


Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



## HMIC Inspection Report

### Gloucestershire Constabulary Major Crime

July 2008



*Gloucestershire Constabulary – HMIC Inspection Report*

*July 2008*

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## Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

## HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

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In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

## Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

## Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

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- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

## Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

## The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

### Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

### Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

### Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse

conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

## **Developing Practice**

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

## **Force Overview and Context**

### **Geographical Description of Force Area**

Gloucestershire Constabulary serves the county of Gloucestershire, comprising six local authorities. The County city is Gloucester and the largest town is Cheltenham. Situated at the northern edge of the southwest region of England, Gloucestershire covers an area of 1,025 square miles, including large areas of outstanding natural beauty. The County includes the Cotswolds in the north and the Royal Forest of Dean in the southwest, separated by the Severn Vale.

### **Demographic Description of Force Area**

The total population of Gloucestershire is 564,559 (2001 census). In comparison to national figures the proportion of the population of Gloucestershire who define their background as being a Black or Minority Ethnic (BME) group is low. Gloucestershire has relatively low levels of unemployment.

Despite its image as a rural idyll, significant pockets of deprivation exist within the County, with 13 wards in the top quartile nationally for deprivation. Furthermore, Gloucester district as a whole represents a particular area of deprivation, being the 101<sup>st</sup> most deprived district in the country out of a total of 354 districts. This situation has a significant impact on overall performance.

### **Structural Description of Force including Staff Changes at Chief Officer Level**

The Force has a new purpose-built force headquarters is at Quedgeley, Gloucester, which was occupied in December 2005.

The chief officer group comprises the Chief Constable, a deputy chief constable (DCC), two assistant chief Constables (ACCs), and two police staff directors. The Chief Constable has been in post for seven years, having previously served as the deputy chief constable in the county for three years. The DCC was previously ACC (operations) in the constabulary. The ACC (operations) joined the Constabulary in 2005 and has also held the post of ACC (corporate services). The ACC (corporate services) joined the constabulary in April 2008 from Bedfordshire. The director of human resources joined the constabulary in April 2007 having previously been director of human resources at Cardiff University. The Director of Finance was appointed in April 2007 having originally joined the constabulary in 1990.

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The force is made up of three basic command units (BCUs) known as divisions, each of which is co-terminous with two local authority areas. Each division is divided into inspector-led neighbourhood areas (INAs), within a geographic policing model; there are a total of 17 INAs.

## Strategic Priorities

On 1<sup>st</sup> April 2007 the Chief Constable launched **Vision2010**. **Vision2010** runs until 31st March 2010 and will ensure the Constabulary is able to meet the challenges of the future, as well as the reasonable expectations of the people we serve now. **Vision2010** is our commitment to all the communities we serve. It provides the strategic framework for the Constabulary, enabling us to shape our own destiny and make progress in a difficult and challenging operating environment.

In previous years the we have produced a Local Policing Plan which was a separate document from our strategic plan **Vision2010**. This year for the first time, we have produced a joint strategy and Policing Plan. This is called **Vision2010+** and enables us to retain the strategic direction and momentum provided by **Vision2010** while at the same time meeting the need to incorporate the Local Policing Plan into a three-year rolling plan.

The policing plan is published as a full website (not simply a downloadable document) at <http://www.gloucestershirepolicingplan.org.uk/>. The three-year strategy is linked to this site.

Current organisational strategic priorities for the force include:

- Achieve new standards of performance through Investors in Excellence (IiE);
- Maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of all our resources;
- Developing information management capability;
- Recruit and develop our workforce to reflect the communities we serve and meet our operational and organisational requirements.

## Operational priorities

- Make our communities safer by reducing levels of crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour
- Strengthen the trust and confidence of all our communities
- Develop more efficient, effective and responsive criminal justice processes for victims and the public
- Tackle serious and organised crime
- Protect the County from terrorism and violent extremism

## Force Performance Overview

There has been a dramatic reduction in the number of crimes being committed in Gloucestershire, with 6,703 fewer offences recorded in the county during 2007/08 when compared to the previous year.

The fall in crime numbers, from a total of 52,388 crimes in 2006/07 to 45,685 in 2007/08, is the fourth decrease to be recorded by Gloucestershire Constabulary in successive years.

Over the course of the year the Constabulary also achieved a crime detection rate of 32%, up from the 30% target set by the Constabulary for detections at the start of the policing year.

The number of drugs offences in the county increased by 270 during 2007/08, but the rise is being attributed to increased Police activity in combating drugs supply in Gloucestershire.

**Year comparisons for 06/07 & 07/08:**

- Total Crime is down by 6'703 to 45'685, which is a 12.8% decrease.
- Violent Crime is down by 1'693 to 10'199, which is a 14.2% decrease.
- Sexual Offences are down by 72 to 595, which is a 10.8% decrease.
- Robbery is down by 96 to 298, which is a 24.4% decrease.
- Domestic Burglary is down by 286 to 2'297, which is an 11.1% decrease.
- Other Burglary is down by 523 to 3'307, which is a 13.7% decrease.
- Vehicle Crime is down by 414 to 4'849, which is a 7.9% decrease.

**Section Detection Rate for 06/07 & 07/08s:**

- Total Crime SDR has increased from 30.2% to 31.5% making a positive change of 1.3%p.
- Violent Crime SDR has increased from 46.5% to 49.5%, making a positive change of 3.0%p.
- Robbery SDR has increased from 29.9% to 35.9%, making a positive change of 6.0%p.
- Domestic Burglary SDR has increased from 20.5% to 24.3%, making a positive change of 3.9%p.
- Other Burglary SDR has increased from 14.5% to 21.3%, making a positive change of 6.8%p.

**Compared with its MSF, Gloucestershire Constabulary has:**

- The second highest level of detection per crime
- The third highest level of detection for burglary
- The highest detection rate for robbery
- The highest detection rate for serious acquisitive crime

In 2006/07 the Constabulary embarked on Operation Clumber, a county-wide initiative targeting major drug dealing and the use of firearms within Gloucestershire. This operation spawned a number of sub-operations, which in the last 12 months have resulted in arrests of key individuals in the drugs trade, many of whom received custodial sentences; officers seized drugs with an estimated street value of more than £1/3 million, more than £100,000 cash and a loaded firearm.

