime officer
SPCB	Service Police Crime Bureau
TA	Territorial Army

