

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary




## HMIC Inspection Report

**Kent Police**

**Major Crime**

**July 2008**



*Kent Police – HMIC Inspection Report*

*July 2008*

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## Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

## HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

## Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

## Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

## Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

## The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

### Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

### Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

## **Failing to meet the standard**

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

## **Developing Practice**

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

## Force Overview and Context

### Geographical description of force area

Kent Police operates over a geographical area of 1509 square miles in the South East corner of England, with a coastline of 343 miles. The county is divided into six basic command units (BCUs), known locally as areas: North Kent; West Kent; Mid Kent; Medway; East Kent; and South Kent.

As well as being the 'Garden of England', Kent is the UK's principal 'Gateway to Europe', with the Channel Tunnel, Dover and other ferry ports to continental Europe in the east of the county. Kent Police has its HQ in Maidstone and is unique among British police forces in operating an overseas police station at Coquelles in France, which is staffed entirely by Kent Police officers and staff.

### Demographic description of force area

The resident population is approximately 1.6 million in some 668,000 households. A quarter live in rural areas and about 100,000 people regularly commute to and from London. The black and minority ethnic (BME) population amounts to some 3.6%, with higher concentrations in North Kent and Medway. A significant population of asylum seekers is to be found in South Kent and East Kent. There are ten prisons in the county.

There are two first-tier local authorities: Kent County Council, with headquarters in Maidstone; and Medway Unitary Authority, based in Strood. The 12 crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) are based on the 12 districts and the Medway Authority.

Other features include Bluewater, one of the largest retail parks in Europe with more than 500,000 visitors per week on average, and the McArthur Glen designer outlet at Ashford, attracting 54,000 visitors per week. There is a nuclear power station, the International Ashford and Ebbsfleet rail terminal, a developing international airport at Manston and Lydd and migrant reception centres at Ashford and Cranbrook.

The Government has identified Kent for substantial regional growth. Plans are well advanced to deliver significant numbers of additional dwellings in the Ashford area between 2008 and 2011, with a simultaneous expansion in the Thames Gateway area (North Kent). The likely impact on future policing and infrastructure requirements will be significant. The opening of the high speed rail link into London from Ashford and Folkestone will continue to change the nature of the area by encouraging further local growth and development.

More than 30 million cross-channel passengers travel through the county each year using Kent's strategic road network (SRN) and to a lesser extent the new high-speed Channel Tunnel rail link. Kent also bears substantial and growing volumes of cross-channel commercial traffic, with over 5 million commercial vehicle movements per year on the longest distance of SRN (M2, M20, M25, M26, A21, A249 etc) of any police force in the UK. Commercial traffic volumes in Kent increased 35% more than the national average between 1980 and 1997. Commercial traffic, particularly from Eastern Europe, has continued to show strong growth in contrast to a recent countywide trend to a small reduction in the volume of other types of traffic.

### Structural description of the Force

Kent Police comprises Force Headquarters in Maidstone, six similar sized BCUs and a Specialist Operations Directorate (including armed response, traffic, dog section, major crime and special branch). The map below details the key Force infrastructure including stations, custody centres, police bases and other contact points.

The Force headcount as at 30 April 2008 comprised:

- Police Officers                      3,739
- Police Staff                            2,678
- PCSOs                                    373
- Special Constables                343
- Volunteers                            120

Staffing levels broken down (as of 31<sup>st</sup> March 2008) as follows:

	<b>Police Officer (FTE)</b>	<b>Police staff incl. PCSOs (FTE)</b>	<b>Special Constables</b>
North Kent	378.0	178.0	38
West Kent	377.8	184.0	48
Mid Kent	398.6	232.2	78
Medway	390.9	194.8	52
East Kent	409.6	222.3	68
South Kent	481.6	242.9	57
<b>6 BCU Total</b>	<b>2436.5</b>	<b>1254.2</b>	<b>341</b>
FHQ	1008.2	1601.3	8
Student PC's	230.0	-	-
<b>FORCE</b>	<b>3674.7</b>	<b>2855.6</b>	<b>349</b>

## Strategic priorities

The core aim is embodied in the joint Kent Police and Kent Police Authority commitment to address national and local priorities with a focus on building public confidence, effectively tackling crime, making communities safer, protecting the public and making best use of resources.

There are five strategic priorities highlighted in the latest policing plan (2008-11), each underpinned by three objectives. Kent Police intend:

**Priority 1: To Build Public Confidence**

Objective: Improve public confidence and victim satisfaction

Objective: Improve the quality of interactions with the public

Objective: Ensure equality and fairness

**Priority 2: Effectively Tackle Crime**

Objective: Reduce serious acquisitive crime

Objective: Ensure a high sanction detection rate

Objective: Tackle repeat victimisation and repeat offending

**Priority 3: To Make Communities Safer**

Objective: Tackle anti social behaviour

Objective: Reduce the harm caused by drugs and alcohol

Objective: Make the roads safer

**Priority 4: To Protect The Public**

Objective: Build protective services capability

Objective: Protect the public from high-risk offenders

Objective: Target organised crime groups

**Priority 5: To Make Best Use of Resources**

Objective: Demonstrate an increase in efficiency

Objective: Increase the availability of frontline officers and staff

Objective: Increase capacity to handle demand

## Force Performance Overview

### Major Crime and Serious and Organised Crime

Kent has risen to the demands of Policing in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, providing a high standard of service to the public of Kent even in the face of extra-ordinary demand. The last 2 years has seen Kent deal successfully with the biggest cash robbery and kidnap investigations in the world (Operation Deliver). With key gang members already convicted, several others await trial in October 2008. The Force has also managed a complex extradition process in relation to this enquiry, with a principal suspect being extradited from Morocco after significant efforts on the part of Kent staff.

The Force has demonstrated its ability to successfully manage and investigate multiple major and serious crime enquires occurring simultaneously or in quick succession, as evidenced by the Forces profile of homicide offences in 2007-08. The Forces conviction rate for Homicide offences demonstrates this ability.

The Force has unique experience in managing international enquires and working effectively with foreign law enforcement organisations, often assisting other UK forces and agencies with their own overseas enquiries.

In particular the force has made great progress in working with SOCA, the UKBA and in France with OCRIEST and the PAF to deal with people smuggling. Also with Holland, Belgium and France in counter terrorism planning across frontiers.

The Force has made significant organisational changes to meet the demands of NHP and Citizen Focus performance at a local level, as well as the changes needed to deliver the high standard of protective service performance deserved by the public in Kent.

The geographical position of Kent presents unique challenges to the policing of major and serious crime. The Force has fostered sound working relationships with key partner agencies both UK and European to ensure the best possible response to the threat of international Organised Crime is provided.

### Key Improvements to Performance

SO has undergone a significant period of change with wholesale changes to resourcing profiles, working practices and performance management regimes. This has provided a significantly enhanced capability to deliver on the performance required within the Forces Protective Service Improvement Plan (PSIP). The strategic goal being to make the public of Kent safer and reduce the fear of major and serious crime.

The Force and SO have adopted the National guidance on mapping and disrupting OCG's. SO have adapted existing systems and processes with the intention that OCG's causing the most harm to communities are identified, accurately mapped and then disrupted/incapacitated, by investing the appropriate police and partnership resources.

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Developments in the Force's Major Crime Department have now resulted in geographical coverage across 3 sites in Kent with a facility to run multiple HOLMES MIR's simultaneously.

SO have developed further its capability to investigate 'cold' major crimes. The Force has a well-established and effective Serious Case Review Team (SCRT), but now also has a dedicated team of specialist investigators, within Major Crime, to take forward the recommendations from the SCRT and provide a ring-fenced resource to investigate 'cold' cases.

The Force has recognised the need to supplement previous investment in the incapacitation of lifestyle criminals via asset recovery activity. SO have recognised the demand for skilled Financial Investigators on BCU's and is in the process of appointing staff. By July 2008 this growth will be in place and the Force rightly sees this as an opportunity to enhance its performance further in relation to OCG disruption/incapacitation and asset recovery.

## **Collaboration**

Kent, together with Essex, is a national demonstrator site for collaborative working. The Force (under the badge Operation Forefront) has made significant progress in ensuring the policing services provided to Kent residents and visitors are as effective and efficient as possible, by appropriately collaborating with Essex. Bespoke Memorandums of Understanding (MOU's) also exist to ensure the Force has built in capability and capacity to cater for extraordinary demand. For example the sharing of Major Crime resources between Forces has already taken place and provided benefits.