During 2007/08 the Force disrupted 5 Class A drugs networks as well as meeting its targets for Class A Drug Supply and Confiscation Orders. The Force was also able to review its standing procedures for addressing terrorism and domestic extremism.

**Notable recent developments within Major Crime and Serious & Organised Crime**

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- The fingerprint bureau has gained the full ISO 9001:2000 which has been re-verified through follow up audit.
- High levels of sustainable performance from the proceeds of crime function through its previous investment in a mixed economy approach to investigative teams.
- Recently conducted the largest ever deployment of the Holmes 2 system setting up a virtual national intelligence warehouse in support of Operation UK Pentameter 2 (UKP2). This linked 18 servers for Regional Intelligence Units, forces and other law enforcement agencies including SOCA to access over 6400 intelligence logs generated through the operation. Further intelligence was then directly sent to Europol to assist in developing organised crime intelligence development.
- UKP2 has been a highly successful operation. It ran in phases from June 2007 until July 2008. It was run by a small national coordination team based at Waterwells. A national gold group was administered. Over 500 staff were briefed across the UK and has been the largest operation of its type. It has contributed to the development of organised crime mapping and the regional intelligence infrastructure.
- Deployments concerning casualty bureau/information bureau remain an area of strength within a tried and tested regional agreement. Gloucestershire has the third largest Holmes 2 server capacity throughout the United Kingdom.
- The Constabulary has led the formation and development of the regional intelligence unit (RIU) and other intelligence assets. The RIU is now active in the South West region.

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## Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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### Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Gloucestershire Constabulary's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as its response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change 06/07	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening & gun crime per 1,000 population	0.420	0.285	-32.14%	0.261
No. of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
No. of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.139	0.035	-74.82%	0.065
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	100.00%	100.00%	0pp*	78.14%
No. of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.435	0.156	-64.14%	0.109
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	8.00%	22.22%	+14.22pp*	35.84%
No. of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.435	0.209	-51.95%	0.209
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	20.00%	58.33%	+38.33pp*	60.83%
No. of manslaughter per 10,000 population	0.000	0.017	Not Applicable	0.021
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	0.00%	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
No. of murders per 10,000 population	0.087	0.052	-40.23%	0.076
% of murders detected/convicted	80.00%	66.67%	-13.33pp*	88.74%
No. of rapes per 10,000 population	3.042	2.347	-22.85%	2.227
% of rapes detected/convicted	22.29%	28.15%	+5.86pp*	21.80%

\*\*pp" is Percentage Points.

\*\*Most Similar Family (MSF) for Gloucestershire is: Cambridgeshire; Devon & Cornwall; Dorset; Norfolk; North Yorkshire; Suffolk and; Warwickshire.

From the SPI data contained in the table above it can be seen that the crime types of Life Threatening and Gun Crime, blackmail and rape pose a potential threat to Gloucestershire Constabulary. The rate of offences for all three categories is above the MSF average

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despite significant falls in 2007. However it should be noted that none of the three rates are high when considering England and Wales as a whole.

The SPI data also indicates that Major Crime investigation in Gloucestershire is comparable with the MSF group. For some offence types Gloucestershire is performing above the MSF average but in other areas the force is performing below the MSF average. However it should be noted that in most areas the sanction detection rates improved in 2007.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT) published in September 2007 indicated that Gloucestershire was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to Homicide, Rape and Kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

While OCG mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Gloucestershire Constabulary has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types are thoroughly mapped. It is currently estimated that 11 OCGs impact the force area, across 4 major crime types. The national comparative work indicated an impact of an undetermined amount from 11 OCGs, which is being researched at the time of the inspection.

The Force Strategic Assessment demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The Force has identified Class A drugs, firearms, violent crime, domestic violence, sexual offences, road policing (death by dangerous driving) as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on control strategy priorities.

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and are being addressed.

The Force has invested suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and inhibit major crime. In particular, Gloucestershire Constabulary role in the provision of support for the RIU is noteworthy.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates maturing process in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with South West regional forces and West Mercia Constabulary are recognised, albeit they are at a very early stage.

## Intelligence

**Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has conditionally committed to major crime investigation with the requisite accommodation, equipment and funding.**

### Strengths

- The force HQ CID department is called specialist criminal investigation services (SCIS).
- There is a team of dedicated analysts who provide support at level 2. Whilst subject of review the structure appears effective, with equally effective dialogue between the analysts across the force.
- The major incident team (MIT), which deals with major crimes and serious incidents, has an experienced and dedicated analyst, who services the analytical requirement for each enquiry. The constabulary has a relatively low rate for homicide (5.5 per annum over a five-year period), some of which are dealt with by BCUs. The MIT analyst is supported by peers from across the county at times of high demand, which is a rare occurrence.
- The MIT analyst supports operational activity with recognised intelligence products. Operational intelligence in support of SIOs and key decision makers for major crime enquiries is evident.
- At the commencement of any major crime enquiry, the senior investigating officer (SIO) will define the analytical and intelligence requirement and involve the analyst and deputy principle analyst (DPA) in this process; this will include results analysis. The MIT analyst also provides analytical support to the economic crime unit.
- Quality assurance for major crime analytical products is determined by the senior investigating officer in consultation with the MIT analyst. Quality assurance for other analytical products follows a framework of reference, including peer review, external feedback from partners for the force strategic assessment (FSA) and feedback from the department lead/commissioning body.
- The DPA manages the organised crime group (OCG) mapping process, which includes the scanning of relevant databases, liaison with basic command unit (BCU) and specialist analysts and the RIU and partner law enforcement agencies. The DPA maintains a dialogue with the MIT analyst to ensure the accurate representation of ongoing major crime enquiries and perceived future threats for inclusion in the force tactical assessment.
- The headquarters (HQ) analytical team has positive dialogue with the regional and national intelligence agencies, routinely submitting and receiving intelligence products.

