



Inspecting policing
in the **public interest**

Prevent

Progress and Prospects

“A small sum spent on prevention is better than a fortune spent on a cure.”

Osama Bin Laden¹

¹ Audiotape from 15 April 2004, broadcast by al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera attributed to Bin Laden.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Background

- 1.1.1 In April 2008 the Government announced the allocation of investment to fund 'ring fenced' posts, within the Police Service, to support delivery of the government 'Prevent strategy'². Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) funding was allocated to 24 'priority' forces responsible for policing areas with higher levels of 'risk'.
- 1.1.2 Funding was allocated according to assessments of population, vulnerability and evaluated intelligence; the best information available at the time. Significant allocations were provided to five forces with highest levels of risk with lesser funding to other 'priority' forces.
- 1.1.3 The same month the Association of Chief Police officers (ACPO) issued its 'Prevent' Strategy and Delivery Plan³ that outlined how the Police Service would use CSR funding, to create additional capabilities at force level to improve the sharing of intelligence and community engagement.
- 1.1.4 The police, along with local authorities, have been identified as critical for the delivery of 'Prevent'⁴. Police involvement in 'Prevent' and the extent to which they drive the agenda, is potentially controversial and there is a need for clarity around accountability in terms of local engagement and delivery⁵.

1.2 Progress

- 1.2.1 Integrating 'Prevent' within daily business is a new challenge for police, partners and communities. They are all progressing, following a trajectory towards full delivery and everybody is learning. It is not surprising that forces are in different stages of implementation and that 'Prevent' is not as sophisticated or developed as other areas of business.
- 1.2.2 The Police Service has made good progress, particularly in the time-scale from announcement of the funding to the beginning of this inspection – a period of only six months. The funding has been invested appropriately. All forces have moved beyond the critical stage of planning and are in different stages of implementation;
- The majority of posts are in place – by the end of January 2009 the service had deployed 96% of the resources⁶;
 - Staff are developing within their roles to deliver capabilities detailed within the ACPO strategy;
 - Structures are being developed – eight forces, including the West Yorkshire and Thames Valley forces (both assessed to be among the six forces with the highest vulnerability), are 'advanced' in their development of structures to support 'Prevent';
 - Awareness among front-line staff is improving; and
 - There are an increasing number of examples where the police, working with partners, intervene to disrupt radicalisers or support individuals vulnerable to violent extremist influences.

² Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery, HM Government, May 2008

³ Prevent: The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strategy and Delivery Plan, ACPO, April 2008

⁴ The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England states that local authorities and the police should take the lead in local 'Prevent' action, ensuring that other partners from the statutory and voluntary sector are involved - HM Government, May 2008.

⁵ The Policy Exchange Paper, 'Choosing Our Friends Wisely; Criteria for Engagement with Muslim Groups', Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton – Policy Exchange 2009, raises potential reputational risks to the police arising from engagement with partners who may be viewed as extreme.

⁶ Source NPDU March 2009

1.3 The Next Steps Focusing on Vulnerability

1.3.1 Arguably, a smart approach means that forces facing greater challenges, predominantly those responsible for metropolitan areas, should move more quickly to the point of fully integrating 'Prevent' into 'business as usual'. To achieve this position, investment and support should continue to be prioritised according to assessments of risk, and where most impact can be achieved (Recommendation 1).

1.3.2 The ACPO strategy included a commitment to "adopt a phased implementation with initial activity focused in BCUs which have been agreed as 'priority areas'".⁷ Basic Command Units (BCUs)⁸ facing the highest levels of risk should be further forward in their development of 'mature partnerships', categorised by;

- Highly developed information sharing;
- Strong links between police management teams and partners; and
- Joint working focused on 'Prevent'.

Minimum Capability

1.3.3 It is important that all forces should establish minimum capabilities proportionate to their levels of risk (Recommendations 2 & 3). Appendix A summarises the key elements that this inspection suggest need to be in place. In particular there is a need for -

Understanding Vulnerability

- Analytical capabilities dedicated to 'Prevent'; and
- Consistent processes for the collection, assessment, sharing, storage and dissemination of 'Prevent' information between partners, unhindered by artificial barriers (Recommendation 4).

Leadership, Governance and Structures

- Dedicated resources to implement 'Prevent' within police forces and partnership working.

Community Partnerships and Interventions

- Measures to improve awareness and skills among the wider police service to contribute to delivery of the strategy.

Assessing Success

- Improved understanding of 'what works' and specific information sharing in terms of 'Prevent' interventions (Recommendation 5); and
- The establishment of resilient performance measures to support delivery of 'Prevent'. (Recommendation 6).

1.4 Recommendations

Recommendation 1

ACPO and OSCT should prioritise future investment and support, using existing indicators, to areas with higher levels of risk where mature partnerships could support delivery of 'Prevent'.

⁷ Prevent: The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strategy and Delivery Plan - Para. 4.1

⁸ For the purpose of this document BCU covers the terms Divisions, Boroughs or Districts

Recommendation 2

ACPO, OSCT and NPIA should define minimum levels of local 'Prevent' capability, categorised according to levels of risk, based upon HMIC proposals, before 30th September 2009; and NPIA should review ACPO 'Protective Services' minimum standards to incorporate the revised minimum levels of capability, before 31st March 2010.

Recommendation 3

Forces should achieve the defined minimum levels of local capability before 31st March 2010.

Recommendation 4

ACPO, Home Office, Security Service LGA and WAG should agree simple but explicit guidance for forces and local partners to improve understanding about –

- Restrictions and permissions provided by different levels of vetting for those engaged in 'Prevent'; and
- Permitted access to different levels of GPMS information.

Recommendation 5

ACPO and OSCT should establish and communicate a formal mechanism for collecting, assessing and disseminating learning about effective 'Prevent' interventions. This would incorporate –

- A central depository for disruption 'case studies' similar to the mechanism employed within the CDRP or CSP environment for partnership related initiatives and projects; and
- A mechanism for assessing and disseminating good practice in terms of partnership structures and supporting infrastructures that deliver interventions.

Recommendation 6

ACPO and OSCT should collate and assess emerging performance management frameworks, and offer a centralised resource for forces and the Home Office in developing performance frameworks for 'Prevent'.

2 Introduction

2.1 Background

2.1.1 On 7th July 2005 four young British Muslims detonated explosive devices on the London public transport system, killing themselves and 52 innocent people. The attack was the most deadly on the British mainland in recent years and the first by suicide terrorism perpetrated by British citizens in the United Kingdom. That, and further attacks later in July, brought home realisation of a new 'threat environment', with home grown terrorists willing to commit mass murder by suicide terrorism.

2.1.2 The Metropolitan Police Service faced unprecedented investigative demands to identify and capture others involved in the planning of the attacks. There was a need to increase capacity to investigate terrorist crimes, and over the next two years the national CT Network⁹ was developed, increasing police capacity threefold in this area. HMIC inspected the National CT Network early in 2008 and identified contributions that could be made by CT investigators to informing local 'Prevent' activity that link to this inspection.

2.1.3 In 2003 the Government issued its CONTEST strategy¹⁰ for combating terrorism incorporating four strands –

- Preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals;
- Pursuing terrorists and those that sponsor them;
- Protecting the public, key national services, and UK interests overseas; and
- Preparing for the consequences.

These four strategic aims remain unchanged within the revised government CONTEST strategy issued on 24th March 2009.¹¹

2.1.4 The 'Prevent' Strand was updated in 2007 (and re-launched on 3rd June 2008) with more detailed intentions about how government would 'Prevent' people becoming terrorists outlining five strategic cross government strands –

- Challenging violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices;
- Disrupting those who promote violent extremism and supporting the institutions where they are active;
- Supporting individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism;
- Increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism; and
- Addressing the grievances that ideologues are exploiting.

These are supported by two cross cutting work-streams -

- Developing understanding, analysis and information; and
- Strategic communications.

2.1.5 At the end of 2007 ACPO appointed a professional lead for delivery of the 'Prevent' strategy within the Police Service. Whilst the Police Service can contribute to the delivery of all of the strands of the strategy, they can make most impact in disrupting those who promote violent extremism and supporting individuals who are being targeted (strands 2 & 3). On 17th April 2008 Chief Constables' Council, the body at which the Chief Officers of police forces in England and Wales agree policy and standards for policing, endorsed the ACPO 'Prevent' Strategy and Delivery Plan. This outlined how the Police Service would support the government strategy and

⁹ The CT Network comprises the Counter Terrorist Command (CTC) in the Metropolitan Police; Counter Terrorist Units (CTUs) in Greater Manchester Police, West Midlands Police and West Yorkshire Police; and Counter Terrorist Intelligence Units (CTIUs) in Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Sussex Police, Essex Police, Derbyshire Constabulary and South Wales Police

¹⁰ Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy, HM Government, 2003

¹¹ Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism CONTEST; Her Majesty's Government 2009

detailed 21 activities mapped against the five strands and supporting work-streams. In November 2008 ACPO issued revised Minimum Standards for Protective Services¹² that incorporated CT and provided specific standards for 'Prevent'. The Inspection Team contributed to discussions for the drafting of these standards and they are reflected in the inspection framework.

- 2.1.6 The ACPO strategy outlined how it would create, at force level, additional capabilities to improve the sharing of intelligence and community engagement by the establishment of Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officer (CTIO) and Neighbourhood Engagement Police Officer (NEPO)¹³ roles. The Home Secretary announced the allocation of 'ring fenced' posts to assist the police service develop its capability to support the government strategy. Within the 2008/2009 CSR, £7,239,000¹⁴ was allocated to the Police Service. Twenty three 'priority' police forces outside London were identified by assessment of population, vulnerability and evaluated intelligence. Sufficient funding was allocated for 137 posts within these forces. A further allocation was provided to the Metropolitan Police Service¹⁵, sufficient to fund 64 'Prevent' posts including 41 for deployment within four 'pilot' BCUs. Seven posts were allocated to each of the three regional Counter Terrorism Units and 8 posts to ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters (ACPO TAM) for regional and national co-ordination.

2.2 The Scale of the Challenge

- 2.2.1 Countering terrorism has, within the Police Service in England and Wales, traditionally been the domain of specialists. The 2005 attacks brought into sharp focus that there are young people who feel alienated and grievous to the extent that they are prepared to commit murder and give up their own lives to do so. They plan and resource their crimes in cities and towns across the UK and usually away from the targets of their attacks. Those places may not have been exposed to the risk of terrorism and the potential that there are people locally, willing to commit mass murder in furtherance of religio-political causes, is inconceivable among many communities.
- 2.2.2 The Police and Government face the challenge of 'getting upstream' - tackling radicalisers who groom and exploit vulnerable people, and the causes of grievance and alienation. This challenge is complex and should not be underestimated. There are various sources and institutions from which radicalising influences can originate that are unlikely to remain constant, but will transform and develop in response to international and national societal changes. The Internet provides a medium through which radicalisers can reach beyond international boundaries but can also provide a platform upon which mainstream ideas can be promoted and 'Prevent' initiatives taken forward.
- 2.2.3 Communities defeat terrorism and it is not solely a police responsibility to identify and support vulnerable people. Responsibility for shaping environments and perceptions is shared across government departments. The aims of the 'Prevent' strategy will be delivered when conditions that contribute to radicalisation, and indicators of vulnerability, are recognised and considered within the 'daily business' of local authorities, the police, schools, universities and prisons; all working with local communities.
- 2.2.4 The Police Service is in the process of mobilising its staff and partners, beyond CT specialists, to engage in preventing violent extremism. Challenges in making this progress should not be under-estimated, particularly following the demands of

¹² ACPO Protective Services Minimum Standards, NPIA, November 2008

¹³ Reference to NEPOs in this report also includes Community Engagement Officer (CEO) or similar variation.

¹⁴ Source OSCT – March 2009

¹⁵ The MPS is funded for CT separately from other forces and made an independent bid for CT growth for the 2008/11 CSR period for 'operational resources and capital items' that support all four strands of CONTEST.

building the national CT Network. Establishing 'Prevent' is being taken forward through three significant cultural shifts;

- Counter terrorism specialists within the police service, and their partner agencies, are understanding the need for sensitive information in their possession to be made available for local partnerships - a recognition that the intelligence 'need to know' principle includes the 'needs' of local authority officials, schools and others dealing with vulnerable communities;
- Responsibility for preventing violent extremism and CT is being adopted within the wider policing family, and increasingly by those dealing with partnership and community policing; and
- The police are harnessing the significant trust and confidence, built upon the foundations of tackling crime and disorder, to agree courses of action for tackling terrorist criminality. This is often several stages before that experienced in other forms of criminality – effectively challenging dangerous thinking before people are killed.