In addition Kent continues to collaborate with Forces and partners in the South East region to provide a coordinated response to terrorist incidents, kidnap and extortion offences and regional serious and organised crime threats.

Kent also collaborates with European partners to ensure Kent and UK interests are considered in multinational policing issues. Kent are key members at the Cross Channel Intelligence Conference and have invested in resources to maintain communication with European Law Enforcement Agencies, ensuring policing issues that may impact upon Kent residents are considered and responded to.

## **Representative Workforce**

The Equality Standard for Local Government (ESLG) is a framework to help public organisations introduce a comprehensive and systematic approach to deal with equality issues. Kent is committed to progressing through all five levels of the Standard, which was adopted by the Force in January 2007. Level 1 of the Standard was achieved in November 2007, whilst at the same time Specialist Operations has made considerable progress towards achieving Level 2. The purpose of the Standard is to mainstream equality and diversity into all parts of Public Sector Organisations. SO have utilised the support of the Forces Diversity Support Team, and have appointed Senior Managers from both Tactical Operations and Crime and Intelligence to lead on implementation of the standard and ensure it is 'main-streamed'.

The Senior Management of SO recognise the importance of a diverse and representative workforce. Historically some of the more specialist roles have been unattractive to some minority staff groups. To tackle this the Senior Management Team in SO have instigated a

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number of initiatives, with the Diversity Support Team, to demystify perceptions and recruit and retain staff from minority groups. This commitment is reflected in SO's performance plans for 08-09.

SO's commitment to the development of staff can be seen in the investment given to the Leadership Development Program. Mirroring the Force program SO has identified the investment necessary to realise the potential of its senior leaders, enabling them to deliver the performance required.

SO has taken steps to ensure staff are appropriately trained and accredited to perform the respective roles required. For example the Major Crime Department is in the process of accrediting all Senior Investigating Officers (SIO's) and Deputy SIO's to PIP Level 3, and already ensures that all Detectives on the Department are accredited to PIP Level 2.

### **Workforce Modernisation**

The Force has demonstrated a commitment to appropriate workforce modernisation, with key roles being scoped and considered before modernisation is undertaken. This has led to significant Police Officer resources being released for frontline and other 'warranted' duties. Examples of this can be seen within the Force HOLMES set up, Major Crime Investigator roles, Financial Investigator roles, 'back-office' support roles, and notably its use of selected Agency staff in major and serious crime investigations. As well as this the Force continues to identify and explore opportunities for further modernisation.

### **Protective Services**

The Force has embraced the Government drive towards enhancing the Protective Services and has introduced a comprehensive performance management regime to ensure all aspects of performance, compliance and development in relation to the Protective Services are progressed. During the last quarter of 2007/8, Specialist Operations (SO) put in place a small team of SO staff to manage and progress the Protective Services plans and activities, to ensure the best possible quality of service to the public. This performance regime involves contributions from all SO departments and has been developed to reflect the priorities identified within the National and Force Policing Plan. Building on the foundation of the 2007-2008 PSIP, individual threat and risk assessments have been conducted to ensure each protective service is constantly evolving, identifying ways in which to improve the service delivered by SO. To compliment this SO have introduced a new governance structure to reflect the individual Protective Services. Each Protective Service has a Development Board, chaired by either the C/Supt Tactical Operations or the D/C/Supt Crime and Intelligence. These boards oversee the performance, compliance and most significantly the development of each Protective Service, to ensure the Forces capability and capacity to respond is maximised. The respective Boards then report to an overarching Protective Services Review Board, chaired by the ACC SO and attended by key stakeholders including Kent Police Authority members.

### **Force development since 2007 inspections**

In the last 2 years the Force has undergone significant change to meet the demands of NHP and Citizen Focus, this has been exemplified by the reduction of 9 BCU's into 6 to equalise the demands across BCU's and ensure the Force is fit to meet the demands of policing over the next 10 years and beyond.

During 2007 the Force undertook a programme to identify the views of staff concerning the delivery of policing (Operation Blueprint). Key goals were; to identify what really mattered to staff; how they perceived the force; how they wanted to be perceived; what motivated them; what frustrated them. The nature of the exercise entailed a commitment to respond positively to all constructive feedback. Blueprint, therefore, is much more than a visioning exercise. It is about the Force defining priorities as an organisation and setting an agenda for action. Action inspired not simply by government targets, but shaped by a shared vision of policing in Kent. As an example Major Crime & Serious and Organised Crime have undertaken a commitment to review the use of telecommunications data and CCTV evidence to enhance its use within investigation and thus address a frustration of staff.

## Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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### Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Kent Police’s capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as its response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those that pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening & gun crime per 1,000 population	0.458	0.390	-14.85%	0.344
No. of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.001
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
No. of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.043	0.074	+72.09%	0.077
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	114.29%	75.00%	-39.29pp*	96.21%
No. of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.555	0.136	-75.50%	0.147
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	8.89%	31.82%	+22.93pp*	35.38%
No. of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.364	0.308	-15.38%	0.273
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	45.76%	50.00%	+4.24pp*	43.76%
No. of manslaughter per 10,000 population	0.025	0.006	-76.00%	0.014
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	75.00%	100.00%	+25pp*	Not Applicable
No. of murders per 10,000 population	0.086	0.105	+22.09%	0.095
% of murders detected/convicted	85.71%	76.47%	-9.24pp*	107.48%
No. of rapes per 10,000 population	2.486	2.517	+1.25%	2.159
% of rapes detected/convicted	21.34%	25.74%	+4.4pp*	22.83%



\*\*Most Similar Family (MSF) for Kent is: Avon & Somerset; Cheshire; Essex; Hampshire; Hertfordshire; Northamptonshire and; Warwickshire.  
\*\*pp” is Percentage Points.

From the SPI data contained in the table above it can be seen that the crime types of life threatening and gun crime and rape pose a potential threat to Kent Police. The rate of offences for both crime types is above the MSF average but is not high when compared to England and Wales as a whole. It should be noted the offence rate for life threatening and gun crime fell significantly in 2007.

The SPI data also indicates that Major Crime investigation in Kent Police is comparable with the rest of the MSF group. Kent is performing at a level above the MSF average in some areas (kidnapping and rape) but below the MSF average in other areas (attempted murder, blackmail and murder). It should be noted that the sanction detection rate for blackmail has shown significant improvement in 2007.

**The National Protective Services Analysis Tool, released on 25 September 2007, revealed that Kent Police faces a high level of demand in respect of the policing response to homicide offences.**

Homicides (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS





In the long term the force is above the national average and after an increase in offending in 2007 is also above the MSF average.

**Kent is bordered by 3 other forces which also indicate raised demand for this crime type.**

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool, released on 25 September 2007, revealed that Kent Police faces a high level of demand in respect of the policing response to rape offences.

Rape (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS



In the long term the force is below the national average but after an increase in offending in 2007 it remains above the MSF average.

Kent is bordered by 3 other forces which also indicate raised demand for this crime type.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Kent Police has sought to make progress by ensuring that major crime types are thoroughly analysed and mapped. It is currently estimated that 87 OCGs impact the force area, across a broad range of crime types, notably involving Class A drugs supply, armed robbery and ATM theft.

The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified serious violent crime as a key major crime priority within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on those involved in offences of violence; the position of and supply of firearms. Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and addressed.

The force has invested substantial resources to allow for intervention activity to maximise harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and to inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a high level of sophistication in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with Essex Police and European Law Enforcement Agencies are recognised.

## Intelligence

**Summary - The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the Force. The Force has fully committed to its major crime investigations with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.**

### Strengths

- The major crime unit has three dedicated analysts who, unlike all other intelligence analysts within the force, operate under the line management of the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) manager rather than the principal analyst. They are aligned to the three HOLMES suites around the county. The HOLMES analysts have no formal role in the development of strategic intelligence products linked to major crime.
- Contributions to the FSA, tactical assessment, strategic rape profiles, homicide profiles, domestic violence profiles, etc are commissioned from analysts within the wider force intelligence bureau analytical structure. In the case of the problem profiles mentioned, these were completed within the public protection analytical unit and have driven the development of the force's homicide and rape reduction strategies.