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### **Work in progress**

- Commissioned by the *Vision 2010* delivery board (Aim 1a), a review of the analytical function is being undertaken by the DPA. The review is examining the ‘analytical and research capability including tasking and deployment, in order to ensure that it is efficient and effective’.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- A necessary review of the dedicated research capability forms part of the analytical structural review. Initially, two researcher posts have been redeployed to strengthen arrangements within and outside the confidential unit.

### **RECOMMENDATION 1.**

**Her Majesty’s Inspector recommends that the force should review both capacity and efficient use of analytical support dedicated to the Level 2 intelligence function.**

**Summary – The force seeks (and shares) intelligence about level 2/and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. Community Impact Assessments used to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.**

### **Strengths**

- The constabulary is beginning to map OCGs, other than just operations, using information from ground level up, current operations. Partnership information, historic intelligence and intelligence from regional intelligence agencies. BCUs play a key role in this process, with evidence of the use of closed and open sources apparent.
- Sensitive tasking meetings regularly review OCG activity and mapping. This developing process is improving understanding of the impact of OCGs across the force area. Following successful operations, the constabulary can now identify the links between OCGs and how the disruption and dismantlement activity of individual OCGs impact upon others.
- Agreed information-sharing protocols exist with a large number of partners, including trading standards, Her Majesty’s revenue and customs (HMRC) and the United Kingdom borders agency (UKBA) formerly the borders and immigration agency (BIA). These protocols appear to be working effectively, supplemented by the MAIDEN partnership information-sharing project.
- Sensitive intelligence was found to be effectively managed by a bespoke unit using a database developed by a consortium of forces. The system provides a secure audit trail.
- An information-sharing agreement between south-west regional partners has recently been finalised by the RIU.
- The MIT is fortunate to possess two detective sergeants who have previous experience of working with the National Crime Operations Faculty. Both sergeants

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have also assisted in developing a peer review mechanism for major crime enquiries.

- There is a growing understanding of the drivers of homicide through NIM profiles, with the constabulary possessing a low incidence of homicide. A problem profile of homicide revealed knife crime to be a key feature, with a problem profile of this issue recently commissioned.
- There have been a total of 66 homicide-related offences over a five-year period, with 35 of these being death by dangerous driving offences, 25 homicides and three manslaughters. With such a low number, trend identification is challenging; offence levels have fluctuated year on year and there is no clear upward or downward trend.
- Approximately 50% of the category C homicides reported are dealt with by BCUs, with 45% of those being domestic related.
- Other profiles have been produced, including gun crime, rape and domestic violence. These possess elements of victim, target or geographical analysis, with one example provided supporting an international enquiry.
- There has not been a category A murder for a number of years. The constabulary is presently investigating a potential category B murder, prior to this the last category B incident was in 2004.

### Work in progress

- A mutual aid arrangement in respect of category 'A' homicide investigation has been developed with West Mercia Constabulary. This remains untested.
- The FIB possesses one temporary analyst, a position subject to review as part of the wider review of SCIS.
- A review of the analytical platform across the constabulary is work in progress and strongly supported by Her Majesty's Inspector. In future, part of the new structure will allow bids for analytical support equitably across the force level 2 assets, which will include public protection (revised SCIS tasking process). Concurrently, a more streamlined confidential/non-confidential tasking structure aims to ensure the best use of resources.

### Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

**Summary – The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to thorough. Problem profiles for knife crime, rape and homicide are satisfactory, with links to force and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.**

### Strengths

- The FSA is controlled and monitored by the principal analyst. Review of the FSA is undertaken on a rolling basis, with formal reviews every six months.

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- The FSA dated November 2007 considers all control strategy priorities, including OCGs, Class A drugs, firearms, domestic abuse, sexual offences, counter terrorism and roads policing. Secondary areas for monitoring presently include kidnap, prostitution and human trafficking and homicide.
- The constabulary understands the threats posed by other life-threatening issues, including road deaths, kidnaps, paedophile rings or dangerous offenders, and these are openly discussed, with recommendations, within the FSA.
- The FSA rightly makes the distinction between those offences committed and the need to monitor other types of crime for precursor activity, including alcohol-related disorder, repeat domestic abuse and the possession of weapons.
- NIM profiles reflect an assessment and recognition of organised criminality; these are gradually making reference to emerging communities. Properly referenced open and closed source data is used in the compilation of the FSA.
- The FSA and the control strategy identify operational priorities to manage the risk of identified threats or harm being realised. Environmental scanning, which considers national and regional threat assessments, is completed.
- The strategic intelligence requirement mirrors the majority of areas identified in the FSA.
- Problem profiles exist for rape and sexual assault in support of the development of a SARC and cold case reviews, domestic violence offender analysis, gun crime, the travelling community and knife crime. In developing problem profiles, key partner data is often used.
- All level 3 MAPPA clients are the subject of a profile produced to support the decision-making process; this approach began in 2006.

### **Work in progress**

- A violent crime prevention strategy is being developed, which at the time of the inspection was not complete due to operational commitments.

### **Area for improvement**

- The constabulary should review its approach to Operation Laser (sex offender profiling) and ensure that its full potential is realised. Operation Laser is recognised as an effective investigative tool and one worthy of examination by other forces.

**Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are routinely shared with partners and BCUs. There is an emerging trigger plan for ‘hot briefing’ whenever a significant change in either the major crime threat, or where the nature of the analysis, demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as CDRPs, the MAIDEN project; SOCA, HMRC and the RIU exist. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full MoPI compliance by 2010.**

### **Strengths**

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- The constabulary has consistently demonstrated a strong commitment to the RIU with the analysts seconded having access to the force IT system and partner forces systems.
- The Charter database is being developed in order to enable all forces within the consortium to share intelligence, with a pilot being conducted by Avon and Somerset Constabulary. The constabulary has managed UKP2 using HOLMES and has advocated the wider application for HOLMES in this crime type on a national platform.
- There is considerable evidence of intelligence sharing with partners in order to disrupt organised criminal activity. Trigger plans are used, for example, with K&E and distraction burglary offences and hot debriefings occur with SOCA participation where relevant.
- There is a MoPI action plan led by the DCC, with a project manager who ensures recommendations are completed. The constabulary is seeking to employ an additional manager to deliver some of the actions. The constabulary is confident that it will meet the 2010 deadline for full MoPI compliance, which appears achievable.
- Significant emerging threats and fast-time intelligence matters are addressed through daily tasking processes. Senior officers at a number of levels can task resources to respond as appropriate. The responsibility out of hours rests with the critical incident managers, with access to on-call specialist advice and suitable training available.
- There is evidence of the use of CATCHEM, Impact Nominal Index (INI), SOCA and NCPE services in gathering evidence and best practice development.
- In partnership with SOCA, the constabulary has developed an effective debrief model for K&E operations using tabletop exercises supported by a PowerPoint template.

### **Work in progress**

- Scoping of the work required to understand and identify vulnerable communities effectively has been undertaken. This is being led by the principal analyst, with her strategic analysts undertaking the work, and will involve key stakeholders from partner agencies and support from the MAIDEN project. Terms of reference have yet to be agreed.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The constabulary should consider producing a tactical assessment for the SCIS department; this would help to consolidate and focus the activity of the department.

**Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.**

### **Strengths**

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- The threat to the community is considered within the risk assessment for individual operations. Community impact assessments (CIA) are now undertaken for all major crime investigations.
- The central diversity unit within the community partnership department monitors community tensions and emerging trends in relation to hate crimes. This process examines in detail the range of incidents for which 'hate' qualifiers exist. These include race, religion/faith, gender, homophobic, transphobic, disability, age, repeat victim and repeat premises.
- Some community and vulnerable location profiling has been completed in response to specific operations, for example Operation Clumber. SB continues to conduct specific work in respect of counter terrorism (CT).
- Following a critical external review in 2005, the constabulary has improved public protection arrangements. These now effectively identify the risk posed by MAPPA and potentially dangerous offenders. All referrals are recorded on MAPPA minutes and entered onto the ViSOR IT system. ViSOR and public protection offender management is delivered on each BCU by dedicated teams who have responsibility for updating records and quality assurance.
- The FSA details an intention to protect vulnerable people by targeting offenders subject to MAPPA management, predatory and high-risk sexual offenders, persistent domestic violence offenders and artifice burglars.
- By delivering the UKP2 programme on behalf of ACPO, the constabulary has vastly improved its understanding of the resident and visiting trafficked and sex worker community. UKP2 has helped shape a new approach to community profiling (see Work in progress below).
- Analysis of some communities has been carried out in support of the assessment of a crime issue, for example, CT, human trafficking, and distraction burglary. A baseline assessment of the traveller community was commissioned, which has led to a number of intelligence gaps being identified and new learning emerging.

### **Work in progress**

- A review of public protection conducted in early 2007 highlighted a number of areas for improvement. The recently appointed superintendent for public protection will be implementing a detailed improvement plan during the present financial year.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Given the resource implications of producing a full community profile, scoping the exercise appears a reasonable first approach. The constabulary will, however, need to consider investing in this business area in the longer term.
- The constabulary should continue to develop the means by which all departments contribute to intelligence gathering.
- The child protection unit has two detectives working full time on investigating internet crime, with a considerable backlog of work reported. Although cases have been risk assessed a longer term solution should be developed.

## RECOMMENDATION 2.

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop intelligence sharing processes with partners and review its internal processes to ensure all functions within the force contribute to tackling major crime.**

**Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed every six months by the Deputy Chief Constable, who oversees the force risk committee. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.**

### Strengths

- Chaired by the DCC, the *Vision 2010* delivery board oversees organisational risk management.
- Each BCU and department maintains a risk register, which contributes to the corporate register. Control room operatives have access to the corporate risk register and hyperlinked plans for any emerging high-risk/fast-time matters.
- The corporate risk register is reviewed every six months; departments and BCUs are expected to routinely review their own registers.
- The corporate register comprises a compilation of the agreed risks managed by each department. A scoring system exists to elevate risks to the corporate register. The register is available on the force intranet site. There is an escalation process for fast-time risks to be elevated to the corporate risk register.
- The SCIS risk register is overseen by the business manager, who reports to the SCIS senior management team (SMT). The SCIS register adopts the central thematic approach, including operational policing, utility services, evacuation migration/relocation of departments, communication, vehicles and transport and information management access. Each risk and potential outcome is described, and then a probability and impact grade is made.
- Actions against each risk are described with a number requiring plans to be drafted, often in consultation with other departments/agencies.
- Each of the higher-grade risks is allocated a unit manager, who reports to the business manager on progress against an action plan. The business manager then reports progress against the plans to the SCIS SMT. Her role includes ensuring plans are kept up to date.
- The risk register is linked to the FSA process, with the delivery board agreeing the organisational risks arising from a PESTELO assessment. The *Vision 2010* delivery board agrees an impact and probability risk rating on the identified organisational risks. This activity occurs at the bi-annual 'Glenfall' conference of senior managers.

### Work in progress

- The risk management process has recently been reviewed with a revised approach implemented.

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- The corporate risk register must now begin to reflect more accurately the level of risk being managed by the HQ CID function, with resources applied accordingly.

#### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The SCIS business manager should be supported in ensuring that action plans are kept up to date.
- With the SCIS department about to assume the public protection portfolio, an opportunity exists to review the current risks in this function and update the SCIS/central register.