2.3 HMIC Inspection

2.3.1 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) was asked to conduct an early inspection of police implementation of the ACPO strategy. Inspection fieldwork was undertaken between November 2008 and February 2009. Forces were developing and refining policies, processes and practices as the inspection progressed. The National Prevent Delivery Unit (NPDU) continued to build capacity, providing national support and issuing guidance products throughout the process. The ACPO Implementation Plan¹⁶ was issued shortly before the fieldwork commenced and Guidance for the Completion of Counter Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs) (see para. 3.1.6) late in the Inspection programme. It was, therefore, impracticable to compare forces and grade against a standard – forces visited toward the end of the process having had greater opportunity to develop than those visited in the early weeks.

2.3.2 The inspection was, therefore, focused at identifying the stages to which forces had reached in their development of capabilities to deliver the government 'Prevent' strategy. Terms of reference were agreed with the OSCT and methodology developed. In preparing the inspection, five key capabilities were identified as contributing to the delivery of the strategy;

- Assessing Vulnerability - understanding where to focus interventions;
- Leadership, Governance and Structures;
- Information Sharing;
- Community Engagement and Interventions; and
- Assessing Success.

2.3.3 HMIC used four assessment categories for stages of development -, 'Implementation', 'Developed', 'Advanced' and 'Delivering'. The terms of reference, methodology and explanations of the assessment criteria are outlined at Appendix B.

2.3.4 The following chapters outline the findings of the inspection under the above listed five headings and provide an assessment of future prospects. It is recognised that the nature of devolved government structures in Wales means that the specific arrangements and terminology used in this report are not always directly relevant.

¹⁶ 'Prevent': The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism Implementation plan, ACPO, September 2008

3 Assessing Vulnerability

Assessment of Stages of Development Reached By Forces

Implementation	Developed	Advanced	Delivering
33 (77%)	10 (23%)	0	0

3.1 Risk Assessment and Mapping

3.1.1 UK police forces use the National Intelligence Model (NIM) to prioritise resource usage¹⁷. Key intelligence products inform decision making. Strategic Assessments provide an overview of current and long term risks faced by forces or Basic Command Units (BCUs). Control Strategies communicate current strategic priorities. Managers prioritise resource deployments through Tasking and Co-ordination Group (T&CG) meetings.




Figure 1 Inclusion of Prevent within NIM Products

3.1.2 'Prevent' was incorporated in 91% of force's and 72% of BCU's strategic assessments. Just under two thirds (63%) of forces clearly demonstrate the link between the National, Regional, Force and local (BCU) strategic assessments. The majority of forces (88%) include 'Prevent' within their control strategies against 60% of BCU's visited. The risk from violent extremism was considered within strategic co-ordination decision making of 84% of forces. The number of police commands that include PVE within intelligence products is an indication that the risk is being recognised, the first step in providing a response. There is, however, still room for development. The majority of documents examined lacked detail; there is a general lack of local to national linkage on 'Prevent' and the issue has yet to be routinely integrated within NIM decision making.

¹⁷ 'Guidance on the National Intelligence Model' – Centrex (Now NPIA) 2005.

3.1.3 There are wide inconsistencies in levels of understanding about local ‘risk’ from violent extremism, primarily through information from the CT Network and the Security Service not consistently reaching forces and BCUs. In some cases this is exacerbated at the local level because partners are yet to focus or engage in improving their understanding of vulnerability to violent extremism.

3.1.4 The Audit Commission/HMIC Learning and Development Exercise Report 2008 identified the importance of understanding the causes of violent extremism. Whilst there is a growing body of academic and research material available, this is not yet in a form with which local decision makers can task their analysts to identify the right data sets for use within analysis. Without a clear understanding of the cause, there can not be systematic understanding of local ‘risk’. Consequentially, partners will not be in a position to determine proportionate and effective responses.




Figure 2 Sharing CT Intelligence

3.1.5 Locally prepared Neighbourhood Profiles¹⁸ provide information to the police about their areas. Special Branches (SB)¹⁹ developed wider knowledge of their communities under ‘Rich Picture’²⁰ and nearly all police forces (95%) have coherent processes to gather ‘Rich Picture’ information. Within 83% of ‘priority’ forces and 84% of non ‘priority’ forces (84% of all forces) Neighbourhood Policing Teams are tasked to gather community information to improve understanding and inform PVE. Within only a third of forces (33%) local mapping is informed by regional CT intelligence.

3.1.6 Counter Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs) have been developed for the provision of intelligence and assessments, in possession of CT specialists, to inform local partnerships’ assessments of local vulnerability. The Police Service awaited the

¹⁸ Neighbourhood Profiles are created and maintained by the local police and partners to support them in identifying and engaging with the diverse communities living in their neighbourhoods, and to help in building trust and confidence within these diverse groups.

¹⁹ For the purpose of this document Special Branch (SB) includes the term Counter Terrorism Branches (CTB)

²⁰ The ‘Rich Picture’ programme is intended to provide a wider understanding of the context of terrorist activity and radicalisation in this country.

issue of guidance, from the NPDU, as to the completion of CTLPs. It provides a useful framework for the passing of 'Restricted' CTLPs and will allow for CT information to be shared in a controlled manner with BCUs and partners.

- 3.1.7 The CTLP process is developing in isolation from Neighbourhood Profiles. Mapping products tend to 'plot' what is known, rather than provide an accurate and current picture of local communities and emerging issues. There is very little evidence that forces utilise local Neighbourhood Profiles to collate information of sufficient detail to provide detailed understanding of local communities, or that CT products contribute to Neighbourhood Profiles. Only within less than half (42%) of forces, neighbourhood mapping products are informed by the 'Rich Picture' process. There is an opportunity to enhance the process by linking the different products that describe local communities and their complexities.
- 3.1.8 There was wide awareness of work being undertaken to develop a national approach for the sharing of CT information. A small number of forces delayed the production of local profiles pending publication of guidance and some produced local profiles based upon locally produced data (e.g. neighbourhood profiles, crime and disorder data etc). In the North West Region, (where the national guidance was trialled) forces developed CTLPs, with CTU support, based upon the draft model. These had yet to be shared with partners pending the finalisation of the Gateway Protocol, by which agreement is reached among contributors about what information can be shared and how.
- 3.1.9 CTLPs should identify gaps in understanding about local communities and all partners can contribute to closing them. A standardised approach will provide BCUs and partners with opportunities to engage and debate about what information they need. It is essential that recipients of CTLPs contribute to their future development by providing appropriate feedback. ACPO TAM and OSCT have already recognised this and a survey of recipients is planned to be conducted from April 2009. Feedback from the survey will inform the refining of products being produced.
- 3.1.10 Increased information flows, (as a direct consequence of 'Prevent' activity generating more information) without the necessary infrastructure to understand it, raises the prospect of the police moving from an 'intelligence gap' vulnerability to one of 'intelligence failure'. This could be a consequence of possessing information indicating a risk, without resources, processes and systems to recognise and manage it. As 'Rich Picture' research continues and demands for CTLP products grow, demand may outstrip capacity of SB and force analysts.
- 3.1.11 Forty percent of forces have allocated analytical resources to PVE. Within force SBs and the CT Network 39% of Analysts are dedicated to 'Prevent'. The CTC and three CTUs account for over half (54%) of the total analytical capacity. The other 39 forces, (including five CTIUs) account for the remaining 46% of analysts of which 45% are dedicated to 'Prevent'. Time taken to produce one CTLP varies, depending upon the complexity of the local area, but estimates were given of up to 120 hours of analytical time. As the demand for 'Prevent' related analytical material increases, particularly as work with partners develops, there is a need for forces to consider the potential demands and resource analysis accordingly.
- 3.1.12 OSCT and the NPDU have recognised the importance of analytical capability in supporting assessments of vulnerability, and allocated funding from the 2009/2010 CSR grant for additional capability in some 'priority' forces. It must, however, be recognised that production of CTLPs differs from crime and disorder products, usually produced by local analysts. It is constructive that staff from the CT Network are 'mentoring' force analysts in raising their awareness of CT analytical requirements.

3.1.13 There is a lack of consistency and relevance of some data sets (e.g. some forces using census data from 2001) and methods for undertaking analysis. This is further complicated by the range of IT systems and analytical software used. Whilst there was some evidence of joint analysis taking place with partner agencies such as LAs, this is not wide spread. The Learning and Development Exercise Report identified inconsistencies in the information that contributed to understanding vulnerability and the lessons from that review are still relevant²¹.

²¹ The Audit Commission/HMIC 'Learning and Development Exercise' Report October 2008, Chapter 3 Information Sharing.

4 Leadership, Governance and Structures

Assessment of Stages of Development Reached By Forces

Implementation	Developed	Advanced	Delivering
19 (44%)	16 (37%)	8 (19%)	0

4.1 Government Prevent Structures

- 4.1.1 Oversight for delivery of the CONTEST strategy is provided by the Government CONTEST Board, with senior representation from across government, the Security Service and police. Responsibility for overseeing and managing delivery of the National ‘Prevent’ Delivery Plan is held by the ‘Prevent’ Sub-board, which is chaired by the Home Office OSCT.
- 4.1.2 The development of ‘Prevent’ has been a collaborative process with OSCT, in particular, supporting ACPO ‘Prevent’ activity. The structure chart below demonstrates linkages between the police and Government in oversight and delivery of ‘Prevent’.
- 4.1.3 Government Office ‘Prevent’ Regional Managers are in place, and are supporting and challenging multi-agency delivery of Prevent across their regions. The inspection found that, whilst these posts existed, there were few indications of visibility to policing beyond the CTUs. These roles are however developing and their engagement is likely to grow beyond the CTUs.




Figure 3 National CT structure

4.2 National Police Prevent Strategy and Policy

- 4.2.1 Progress achieved by forces in their implementation of measures to support delivery of ‘Prevent’ needs to be considered against levels of risk faced by forces and the time-scales within which strategy, policy and guidance documents have been issued. Whilst the ACPO Strategy provided intentions, the detailed Implementation Plan followed five months later. Meanwhile, a refreshed Government ‘Prevent’ Strategy

and a comprehensive guide for local partners²² were published. A review of progress over the last 12 months demonstrates an incremental build, with forces progressing at different rates (Appendix C provides a time-line illustrating key mile-stones in the development of 'Prevent').

- 4.2.2 There is a widespread belief among police managers (particularly at BCU level) that the drive to implement 'Prevent' is being police led, and frustration that they are unable to encourage some partners to engage, particularly in achieving interventions. This is demonstrated by the lack of joint structures and plans for addressing 'Prevent' (see Community Engagement and Partnership, Section 6). It would be helpful, from the police perspective, if all key partners (not just local authorities who are generally working more closely with police on 'Prevent') demonstrate similar levels of commitment. If partners do not consistently engage in delivery of 'Prevent', progression to 'business as usual' will be slower. One BCU Commander commented that, "with Y2K (Millennium bug) everybody was spending and planning heavily for something that was never going to happen, but for PVE, nobody is planning for something that will definitely happen!"

4.3 National Police Prevent Structures

- 4.3.1 ACPO TAM leads and co-ordinates the direction and development of police CT capability and supporting infrastructure. The 'Prevent' Programme Board, chaired by the ACPO Lead for 'Prevent', provides oversight of the ACPO Strategy and Delivery Plan, Implementation Plan and funding distribution. A Senior Responsible Official (SRO) for 'Prevent' at Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) level was appointed in June 2008 and is responsible for the overall Police 'Prevent' programme.
- 4.3.2 The NPDU, which organisationally forms part of ACPO TAM, has developed and increased in size throughout 2008/9 with the evolution of the ACPO 'Prevent' Programme. ACPO TAM was allocated eight additional police officer posts within the initial CSR allocation, but has, through conversion to police staff and additional funding, created thirteen posts. Its role is to support delivery by forces and regions against the Implementation Plan, delivering against key projects within the 'Prevent' Programme and developing new materials such as training and 'Rich Picture' guidance. The NPDU also acts as a focus for best practice, communication and linking into the national partners at government level, and a focal point for all 'Prevent' matters.
- 4.3.3 Additional NPDU posts have been targeted at supporting delivery of the projects, increasing capacity to support forces and strategic engagement. Three quarters of the posts had been filled by the beginning of January 2009. The unit is providing valuable support to the establishment of important capabilities (e.g. the Channel Project and Operation Nicole), has issued useful guidance documents (including the Guide to the Production of CTLPs), and is co-ordinating activity nationally and developing as a reference point for police 'Prevent'. Throughout the inspection, NPDU staff continued to increase their understanding of what needs to be done and how, and develop plans to improve their support to 'Prevent' policing.