### Work in progress

- The major crime team's remit is set to expand considerably in April 2008 when investigative staff numbers will be increased further. Although Project 2015 considered analytical requirements, practitioners expressed concern that there would be insufficient in-house capacity to deal effectively with the workload. Currently, basic command units (BCUs) are required to establish local analytical cells in support of homicide investigations. This is set to continue after the April 2008 staff uplift to major crime. A best value review of all analytical support is currently taking place.

### Area(s) for improvement

None identified.

**Summary - The force seeks (and shares) intelligence about Level 2 and Level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force assessments of community impact to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.**

### Strengths

- Kent Police's major crime team makes wide use of the force's specialist assets.
- Information-sharing protocols are in place with key partners, including the probation and prison services, drug action teams, local safeguarding children boards, the UK Border Agency, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).

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- The force has generally good working relationships with partners. One example is the Joint Intelligence Unit based at Bouverie House which sees the co-location of Special Branch (SB), the Department for Work and Pensions, the UK Border Agency, HMRC and SOCA. As a frontier force Kent has developed, and maintains, strong international links. The treaty of Sangatte provides a framework for the free flow of information with France. During 2007 the force hosted the Cross-Channel Policing Conference which is annually rotated through the four member nations: France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK. This model has led to the development of an Anglo-French trans-frontier collaborative initiative on local co-operation outside the Channel Tunnel arrangements. The force also benefits from having two SOCA officers embedded within the confidential unit and managed by the detective inspector (special projects).
- CIAs are considered to be a standard product in all major crime enquiries and likewise for other critical incidents. It was evident that these were meaningfully taking place. On occasions, neighbourhood staff had been consulted in the development of the CIAs, but this good practice appeared to be inconsistent in its application.
- A CIA training workshop was held on 17 November 2007 involving 120 staff from across the force, including police community support officers (PCSOs), constables, sergeants and Inspectors. In addition, module three of neighbourhood team training, which is currently being delivered by the Kent Police College, includes an input on developing CIAs.
- Supporting the development of effective CIAs, a community portfolio has been developed within the key individual networks database which is maintained by the relevant neighbourhood policing officer and quality assured by the community liaison officer. These profiles should contain a detailed overview of the community and its history.
- The force published its Homicide Prevention Strategy in mid 2007. This drew upon a range of analytical profiles, including homicide profiles and domestic violence profiles.

### Work in progress

- It is intended that CIA training will form part of the neighbourhood officer course.

### Area(s) for improvement

None identified.

**Summary - The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to its major crime to some extent. Consequently, the Force Control Strategy is found to be adequate. Problem profiles for domestic abuse and serious sexual assaults are satisfactory with links to force, departmental and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.**

### Strengths

- Unlike serious and organised crime, major crime does not feature as an independent heading within the FSA (November 2007). Notwithstanding this, within the document there is evident attention to a number of crime areas which populate that picture,

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including "rape and sexual offences", "domestic violence and honour killings" and "the criminal use of firearms". A more detailed examination of some major crime drivers was found within the specialist operations (SO) strategic assessment of the same period.(See Area(s) for improvement.)

- The force strategic intelligence requirement is an appropriately detailed, high-level document addressing both serious and organised crime and major crime. (See Area(s) for improvement.)
- Organised criminality is recognised and assessed in National Intelligence Model (NIM) products, including the FSA. Within the FSA of November 2007, serious and organised criminality receives specific address. Both open and closed sources are used in the collection of intelligence. Information is sought through established multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) with partner agencies, for example the probation service.
- The force has recently completed a bi-annual product on the criminal use of firearms which contributes to the firearms threat and risk assessment.
- Organised crime families are a long-standing project mapping a narrower spectrum of OCGs than the later national project.
- Through its neighbourhood policing arrangements the force has developed a reasonable understanding of neighbourhood demographic profiles.

### **Work in progress**

None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Force-level strategic assessments provide little evidence of any detailed examination of major crime trends. Kidnaps and other crimes in action were not examined and the analysis of MAPPA and child abuse was limited to little more than a numerical breakdown by BCU. Further analysis at the strategic level is required.
- BCU-level products focus strongly towards volume crime, anti-social behaviour and their control measures. Where focused activity at a BCU level can impact on force-level performance in respect of major crime, clear links should be identifiable within BCU control strategies and other intelligence products.
- Despite the nomination of both strategic and tactical leads for intelligence priorities and requirements, the force did not have an auditable process for tracking progress towards meeting the strategic intelligence requirement. Collection plans should be linked to force-level intelligence requirements and activity tracked through tasking processes to energise their delivery.

## **RECOMMENDATION 1**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force reviews the linkages between BCU and force strategic intelligence products and control strategies to ensure that appropriate and explicit linkages are made in their development. In particular, intelligence requirements at BCU and force level should be clearly expressed and appropriately linked, with plan owners identified at each level and held to account for their delivery.**

**Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are often shared with partners and BCUs. There is a trigger plan for ‘hot briefing’ when there is a significant change in either the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as SOCA exist. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full MOPI compliance by 2010.**

### **Strengths**

- Examples were provided to demonstrate the use of fast-time intelligence sharing and trigger plans for ‘hot briefing’ when intelligence changes. These include Operation Frost (kidnap involving intelligence sharing with the Metropolitan Police Service, SOCA and French police through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office); counter-terrorism-related trigger plans through the regional intelligence cell; and in relation to OCGs operating ‘cannabis factories’, through the regional intelligence unit.
- Between 9 January and 31 December 2007 the force reported details of 48 offences to the serious crime analysis system (SCAS). Notably, the force submissions were assessed as being 81% compliant with SCAS codes of practice (among the highest-performing forces). In the same period, the force made 193 SCAS enquiries.
- Analysts employed by the force’s public protection unit share quarterly trend analysis and problem profiles relating to high-risk violent and sexual offenders with the MAPPA strategic management board.
- Operational examples have been provided of where major crime staff have accessed a range of professional databases including the SCAS, GENESIS and the kidnap and extortion database.
- In addition, the force has been proactive in developing its own internal database of staff life skills, cultures and languages. This was used to good effect in Operation Mortlake when a Polish-speaking crime scene investigator was identified to assist in various phases of a murder investigation; in Operation Natterjack when a Sikh staff member assisted in a murder enquiry; and in Operation Ketch when a Punjabi speaker aided a murder investigation.

### **Work in progress**

- The force can demonstrate that it is on track to achieve full MoPI compliance by 2010. A comprehensive action plan is in place which is being tracked through the bi-monthly information management group which reports to the Bichard board. A GANTT chart details activity through to the projected completion date for the project in December 2009.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

**Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has been using Mosaic socio-economic data to provide a high-level picture of communities and is experimenting with the use of a further commercial package, the 'Origins' database which is purported to be a good indicator of ethnicity at a strategic level.
- The force has developed Operation Atlas specifically in response to the threat of radicalisation and has used this to map the picture at both force and BCU levels. The profile arising from this work was commented upon within the November 20 07 FSA, together with recommendations for action.
- During the inspection year, a total of 38 case referrals were made for consideration by the level 3 MAPPA management. Of those referred, around half were agreed as being appropriate for this level of activity and went on to receive it.

### **Work in progress**

- Communities are not profiled within the FSA. Detailed community profiles were identified as emerging at level 1 during the course of the 2007 HMIC inspection of neighbourhood policing. Although this coverage has further improved, this is not yet aggregated into a force-level product. The force continues to develop mechanisms to draw together knowledge from neighbourhood profiles into useful force-level products, as evidenced in the mapping of the six diversity strands and related 'social identity' Police and Communities Together partnerships by BCU.
- The force is working with Kent University looking at new communities (both legal and illegal) and their vulnerabilities. The work is at a relatively early stage and has not reached a position where interventions can be considered.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

**Summary – The Force maintains a Strategic Risk Register which is reviewed quarterly by the ACPO lead responsible for the relevant business area. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan which is robustly and effectively monitored, however holistic oversight of these risks is made more difficult by limitations in the visible audit trail within the electronic risk register.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has developed a highly graphic, IT-based tool for the effective management of risk, with clear and unambiguous guidance in its practical application. The system is managed by a dedicated risk adviser, with specific risks allocated to individual risk owners.
- Where these are considered to be corporate-level risks, the owner will be a member of the chief officer's team – the assistant chief constable (ACC) (SO) for risks

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specific to major crime and serious and organised crime, while tactical risks will be owned at chief inspector or superintendent level. Only corporate-level risks feature within the force strategic risk register, with lesser risks managed at BCU or department level and featuring within their respective tasking and co-ordination (TCG) processes.