**Summary – The force is fully collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Most of the operational databases are searchable from the RIU. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been partially implemented.**

#### **Strengths**

- The intelligence systems within the south-west region of forces are linked to the RIU. The RIU possesses a number of agreed protocols with an established Regional Operations Group (ROG), providing for the development of consistency of intelligence products and operational agreements. Via the MAIDEN project, partner/CDRP intelligence is routinely available and used in support of numerous joint and single agency projects. MAIDEN is the gateway for partner agency intelligence sharing and an established capability for all concerned.
- The confidential unit has become the gatekeeper and secure environment where intelligence from numerous sources is collated and analysed. It applies intelligence gathering discipline to a range of operational collection tactics, the force intelligence bureau (FIB), the dedicated source-handling unit, surveillance and level 1 and level 2 operations.
- The constabulary is well sighted on strategic intelligence issues. The detective chief superintendent is the intelligence lead for the south-west region and participates in the national confidential unit working group.
- A central registry exists for information-sharing agreements. The constabulary has completed an assessment of how it complies with the Bichard recommendations and has appropriate systems in place. All relevant staff interviewed possessed knowledge of, and adhere to, the business rules of the INI, with monitoring in place by business auditors and the INI auditors. The process operates effectively; future IMPACT releases will be mainstreamed in a similar manner.
- Intelligence collection includes access to information from uniformed and CID staff; specialist units such as the major incident rooms (specifically HOLMES databases), DSU, undercover and surveillance officers and departments such as forensics and technical support. Good relationships exist with regional and neighbouring forces and intelligence sharing is a routine activity, either via the confidential unit, which appears to be becoming the preferred option for intelligence operatives, or the RIU.

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- ViSOR is the only interoperable system employed within the PPU environment. Each probation area will be funding a ViSOR administrator, who will be the link between the police and probation service.
- Internal intelligence systems including, for example HOLMES, Charter and Unity are not interoperable. Intelligence exchange is achieved by human updating. This is undertaken during live enquiries. Previously finalised HOLMES enquiries are examined for potential intelligence on a risk-assessed basis.
- Analysts currently operate with iBase 5, through which they can access the following force databases: Unity, drugs, domestic abuse, child protection and command and control. The force IT administrator is currently working to integrate the ANPR database.

### **Work in progress**

- The constabulary is presently trialling the placement of 100 CPU cases onto the new Unify system. This should provide a platform for more effective management of cases and more consistent partner based-risk assessment of public protection matters.
- A comprehensive MoPI action plan was made available with plans for the constabulary to appoint a records manager to oversee a number of the actions contained within the MoPI plan. The constabulary appears to be on target for the 2010 compliance target.
- Departments including the DVU, CPU and CTO have dedicated standalone systems in addition to the Unity system. These will become more widely accessible following the upgrade of Unity to Unify in the next financial year.
- The constabulary has implemented SOCWEB through the force intranet to ensure that full access to forensic data and intelligence is available to all operational staff.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The constabulary and partners should strive to deliver greater co-location of PPU resources with partner agencies, for example social services emergency access teams.

**Summary – The force has a case review policy that is routinely applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is in development.**

### **Strengths**

- The constabulary has a major crime review policy. This uses the major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) as its baseline and draws on good practice from the south-west regional major crime review group, which also facilitates independent reviews.
- There is a semi-structured approach through the NIM tasking process to the management and operational review of major crime investigations, with community impact assessments (CIA) routinely used to gauge the appropriateness of some tactics and manage their impact upon local communities.

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- Three detective superintendents are trained to the national standard for major crime review. Peer reviews of live operations are adopted and independent reviews by other forces are commissioned where appropriate.
- A review panel convenes to review cold case progression. This provides a supportive peer process for SIOs. A detective sergeant within the MIT is the lead interview advisor (PIP 5) and champion in relation to cold case reviews. This officer is currently conducting a revision of the review policy and has attended a two-day national review conference to assist with this activity.
- A similar approach to that found with peer reviews is being considered for all major crime and serious and organised crime cases. This will comprise the review lead with a small team brought together for each review reporting to a panel.
- The review process lead has delivered a revised system of peer reviews. There is evidence of benchmarking and consultation with other forces and national databases during major crime reviews.
- Undetected murder/manslaughter cases are subject of an initial assessment within 24–72 hours; these are undertaken by the ACC (operations) together with the detective chief superintendent or detective superintendent SCIS. The assessments probe management and corporate issues, the structure of the investigation, logistics and direction and control.
- A nominated review officer working under focused terms of reference will conduct a progress assessment after seven days. A formal review of any major crime will be carried out at 28 days. The constabulary possesses a review policy for road death investigations.

### **Work in progress**

- A new debrief template for detected cases stipulates a meeting of all key stakeholders and the distribution of a questionnaire to staff involved within seven days of any charge being laid.

### **Area for improvement**

- The SCIS should continue to develop a system which more effectively controls and manages organisational learning and development, in particular from PIP, reviews, cold case activity, operational debriefs, external reviews and level 2 operations. This should be led by the newly created major crime and investigative development superintendent portfolio.

### **RECOMMENDATION 3.**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should enhance its processes and systems in order to effectively identify and develop organisational learning opportunities.**

**Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.**

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### **Strengths**

- Overseen by the NIM standards group, the constabulary possesses constantly evolving TCG processes, which are used to direct resources towards serious and organised crime threats in both slow and fast time. Considerable commitment to the process by the chief officer team was evident.
- The level 1 and 2 TCG processes witnessed were robust, intrusive and supported by the staff interviewed. The MIT, which investigates major crime incidents, was working at full capacity with a complex enquiry.
- The ACC (operations) chairs the level 2 TCG process and receives a confidential briefing around the force tactical assessment and bids for resources from the director of intelligence (DOI) prior to the meeting.
- Operation Olivia (Class A supply, firearms, armed robbery, intimidation and violence) involved a suite of intelligence gathering opportunities/tactics being exploited.
- Chaired by the DOI, the MIM is the platform for serious and organised crime and major crime operations to be discussed and developed, which often prevents escalation to level 2 and proves an effective interface between specialist teams and BCU operatives. The weekly meeting provides the opportunity for consideration of the efficacy of tactics. The MIM is supported by a weekly intelligence meeting between force level intelligence staff, SOCA and BCU intelligence operatives.
- The origin of cases submitted for consideration at level 2 tasking is broadly balanced between BCUs and HQ CID. This reflects the emphasis on BCU participation.