4.4 CSR Prevent Funding for Forces

- 4.4.1 Initial allocations of funding were determined upon the best possible indicators of risk available at the time. The ACPO strategy recognised that initial implementation would be phased, with initial investment targeted at 'priority BCUs'. Processes for assessing risk at national, regional, force and local levels are developing. Prioritisation of investment should continue and, as ACPO and OSCT develop their

²² The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England, HM Government, May 2008

knowledge and skills about what works, specialist support should also be focused at priority areas where greatest 'Prevent' yield can be achieved.

Recommendation

ACPO and OSCT should prioritise future investment and support, using existing indicators, to areas with higher levels of risk where mature partnerships could support delivery of 'Prevent'.

4.4.2 Guidance as to how CSR funded posts should be used by forces was provided within the ACPO strategy and associated descriptions for the CTIO and NEPO roles. The ACPO Lead for 'Prevent', however, recognised that Chief Officers would 'select activities that have a local resonance' and that the 'Prevent' Strategy 'is not a "one size fits all" plan'²³. There are, therefore, different interpretations as to the roles and how resources are deployed.

4.4.3 The total budget allocation for 137 police officer posts within 23 forces outside London, in 2008/9, was £7,239,000 including provision for training, car usage, travel & subsistence and supplies & services. Funding was allocated to provide 50 CTIO and 87 NEPO posts.

4.4.4 An under-spend (based on forecasted recruitment) was projected early in the financial year, providing an opportunity to bring forward to 1st October recruitment from the 2009/10 budget for -

- 10 analyst posts based within BCUs;
- One training and development lead for 'Prevent'; and
- 50% of a post in the Research Information and Communication Unit (RICU) within the Home Office, jointly funded with OSCT.

This increased the budget allocation to £7,451,000.




Figure 4 Percentage of Prevent CSR funded staff recruited by forces

²³ Letter from the ACPO 'Prevent' Lead to Chief Officers, 2nd May 2008

4.4.5 Based on figures to January 2009²⁴, there will be an under-spend of £2,507,000, predominantly as a consequence of delays in recruiting staff. Many forces had only recently recruited or were still holding vacancies whilst staff were being identified. Figure 4 above demonstrates how recruitment has progressed since April 2008.

4.4.6 At the time of the inspection, CTIO posts had been staffed across 96% of forces. In the NEPO function, however, flexibility given to forces has made it more difficult to identify specific posts. There are many variations, and some forces have converted police officer posts to deploy more staff using the same funding. Appropriateness of staff profiles depend upon local requirements. Where additional capability has been provided, in whatever form, the overall goal should be to widen the extent to which 'Prevent' is recognised within daily policing and partnership priorities.

4.5 CTIO Additional capability




Figure 5 Activity undertaken by CTIO or local equivalent

4.5.1 In a number of forces, CTIO posts had only recently been deployed and their impact in developing information flows can not be judged. The majority of funded CTIOs are fulfilling the internal briefing role described within the ACPO TAM blueprint, providing strategic and tactical briefings to police officers (71%) and police staff (54%). Some routinely brief partners (17%). They are also providing a link between local policing and CT specialists (54%). Only 17% of CTIOs in funded forces are providing the same link to local partnerships, suggesting their focus is currently internal.

4.5.2 Eight of the nine forces demonstrating better information sharing (i.e. those assessed as 'Developed') have funded CTIOs. Whilst it is recognised that the remaining 16 'priority' forces have not demonstrated similar progress, it would seem that dedicated CTIOs in forces, undertaking the vital link between the 'CT world' and front line policing/partnerships, are valuable assets and should be encouraged.

²⁴ Source NPDU, March 2009

4.6 NEPO Deployments

- 4.6.1 Of the 'priority' forces, at the time of the inspection, one had yet to deploy its funded NEPO (community engagement) posts and half had only recently deployed them, thereby rendering it too early to assess the focus of their activities. Of the eleven forces that had deployed community engagement resources, the primary focus within 45% (5) was the briefing of front line staff to improve their understanding of 'Prevent' and engagement skills. Five forces (45%) are utilising their funded posts to directly engage with vulnerable communities. There was a lack of clarity within one force as to the role of funded community engagement staff.
- 4.6.2 Planning of what the roles are intended to achieve, how they will be deployed and recruitment has inevitably led to a longer 'lead in time' to the establishment of posts. There are cases where existing roles, linked to 'cohesion' or 'diversity', have been 'relabelled' as 'Prevent' posts. Whilst 'diversity' and 'community cohesion' have links with PVE, 'Prevent' activity has specific aims. Merging two missions can lead to a lesser focus on 'Prevent' objectives and initiatives.

4.7 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) CSR Funding

- 4.7.1 MPS CT Grant growth during 2008/9 amounts to 183 posts²⁵. Those primarily supporting 'Prevent' were deployed forming designated 'Prevent' teams within four 'pilot' boroughs, each consisting of an inspector, a sergeant, four constable posts and an analyst. In addition, the MPS have identified a number of other posts including chief inspector co-ordinators, analysts and CTIOs. At the time of the inspection all of the BCU and CTIO posts were in place.

4.8 CSR Funding for Regional Prevent

- 4.8.1 Each of the three CTUs within the CT Network were provided funding for 2008/9, to provide an additional seven posts for regional co-ordination of 'Prevent'. These included Regional 'Prevent' Managers or Co-ordinator posts to manage the interface between partners, CTUs and local teams. Additional posts are performing 'Prevent' functions within CTUs, mainly supporting the host forces. As with other forces, not all of these posts have been in place for the full year, and there are variations in the approaches taken. There is little evidence that regional posts are supporting other forces within their regions. Regional 'Prevent' Managers should be using the additional regional posts to support 'Prevent' within all forces within their regions.
- 4.8.2 Each of the five Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) were provided additional funding, from an identified under-spend, for four 'Prevent' posts effective from 1st October 2008. As of March 2009, 85% of the posts had been filled. These should provide better support to forces for 'Prevent' outside of the CTU regions.
- 4.8.3 Regional 'Prevent' Delivery Managers are now in place for the eight ACPO regions outside London. Each of the Regional 'Prevent' Delivery Managers work with force 'Prevent' leads and have structures that provide support, share developing practice, and disseminate information about national developments. This is a good early mechanism for taking forward improvement pending the establishment of formal mechanisms for organisational learning (see para. 6.5.5 below).

²⁵ Source MPS SO2, March 2009

4.9 Force Prevent Structures




Figure 6 Leadership and structures

- 4.9.1 All forces have appointed ACPO Leads who provide visible leadership for 'Prevent'. Strong and supportive ACPO leadership is often cited as being vital to delivery. Allocation of the ACPO 'Prevent' portfolio within forces varies between Specialist Crime, Operations or Territorial Policing. There is no discernible evidence that either approach delivers stronger capability - the key to effective implementation of 'Prevent' appearing to link more with quality of personal leadership and commitment.
- 4.9.2 Seventy nine percent of 'priority' forces have clear structures that support 'Prevent' in comparison to non 'priority' forces, of which only 63% have clear supporting systems and structures.
- 4.9.3 Across all forces, the post of dedicated 'Prevent' Delivery Manager (or local equivalent) is a key enabler for the implementation of 'Prevent' capability. Where responsibility for implementing 'Prevent' is one of many responsibilities held by a manager, 'Prevent' appears to become less prominent as a consequence of competing demands on the individual.
- 4.9.4 The first version of the ACPO Protective Services²⁶ Minimum Standards,²⁷ that incorporated CT, was approved in December 2007. Revised minimum standards were published in November 2008, after this inspection had begun, and include the requirement to provide support for BCUs that are vulnerable to violent extremism.²⁸ The ACPO Strategy, Success Criteria for 'Prevent' Policing 2008/2009 and the ACPO TAM Implementation Plan documents all provide guidance as to what should be in place to support delivery of the 'Prevent' Strategy.

²⁶ Protective services include counter-terrorism and extremism, serious organised and cross-border crime, civil contingencies and emergency planning, critical incident management, major crime (requiring the appointment of a senior investigating officer), public order, strategic roads policing and protecting vulnerable people

²⁷ ACPO Protective Services Minimum Standards, ACPO, December 2007

²⁸ ACPO Protective Services Minimum Standards, NPIA, November 2008, Reference PS/08/CT/31

- 4.9.5 Delivery could be enhanced if clear and structured minimum levels of capability were defined for forces to apply to local policing according to assessments of their 'risk'. For high risk areas within 'priority' forces, where staff deal daily with 'Prevent', these could incorporate comprehensive structures with highly trained and briefed staff supported by regular assessments and a range of partnership and specialist capabilities. Elsewhere, these capabilities, in terms of knowledge and tangible support, could be available when required. It would, however, be important that triggers for their requirement and how to mobilise them are clearly understood. The Audit Commission/HMIC Learning and Development Exercise Report provided a model for partnership delivery of 'Prevent'. Appendix A provides an interpretation of that model and proposals for minimum levels of capability categorised according to assessments of 'risk' for 'priority' and non 'priority' BCUs.

Recommendation

ACPO, OSCT and NPIA should define minimum levels of local 'Prevent' capability, categorised according to levels of risk, based upon HMIC proposals, before 30th September 2009; and NPIA should review ACPO 'Protective Services' minimum standards to incorporate the revised minimum levels of capability, before 31st March 2010.

Recommendation

Forces should achieve the defined minimum levels of local capability before 31st March 2010.

- 4.9.6 Many forces have established 'Prevent' Boards (or similar), or include 'Prevent' within a wider CONTEST Board. Again, there is no evidence that one approach is better than another, providing that the board drives the issue forward. Boards usually include representation from BCUs, with some notable examples including local authority and police authority representation. Within forces, internal communications contain regular references to CT generally but PVE is less visible.
- 4.9.7 Police Authorities (PAs) have a key role in supporting delivery of the Police 'Prevent' Strategy, for example by providing effective oversight of performance and promoting 'Prevent' within their consultations with communities. The inspection identified that the vast majority of PAs demonstrate some engagement with 'Prevent', although the degree of knowledge, active participation and oversight varies. The majority of authorities have appointed a lead member for 'Prevent' either as a 'stand-alone', part of wider CT responsibility or within their 'Protective Services'²⁹ portfolio. There is little discernable difference between briefing and engagement of PAs for 'priority' and non 'priority' forces (83% in 'priority' forces and 84% in non 'priority' forces).
- 4.9.8 At a strategic level, police authority members demonstrate genuine enthusiasm and commitment to engage in 'Prevent', but not at BCU level, where link members' involvement appears to be very limited. A number of authority members expressed concern about a lack of clarity for their role and an absence of performance frameworks for PVE. The APA issued guidance at the end of November 2008³⁰. It is, therefore, too early to demonstrate how this has been established as part of 'Prevent' oversight.

²⁹ Protective services include counter-terrorism and extremism, serious organised and cross-border crime, civil contingencies and emergency planning, critical incident management, major crime (requiring the appointment of a senior investigating officer), public order, strategic roads policing and protecting vulnerable people

³⁰ Guidance for Police Authorities on the Performance Monitoring and Scrutiny of Protective Services – APA November 2009

4.9.9 Seventy four percent of PA members have been security vetted, whether Counter Terrorist Checked (CTC), Security Cleared (SC) or Develop Vetted (DV) to assist them in their oversight of 'Prevent'. An APA survey undertaken in early 2009 revealed that 88% of Police Authorities included members vetted at CTC or above³¹. There is no consistent approach to the provision of training or briefings for Police Authorities. That said, the majority of PAs are satisfied with constructive 'Prevent' engagement by their forces (in particular the ACPO Lead) and recognise 'Prevent' as an emerging strategic issue. There are examples of PAs leading community engagement and establishing relationships with strategic partners on 'Prevent' but it is not clear how much of this was 'Cohesion'³² rather than PVE focused.