- Specific risks included within the register include achieving MoPI compliance, digital forensics capacity issues, general policy compliance, and protection of IT systems. Action plans were found to be robust and current.
- There is an expectation that risks held within the register will be reviewed and updated at least quarterly. Action plans generally appeared to have been progressed. (See Area(s) for improvement.)
- The identification of new corporate-level risks, and the policing of the system to ensure that meaningful progress is made towards mitigating risks, are achieved through the performance meetings of portfolio-holding chief officers; thus SO risks are tracked within the SO performance meeting.
- The force is currently assisting Essex Police in the establishment of an effective risk register and management processes.

### **Work in progress**

None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The electronic risk register tool does not allow for the tracking of updates, with dating occurring within the evidence or action plan sections only if the author chooses to include this. Authorship of entries is likewise unclear. The force must address these issues to ensure that oversight of the force-level risk picture can be provided through one single mechanism.

**Summary – The Force is creating ways of collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Most of the operational databases are searchable within the force intelligence bureau.**

### **Strengths**

- Intelligence systems owned by neighbouring forces are not directly accessible within Kent, but North Kent BCU, driven by operational need, has embedded a staff member in its neighbouring Metropolitan Police Service BCU's intelligence unit at Bexley to address the issue locally.
- Since March 2006 the force has invested in a shared data hub in partnership with British Transport Police, Kent Fire and Rescue Service, Kent County Council (county-level local authority to district level), the primary care trust and the local health board. Data hub products were used in the development of 2007/08 crime and disorder reduction partnership strategic assessments; in developing county strategic priorities for the community safety agreement; and a number of other strategic products.

- The force has also established a Joint Intelligence Unit at Bouverie House where the Department for Work and Pensions, SB, HMRC, the UK Border Agency and SOCA are co-located.
- As part of the MoPI programme 'desktop intelligence', a business objects-based tool, has been developed which allows data mining from a warehouse that includes GENESIS, STORM, Road Traffic Collision (RTC) database, NFLMS (firearms), Stops database and human resources (HR).
- At present there is the expectation that intelligence within HOLMES accounts will be manually input into the GENESIS system, but it is acknowledged that this is far from perfect in its execution. Likewise, there is a similar expectation in respect of intelligence identified during 'paper' enquiries such as Category C murders and stranger rapes which may still run on BCUs.
- In 'paper' cases an Excel program is used in place of a HOLMES account.
- Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) reads from static and mobile sites, both local and national.
- The force has established a Bichard board, chaired by the ACC (SO), to drive activity in meeting the recommendations of the Bichard Inquiry. A project team has been established to oversee the implementation of MoPI codes of practice and other guidance. The information management group acts as the project board, itself reporting to the Bichard board.
- Progress is actively tracked, with compliance anticipated by 2010.
- Memoranda of understanding are in place to support the sharing of intelligence between partners.
- The force can demonstrate Data Protection Act compliance and has a dedicated unit with this responsibility, headed by an inspector.
- The force has taken the step of extending the use of the Violent and Sex Offenders Register (ViSOR) database to recording details of any individual assessed as potentially dangerous and yet falling outside MAPPA. In doing so, the system has become a significant repository of intelligence on the most dangerous offenders and potential offenders.

### **Work in progress**

- An IT interface between GENESIS and ANPR has been developed. The intuitive software is capable of searching the most prominent days of vehicle activity; it can produce maps and time lines, sort and categorise crimes, map offences and identify common vehicles, and link index marks to intelligence records. Implementation of the system is likely to take place towards summer 2008.
- Work is planned to integrate HOLMES as the next desktop intelligence system.
- HOLMES release 12 is currently in use, **the more current release 11** being incompatible with the contemporary ORACLE database which Kent Police is operating. In consultation with suppliers, a considered strategic decision was made

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to move directly to release 12 expected in April/May 2008. Until this is resolved, cross-force linking of HOLMES accounts will not be possible.

- The force has in the past operated a system called Revelation which warehoused historic records. These included those from HOLMES 1 accounts; Operational Information System (OIS), the predecessor to STORM; Computerised Crime Information System (CCIS), the previous crime system; serious crime records prior to 1985; and GENESIS records, although updating of these ceased a number of years ago.
- The system went offline permanently in mid 2007 as a result of a serious fault, with an interim replacement scheduled for February 2008 which would allow word searching of historic records. This database is being populated with the same historic records as were held on the original database, although the search engine has a number of capability limitations.
- The force has developed a new process to add rigour to the manual transfer of HOLMES intelligence into the GENESIS system and underpinned by a performance regime. This will be introduced from February 2008 and provide an interim solution ahead of migration into the data warehouse project.
- The force has made a number of approaches to the Metropolitan Police Service in order to secure direct access to its Criminal intelligence system and has been given indications that this may be supported towards the end of 2008..

#### **Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

**Summary – The force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is highly effective.**

#### **Strengths**

- Kent Police has a dedicated serious case review team headed up by a very experienced former senior investigating officer (SIO). The team primarily has responsibility for conducting reviews of unsolved major crime investigations after 28 days and child protection reviews under Part 8 of Working Together to Safeguard Children. In addition, it reviews other serious crime and incidents as directed.
- These include domestic violence homicide reviews, seeking to identify learning from the case history prior to the death; MAPPA reviews, conducted following the commission of an index offence by a managed offender and intended to identify learning from the case history; adult protection reviews following the death of a vulnerable adult; thematic reviews, where the force wishes to identify opportunities for improving overall response in a business area, for example missing persons and rape; and external reviews in support of other force investigations into unsolved homicides.

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- The ACC (SO) chairs the force's serious crime review board. Formal homicide reviews fall at 28 days, but it was evident that the force is flexible and proactive in commissioning earlier reviews on a needs basis.
- The serious crime review board not only acts as the commissioning body and mechanism for receiving reports on reviews, but also provides the vehicle for ensuring that organisational learning is promulgated within the organisation.
- The force has a process to review all unsolved murders dating back to the 1960s and all stranger rapes back to 1985.
- During the course of the cold case review of homicide and particularly stranger rape, issues were identified in regard to the way that records, case papers and exhibits have been historically stored, thereby potentially leaving some evidential gaps. The force has reviewed procedures to ensure that they are now sufficiently robust.
- The force is proactive in identifying good practice from elsewhere. In developing the force's homicide reduction strategy, visits were made to Avon and Somerset; and to Hampshire and Hertfordshire in developing its threat to life policy.

### **Work in progress**

- Kent Police has both a policy and a standard operating procedure in respect of case review. Neither had been reviewed since November 2005 and both were clearly out of date and currently being reviewed.
- Despite this, the practicality of review has continued to develop with a broad range of good practice reviews being commissioned as described.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

**Summary – The Force Tasking and Co-ordination process functions cohesively to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.**

### **Strengths**

- Kent Police was a pioneer force in the development of intelligence-led policing, with the Kent policing model in effect being the direct forebear of NIM. The mechanism of tasking and co-ordination processes are well understood within all levels of the organisation and are very much seen as 'business as usual'.
- Clear documentation underpins tasking processes and provides an audit trail for decision making, and this is very much seen as adding value rather than bureaucracy by those involved in the process.
- Tactical tasking meetings occur on a fortnightly basis at all levels and deliver clarity of action in response to identified threats. Outcomes of specialist policing activity are tracked and recorded within force-level meetings.

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- A range of analytical profiles are produced indicating historic, current and future major crime threats. Such products informed the development of the current Homicide Prevention Strategy.

### **Work in progress**

None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The discipline of recording rationales in support of positive and negative decisions within tasking and co-ordination processes should be further developed and standardised.

### **Summary – Due to appropriate training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has developed a computer-based diversity training package which all staff are expected to complete. In addition, a day’s training was provided at the Kent Police College. It was evident that the majority of staff had undergone the training relatively recently and that it had been well received.
- While specific examples could not be provided to evidence how, in an operational sense, the training had assisted in furthering a major crime enquiry, it was evident that staff were acutely sensitive to identifying and responding to the needs of differing communities. Various examples were provided to demonstrate how the life skills and backgrounds of staff within the organisation had been brought to bear in investigations.
- Support associations within the force have been used to add value in investigations and the independent advisory group (IAG) had identified an appropriate individual to assist in the case of the murder of a gay man. At North Kent BCU all staff receive BCU-level diversity training and this links with immersion visits to places of religion, including gurdwaras and mosques.
- The force negotiator co-ordinator is currently completing a PhD in the training and selection of negotiators. Currently, no national guidance exists in respect of cross-community negotiation. In the November 2007 ‘red’ negotiator course, Asian staff members assisted in simulating a number of scenarios. A paper is with the Kent Minority Ethnic Police Association for consideration as to how it may assist in further developing this theme area.
- European delegates attend all negotiator courses and consideration is currently being given to developing an international kidnap course in collaboration with French counterparts.