### **Work in progress**

- The national intelligence model (NIM) standards group action plan provides evidence of how the constabulary has developed the NIM over the last year, with considerable progress having been made and more to be achieved.
- The continuous development of the NIM model is noteworthy, however, the approach taken using the NIM standards group should be reviewed by the constabulary, in order to ensure its effectiveness in delivering and supporting change.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

**Summary – Due to appropriate and comprehensive/inadequate training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.**

### **Strengths**

- Diversity training is embedded into all aspects of training in the organisation. All lesson plans include an input regarding the six strands of diversity. There is no bespoke internal course that considers diversity within major crime enquiries. There

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are courses available that cover diversity from a CT perspective and other aspects of diversity.

- At the commencement of a major crime investigation, community liaison officers provide an input regarding community issues, usually at or near the first briefing. An example provided was of a complex rape investigation, in which the arrest of an Asian suspect was likely to cause community tension. A community briefing took place and potential repercussions of arrest identified. Risk reduction measures, including non-uniformed attendance and dialogue with local community leaders, were adopted and successful.
- Independent advisors provide a similar service in support of gold groups.
- The focus groups interviewed demonstrated good knowledge of their multi-cultural communities, for example West Indian, Muslim and Eastern European communities within the Barton Street/Treadworth areas of Gloucester. The officers were confident that they would receive appropriate advice when investigating major crime in Gloucestershire.
- SB has community officers with a dedicated liaison officer who provides the CT training course mentioned above.

### **Work in progress**

- Cultural awareness training for key groups working in the community is being established through a private company, Communicate. This will be focused towards SCTs and intelligence officers in the first instance and is embryonic.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Details of the percentage of staff within the MIT that have received diversity awareness training were not available. Capture of this data is worthy of consideration by the constabulary, particularly in key investigative roles.

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## Prevention

**Summary – The force has an IAG which is frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.**

### Strengths

- The independent advisory group (IAG) approach taken by the constabulary commenced in 2005. Since then organisational learning has developed the IAG, which now services all of the criminal justice agencies, with the police being the main customer.
- The members interviewed were positive about the relationship developed with the constabulary, acting as a critical friend to the organisation. The IAG is invited to a variety of different forums, including police authority groups, and is actively involved in the work of the constabulary.
- Having overcome a number of hurdles, the IAG is now becoming more engaged with the constabulary, involved in policy development, critical incident training and gold groups (Operations Outlook and Texas). Examples of policy development contributions include the management of intelligence, hate crime, FLOs and investigative interviewing.
- In September 2007, a presentation was provided to the force operations conference and senior detectives conference on the use of advisors in critical incidents. Advisors have been used in a number of gold groups, namely Operation Outlook and Operation Texas.
- The community impact assessment (CIA) template requires consideration of the use of an independent advisor, which is becoming a more routine occurrence at all levels, in particular at INA and BCU level, examples including the Stow Fair and the proposed development of a traveller site in C division.
- There is one IAG for the county, comprising 14 members, who are engaging with BCUs. The group meets bi-monthly and receives administration through the community partnerships department. All members are profiled for expertise and interest. When pre-planned activities/work arise, members are invited to express an interest.
- Of the 14 independent advisors, two are predominantly utilised for critical incident gold groups including Operation Outlook (flooding) and a live operation being investigated during the fieldwork stage of the inspection.

### Work in progress

- The IAG appears well led and working hard to develop trust and positive relations with the constabulary, partners and the wider community. The constabulary must continue to support the work of the IAG and ensure that the sound platform described is continuously enhanced and new learning emerges.
- The chair of the IAG is conducting a number of awareness visits to BCUs and heads of departments, including the SCIS, in January 2008.

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- The constabulary is developing a post-incident training exercise for CT and firearms incidents. This will include IAG involvement, which is good practice.
- In September 2007, the diversity unit and chair of the IAG commenced visits to all divisional and departmental SMTs to promote the use of advisors. This is currently being followed up by visits to SCTs to introduce and promote the use of advisors.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

**Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were sufficiently understood by call-management staff and first responders.**

### **Strengths**

- The force control room employs a system of electronically held contingency plans, which are used to guide staff within the unit and first attendees of critical incidents, missing persons and major crime events.
- Examples of contingency plans for homicide, K&E, rape and suicide investigations were examined and appeared sufficient to assist the control room operatives in the management of golden hour principles.
- The response to homicide, as well as a number of the critical force plans, requires the control room inspector to manage the early stages of any event in concert with the outside duty inspector. When interviewed such officers were found to be fully conversant with their responsibilities.
- Contingency plans provide for readily available specialist advice via call-out rotas. For SCIS these were found to be up to date and easily accessible.
- The control room maintains a suite of mobilisation plans for civil emergencies; these are regularly reviewed to ensure the currency of the plans.
- The constabulary has a 24/7 on-call rota for SIOs comprising the SCIS superintendents and seven of the detective chief inspectors. An on-call detective inspector supplements this approach over the weekend period (Friday through to Sunday).
- The constabulary provides a night cover detective constable, who is available to offer advice around golden hour principles and take immediate control of certain investigations. All departments and BCUs provide staff for this role, including the MIT and the MCU. All BCUs provide duty inspector cover until midnight with a duty force inspector providing night cover. The duty force inspector role is drawn from all uniformed inspectors.
- All constables undertake Streetskills training courses, which focus on issues including major crime and golden hour principles. Perceptual training, based around

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a murder scenario, was recently delivered, with the course valued by the officers interviewed.

- The constabulary has the capacity to establish a casualty bureau at short notice and this is routinely tested following the experiences during the flooding in 2007 (Operation Outlook).

### **Work in progress**

None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- In order to improve the speed and accuracy of access, the constabulary should review how contingency plans are electronically presented to control room operatives.
- The constabulary should consider reviewing its mobilisation plans with more detail on the mobilisation of the SCIS major crime asset base.