4.10 BCU Level Structures

4.10.1 BCU Commanders and local 'Prevent' leads generally attach importance to 'Prevent', and are willing to progress 'Prevent' activity engaging with partners. There was a discernible difference between 'priority' forces (96%) and non 'priority' forces (84%) in whether or not designated BCU 'Prevent' Delivery Leads had been appointed (combined 91%). This could be by reason of 'Prevent' already having been identified as a greater threat within 'Priority' force BCUs.

4.10.2 As with the force level Delivery Managers, 'Prevent' has greater impetus where there are dedicated BCU delivery posts. The inspection identified, within forces and BCUs, posts that appeared critical to, or could hinder, the delivery of 'Prevent' – the 'Enablers'. Whilst acknowledging the wide variation in approaches to implementation of 'Prevent' and the diverse terminology applied to posts and roles, appendix E sets out a brief summary of roles, at force and BCU levels, and the extent to which they are key to the success or potential inhibitors to the delivery of 'Prevent'.

³¹ Source APA, March 2009 The disparity in results is explained as those contributing to the inspection would not include all of those identified in the survey

³² Community cohesion is defined within 'The Guidance on Community Cohesion (ODPM et al., 2002) as being characterised by a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities; diversity of people's different backgrounds and circumstances appreciated and positively valued; people from different backgrounds having similar life opportunities; and strong and positive relationships being developed between people from different backgrounds and circumstances in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods.'

5. Information Sharing

Assessment of Stages of Development Reached By Forces

Implementation	Developed	Advanced	Delivering
34 (79%)	9 (21%)	0	0

5.1 Information Sharing Within the Police Service

- 5.1.1 Whilst the Police Service has responsibility for the prevention, detection of crime and public protection (including crimes linked to terrorism), the Security Service is responsible for protecting National Security (including threats posed by terrorism). The Security Service and Police must work with other partners to maintain an environment within which people are deterred from terrorism and the sharing of information is critical.
- 5.1.2 There needs to be routine and systematic sharing of information to inform local 'Prevent' initiatives. Greater sharing of information in possession of the National CT Network with local forces and partners would assist this. Whilst there are indications that these structures are beginning to consider 'Prevent', they are still predominantly focused on investigating people involved in terrorist criminality. Flows of information from the intelligence community at a regional level to individual forces and BCUs are still limited but developing.
- 5.1.3 CT intelligence is held by the Security Service, CT Network and SBs. Information about vulnerability to violent extremism has to flow within the police service before it reaches partners. Eighty eight percent of forces have protocols or processes in place to share information with the intelligence community. Whilst information is provided, as yet, only half of the BCU's visited (51%) have routinely received information from these sources to help inform their local assessment of vulnerability from violent extremism.




Figure 7 Material seen by BCU Commanders

- 5.1.4 BCU Commanders are key contributors to the successful delivery of 'Prevent' and need to understand local risks. They are not yet routinely receiving necessary information in a form that would enable sharing with key partners to inform strategic

decisions. There are inconsistencies in the types of written briefing material received by BCU Commanders, some seeing 'Restricted' material about generic terrorist threats or other information, and others having seen 'Restricted' versions of CTLPs, which are beginning to emerge. Most BCU Commanders have received some verbal briefing from SB or CT Network staff about terrorism with only 21% stating they had not. Again, the nature of briefings provided was highly varied.

- 5.1.5 Only a few BCU Commanders and local 'Prevent' Leads have been fully engaged with the CT Network or their force special branches over their needs. There is little consultation about the form of material provided - most await whatever product is being generated for them. Some interviewees felt that information they had seen was not adding value to local understanding of risk. There was also a view among some BCU Commanders that they did not want to see 'Secret' material as they would be unable to share it with key partners and did not want to be perceived as withholding material.
- 5.1.6 The process for sharing information about risk is in its infancy and will take time to mature. For the future, the key issue must be to ensure that 'Restricted' information provided to BCU Commanders and their local partners is used to develop a local approach, and generate two way flows of information necessary to maintain accurate pictures of local 'risk'. With the exception of information shared to develop Strategic Assessments (see Assessing Vulnerability above), there is little evidence of forces using information that is currently available to develop joint assessments and guide their strategic approach with partners. Only 26% of forces describe actively working with local partners on a joint assessment of local vulnerability to inform their approach to 'Prevent'.
- 5.1.7 The over classification of documents relating to 'risk' is regularly cited as an inhibitor to sharing information. Security Service or CT Network documents are often protectively marked and there is a belief that they can not be shared with non-vetted personnel. This is a common misconception amongst those engaged in 'Prevent' at all levels, demonstrating a lack of understanding about Government Protective Marking Scheme (GPMS)³³ protective marking of documentation and the vetting levels required to see it (vetting is dealt with in greater detail within Para. 5.4 below).

5.2 Information Sharing With Partners

- 5.2.1 Sharing information with partners is essential in reaching local common understanding of risk. All forces have systems, processes or formal protocols in place for exchanging crime and disorder information within CDRPs (or CSPs in Wales). However, only 51% of forces (including 6 of the 11 with highest levels of 'risk') demonstrate formal use of these protocols to pass information about risks from violent extremism, and even then not to any consistent extent. Furthermore, only 26% of forces demonstrate that information on violent extremism is shared with partners as part of established partnership meetings.
- 5.2.2 Exchanging information on vulnerable people and places is part of 'daily business' for the police service and partners. Whilst preventing violent extremism is complex, the principles for information exchange between those able to address vulnerability remain the same. Existing mechanisms should therefore be used. However, the legal basis for information sharing on risks from violent extremism is not explicit and legislation is being interpreted differently, with those using existing mechanisms adopting a 'dare to share' approach.

³³ Government Protective Marking System; grades material based upon the estimated harm that unauthorised disclosure would cause to national interest. It defines the personal, physical and electronic security measures that must be adopted for handling the material

- 5.2.3 However, 60% of BCU Commanders provide some generic 'Prevent' or CT briefings to key partners, thereby demonstrating the value of leadership and personal relationships. An additional 12% have made use of written material to illustrate local risks in the briefing of partners. The remaining 28% have yet to engage in substantive information exchanges with local partners whether by reason of absences of tangible products to share (i.e. CTLPs) or lack of partner engagement (e.g. because 'Prevent' is not seen as a priority in the local area). There is evidence of 'Prevent' specific protocols being implemented in some places, for example to deal with the specific information sharing requirements of 'Channel' (Channel is described in greater detail within para. 6.5).
- 5.2.4 Sharing of information for 'consequence management' meets the immediate needs of incidents. Information sharing about risks for long term strategic reasons is, however, lacking in many places. Previous experience of CT operations, or a more detailed understanding of local 'risks' among partners, provides an environment within which information is shared more confidently. Experience of terrorist incidents directly impacts upon local partners' approach to 'Prevent', making it more visible and explicit as a strategic priority. This, in turn, has a direct impact on developing a more trusting approach to information sharing at senior level.³⁴
- 5.2.5 Trust is a major enabler for information sharing at all stages (e.g. between the CT Network and forces, and between BCUs and local partners). Sharing of information between individuals who have developed personal relationships (e.g. BCU Commanders to Chief Executives) does occur. Whilst in a number of forces, ACPO, BCU Commanders, Chief Executives and Police Authorities achieve a common understanding of local risks, it is not happening consistently.
- 5.2.6 Consistency of personnel was previously identified as a potential inhibitor to the development of strong and trusting relationships.³⁵ This is most important among BCU Commanders who are the primary link with local partners at a strategic level. Of the BCU Commanders interviewed, the average time in post was 18 months, but it is worth highlighting that 53% had been in post for less than 12 months. Conversely, 21% had been in place for 3 or more years.

³⁴ Learning and Development Exercise, Audit Commission/HMIC, October 2008, para. 105 et seq.

³⁵ Learning and Development Exercise, Audit Commission/HMIC, October 2008, para. 93.




Figure 8 Information sharing processes

5.2.7 Whilst information sharing with a wider range of partners in support of PVE is in early stages, there are encouraging signs that it is developing. Information exchange about local risks with other key partners, including National Offender Management Service (NOMS) and schools, is evident, but inconsistent, in a third of forces. In total, 65% of forces demonstrate some information exchange with other key partners, largely briefings about the generic CT threat or on ‘Prevent’ in general.

5.2.8 Some forces, supported by local Special Branch Liaison Officers, (funded by the National Coordinator Special Branch (NCSB)) have established protocols with NOMS for the exchange of information. The flow of intelligence and information from Prisons on CT and ‘risk’ is developing, but is dependent upon willingness among individual local prison governors. Dedicated briefing officers (to provide a consistency of approach) in a number of forces have provided generic briefings to the staff of local partners (e.g. local authorities, prisons, etc).

5.2.9 A number of forces have data warehousing or hub arrangements with local partners enabling shared access to data. These arrangements have helped to inform the development of CTLPs by providing data sets that, together with CT information, paint a picture of the local community and highlight areas that may be vulnerable to violent extremism. Different IT systems and software used by partners, and even within the police service, is described by a number of forces as an inhibiting factor.

5.3 Informing the Community

5.3.1 Sharing information about local vulnerability with communities remains a key issue for local partnerships. As local approaches to ‘Prevent’ develop, there are roles for Police, Partners and Police Authorities in the delivery of clear messages to local communities about what is planned and why that approach is being adopted. Al-Qaeda has, however, developed a single narrative that underpins extremist messages. In contrast there is an absence of consistent language with which police forces and partners seek to challenge and undermine those messages. Difficulties as a consequence of inconsistencies within the national governmental narrative have been raised before.³⁶

³⁶ Learning and Development Exercise, Audit Commission/HMIC, October 2008 para. 28

5.3.2 In September 2007, RICU issued guidance on communicating 'Prevent' to communities and local partners. They were commissioned to draft a revised document in November 2008. There is a desire for central guidance and single message representing the interests of all government departments to inform local dialogue. The absence of coherent messages can undermine local endeavours to communicate with communities and there is little evidence that approaches to 'Prevent' adopted by forces and partnerships have evolved to the stage where information about vulnerability to violent extremism is openly shared with local communities. It would be useful for RICU to issue the revised guidance on communications at the earliest opportunity.

5.3.3 Within 13 forces (30%), Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs) or similar consultative community groups or key individuals are briefed on 'Prevent' and local vulnerability, either through formal meetings (e.g. 'Prevent' Boards) or ad hoc consultative arrangements. Key individuals are also briefed and engaged in response to local CT incidents. In most other forces, relationships are maturing between police and key individuals within communities which will provide opportunities to discuss 'Prevent'.

5.4 Security Vetting




Figure 9 Vetting of BCU Commanders

5.4.1 Vetting is considered an inhibitor to effective information sharing and is regularly quoted as a reason not to share information, either within the police service or with partners.³⁷ There is wariness around sharing data, as a consequence of uncertainty around what vetting levels mean, what is required, and what documents can be accessed. The approach to the vetting of individuals varies between forces and partners. Of the BCU Commanders interviewed, 28% are Developed Vetted (DV), 58% are Security Cleared (SC) and 7% are CT Checked. Only 7% stated that they had not been vetted.³⁸

5.4.2 There is no consistency in the approach taken by forces to vetting of staff. Detailed analysis is not possible as a consequence of the different role definitions and approaches being adopted by forces in the delivery of 'Prevent'; 'double hatting' (where a person is vetted as a consequence of performing a separate role); legacy vetting (where a person claims to be vetted as a consequence of a previous role); and a lack of knowledge on the part of individuals what vetting they have undergone.

³⁷ Learning and Development Exercise, Audit Commission/HMIC, October 2008, para. 77 et seq said that 'vetting should not present a barrier to effective information sharing'.