### **Work in progress**

None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Support associations indicated the perception that major crime staff are less culturally aware than BCU-based staff. The major crime department could do more to encourage under-represented groups to apply for roles within the major crime command.

## **Prevention**

**Summary – The Force has an Independent Advisory Group but this has only been used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations on a limited number of occasions.**

### **Strengths**

- Specific major crime-related partnership agreements are reviewed on an ‘as needs’ basis driven through the major crime senior management team meeting, for example the *Clostridium difficile* case.
- The force has access to a single established IAG which has been operational since 15 March 2006. It was developed from existing forums: black and minority ethnic, lesbian and gay, Medway Caribbean, and Swale Minority Policing Panel. It retains strong links to those groups.
- Seven members of the IAG and an additional 14 members of the community act as critical incident advisers to the force.
- It is clear that the IAG and other community advocates are being consulted and are adding value to some major crime investigations, but this appears to be a developing theme.
- At a specific training event for 140 officers and staff in respect of CIAs, held in November 2007, the issue of key individual networks and IAG involvement was addressed.

### **Work in progress**

- Each Kent BCU has in place consultation mechanisms which theoretically provide access to all diverse groups. Their level of development and formality varies from BCU to BCU. Engagement continues through the work of community liaison officers and neighbourhood teams.
- The IAG has work groups covering recruitment; retention and training; street encounters; hate crimes; communications; and critical incidents. Funding was agreed in autumn 2007 for a post of development manager for two years to assist with driving forward the development of the IAG. Although it was intended to appoint an individual in April 2008, at that time the post remained an aspiration. The force, together with the Kent Police Authority, is currently examining ways to achieve the same outcome within existing resources.
- The IAG critical incident sub-group is actively considering the role of independent advisers to the gold group and in maintaining community contact and confidence.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force supplied evidence to demonstrate IAG advice within a gold group that amounted only to a suggestion as to the way a victim should be referred to – apparently in direct response to the choice of language that had been used by the previous speaker (Operation Plough of August 2007).
- Five further examples were provided that illustrated the complete picture of documented community involvement in major crime investigations. The force acknowledges that the practice of formally documenting community/IAG advice is not yet strong.

### **RECOMMENDATION 2**

**Her Majesty’s Inspector recommends that the force reviews how it may more effectively utilise IAGs and other community involvement within Gold support groups. Consideration should be given to setting clear expectations, training needs, and required processes, particularly in accurately capturing the issues considered, advice given and feedback.**

**Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.**

### **Strengths**

- Written procedures provide clear guidance on when specialist resources are to be contacted for advice and deployment in the event of major crime.
- The force control centre (FCC) provides 24-hour silver cover for firearms incidents and each BCU has a duty inspector 24 hours a day. At a force level, there is always a nominated on-call senior detective of detective chief inspector rank and an on-call SIO. Each BCU provides an on-call detective sergeant and detective inspector. A variety of arrangements exist across the force area in respect of on-duty detective cover at night. Three BCUs have detective cover 24/7; a fourth is reliant on an on-call detective sergeant arrangement after 11pm; the remaining two have no cover after 11pm but are in the process of considering extending this in some way.
- The force operates a system of trained critical incident inspectors. Around 44% of sergeants have received critical incident training since April 2007.
- A range of specialist advisers, including police search advisers (POLSA), tactical firearms and Police Support Unit (PSU), are available via the FCC.
- Dedicated call-out procedures exist for key individuals, again via the FCC.
- Staff within the FCC are supported with drop-down menus. In addition, ‘callflow’ menus (added in 2007) are being incorporated within the STORM system to guide operators in their responses, for example in response to kidnap.

### **Work in progress**

- Critical incident training will feature as a core leadership development programme module from March 2008.
- The force has a dedicated major crime investigation unit, with a remit largely limited to Category A and B murders until the final part of the staffing uplift is achieved in April 2008. At that point it will take responsibility for the investigation of all homicides, stranger rape, crimes in action and significant critical incidents, as spelled out in detail within a service level agreement. Despite the lack of a formal requirement to do so, the majority of all Category C murders have also been investigated by the unit since April 2007.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

**Summary - The threats from precursors to major crime offending were found to be analysed adequately.**

### **Strengths**

- There is a good understanding of dangerous and sex offenders resident in communities, the night-time economy, firearms, and risks posed by drugs markets. Specific problem profiles exist that address rape, Class A drugs, domestic violence and firearms (threat analysis).
- The force has a standing violent crime gold group chaired by the ACC (Area Operations), driving strands of activity including night-time economy issues, domestic violence and youth.
- The force has in place both rape reduction and homicide prevention strategies. The rape reduction strategy has led to 172 officers being trained as initial response officers skilled in securing early forensic evidence and the delivery of quality victim care to augment the cadre of 63 higher-skilled specialist trained officers. A further 15 officers are to be trained as initial response officers in February 2008 and 9 as specialist trained officers in April 2008 to complete the agreed complements. A Sexual Assault Referral Clinic (SARC) has been established within Darent Hospital at Dartford, with a second planned for the east of the county in the future.
- The homicide Prevention strategy was reviewed in November 2007. Delivery is driven through a robust action plan, the ownership of which has recently been transferred to the major crime development board and will feature as a standing agenda item.
- No specific analytical profiles have been commissioned to consider near miss offences. However, with the exception of black and minority ethnic communities, the force is confident that the need to develop a specific intelligence product would be triggered as a result of considering the quarterly public protection intelligence assessment.
- The force has for some time been using the SPECSS+ risk assessment model for incidents of domestic violence.

### **Work in progress**

- The SO strategic assessment of November 2007 identified gaps in knowledge, particularly in regard to the importation, modification and distribution of firearms which are at variance with the substantial increase in the use of firearms experienced. An intelligence collection plan is in place and a separate grouping for firearms intelligence is being added to GENESIS.
- One multi-agency risk assessment conference process is currently operational at Maidstone in support of the special domestic violence court there. The force would like to see this practice established formally within the remaining five BCUs by April 2009.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force does not have in place a mechanism to monitor near miss offences against the black and other minority ethnic population.

**Summary – The force’s policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff. An active process is currently in progress to make staff familiar with the forces new policy and to improve accessibility to the detail of previous warnings. Examples of joint, regional, cross- border and multi-agency operations are abundant.**

### **Strengths**

- The threat to life policy is available on the force intranet, but at the time of the HMIC field visit this was in need of updating, having last been reviewed in December 2006. It therefore lacked consideration of the very important judgement in the case of Van Colle of April 2007 relating to threshold test – a move from ‘real and immediate risk’ to ‘common sense and humanity’. Notwithstanding this, the force policy of that time had been generously couched, reducing the likelihood of risk.
- The threat to life policy was reviewed, updated and republished on the force intranet on 14 January 2008. Although this does not mention the case of Van Colle, the force has sought to encapsulate the essence of the judgement.
- The force threat to life policy considers the use of prevention and disruption tactics and directs the reader to make contact with appropriate specialists (including taking IAG advice if appropriate).
- Operation Rucksack was an investigation into a domestic murder where a series of ‘Osman’ warnings were issued to a number of the individual’s ex-wives and girlfriends. Operation Blazer also resulted in a series of ‘Osman’ warnings being made. A subsequent evaluation of this intervention deemed the tactic to have been effective.
- The force operates a rolling policy of interdiction in Class A drug supply, with strategic aims including reduction of harm in communities, notably gang-related violence and gun crime. Operations History and Volatile evidence a proactive approach to the incapacitation of gun distribution and importation.

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### Work in progress

- Knowledge of the threat to life policy or its existence was found to be poor at police constable level but better among supervisors and within the criminal investigation department (CID). However, briefings were being carried out within the force at that time. A small team has been established to assess the impact and practical application of the policy during March 2008.
- The force does not have a central and readily searchable repository for threat to life-related issues and records of 'Osman' warnings, but brief records are to be found in the STORM and GENESIS systems providing a signpost to their existence and location. Paper documentation is retained with the decision log in BCU tasking and co-ordination units. All files receive a unique reference number and should be traceable via this mechanism. The force is aware of the shortcomings of this process and is actively seeking a more satisfactory solution.