### **Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.**

#### **Strengths**

- There is analysis of the current and future demand of major crime types and precursors to these offences. The constabulary has an apparently good understanding of the threats arising from risks identified in the FSA.
- A key word search to identify precursor crimes and detailed analytical work is undertaken by senior analysts within the business improvement unit and analysts dedicated to certain of the crime types. This provides a clearer understanding of the risks posed by domestic violence, knife-related criminality, sex worker crime, stranger attacks on lone females, violence involving multiple offenders and male-on-male street violence.
- Prevention strategies for victims, vulnerable people and locations are employed.
- Information and intelligence sharing between MAPPA partners is improving. MAPPA offenders are managed centrally, with the constabulary possessing established MAPPA processes to reduce the risk posed by dangerous offenders.
- A preventative approach to domestic violence has been adopted and the constabulary uses the Cardiff risk model. Independent domestic violence liaison officers are in place in each of the BCU community protection teams and they work in partnership with domestic violence officers to support high-risk victims identified through the multi-agency risk assessment conference process.
- The prison liaison officers are contributing to the intelligence system.
- CIAs are used to engage with communities in order to prevent crimes and reduce community tension (Operation Clumber).

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- Domestic abuse cases assessed as very high risk are reviewed within the BCU tactical assessments. Briefing sheets are used to circulate certain of these cases in particular for response, inspector neighbourhood area (INA) teams. High risk addresses are flagged on the force command and control system, with prompts for staff attending incidents. Prompt guidance is held within the command and control incident guidance, with incidents only closed by control room supervisors.
- The community protection team undertakes joint criminal justice and agency work, including the rehousing of victims, eviction of perpetrators and operations with the local authority anti-social behaviour co-ordinators.
- The decision to develop a force PPU department from 1 April 2008, led by a dedicated superintendent, should bring focus and control to this function.

### **Work in progress**

- The constabulary has yet to develop an independent domestic violence advocate service. A business case for six advocates is being considered with funding for three posts approved.
- The constabulary is at an advanced stage in the development of a sexual assault referral clinic (SARC). This is a joint venture with the Gloucestershire Primary Care Trust (PCT) and due to open in October 2008.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- A strong focus on volume crime performance is evident and found within force and BCU strategic and tactical assessments. The constabulary must further subscribe to articulating and acting upon the risks and threats posed by major and serious and organised crime at level 1.

**Summary – The policy covering threats to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint/regional/cross-border/multi-agency operations are evident.**

### **Strengths**

- The constabulary possesses a detailed threat to human life policy, which is accessible to all staff via the SCIS intranet site. Osman warnings and letters are administered through the authorities bureau with the DOI being the authorising officer. A flowchart is available for incident handlers and an operations trigger plan supports this with a drop-down menu for fast-time response.
- The inspection team found sufficient evidence of effective trigger plans, risk management plans, and security arrangements being made for threat to life incidents.
- Knowledge of the policy at a senior level was found to be good, with prevention tactics always considered and used, for example the arrest of subjects, displacement or overt disruption. Such decisions will be recorded on the incident log or SIO's policy record. The constabulary demonstrated a good awareness of the need to carefully manage the re-introduction of subject(s) into the community following an Osman issue. Of the evidence of operational activity viewed it was apparent that

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senior investigating officers dealt with the subject(s) concerned with integrity and sensitivity.

- The constabulary has developed an effective cadre of on-call SIOs. The cadre provides a 24/7 call-out rota, although in the first instance the force duty critical incident manager or BCU duty inspector provides the first point of contact for advice and guidance.

### **Work in progress**

None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Given the relatively low incidence of threats to life the constabulary should consider reviewing its policy and procedures and benchmark these against those of other forces.

**Summary – The force has part time witness protection advisors that are supported by on demand covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated and understood by staff. The force is partially collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.**

### **Strengths**

- The ACC Operations is the force champion for witness protection, supported by the detective superintendent for serious and organised crime. The constabulary has a good understanding of the need for and mechanisms by which tactics, resources and witnesses can be protected and, where appropriate, offered anonymity.
- HMIC found evidence of witness protection policies in place entitled the witness support referral guide.
- In circumstances where protected persons status is required outside the capability of the constabulary, the services of other forces are available.

### **Work in progress**

None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

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**Summary – The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.**

### **Strengths**

- The constabulary has established an approach to neighbourhood policing that is effectively an extension of its existing INA model. The community profiles from this process have served to reinforce understanding in this crime type.
- Community information is used to monitor specific offences and community tensions.
- Senior investigating officers have appropriate access to the intelligence function, with dedicated resources available.
- Covert human resource management was examined and found to be effective with central and BCU resources applied.
- Constabulary delivery plans group enforcement/preventative activity around key crime themes, including burglary, vehicle crime, street crime, road crime and drug crime. A results analysis approach is evident in each of the plans, providing limited evidence of the impact of preventative and enforcement activity.
- Community impact assessments (CIAs) are produced during live major crime and level 2 enquiries. CIAs are quality assured and recorded by the central diversity unit, with appropriate feedback loops with BCU commanders evident. There is evidence of SIO, BCU and partner involvement in the compilation of CIAs.
- The diversity unit produces a weekly 'tensions overview' report, which is an amalgamation of the three BCU community overview reports. The report reflects NCTT grading 6x6x6 criteria for incidents that are critical, severe, substantial, moderate or low. BCUs therefore provide an individual assessment of tension. The reports include the International Security and National Resilience number in order to encourage the development of community intelligence to support the incidents within the report. Each report includes recommendations for local action where appropriate, with follow-up produced in the following week's report.
- The compilation tensions overview report is provided to senior managers and ACC (operations) as well as the NCTT. Gloucestershire is one of nine forces nationally that routinely provide such reports to the NCTT.
- There is a multi-agency sexual offences steering group, which includes representation from 'rape crises', an independent organisation. There is a quarterly sexual offences meeting attended by BCU leads and CPS lawyers specialising in rape.
- There is evidence to show that neighbourhood policing officers attend major crime briefings and debriefings to discuss community tensions.
- There is evidence of the profiling of communities and certain crime types with the examples provided being of an acceptable and improving standard.

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### **Work in progress**

- The constabulary is about to scope a community profiling project in order to build upon some limited work previously undertaken. This should be viewed as an important project.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Given the seriousness of the risks and threat posed, and focus upon BCU preventative activity, BCU intelligence products should by now contain greater detail of level 1 activity in respect of major and serious and organised crime.