³⁸ Guidance on the GPMS and personnel security issues can be found on the Cabinet Office website www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk

- 5.4.3 Whilst there are wide variations in the approach, in addition to BCU Commanders, the following posts most commonly had a vetting level of CT Checked, SC or DV:
- ACPO lead
 - Police Authority Chair and/or Lead for 'Prevent' (sometimes also the lead for 'Protective Services')
 - Force 'Prevent' Lead (sometimes because this is Head of Special Branch)
 - BCU 'Prevent' lead
 - Intelligence staff (at BCU and Force level)
- 5.4.4 A number of forces reported that senior partners (e.g. Chief Executives) had been vetted to SC level, sometimes as a consequence of previous CT incidents. A few forces reported that key partners were going through the vetting process, but the rationale for this was not explicit further than a perceived need for vetting to see protectively marked material. Vetting is an unnecessary distraction in taking forward information sharing - a 'red herring'. Furthermore, misconceptions about levels of vetting required to access protectively marked material, and in some cases possibly being seen as a 'status symbol', has created, in some places, unnecessary additional work and expense. The cost of vetting varies between forces and organisations. An estimate for DV is £880 - £1420 per person, SC is £50 - £100 and CT Checking is £45 - £80.³⁹
- 5.4.5 There is now a process in place that will determine who can, and needs to see what information, in order to deliver local 'Prevent' approaches. In only a few cases will there be a need for access to more sensitive information for which vetting may be required. Unnecessary vetting could be avoided through a more considered approach to the production of documents for wider circulation (intelligent authorship), greater awareness of recipients about GPMS and a willingness to challenge the value of material received (intelligent readership).
- 5.4.6 There needs to be greater clarity around what vetting levels, if any, are required and by whom. Explicit agreed guidance around vetting levels would provide the necessary clarity for all local partners.

Recommendation

ACPO, Home Office, Security Service, LGA and WAG should agree simple but explicit guidance for forces and local partners to improve understanding about –

- Restrictions and permissions provided by different levels of vetting for those engaged in 'Prevent'; and
- Permitted access to different levels of GPMS information.

³⁹ Figures provided by vetting agencies.

6 Community Engagement and Interventions

Assessment of Stages of Development Reached By Forces

Implementation	Developed	Advanced	Delivering
31 (72%)	12 (28%)	0	0

6.1 Mainstreaming 'Prevent' Within Wider Policing

6.1.1 Resources are tasked with 'Prevent' activity at force and BCU T&CG meetings within 42% of forces. A greater proportion of non 'priority' forces (58%) consider 'Prevent' within T&CG processes than 'priority' forces (29%). The probable reason is that 'priority' forces have established dedicated resources that deliver 'Prevent', whilst non priority forces are considering the allocation of resources against other priorities.

6.2 Strategic Structures for Engagement




Figure 10 Engagement structures (priority forces only)

6.2.1 Existing engagement structures should be used by forces and BCUs to work with partners to take forward 'Prevent'. Whatever form partnerships take, 'Prevent' has only recently been introduced within their agendas. Twelve 'priority' forces (50%) and one non 'priority' force have established joint strategies with partners specifically to deal with PVE. Five forces, including two that have established joint strategies, have developed multi-agency delivery boards.

6.2.2 Thirty three percent of 'priority' forces' BCUs visited have formal agreements with local authorities detailing how they will jointly deliver CT PVE. Within six forces, LSPs,⁴⁰ CDRPs and CSPs have included PVE as a specific issue. Thirteen percent of 'priority' forces' have agreements with other partners (e.g. Education, NOMS or Healthcare) for the joint delivery of PVE. These types of agreements, with either local authorities or other partners, do not exist within non 'priority' forces, an indication that

⁴⁰ Reference to LSP includes LSBs in Wales

where there are recognised risks, partnerships are better focused on PVE. Furthermore, within 46% of 'priority' forces, funded community engagement staff have, as part of their roles, responsibility for supporting development of partnerships with local authorities and other partners to deliver effective programmes in support of the 'Prevent' Strategy. This indicates that 'priority' forces are investing in the strengthening of partnerships to support PVE.

- 6.2.3 Many communities and partners, even where there have been experiences of arrests and prosecutions for planned acts of terrorism, consider the risk of terrorism remote and unrelated to local affairs. Whilst many local authorities have strong 'Cohesion Plans', forces are still finding that some local authorities, education and other partners are reluctant to acknowledge 'Prevent' as a local challenge.
- 6.2.4 Whilst the police service clearly leads on tackling criminality, including when connected with radicalisation for terrorism, it should not be considered responsible for policing ideas and opinions. Responsibility for ensuring that local conditions do not provide for increased risks from violent extremism is shared with partners. The delivery of 'Prevent' could be enhanced by the development of 'mature partnerships', particularly within 'priority' BCUs, categorised by highly developed information sharing, strong links between police management teams and partners, and joint working focused on 'Prevent'. LSPs, CDRPs, CSPs and other partnership mechanisms can deliver 'Prevent' in the same way as they contribute to the delivery of other crime prevention strategies.

Developing Practice

Cleveland Police have a Gold, Silver and Bronze meeting structure for the delivery of 'Prevent'. The 'Gold Meeting' at force level is chaired by the Assistant Chief Constable with attendance from local authority Chief Executives or deputies. The multi agency Silver meeting within each BCU is chaired by a local authority officer at director level with divisional commanders acting as deputy chairs. At these meetings attendees are held accountable for specific aspects of 'Prevent'. The pivotal role of Local Authority senior officers within the 'Prevent' meeting structure demonstrates genuine buy-in with visible ownership and responsibility for 'Prevent' delivery.

6.3 Local Level Engagement




Figure 11 'Prevent' initiatives and awareness

- 6.3.1 The extent to which Neighbourhood Policing Teams and other front-line staff are briefed and trained provides an indication of the extent to which forces have recognised their value to the delivery of 'Prevent'. Ninety three percent of forces have established programmes to raise staff awareness about 'Prevent', whether through training, marketing or other communication mechanisms. In the three forces within which formal mechanisms are not evident, there are indications that activity is being taken forward by Special Branches, or other units, to provide briefings and raise the issue.
- 6.3.2 Within 65% of forces, training is being delivered to Neighbourhood Policing Teams to raise awareness and improve capabilities to recognise conditions that contribute to higher levels of vulnerability. This is being delivered by funded community engagement posts within 38% of 'priority' forces. Front-line staff within 75% of the 24 'priority' forces receive briefings linked to 'Prevent', compared with 63% of non-priority forces. Funded community engagement staff deliver these briefings within 63% of 'priority' forces
- 6.3.3 Low levels of recognition, by communities, of local risks from violent extremism and terrorism provide impediments for BCUs and front-line staff in achieving PVE engagement. One Chief Constable of a large force commented that "We do not understand the lack of awareness amongst the public about terrorist activity". Some schools articulate concerns about the possibility that raising PVE as an issue could lead to the bullying of children from minority communities. Additionally the link between the 'Prevent' strategy and CT reportedly raises concern among communities that PVE partnership initiatives are linked with 'MI5' and aimed at spying on them.
- 6.3.4 Seventy two percent of forces have established, or are using existing, Education Liaison arrangements to take forward PVE with schools and higher education. In October OSCT made £3 million available, to be distributed between the 24 'priority' police forces to work with schools, colleges and universities to deliver activities

outlined within the document 'Learning Together to be Safe: a Toolkit to Help Schools contribute to the prevention of violent extremism'. At the time of the inspection –

- Eight forces had not considered how to use the funding;
- Three forces highlighted that schools do not 'buy in' to PVE and were still considering how best to use funding;
- Two forces in the North East region are consulting with the West Yorkshire Police CTU in determining how to co-ordinate use of the funding across the region;
- Three forces are allocating dedicated resources to engage with schools;
- Seven forces are funding specific initiatives aimed at raising school staff awareness (e.g. 'Miss Dorothy' and 'Act Now'); and
- The 'Schools Toolkit' is being reviewed and considered by the Welsh Assembly Government. It is, however, not seen as applicable to Wales. South Wales Police is investing its funding to support schools in accordance with local initiatives.

- 6.3.5 Young people and women have been identified as key contributors to tackling vulnerability; young people as potentially being vulnerable to radicalisation; and women as a strong but unheard influence. A third of forces (35%) are undertaking specific initiatives to engage with young people including supporting the 'Youth Parliament' (within which young people can represent their peers) and organisation of specific youth groups. A third (37%), the majority of which are also undertaking youth engagement initiatives, are pursuing initiatives to engage with women.

Case Study

Humberside Police has commissioned a mobile phone game, aimed at young people, which provides role play and choices - allowing the force to inform, provide information and challenge views that are raised in the course of play.

6.4 Consequence Management

- 6.4.1 A number of triggers, whether international or locally focused, can increase local tension (e.g. terrorist attacks or conflict abroad that impact upon local communities or local arrests for terrorism). This can be particularly acute where there are low levels of identification with the risk of terrorism. It is, therefore, important that the police have measures in place to work, with communities and partners, to provide reassurance about community safety and any police action. The majority of BCUs in England and Wales have established plans to manage the consequences of critical incidents within their areas. CT related incidents can involve complexities, requiring specific communication, engagement and reassurance activities. Seventy one percent of 'priority' forces and 37% of non 'priority' forces (56% of all forces) have established plans, or their plans contain provisions, to deal with local consequences of arrests or other terrorism related incidents.
- 6.4.2 All forces have established IAGs and/or Key Individuals Networks (KINs) to help communicate with communities, advise and support in providing reassurance, and act as 'critical friends' to help tailor responses to community needs. Where there are experiences of terrorism interventions, there is strong joint understanding between the Police, LAs and community groups. A few forces have recognised that IAGs and KINs do not reflect communities within their areas sufficiently to support delivery of 'Prevent' objectives and are working to improve representation of vulnerable groups.

6.5 Interventions

- 6.5.1 Existing partnership working between the police, Local Authorities and local communities are used to deliver the aims of the Channel Project, which is a Police-led, community based, multi-agency partnership initiative designed to provide support for people who are at most risk of becoming violent extremists. It is based on a hybrid of multi-agency risk management projects that have been successfully used to

manage other risks impacting upon people within communities (e.g. Drugs misuse and domestic violence). Funding is provided to forces, based upon assessments of risk, to establish posts and develop partnership structures. As of January 2009 Channel had been established in eleven sites within seven forces in England and Wales (all of which are in receipt of additional CSR funding), to which 225 cases had been referred. In January 2009 a dedicated post was established within the NPDU, to co-ordinate the establishment of further Channel partnerships. It is anticipated that between nine to fifteen further sites will establish Channel structures in coming months.

- 6.5.2 There are examples where the police are working with partners, using Channel schemes to improve information sharing and joint working, leading to the early identification and intervention in support of vulnerable children in schools. Unlike MAPPA,⁴¹ there is an absence of legislative support underpinning engagement. Reluctance among some partners to work with the police in tackling PVE is raised as an issue by two forces within which the Channel Project is being taken forward.
- 6.5.3 Forces without Channel schemes have demonstrated that existing partnerships can be used to intervene in support of vulnerable people. Six forces have used MAPPA arrangements, one force has worked with Schools and Social Services, and one force has used what are described as 'ad hoc' arrangements with Health Services and Local Authorities to deliver two interventions. An additional 12 forces have agreed with local partners that PVE cases can be dealt with by existing structures including MAPPA, Protecting Vulnerable People (PVP), Safeguarding Children, Prolific and Persistent Offenders (PPOs) and using Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC) processes as applied to domestic violence cases.
- 6.5.4 Levels vary to which partnerships engage in the development of initiatives to intervene in cases where individuals are assessed to be vulnerable to radicalisation for violent extremism. Within 33% of 'priority' forces, funded staff, within their responsibilities, develop and work in partnerships to deliver PVE interventions. Seven 'priority' forces raised reluctance among partners to engage, the slow speed at which the process works within their areas, or other issues as impediments to delivery of interventions.
- 6.5.5 There are early signs that effective interventions have been achieved. At present the sharing of experiences is achieved through recently convened 'Regional Co-ordinators Meetings' or sought out by NPDU staff. There is however a need for what works, in this new area of business, to be effectively assessed and shared.

Recommendation

ACPO and OSCT should establish and communicate a formal mechanism for collecting, assessing and disseminating learning about effective 'Prevent' interventions. This would incorporate –

- A central depository for disruption 'case studies' similar to the mechanism employed within the CDRP or CSP environment for partnership related initiatives and projects; and
- A mechanism for assessing and disseminating good practice in terms of partnership structures and supporting infrastructures that deliver interventions.

⁴¹ MAPPA arrangements are provided for by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to manage sexual and violent offenders. The act provides for 'Responsible Authorities' consisting of the Police, Prison and Probation Services that are charged with the duty and responsibility for the assessment and management of risk of all identified MAPPA offenders.