### Area(s) for improvement

None identified.

**Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by dedicated covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by dedicated staff only. The force is informally collaborating with other forces and partners in this area and in the process of formalising these arrangements.**

### Strengths

- The force has a dedicated and experienced witness protection team consisting of a detective inspector, a detective sergeant and four detective constables, together with administrative support. The team may be augmented at periods of peak demand by a further two detective constables who are deployed elsewhere within the organisation. Current demand is estimated at around 75% of dedicated capacity.
- Dedicated witness protection training inputs are provided on CID courses and source handling courses and to senior detectives.
- A 24-hour telephone number for witness protection is available via the intranet or telephone system, but practitioners acknowledge that this has had little marketing.
- Although signed protocols were not in place at the time of the field visit, solid evidence was provided in regard to placements which had taken place within and outside the region as a result of mature working relationships.
- Staff are well equipped, for example with encrypted laptops and covert vehicles.
- The force is using a standalone system to meet the requirements of witness protection. Developed by Lancashire Constabulary, the system has been taken up by a number of forces nationally.

### **Work in progress**

- In the past, witness protection collaboration had been structured within the region and had developed to the extent that protocols were awaiting sign-off. However, Kent has chosen to progress a relationship with Essex and now attends collaborative meetings within the region only in the capacity of observer.
- Witness protection training to detective inspector level is planned for early in 2008.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Witness protection staff have, in the past, briefed BCU-level staff in relation to their role, but reality testing identified that knowledge of witness protection as a specialism was largely vested in the CID with little knowledge among front-line uniform staff.
- Consideration should be given to the suitability of the current location of the witness protection unit which does not adequately reflect the unit's requirement of anonymity.

**Summary – The force has a limited system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.**

### **Strengths**

- At a force level, the Kent Crime and Victimization Survey is used to monitor satisfaction levels. The sample size is statistically significant and as such the Government Office for the South East has accepted its use in place of British Crime Survey data for the monitoring of local area agreement targets.
- The success of Operation Trojan and other territorial policing operations has been measured through a formal assessment of acquisitive crime levels both pre- and post-activity phase.

### **Work in progress**

- From March 2008 the one-day module of training for all neighbourhood policing staff will include the use and completion of CIAs by community liaison officers and neighbourhood policing staff, creating a link to information held in neighbourhood profiles.
- By 31 March 2008, the force will have developed dedicated neighbourhood policing briefing products, including tension indicators at ward, district and BCU levels.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The measurement of harm in communities is at present an underdeveloped discipline. The force needs to increase the range of harm indicators and supporting processes that it has in place to guide operational interventions.

**Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force sometimes considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a comprehensive security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.**

### **Strengths**

- Kent Police's professional standards department (PSD) aims to be compliant with the recommendations of the report *Raising the Standard*.
- The force has an evident culture of operational security at all levels and has introduced the post of operational security manager. Teams hold and disseminate intelligence on a 'need to know' basis. Physical security measures were evident throughout the force, augmented by the discipline of a 'clear desk' policy.
- IT infrastructure testing to protect the force against illicit penetration takes place on a regular basis. Internal systems are routinely monitored for misuse and where intelligence dictates, proactive interventions are made. It was confirmed that regular audits of the HOLMES system take place.
- Legend building is in place for SB and witness protection officers as well as covert operatives. The operational security manager has specific responsibility for monitoring activity within source units and the identification of potential handler compromise. Covert human intelligence source (CHIS)/handler integrity dip sampling is a regular activity.
- Operation Deliver was offered as an example of where the PSD had been proactively involved in securing a very high-profile operation in respect of the Securitas robbery.
- Robust vetting processes were evidently in place. All specialist staff were aware of their vetting levels; obligations in regard to notifications of change of circumstance; and time periods for review. At the time of inspection, 12 staff were DV cleared, 883 SC and 666 MV.
- The force has used 'service confidence' procedures on two occasions when there was a robust intelligence case but disciplinary processes were inappropriate.
- The majority of documents supplied to HMIC were compliant with the Government Protective Marking Scheme, but appropriate markings were absent or incomplete in a small number of cases.

### **Work in progress**

- The force is currently in the process of rewriting its anti-corruption strategy.
- The force is to launch a confidential line for the reporting of wrongdoing by staff, simply called the 'PSD Confidential Reporting Line'. It is to be advertised in the February 2008 edition of the force newspaper *The Relay*, the PSD newsletter *The Standard*, the PSD intranet site and through verbal briefings. Timing of the launch will coincide with the launch of the anti-corruption strategy. The force intends to launch an anonymous email facility to augment the confidential telephone line.

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- The force is currently awaiting delivery of the Sentinel system which will enable cross-system monitoring of internet, email and GENESIS searching and deliver real-time reports for evidential purposes as required.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- PSD staff do not routinely attend SO tasking meetings, nor are they directly involved routinely in operational planning. All major crime operations should be routinely scanned by the operational security manager for potential compromise issues. In addition, the force should develop written guidance to assist managers in identifying appropriate matters for referral to the operational security manager.
- The PSD operates in a largely reactive way with little or no proactive capability for initiatives such as integrity testing.
- Crime scene investigators only receive basic-level vetting checks. The force should review the appropriateness of this level of vetting for those staff involved in major crime investigations.

## **Enforcement**

**Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are effective, however inadequate use is made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.**

### **Strengths**

- The ACC (SO) is the dedicated chief officer lead responsible for both serious and organised crime and major crime. He currently provides the interface between the force and the police authority.
- In late 2006 the police authority recognised an opportunity to further develop oversight arrangements and appointed a lead member with responsibility for major crime.
- In addition, the police authority performance and HR committees have been strengthened to drive a more accountable agenda.
- BCU, SO and other force TCGs take place on the Wednesday before the force tactical tasking and co-ordination group which is held on the Friday of the same week. The SO TCG meeting, chaired by the ACC (SO), accounts for the activities, and tasks the assets, of the SO directorate comprised of covert support, major crime, serious and organised crime, roads policing and SB.
- Gold groups are established as a matter of routine for all major incidents, homicides and critical incidents when required.

### **Work in progress**

None identified.

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### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force performance operational review process applies to major crime. However, largely due to the complexity of some aspects of the business, a mechanism for applying this level of scrutiny to much of major crime, serious and organised crime and covert support has yet to be found.
- The Kent Police Authority's lead members for serious and organised crime and major crime have received basic-level vetting checks across a range of intelligence databases and a financial assessment. The force should review the vetting status of police authority members and, as a minimum standard, raise the vetting status of the serious and organised crime link member and police authority chair so that more full briefings may be safely given in appropriate cases.
- It is clear that the IAG and other critical incident advisers from the community are being consulted and are adding value to major crime investigations, but this appeared to be a developing theme. The force needs to progress this work to ensure that in appropriate cases IAG and other community involvement is engaged within the gold group at an early stage and that questions and advice are properly documented.

**Summary – The Head of the Crime Department and two other SIOs are fully and competent in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.**

### **Strengths**

- Kent Police applies the principles of major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) which include the appointment of an officer in overall charge in the event of a multi-force investigation. Three major crime SIOs have completed the Management of Linked Serious Crimes Course (MLSC) course and remaining major crime SIOs will be trained during 2008. The force response was tested in the investigation leading to the conviction of Antoni Imiela.
- The force has adequate numbers of gold- and silver-trained senior officers who have received accredited training for critical incident command.

### **Work in progress**

None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

**Summary - The force's performance regime for monitoring the investigation of major crime is currently under development. Although some data is routinely captured, understanding of the relationship between cost, inputs, outputs and results is less well understood.**

### **Strengths**

- Serious and organised crime and major crime have been brought formally into the force 'business planning' process. In addition, the ACC (SO) chairs a bi-monthly meeting which measures performance against the policing plan and the corporate service improvement plan, and reviews the risk register, etc. Monthly departmental meetings are held with the head of crime.
- The force has a dedicated case review team responsible for, among other things, the completion of 28-day reviews in unsolved homicide cases and Part 8 reviews. They report to the Major Crime Board and Public Protection Board. These boards drive necessary activity and have a clear role in ensuring that any identified learning is appropriately actioned within the organisation by way of process changes, training development, etc.
- A number of mechanisms are in place to harvest and action force-wide learning, including a comprehensive organisational scanning process owned by the Major Crime and Public Protection Board, and environmental scanning owned by the so-named forums of the corporate development department. These ensure that inquest findings, lessons from public inquiries, etc are included within these boards' processes and action tracking.
- All major crime operations are formally debriefed at their conclusion following a template. Minutes are retained within the major crime directory of the force system's local drive. Specific learning points are developed further into an 'SIO pack' of professional knowledge and guidance documents, which may also be accessed via force systems.