Case Study

Teachers at a school in the South East were alarmed when a pupil provided a class presentation about an aspiration to join a terrorist organisation. The presentation included graphic images of terrorist atrocities. Teachers from the school visited the family who reported a negative outside influence. The school was sufficiently confident to work with the police in order to divert this pupil. The school and local partners worked together to counter the negative messages that this pupil had been subjected to. This young person is now fully integrated back within mainstream schooling and is pursuing positive continuation of their academic studies.

Case Study

A teenage girl in the north of England was identified as being groomed by a suspected radicaliser. The girl's family life made her mentally vulnerable. During one visit at a place of worship she met a known radicaliser who gave her his business card and money. He stated if she ever needed anything he would be able to help.

Her family was approached and she was found to have disturbing images on her computer depicting violence. The girl was interviewed and welfare concerns identified about a new girl-friend, who had mentioned in SMS messages suicide attempts as a consequence of her grandfather being intent on arranging for her to be married in Pakistan,.

Interventions were undertaken for both girls. For the original girl, contact was made by the police with her School and a support plan was formulated. The radicaliser was investigated.

Due to the sensitive nature of her friend's concerns about the 'arranged marriage' and risk of suicide, her school provided appropriate adults to assist in interviews at school. She revealed her concern that she would be taken to Pakistan by her grandfather and forced into an arranged marriage. She was relieved to be able to talk about the impact on her life. Procedures were put in place to notify Law Enforcement Agencies should any attempt be made to take her from the country.

Periodic reviews of both girls indicate that there are not current concerns.

6.6 Training and Development




Figure 12 Awareness, training and exercising

- 6.6.1 Levels of understanding about what is necessary to deliver 'Prevent' vary widely. An intention to provide Intelligence and Community Engagement Training (ICE), aimed at improving skills of front-line staff, was included within the April 2008 ACPO strategy. There is a programme for the roll out of ICE training with completion scheduled for the end of September 2009.
- 6.6.2 The delay in delivering this critical training package is a concern. Some forces have developed their own programmes based upon early versions of the training package and 23% of forces have developed a form of programme to deliver community and intelligence training. It would be beneficial if the learning from these products is incorporated into any national training.

Developing Practice

Northamptonshire Police has developed its own training package on PVE. All roles within the Force were scored in a matrix to determine the skills required. There are now 5 different levels of training as opposed to a generic course. Safer Community Teams are receiving a 2 day training package. On the first day there is Islamic awareness training, an awareness visit to a Mosque and cultural skills. On day two, special branch delivers inputs on radicalisation, community intelligence, 'Rich Picture' and 'Safer Schools'. There are also "hard hitting" group exercises with paper feed scenarios.

- 6.6.3 A BCU Commanders' Guidance was produced by the National Community Tension Team (NCTT), with the assistance of BCU Commanders who had experienced managing the consequences of CT incidents.⁴² There was awareness of the guidance and its availability within 74% of forces.

⁴² BCU Commanders Guide for Counter Terrorist Operations, ACPO NCTT, 2007

- 6.6.4 Operation Nicole is one of the 21 tactical initiatives within the ACPO strategy. It provides a two day storybook training package, delivered by the NCTT, supported by Independent facilitators from the Lokahi foundation. Local community representatives are provided opportunities to understand police decision making when managing consequences arising from CT incidents. There is a schedule of Nicole events planned throughout 2009 and the start of 2010. Feedback from events has been very positive. Fifty one percent of forces have delivered Operation Nicole training or a local equivalent. Events are generally convened in conference facilities and funding is provided by the ACPO 'Prevent' Delivery Team to assist forces. Of the forces that have organised Operation Nicole event, fourteen are 'priority' and seven non 'priority'. Nine 'priority' forces have not convened Operation Nicole training.
- 6.6.5 There is a need for the NPDU to understand what steps need to be taken to improve awareness about 'Prevent', where training should be focused and what steps need to be taken to increase awareness. Existing training packages, focused upon partnership working, can support the delivery of 'Prevent' (e.g. Critical Incident Training). There is, however, a lack of clarity as to how training and 'marketing' opportunities complement each other and where there are gaps.

7 Assessing Success

Assessment of Stages of Development Reached By Forces

Implementation	Developed	Advanced	Delivering
38 (88%)	5 (12%)	0	0

7.1 Delivery of Additional Capability

- 7.1.1 Seventy nine percent of priority forces demonstrate established plans for the recruitment and use of CSR funded posts, although the remaining forces have plans under development. It is not surprising to find that only a small proportion (13%) of 'priority' forces have established performance frameworks that assess outcomes and support delivery of the ACPO 'Prevent' strategy.

Recommendation

ACPO should collate and assess emerging performance management frameworks, and offer a centralised resource for forces and the Home Office in developing performance frameworks for 'Prevent'.

- 7.1.2 The NPDU is continuously working, with OSCT, to understand what difference the CSR allocations have made, what works and where gaps and vulnerabilities exist. The unit was initially tasked to review the effectiveness of the posts and prepare a report to inform 2009/2010 allocations. Whilst this review was not completed, the NPDU team and OSCT have drawn lessons from the early findings of this inspection and other developing mechanisms to reach decisions for allocations of funding described within chapter 4 (Leadership, Governance and Structures).
- 7.1.3 Except for some quantitative (output) measures, there is a lack of meaningful performance indicators for the roles undertaken by 'Prevent' staff, whether funded or unfunded. The use of quantitative performance measures in some forces for newly introduced funded staff is often a deliberate policy to drive activity. Care should be taken to ensure that over time, there is a national 'standard' to allow for equitable comparisons between forces and regions.

7.2 Performance Measures




Figure 13 Performance management

7.2.1 Public Service Agreement (PSA) 26, provides an indicator to “Reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism” (2008-11). It does not include a specific performance measure for the police, but police service contributions are reported through the Assessments of Policing and Community Safety (APACS).

7.2.2 National Indicator (NI) 35 “Building resilience to violent extremism”, is a joint Home Office, CLG⁴³ indicator and builds upon PSA 26. The aim of this indicator is to assess the contribution of local partners in developing programmes in support of the five ‘Prevent’ strands and two supporting work-streams. Adoption of NI35 by Local Authorities, as part of Local Area Agreements, has been limited (at the time of the inspection 19 out of 152 in England)). Nevertheless, all Local Authorities report on NI35 and the Inspection looked for evidence that forces are using the framework with partners to assess local progress in the four areas:

- Understanding of, and engagement with, Muslim communities;
- Knowledge and understanding of the drivers and causes of violent extremism and ‘Prevent’ objectives;
- Development of a risk-based preventing violent extremism action plan, in support of delivery of the ‘Prevent’ objectives; and
- Effective oversight, delivery and evaluation of projects

7.2.3 Only 10 (26%) forces had established an assessment framework in partnership with Local Authorities, to assess delivery against NI35. This has parallels with the number of Local Authorities who have adopted NI35 as part of their Local Area Assessment. Partners tend to focus upon measures indicating levels of ‘cohesion’.

7.2.4 Effective measurement of ‘Prevent’ is difficult and still under development, and there is a general lack of understanding about what success looks like across police forces.

⁴³ The functions of CLG in Wales are undertaken by the Welsh Assembly Government

This issue was examined within the Learning and Development Exercise Report.⁴⁴ Not surprisingly 'Assessing Success' was the least developed area scrutinised within this Inspection. Only 6 forces (14%) demonstrated mechanisms to assess their effectiveness in delivering 'Prevent'.

- 7.2.5 Tasks associated with 'Rich Picture' themes are being completed by front line staff and the APACS assessment of forces demonstrates most forces achieving a 'good' or 'excellent' grading.
- 7.2.6 Only seven forces (16%) have established mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of 'Prevent' interventions and unsurprisingly these are still maturing. Development of effective measures to assess success against 'Prevent' firstly requires shared understanding about the problem being faced (discussed in Chapter 3 Assessing Vulnerability). In the absence of this, forces have adopted a pragmatic and phased approach, initially monitoring their activity against the tasks and milestones outlined within the ACPO Implementation Plan⁴⁵.

Developing Practice

Cleveland

None of the Local Authorities have adopted NI35. There is multi-agency working towards the APACS local assessment, and the developing joint strategy and delivery plan is producing some qualitative success criteria. There are numerical measures such as the number of officers briefed, and Operation Fairway intelligence (Lightening, Trammell and Camion which has a 112% increase this year).

Thames Valley

The force has developed a monthly performance template capturing PVE activity throughout the seven pathfinder locations and reviewed through the chief constable's 'Prevent' Steering Group. They are aware they need to extend this to include CT disruptions.

7.3 Success Criteria for 'Prevent' Policing 2008/09

- 7.3.1 A letter dated 5th August to Chief Officers and Chairs of Police Authorities, jointly signed by the Government SRO, ACPO 'Prevent' Lead and Chair of the Association of Police Authorities, outlined 'success criteria' for forces in the first year 2008/2009. This was incorporated within the ACPO Implementation Plan. Whilst 93% of forces have adopted the Implementation Plan, the inspection found little evidence of forces using the Success Criteria to assess their progress in the delivery of 'Prevent'.

⁴⁴ Learning and Development Exercise Report, Audit Commission/HMIC, October 2008, Chapter 5

⁴⁵ Prevent: The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism, Implementation Plan, ACPO, September 2008, page 39

8 Prospects

8.1 Outlook

8.1.1 Good progress has been made since ACPO agreed the 'Prevent' Strategy and Delivery Plan. 'Prevent', as a strategic intention, has traction within the Police Service, and work done so far forms a basis upon which to build for the future. Prospects are good for fully integrating 'Prevent' as 'daily business' in policing. The existing commitment to the provision of 'ring fenced' 'Prevent' posts and direction needs to be maintained in the short to medium term. There is a need now to –

- Strengthen guidance and structures that facilitate confident sharing of information within the police service and with partners;
- Establish minimum levels of capability for forces to meet to deliver 'Prevent' (based upon their levels of risk and vulnerability); and
- Improve ability to understand what works, particularly in terms of structures and interventions.

8.2 Impact of Funding

8.2.1 CSR 'Prevent' funding was made available to forces from June 2008. A number of forces took immediate steps to identify staff and fill posts whilst others waited for documented funding approval before beginning the recruitment process. It is, therefore, not surprising that recruitment of CTIO and CEO posts was incremental and within many forces, at the time of the fieldwork, staff were still being recruited or were only recently in post. It has, therefore, been difficult to judge, at this stage in the 'Prevent' implementation programme, the true effectiveness of the additional funding.




Figure 14 Impact of funding on stage of development

8.2.2 Figure 14 shows the percentage of both 'priority' and non 'priority' forces that have achieved either the 'Developed' or 'Advanced' stage. It indicates that 'priority' forces have established 'Prevent' further within their business compared with non 'priority' forces. Whilst they still have not reached the stage where 'Prevent' is daily business, it is reasonable to conclude that 'priority' forces demonstrate a better overall performance across the areas Inspected.

8.3 Future Prospects


- 8.3.1 ACPO 'Prevent' Programme Board, in considering a 'Refresh' of the ACPO Strategy, has identified five key issues for going forward -
- Embedding 'Prevent';
 - Partnership Interventions;
 - 'Prevent'/'Pursue' 'Overlap';
 - Information Sharing; and
 - 'Prevent' Capability and Capacity Building.
- 8.3.2 This inspection demonstrates that these themes are appropriate to progress 'Prevent' within forces over the next twelve months. The issues are inter-connected – for example, better understanding will inform intelligent focusing of resources, information sharing should engender improved partnership engagement and support the full integration of 'Prevent' within the business of front-line public services.
- 8.3.3 In particular this inspection has demonstrated that the police service is following a trajectory to a working ethos where 'Prevent' is 'business as usual' within mainstream policing - recognised as an issue whenever and wherever it arises, in the same way as gun crime and drugs. The deployment of dedicated staff performing community engagement and intelligence functions are important in raising 'Prevent' in the agendas of the wider policing family and partners.

8.4 Future funding

- 8.4.1 The ACPO 'Prevent' Programme Board reviews the use of funding and monitors progress against the planned investment. In June 2008, ACPO TAM planned to review the effectiveness of funded posts and utilise findings to inform the 2009/2010 CSR allocation. Whilst this review was not undertaken, the NPDU is considering emerging information from this inspection, and renewed information about vulnerability, to inform the next CSR allocation. As a result, ACPO TAM has proposed that 2009/2010 CSR funding is apportioned to provide:
- One Sergeant post to the 19 forces currently unfunded (with five forces also receiving a researcher) (Total 24 posts)
 - Additional CTIO/CEO posts in specific BCUs, based upon a reassessment of risk, within 17 forces; some of which are already in receipt of CSR funding (total 23 posts),
 - 13.5 posts to support the NPDU or posts elsewhere to support 'Prevent' related activity
- 8.4.2 The evidence of this inspection suggests that supporting currently unfunded forces with dedicated 'Prevent' resources should provide a tangible benefit. These resources would be best used in the Force Delivery Lead/Project Manager role or supporting a senior officer in that function to develop minimum levels of capability in support of 'Prevent'.
- 8.4.3 An emerging issue for 2009/10 will be the availability and capacity of forces to undertake the analysis of material that impacts upon 'Prevent', in particular the capacity to prepare and update CTLPs. In February 2009, OSCT announced that approximately £700,000 would be available to forces to provide analytical capacity to produce the first tranche of CTLPs. Bids for this money are currently being considered. However, this funding is for 2009/10 only and whilst this is welcome, the long term requirement for analytical support to support 'Prevent' needs to be reviewed. HM Inspector's recommendation concerning the review of capability and informing future capacity building should include analytical resources.
- 8.4.4 The global economic crisis will impact upon public spending and inevitably investment in policing. Government has already announced a £5 billion reduction in public

spending from 2011 onwards. It is therefore essential that 'Prevent' is seen as part of mainstream policing not as a standalone programme. Whilst the imperative on the police service will be to achieve more with existing funding, unemployment and economic hardship are also likely to impact upon local communities. Minority communities could be disproportionately affected thereby increasing senses of grievance and alienation, providing catalysts for increased community tension. The police and partners should be positioned to provide support and tackle those seeking to exploit these conditions.

Model for Police Infrastructure and Minimum Capabilities to Support 'Prevent' Activity



Minimum Capability	'Priority BCUs'	Non 'Priority BCUs'
<p>Clear structures for oversight and delivery of 'Prevent', with identified Police Authority and ACPO Leads, nominated delivery managers and sufficient resources to incorporate 'Prevent' as daily business. Where forces host regional capability, they will have strong links with all forces in their regions, co-ordinate regional activity and support local assessments of risk.</p>	<p>Nominated Delivery Manager and sufficient resources locally to –</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertake assessments; • Link with force level and partners; and • Train brief and task front line delivery staff to support 'Prevent'. 	<p>Nominated Delivery Manager and access to force level resources -</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide assessments; and • Train, brief, task and advise about delivery of 'Prevent'.
<p>'Prevent' is included as priorities for local strategic partnerships to deliver effective programmes of action, which set out clear and tangible milestones for tracking progress.</p>	<p>Joint assessments of risk with local authorities drawing upon police, local authority and other partnership information including PCTs, Education and NOMS.</p>	
	<p>'Prevent' is a fixed agenda item within CDRPs or other partnerships with regular and ongoing tasked responsibilities.</p>	<p>'Prevent' is an agenda item for CDRP or other partnerships with actions considered, according to need, on a regular basis.</p>
<p>Forces will have an understanding of risk levels of violent extremism within their areas.</p>	<p>Local Level Assessment produced using regional, force, local police and partnership information.</p>	<p>Force Level Assessment produced using regional, force, local police and partnership information.</p>
<p>Forces, including at the local policing level, should have an understanding of their communities informed by the Rich Picture and use effective processes for gathering, assessment and sharing information with partners.</p>	<p>Linkages between regional, force, local levels and with partners – Local Assessment.</p>	<p>Linkages between regional, force, local levels and with partners – Force Level Assessment.</p>
<p>Forces have identified and established Independent Advisory Groups and Key Individual Networks that advise on implications arising from incidents and the planned police activity.</p>	<p>BCUs have mapped their communities and identified KINs and IAGs that represent all communities but with particular focus on vulnerable groups and communities.</p>	<p>BCUs have mapped their communities and identified KINs and IAGs that represent all communities.</p>
<p>Forces have developed plans to reassure communities following 'trigger' incidents, whether international or locally focused (e.g. terrorist attacks or conflict abroad that impact upon local communities or local arrests for terrorism).</p>	<p>BCUs have developed consequence management plans tailored to the needs and vulnerabilities of local communities.</p>	<p>Forces have developed consequence management with provisions to manage the consequences of terrorism related triggers.</p>

Minimum Capability	'Priority BCUs'	Non 'Priority BCUs'
<p>Police will engage in partnerships to –</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify and provide support to vulnerable individuals; • Disrupt those who promote violent extremism; • Work with institutions where radicalisers may be active; and • Support sections of communities to resist the challenge from radicalisers. 	<p>'Channel Funded' BCUs have established partnerships to support the scheme. Where Channel has not been developed, local commands will have agreed, with partners, the introduction of 'Prevent' interventions within MAPPA, PPO, PVP and other partnerships.</p>	<p>BCUs will have identified and agreed plans, with partners, to consider 'Prevent' interventions within MAPPA, PPO, PVP and other partnership structures.</p>
<p>Police and partnership front line delivery staff trained, briefed and tasked to recognise indicators of vulnerability, initiate low level partnership activities or refer cases to –</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify and provide support to vulnerable individuals; • Disrupt those who promote violent extremism; • Work with institutions where radicalisers may be active; and • Support sections of communities to resist the challenge from radicalisers. 	<p>Front line staff have comprehensive awareness of local communities, potential vulnerabilities, and a range of local options for engagement and intervention, and have undertaken to raise awareness among partners and within communities.</p>	<p>Front line staff understand their communities, recognise increases in risk and vulnerability and have access to support to identify vulnerability to violent extremism and options for intervention.</p>
<p>The Police Service has effective mechanisms to understanding how performance in respect of 'Prevent' is best assessed.</p>	<p>Forces have established detailed and effective mechanisms, informed by national 'best practice', that assess effectiveness of 'Prevent' delivery.</p>	<p>Forces have established effective mechanisms, proportionate to local risk and vulnerability, that assess effectiveness of 'Prevent' delivery.</p>
<p>Forces and the CT Network will have mechanisms to review and improve their performance against 'Prevent' APACS indicators – KDIs NI35, rich picture, disruptions, CT taskings.</p>	<p>There are effective mechanisms for the reporting of performance between BCUs, forces and the CT Network.</p>	

Terms of Reference for the Inspection

- To assess the progress of police forces in implementing measures that support the seven strategic objectives outlined within the 'Police 'Prevent' Strategy and Delivery Plan'. This will include capacity and capability building, and the identification of Developing Practice and vulnerabilities.
- To assess efficiency and effectiveness of the use of funding allocated to support of police 'Prevent' activity.
- To deliver a report to the Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

Methodology

- Key individuals were consulted and documents examined that provide guidance and direction for the development of the police CT 'Prevent' capability.
- A question framework to support the inspection themes was developed and circulated to all forces:
 - Assessing Vulnerability;
 - Leadership, Governance and Structures;
 - Information Sharing;
 - Community Engagement and Interventions; and
 - Assessing Success.
- A document request was sent to forces, and the returns were reviewed prior to the fieldwork.
- Fieldwork began on 24th November 2008 and ended on 13th February 2009. During this period the inspection teams undertook a series of visits to Senior CT Stakeholders, National & Regional Units, forces, BCUs and other key stakeholders, during which interviews were conducted with individuals and focus groups.
- Meetings were held halfway through and at the end of the fieldwork programme to review the progress of the Inspection, ensure consistency of approach and to identify emerging findings.
- Throughout the period of this Inspection, consultation and liaison has continued with Government Departments (particularly Home Office), ACPO (including ACPO TAM), Security Service, and Chief Officers from around the country. In addition, HMIC has been involved in exercises and stakeholder meetings on a variety of CT/DE related topics.
- All or relevant parts of the report have been reviewed by 'Critical readers' during the drafting process.

Assessment Criteria

The stages of development and definition attached to those assessments are as follows -

Implementation

- Wet ink plans and policies;
- Some, recent examples of activity;
- Not considered force wide;
- Promises for the future;
- Refining the approach.

Developed

- Complementary plans and policies;
- Established structures with future plans;
- Responsibilities allocated;
- Staff in place;
- Force wide approach;
- Clear and visible approach.

Advanced

- Resilient internal structures;
- Tangible partnership working on PVE;
- Staff established with direction and supporting infrastructure;
- Consistent force wide approach;
- Review process.

Delivering

- Day to day business addressing vulnerability;
- Embedded across force and partners;
- Time dependant (effective review process);
- Staff & resources in place (resilient).

Timeline for Implementation of 'Prevent'

Apr 2008	May 2008	Jun 2008	Jul 2008	Aug 2008	Sep 2008	Oct 2008	Nov 2008	Dec 2008	Jan 2009	Feb 2009	Mar 2009
<p>16th Home Secretary announces CSR funding for police 'Prevent' posts.</p> <p>17th ACPO 'Prevent' Strategy and Delivery Plan – agreed by Chief Officers Council</p>	<p>2nd Letter to all forces from ACPO 'Prevent' Lead : 'Prevent'; ACPO Police Strategy and Delivery Plan Next Steps'</p>	<p>1st SRO for ACPO 'Prevent' appointed</p> <p>3rd Government 'Prevent' Strategy and Guide for Local Partners launched.</p> <p>25th CSR Funding Released</p>		<p>5th 'Success Criteria for 'Prevent' Policing' launched</p> <p>8th 'Prevent' toolkit for schools launched.</p>	<p>30th ACPO TAM Implementation Plan launched</p>		<p>7th LDE report published and launched at LGA conference</p>		<p>12th ACPO TAM CTLP Guidance circulated</p>	<p>5th Launch of ACPO TAM Implementation Plan 'Summary for Partners'</p>	
<p>17th Arrest of Andrew Ibrahim (Bristol, Avon & Somerset) for terrorism offences</p>	<p>22nd Attempted bombing of Exeter restaurant by Nicky Riley</p>						<p>Devon & Cornwall, Lincolnshire, West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester, West Midlands, Metropolitan Police.</p>	<p>Avon & Somerset, Norfolk, South Yorkshire, Lancashire, West Mercia, Wiltshire, Suffolk. City of London, North Yorkshire, Merseyside, Staffordshire, Gloucestershire, Cambridgeshire.</p>	<p>Sussex, Cleveland, Cheshire, Warwickshire, South Wales Essex, Surrey, Durham, Cumbria, Leicestershire, Gwent, Northamptonshire Thames Valley, Northumbria, North Wales, Nottinghamshire, Dorset, Hertfordshire.</p>	<p>Kent, Humberside, Dyfed-Powys, Derbyshire, Hampshire, Bedfordshire.</p>	
	<p>← HMIC Audit Commission 'Learning and Development' →</p>						<p>← HMIC Progress and Prospects Inspection →</p>				
Apr 2008	May 2008	Jun 2008	Jul 2008	Aug 2008	Sep 2008	Oct 2008	Nov 2008	Dec 2008	Jan 2009	Feb 2009	Mar 2009

Specific Findings

Assessing Vulnerability	Priority Forces		Non Priority Forces		All Forces	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Force Strategic Assessment considers PVE	92%	8%	89%	11%	91%	9%
BCU Strategic Assessment considers PVE	83%	17%	58%	42%	72%	28%
Link between BCU, Force, Regional & National Strategic Assessments	63%	38%	63%	37%	63%	37%
PVE features within force Control Strategy	88%	13%	89%	11%	88%	12%
PVE features within BCU Control Strategy	71%	29%	47%	53%	60%	40%
Strategic co-ordination meeting or equivalent considers risks from PVE and decides priorities	88%	13%	79%	21%	84%	16%
Rich Picture information gathered and passed to force and Intelligence Community	96%	4%	95%	5%	95%	5%
Neighbourhood Policing Teams tasked to gather community information in support of improving understanding of communities and supporting PVE	83%	17%	84%	16%	84%	16%
Mapping informed by force and regional CT intelligence	42%	58%	21%	79%	33%	67%
Rich Picture information contributing to local neighbourhood mapping	50%	50%	32%	68%	42%	58%
Analytical resources allocated for assessing risk of PVE	46%	54%	32%	68%	40%	60%
Protocols and processes in place to share information with the Intelligence Community	96%	4%	79%	21%	88%	12%
Local assessments informed by Intelligence Community	46%	54%	58%	42%	51%	49%