### **Work in progress**

None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force acknowledges that performance structures at level 1 are more developed than those at level 2.
- The force performance operational review process applies to major crime. However, largely due to the complexity of some aspects of the business, a mechanism for applying this level of scrutiny to much of major crime, serious and organised crime and covert support has yet to be found.
- The force does not routinely cost major crime operations. However, 'additional cost' over and above the running cost of the department is known by virtue of a bidding process to the major crime contingency fund controlled by the head of crime.
- Insufficient resources are available to conduct routine results analysis of all major crime operations; instead, this technique being reserved for high-profile cases.

### RECOMMENDATION 3

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force develop its arrangements for the performance scrutiny of major crime.

### Performance Management and Resilience

**Summary – The inspection teams found a strong investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands.**

**Collaborative agreements with the Serious Organised Crime Agency and Essex Police exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide extensive protection for the investigative capability.**

#### Strengths

- The force investigative response was recently tested both in terms of capacity and capability in the form of the nationally significant and successful Operation Deliver, the investigation into the Tonbridge Securitas robbery. This placed what can only be described as extraordinary demands upon the force that could not have been anticipated. Assistance was provided by the Metropolitan Police Service, regional forces and the military. For example, 136 POLSA officers were deployed to the enquiry.
- Operation Tapestry is the joint Kent Police/Health and Safety Executive investigation into *Clostridium difficile*-related deaths in a number of Kent-based NHS trust hospitals. A corporate manslaughter service level agreement is in place for major crime. Awareness of work-related death issues has recently been raised in force through the quarterly senior detectives forum which provides ongoing professional development to detective managers at BCU and force level. These attract up to 150 staff.
- Crime scene investigators and scientists/pathologists are appropriately tasked during homicide and major crime investigations.
- Policies are in existence designed to assure the quality of investigation in sudden/unexplained death cases, including drug-related deaths, suicides, work-related deaths, and deaths in care homes, hospitals and military establishments.
- All FCC staff received an e-learning package of 'critical incident' training in the last year. Focus group members were unable to articulate the definition, but indicated broad understanding in being able to describe incidents that either were or had the potential to become critical incidents.
- Contingency plans are readily accessible through the force intranet. The force intranet system contains comprehensive guidance to assist the FCC in addressing the majority of incident types. This guidance is being translated into command prompts within the STORM system, compliance with which is the subject of ongoing audit.

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- The force operates a system of critical incident inspectors, 24/7 – with direct access to on-call gold at chief superintendent and ACPO level. In addition, since April 2007 the force has provided critical incident training to around 44% of its sergeants and it will be included as a core leadership development programme module from March 2008.
- Documented arrangements exist to direct the managed call-out of specialist staff through the FCC, for example SIOs. There is an expectation that a full major crime team can be deployed anywhere within the county within four hours and this is enshrined in the service level agreement.
- The force established a professionalising the investigative process (PIP) project board on 29 January 2008, charged with driving the PIP action plan and raising awareness of PIP widely across the force, a feature that was found lacking at the time of the field visit. The force has a comprehensive training plan, which includes PIP-level accreditation for SIOs and staff, as well as advanced interviewing.
- Operations Damacles and Apollo deliver student officers trained to level 1. The Initial Crime Investigators' Development Programme (ICIDP) delivers around 90 new officers per year at PIP 2. (See Work in progress and Area(s) for improvement..
- The force has a detailed succession plan which is maintained within the HR department and covers BCU, SO and other departments.
- Kent Police is fairly well advanced in developing its collaborative arrangements by virtue of the willingness of the chief officers and police authorities of Kent and Essex to drive forward this area of business. Project Forefront, focusing on four main strands – ports command, marine, air support, and strategic roads policing – was awarded demonstrator site status by the Home Office in mid 2007. A memorandum of understanding is in place to provide generalist collaborative support in relation to major crime and serious and organised crime. These arrangements have been tested on a number of occasions with the movement of teams both in support of Kent and in support of Essex.
- A standing procurement contract exists that enables the force to access staff at periods of peak demand through a number of specialist commercial providers. These arrangements have been successfully tested on a number of occasions in recent history, for example in Operations Deliver and Greenfinch and for a number of Category A murders.
- In common with other regions, there is no standing regional team to be deployed against threats identified in regional intelligence assessments. Regional tasking is the agreed route through which resources would be apportioned, but these formal arrangements are not yet well tested. Informally, there are many examples where collaboration has taken place to meet regional threats.

### **Work in progress**

- A programme of training for major crime staff in respect of the Corporate Manslaughter Act is planned to coincide with it being enacted (anticipated in April 2008).
- The force is currently in the process of reconfiguring its investigative capability in line with recommendations arising from Project 2015, itself established in response to

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HMIC's *Closing the Gap* report. The full resource uplift of staff into major crime will not be completed until April 2008 when the remit of the team will include Category C murders which in the meantime remain the responsibility of BCUs; stranger rape; and other significant critical incidents.

- The force has inconsistent out-of-hours detective constable coverage. Reviews of this provision are being conducted on a BCU basis. Consideration should be given to evaluating the appropriate levels of coverage within existing critical incident arrangements and at a force level.
- At present the force is able to deliver PIP level 2 investigators through the ICIDP, but at present there is no formal process to assess the maintenance of those skills, through practical application and continuing professional development beyond this point.. The force is currently providing managers with assessor training skills and is considering how ongoing assessment will be linked with the personal development review process.
- Hydra-based critical incident training is planned for key individuals to commence in July 2008.
- HOLMES release 10 is currently in use, the more current release 11 being incompatible with the contemporary ORACLE database which Kent Police is operating. In consultation with suppliers, a considered strategic decision was made to move directly to release 12 expected in April/May 2008.

#### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force undertook to adopt and follow the national 'critical incident' definition in 2006, but a number of contemporary documents provided to HMIC during the course of the inspection, including the force critical incident policy, contained a non-standard definition of 'critical incident'. This definition implied that an event must be beyond the capability of a BCU before it could be a critical incident. It was evident from interviews that this additional test could prevent early identification of potentially significant incidents. In May 2008 the 'policy document' issue remained unresolved. The force must take urgent action to ensure that out-of-date messages are expunged from contemporary documentation and must test knowledge of the critical incident definition at all levels of the organisation.
- In November 2007 the National Policing Improvement Agency reported on an earlier peer review of PIP implementation within the force. While generally complimentary, the report noted that the force was unlikely to meet all phase 2 milestones by March 2008, although it did not regard this as critical at that stage.
- There is a lack of knowledge of MIRWEB which should be available for use

#### **RECOMMENDATION 4**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force take urgent action to ensure that documentation reflects the national definition of critical incident which it has adopted and that this definition is promulgated to all staff. Training should be advanced to ensure that staff in key posts are not only aware of the definition but fully conversant with its practical application.**

**Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be highly effective. The force is self sufficient in this regard, though has sought to bolster its position through a number of written collaborative agreements some of which have been well tested. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a wide range of offences.**

### **Strengths**

- The major crime department is headed by a detective superintendent, supported by six SIOs at detective chief inspector level. There are six investigative teams each headed by a detective inspector below whom the teams are split into two sub-teams each consisting of a sergeant and a number of detective constables and police support investigators. When the staff uplift is completed in April 2008 there will be 47 detective constables and 26 police support investigators, the totals currently standing at 35 and 24 respectively.
- The force has access to three full surveillance teams comprising a sergeant and 12 constables. In addition, the force has a rural surveillance team consisting of a sergeant and eight constables trained to deliver covert rural observation posts (CROPS), close target reconnaissance (CTR), covert method of entry, resourcing and managing the Juniper suite and probe product, tactical support unit deployments, Part 3 Police Act vehicular equipment, and mobile surveillance. Thirteen staff have firearms capability solely for self-protection in connection CROPS and CTR. Armed surveillance is achieved through a 'bolt on' configuration involving the force's tactical firearms team. Joint training takes place with each team for a minimum of two days per year.
- The force has structured its dedicated source handling arrangements in two tiers – BCU and level 2 – together running a substantial number of CHIS. Sources are proactively managed. The level 2 unit is staffed by a detective inspector, detective sergeant and six staff. In addition, an SB source unit is in place, staffed with a detective inspector, detective sergeant, seven constables, one member of police staff and two members of the UK Border Agency who are also in the line management of the detective superintendent responsible for source handling and covert deployments.
- Kent Police maintains both Under Cover (UC) and Test Purchase (TP) trained staff. Resources are managed and deployed through the force's nationally accredited special projects team comprised of a detective inspector, two detective sergeants, seven warranted officers and a member of police support staff. This forms part of the South East undercover consortium of which the head of department is deputy chair. UC officers are held centrally while TP officers are currently drawn from BCUs as required.
- A central authorities' bureau is in place and is responsible for all CHIS and Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 authorities, with the exception of those for directed surveillance originating at level 1 for which it maintains a role of quality control.
- Financial investigation is championed within the force by an evidently knowledgeable, energetic and committed detective inspector who leads the force's

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financial investigation unit. The force currently employs 14 full-time equivalent financial investigators as a central resource.