Leadership, Governance and Structures	Priority Forces		Non Priority Forces		All Forces	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Priority forces only						
CTIO (or local equivalent) provides strategic and tactical briefings to police officers	71%	29%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CTIO (or local equivalent) provide strategic and tactical briefings to police staff	54%	46%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CTIO (or local equivalent) provides strategic and tactical briefings to partners	17%	83%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CTIO (or local equivalent) provides link between CT specialists and local policing	54%	46%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CTIO (or local equivalent) provides a link between CT specialists and local partners	17%	83%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Identified ACPO 'Prevent' lead	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%
Clarity in structure that supports delivery	79%	21%	63%	37%	72%	28%
Police Authority briefed and engaged	83%	17%	84%	16%	84%	16%
Identified BCU 'Prevent' lead	96%	4%	84%	16%	91%	9%

Information Sharing	Priority Forces		Non Priority Forces		All Forces	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Use of existing information sharing protocols with Local Authority on 'Prevent'	58%	42%	47%	53%	53%	47%
Information shared with other partners in support of 'Prevent'	46%	54%	5%	95%	28%	72%
Information shared with community groups or key individuals in support of 'Prevent'	33%	67%	37%	63%	35%	65%
Use of existing information sharing protocols with Local Authority on 'Prevent'	29%	71%	32%	68%	30%	70%

Community Engagement and Interventions	'Priority' Forces		Non 'Priority' Forces		All Forces	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
'Prevent' activity regularly appears in tasking & co-ordination processes	29%	71%	58%	42%	42%	58%
Forces/BCUs have shared strategies with local authorities and strategic partnerships focused on PVE	54%	46%	5%	95%	33%	67%
Forces/BCUs have agreements/protocols with local authorities detailing how they will jointly deliver CT PVE	33%	67%	0%	100%	19%	81%
Forces/BCUs have agreements/protocols with other partners detailing how they will jointly deliver CT PVE	13%	87%	0%	100%	7%	93%
Mechanism exists for raising staff awareness on CT issues	92%	8%	95%	5%	93%	7%
Neighbourhood Policing Teams trained to understand communities and 'Prevent'	71%	29%	58%	42%	65%	35%
Front line staff regularly briefed on CT issues and 'Prevent'	75%	25%	63%	37%	70%	30%
'Prevent' considered within education liaison	88%	12%	53%	47%	72%	28%
Specific 'Prevent' initiatives exist to engage young people	50%	50%	16%	84%	35%	65%
Specific 'Prevent' initiatives exist to engage women	50%	50%	21%	79%	37%	63%
Forces/BCUs have consequence management plans to manage the local impact of CT events	71%	29%	37%	63%	56%	44%
Forces/BCUs have established Independent Advisory Groups and Key Individual Networks	96%	4%	100%	0%	98%	2%
Forces/BCUs have structures to work with partners in identifying those vulnerable to radicalisation for violent extremism and delivery diversionary initiatives (e.g. Channel)	29%	71%	11%	89%	21%	79%
Availability and awareness of BCU Commanders' guidance	83%	17%	63%	37%	74%	26%
Partners and community representatives engaged in CT exercising	63%	37%	37%	63%	51%	49%
A programme exists to deliver community engagement and intelligence training	25%	75%	21%	79%	23%	77%

CEO Deployment	Yes	No
CEOs (or local equivalent) deliver training, to Neighbourhood Policing Teams in the production of 'neighbourhood profiles', which support "Prevent" in engagement work with the community	38%	63%
CEOs (or local equivalent) deliver briefings, for Neighbourhood Policing Teams to inform the production of 'neighbourhood profiles', which support 'Prevent' in engagement work with the community	63%	38%
CEOs (or local equivalent) support the development of partnerships with local authorities and other partners to deliver an effective programme of action, in support of the objectives of the 'Prevent' Strategy	46%	54%
Partnerships with local authorities and other partners deliver interventions in support of 'Prevent' Strategy objectives	33%	67%

Assessing Success	Priority Forces		Non Priority Forces		All Forces	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Clear plans, with monitoring mechanisms, for the recruitment and use of additional posts funded by the CSR	79%	21%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Performance frameworks for CSR funded posts that assess outcomes and delivery of the Police 'Prevent' strategy	13%	88%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Forces have established assessment frameworks, in partnership with local authorities, to consider delivery against NI35	21%	75%	26%	58%	23%	67%
Mechanisms in place to assess forces'/BCUs' effectiveness in delivering 'Prevent'	17%	83%	11%	89%	14%	86%
Clear progress against CTU/CTIU Rich Picture Requirements	79%	21%	84%	16%	81%	19%
Mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of CT disruptions	8%	92%	26%	74%	16%	84%
ACPO 'Prevent' Implementation Plan adopted by forces	96%	4%	89%	11%	93%	7%

Comparison of overall assessment

	Funded forces achieving Developed or Advanced as % of all forces demonstrating 'Developed' or 'Advanced'	Funded forces achieving Developed or Advanced as % of all forces	Non-funded forces achieving Developed or Advanced as % of all forces	Developed or Advanced forces as a % of all funded forces	Developed or Advanced forces as a % of all non-funded forces
Overall Performance	91% (10/11)	23% (10/43)	2% (1/43)	46% (10/24)	5% (1/19)
Assessing Vulnerability	80% (8/10)	19% (8/43)	5% (2/43)	33% (8/24)	11% (2/19)
Leadership, Governance and Structures	76% (19/25)	44% (19/43)	14% (6/43)	79% (19/24)	32% (6/19)
Information Sharing	89% (8/9)	19% (8/43)	2% (1/43)	33% (8/24)	5% (1/19)
Community Engagement and Partnership	92% (11/12)	26% (11/43)	2% (1/43)	46% (11/24)	5% (1/19)
Assessing Success	100% (5/5)	12% (5/43)	0% (0/43)	21% (5/25)	0% (0/19)

Key Enablers (in priority order)

ACPO PVE Lead

Delivery of 'Prevent' requires visible strategic leadership to ensure that it is fully integrated into force structures and processes. Typically, ACPO leadership is characterised by:

- Providing visible leadership, for example, by being the 'Prevent' 'champion' with the chief officer group and by Chairing a PVE Board;
- Ensuring structures for delivery are implemented;
- With ACPO colleagues, balancing resources to meet CT demand and other policing priorities;
- Link/influence with partners across wider partnership (e.g. LRF);
- Ensuring 'Prevent' is considered within Level 2 and other force T&CG processes; and
- Representing the force in Regional engagement.

Force 'Prevent' Delivery/Project Manager

Working directly, or through force management, to the ACPO Lead, the 'Prevent' Delivery or Project Manager is a key enabler in coordinating the implementation of 'Prevent' in the force. This is achieved by:

- Acting as the single point of contact and conduit of information/Developing Practice from Regional or National sources;
- Providing advice and guidance to BCU Commanders and 'Prevent' Leads;
- Developing and refining force strategy and policy;
- Assuming responsibility for delivery of the force plan and ensuring force wide development in line with risk/threat; and
- Integrating 'Prevent' with other CT work (e.g. Protect and Prepare).

The absence of this role is an inhibitor to successful implementation of 'Prevent'. Allocating 'Prevent' in addition to other responsibilities (e.g. 'double-hatting' the HSB in a number of forces) may not give 'Prevent' the necessary impetus (depending upon local threat and risk). In a small number of forces, this post is occupied by a non-police officer.

BCU Commander

'Prevent' will not be delivered locally without the engagement of key partners (e.g. CDRPs, LSPs or CSPs). The BCU Commander (or equivalent depending upon force structures) is the primary link to local partnerships and will need to demonstrate active engagement and well developed working relationships. Typically, active 'Prevent' leadership by BCU Commanders is characterised by:

- Providing visible leadership within the BCU, for example, by being the 'Prevent' 'champion';
- Ensuring information sharing is undertaken;
- Engaging with key partners and driving 'Prevent'; and
- Ensuring BCU structures for delivery are implemented and appropriately resourced.

BCU 'Prevent' Delivery

Working directly, or through local BCU management, to the 'Prevent' Lead (most often the BCU Commander), the 'Prevent' Delivery or Project Manager is a key enabler in co-ordinating the implementation of activity with the BCU and with local partners. This is achieved by:

- Providing tactical leadership, direction and coordinating local 'Prevent' activity with partners;
- Providing the conduit for information/developing practice locally, advice and guidance to NPTs/other staff; and
- Ensuring the BCU delivers against a local plan in support of the force effort.

Neighbourhood Engagement Police Officer

The role profile of NEPOs was defined by ACPO TAM on 1st May 2008. The role of NEPOs is perhaps the one most subject to local variation, interpretation and different staff profile. Nevertheless, the dedicated functions of these individuals, particularly in the early days of 'Prevent' implementation, appear important for success;

- Linking with NPTs to support engagement with community groups, hard to reach communities, KINS, etc and partner organisations (providing the 'overt' face of 'Prevent'); and
- Providing specialist advice and support in community engagement.

There is a recognised need for clarity of responsibility in terms of community engagement. The LDE report referred to danger of over-reliance on key individuals, which can adversely impact on the effective engagement of front line staff.

CT Intelligence Officer

CTIOs generally provide a conduit between BCUs and the force SB and/or CT Network which is essential in creating two-way flows of information. The inspection also revealed CTIOs fulfil a key role in 'Prevent' by;

- Briefing senior local stakeholders;
- Providing BCU staff (in particular the neighbourhood policing) with briefing and training (e.g. 'Rich Picture');
- Developing the information flow from neighbourhood policing and partners (in some cases).

Head of Special Branch

Heads of Special Branch (or equivalent in those forces in which the CT responsibilities have been re-organised) have a key role in integrating 'Prevent' with the 'Pursue' covert investigative functions undertaken in force. HSBs also support 'Prevent' by ensuring:

- Links between the force (including force crime intelligence) and the Security Service/CT Network;
- Two way information sharing between the 'CT world' and local policing;
- Delivery of information about vulnerability to violent extremism that can be shared with partners;
- Tasking and coordination processes consider 'Prevent': and
- Senior stakeholders are properly briefed.

Police Authority

Engagement of Police Authorities in 'Prevent' is developing. Police Authorities support the implementation of 'Prevent' through;

- Oversight of performance;
- Ensuring the provision and oversight of resources;
- Agreeing funding priorities; and
- Providing public facing support for 'Prevent' approaches and consulting/linking to community groups and partners.

List of Acronyms

ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ACPO(TAM)	Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee
APA	Association of Police Authorities
APACS	Assessments of Policing and Community Safety
BCU	Basic Command Unit
CDRP	Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CEO	Community Engagement Officer
CLG	Communities and Local Government
CONTEST	Government Counter Terrorism Strategy
CS	Control Strategy
CSP	Community Safety Partnership
CSR	Comprehensive Spending Review
CT	Counter Terrorism
CTC	Counter Terrorist Command (MPS)
CTIOs	Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officer (MPS)
CTIU	Counter Terrorist Intelligence Unit
CTLP	Counter Terrorism Local Profile
CTU	Counter Terrorist Unit
DV	Developed Vetting
FIB	Force Intelligence Bureau
GMP	Greater Manchester Police
GPMS	Government Protective Marking Scheme
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
IAG	Independent Advisory Group
ICE	Intelligence and Community Engagement
KINs	Key Individual Networks
LA	Local Authority
LGA	Local Government Association
LSB	Local Strategic Board
LSP	Local Strategic Partnership
MAPPA	Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements
MARAC	Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference
MPA	Metropolitan Police Authority
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
NCSB	National Coordinator Special Branch
NCTT	National Community Tension Teams
NEPO	Neighbourhood Engagement Police Officers
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NOMS	National Offender Management Service
NPDU	ACPO National 'Prevent' Delivery Team

NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
OSCT	Office for Security and Counter Terrorism
PA	Police Authority
PAW	Police Authorities for Wales
PCT	Primary Care Trust
PPO	Prolific and Persistent Offender
PSA	Public Service Agreement
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
PVP	Protecting Vulnerable People
RICU	Research, Information and Communications Unit
SA	Strategic Assessment
SB	Special Branch
SC	Security Cleared
SRO	Senior Responsible Officer
T&CG	Tasking and Coordinating Group
WAG	Welsh Assembly Government

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