- The force has a dedicated and experienced witness protection team consisting of a detective inspector, a detective sergeant and four detective constables, together with administrative support. The team may be augmented at periods of peak demand by a further two detective constables who are deployed elsewhere within the organisation. Current demand is estimated at around 75% of dedicated capacity.
- As described above, the major crime unit has access to the substantial specialist resources of the force. Few conflicts of priority were found, but where these do exist they are managed within the SO TCG or outside that process through the head of crime or the ACC (SO).
- Kent Police is fairly well advanced in developing its collaborative arrangements by virtue of the willingness of the chief officers and police authorities of Kent and Essex to drive forward this area of business. Project Forefront, focusing on four main strands – ports command, marine, air support, and strategic roads policing – was awarded demonstrator site status by the Home Office in mid 2007. A memorandum of understanding is in place to provide generalist collaborative support in relation to major crime and serious and organised crime, and there have been early examples of a willingness to share resources for specific operations, for example Operation Plough (Kent) and Operation Anagram (Essex).
- Regional collaborative arrangements are in place for counter-terrorism and crimes in action. Agreed responses have been developed for counter-terrorism and in respect of crimes in action, and considerable work has gone on to profile the investigative assets within the region.
- The force negotiator co-ordinator was responsible for designing a nationally approved 'red' negotiator course which is run on a regional basis. A signed protocol for regional collaboration in respect of negotiator assets, both human and technical, has been in place for three years.

### **Work in progress**

- A proposed protocol for negotiator collaboration with Essex Police has been submitted for consideration, but no timescales for this work are agreed. No impact is anticipated in respect of the existing regional collaboration.
- At BCU level, currently only North Kent has any financial investigator presence in the form of a financial intelligence officer (a trainee financial investigator). At the time of the HMIC field visit, the individual had been in post just five weeks but a considerable increase in seizures had already been seen. This posting was being run as a pilot, but at that time a paper was under the consideration of chief officers to deploy an additional financial investigator to each BCU. This has been agreed and will be implemented in April 2008. It is anticipated that this will result in a substantial increase in level 1 confiscation cases while releasing capacity at level 2 for further development work.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force has just four POLSA officers. The number of search advisers should be increased to ensure that resilience can be assured in an area of business that is so frequently called upon.

**Summary – The Force has a full-time and dedicated case review team that is always deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is efficient. (Refers to impact on cases)**

### **Strengths**

- Kent Police has a dedicated serious case review team headed up by a very experienced former SIO. The team primarily has responsibility for conducting reviews of major crime investigations and child protection reviews under Part 8 of Working Together to Safeguard Children. In addition, it reviews other serious crime and incidents as directed.
- The ACC (SO) chairs the force's serious crime review board. Formal homicide reviews fall at 28 days; however, it was evident that the force is flexible and proactive in commissioning earlier reviews on a needs basis.
- The serious crime review board not only acts as the commissioning body and mechanism for receiving reports on reviews, but also provides the vehicle for ensuring that organisational learning is promulgated within Kent Police.
- The serious case review team has identified all unsolved murders dating back to the 1960s and all stranger rapes back to 1985 and has a current programme of two-yearly periodic reviews.
- Substantial forensic submissions have been made, including the use of 'low copy number' DNA techniques, for example Operation Cube.
- In order to ensure that investigations arising from cold case reviews receive adequate priority, the force established a cold case investigation team in December 2007 to investigate those cases where review identified new lines of enquiry. This is led by a detective chief inspector SIO and staffed with a detective sergeant, two detective constables, and 2.5 full-time equivalent police staff investigative assistants. It is intended to utilise agency staff flexibly, as demand in the unit rises and subsides. Investigation practice is broadly MIRSAP compliant.
- During the course of the cold case review of homicide and particularly stranger rape, issues were identified in regard to the way that records, case papers and exhibits have been historically stored, thereby potentially leaving some evidential gaps. The force has reviewed procedures to ensure that they are now sufficiently robust.

### **Work in progress**

None identified.

**Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

**Summary – The inspection found that the force was predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the Murder Investigation Manual and major incident room standardised operating procedures.**

**Strengths**

- The force aims to be MIRSAP compliant, although where appropriate it has developed themes. For example, the force has employed police staff ‘document managers’ to fulfil the role of action allocator. Doctrinal documents are accessible and are utilised as appropriate.
- Decision logs and their sensitive counterparts were found to be in use from the outset of enquiries.
- The force has produced two specific booklets to assist SIOs in the completion of decision logs: one in respect of general major crime enquiries, the second in respect of kidnap and extortion. New SIOs receive a dedicated training input to ensure consistency of application.
- Decisions not to pursue lines of enquiry are included within decision logs together with the rationale for the decision.

**Work in progress**

None identified.

**Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

## **Recommendations**

### **Recommendation 1**

**Her Majesty’s Inspector recommends that the force reviews the linkages between BCU and force strategic intelligence products and control strategies to ensure that appropriate and explicit linkages are made in their development. In particular, intelligence requirements at BCU and force level should be clearly expressed and appropriately linked, with plan owners identified at each level and held to account for their delivery.**

### **Recommendation 2**

**Her Majesty’s Inspector recommends that the force reviews how it may more effectively utilise IAGs and other community involvement within Gold support groups. Consideration should be given to setting clear expectations, training needs, and required processes, particularly in accurately capturing the issues considered, advice given and feedback.**

### **Recommendation 3**

**Her Majesty’s Inspector recommends that the force develop its arrangements for the performance scrutiny of major crime.**

### **Recommendation 4**

**Her Majesty’s Inspector recommends that the force take urgent action to ensure that documentation reflects the national definition of critical incident which it has adopted and that this definition is promulgated to all staff. Training should be advanced to ensure that staff in key posts are not only aware of the definition but fully conversant with its practical application.**

## Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

### A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition

### B

BCU	basic command unit
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### C

CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CIA	community impact assessment
CID	criminal investigation department
CROP	covert rural observation post
CTR	close target reconnaissance

### D

DDA	Disability Discrimination Act
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### F

FCC	force control centre
FI	financial investigator
FIB	force intelligence bureau
FIU	financial information unit
FSA	force strategic assessment

### H

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HR	human resources
<b>I</b>	
IAG	independent advisory group
ICIDP	Initial Crime Investigators' Development Programme
<b>K</b>	
K and E	kidnap and extortion
KCC	Kent County Council
<b>M</b>	
MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MIRSAP	major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MoPI	management of police information
MSF	similar force(s)
<b>N</b>	
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NPPV	Non Police Personnel Vetting
NPSAT	National Protective Services Analytical Tool
<b>O</b>	
OCG	organised crime group
Osman	Osman v UK (1999) 1 FLR 193, where the court established that in certain circumstances the state has a positive obligation to take preventive measures to protect an individual who is at risk from the criminal activities of others

**P**

PCSO	police community support officer
PIP	professionalising the investigative process
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act
POLSA	police search adviser
PSD	professional standards department

**R**

RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
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**S**

SAP	the company that created the accountancy system used by the force
SB	Special Branch
SCAS	serious crime analysis system
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SO	specialist operations
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency

**T**

TCG	tactical and co-ordination group
TTCG	tactical tasking and co-ordination group

**V**

ViSOR	Violent and Sex Offenders Register
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