## **RECOMMENDATION 4.**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that BCU intelligence products should contain greater focus and emphasis on the Level 1 contribution towards tackling major crime and serious and organised crime.**

**Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is comprehensive security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.**

### **Strengths**

- There is evidence of a robust security policy for vetting procedures and level 2 investigations. It is the responsibility of the SIO to instigate adequate operational security around major crime investigations and record the rationale for this in the policy book.
- There is evidence of the use of confidentiality agreements by senior investigating officers during live major crime investigations.
- There is a tiered level of access to force intelligence systems, which is robustly managed with restricted viewing and the effective sanitisation of intelligence.
- The vetting unit comprises an information security and vetting manager (ISVM) and three force vetting analysts, with funding approved for additional growth. All posts in the SCIS have been reviewed and risk assessed for the level of vetting commensurate with the role. Additional vetting is required for certain roles.
- A force vetting policy aligned to the ACPO/ACPOS police national vetting policy has been ratified and adopted since August 2007. Purchase of the CORE VET database is viewed as a positive development. Chief officer vetting is comprehensive and annually reviewed. All level 2 operatives have been vetted to SC level, with those employed in the MIT vetted to CTC. SC vetting is renewed in accordance with government standards or as a result of self referral or change in role. High-risk decisions are referred to a fortnightly vetting panel.
- The head of the PSD has responsibility for policy in relation to the management of force drug and alcohol testing. There are mandatory posts, which will be subject to

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random drug and alcohol testing. There have been some 200 tests completed with no positive results.

- The constabulary ISVM has a comprehensive portfolio, which is robustly delivered. There is evidence of proactive internal security testing with a calendar of events throughout the year including building systems, key roles, clear desk policy and staff not wearing identification in police buildings being challenged. This approach is supported by other forces.
- The level of vetting applied to inter-departmental attachments or temporary postings remains the same. Vetting failures are managed according to complexity and risk with department heads normally required to deal. Aftercare is an issue being developed by the force.
- The business improvement department manages a detailed MoPI action plan with progress reportedly in line to meet the 2010 deadline.
- Vetting for IAGs is to a basic level, with the diversity manager, assistant director of HR and force solicitor all supporting the vetting panel, thereby providing additional tiers of advice for any potential issues falling out of vetting procedures.
- The constabulary has an HR-based case conference group, which meets every month to identify and resolve issues. This might include unusually high sickness among key personnel or complex HR issues. Each department and BCU either has or shares an HR manager who supports this process. This group is responsible for an organisational learning matrix, which is populated with learning outcomes and actions, for example, policy changes which are monitored by the group until resolved.

### **Work in progress**

- A confidential reporting line, 'Safecall', is presently subject to review. The constabulary actively markets 'Safecall' but take-up remains low.
- The approach to information systems and the internet is a growth area, with information and data leakage issues routinely considered and systems and individuals tested in this regard.
- The PSD is piloting a shared analytical post from within the strategic analyst cadre. This will provide for more effective scanning of sickness, OCC, health and financial vulnerability.
- The IIU has developed an approach for ethical interviews, which it considers groundbreaking.
- The business improvement department manages the constabulary response to MoPI via a detailed action plan. The constabulary is intending to develop a bespoke unit and information manager to deliver this function. This will help to remove the data protection function from the PSD, where it presently sits.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

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## Enforcement

**Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are effective with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.**

### Strengths

- The ACC (operations) is the lead for major crime investigations. At the time of the fieldwork the ACC operations was an experienced operational police officer, who takes a very active and supportive approach to the oversight of the investigation of serious and organised crime.
- The ACC (operations) chairs an effective force TTCG meeting process, which has been subject to review and enhancement.
- The Chief Constable chairs the monthly performance improvement conference (PIC), which is attended by the chief officer group, BCU commanders and departmental heads. The PIC process is robust and holds BCU commanders and department heads to account. The meeting effectively links performance management and the NIM process at a strategic and tactical level.
- The police authority is supportive of this crime type and takes an active interest in major crime investigations. Quarterly strategic performance reviews are held with full police authority participation.
- The Chair of the police authority currently represents the SCIS regarding budget bids in respect of major crime and serious and organised crime. The Chief Constable briefs the Chair of the police authority on a weekly basis, including this crime type.
- The approach to vetting of the police authority is agreed by all parties and appears to meet the needs of the organisation.
- The ACC (operations) chairs the majority of gold group meetings. Governance of any live major crime enquiry is effectively managed including the review of costs, risk, harm and community impact against the strategic objectives. The IAG and Authority play a valued role in supporting gold groups.
- The detective superintendent operations is held accountable by the ACC (operations) for the use and management of budget and resources. All operations are reviewed via the strategic TCG, which is a thorough and open process witnessed by the inspection team.
- Chief officers review and sign SIOs' 'policy books' and raise policy considerations when required.

### Work in progress

None identified.

### Area(s) for improvement

- The police authority should consider whether the Chair should be further supported by a deputy in discharging the governance function in respect of level 2 activities.

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**Summary – The ACPO lead and head of crime are fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate and testing in critical incident command, CIAs and policing in partnership.**

### **Strengths**

- The head of crime and the current head of the professional standards department are trained and experienced in linked and series crime. Both officers possess a track record of delivery, with the remainder of the SCIS SMT possessing varying levels of experience.
- There is a capability in the management of those crimes. During Operation Outlook (2007 flooding), the Chief Constable was the officer in overall command and managed the incident supported by his team and partners with distinction.
- Senior investigating officers are supported by diversity advisors, including the progression of community impact assessments (CIA) and pre/post-operation reassurance tactics.
- The diversity unit produces a weekly tensions overview report, which is an amalgamation of reports produced by each of the BCUs. A recent change in the reporting template was supported by a briefing to community intelligence officers, community liaison officers, hate crime officers and safer community team (SCT) sergeants (October 2007).
- Community impact assessments are completed following consultation between SIOs and the relevant BCU. The SCT actually completes the CIA, which are quality assured by the force diversity unit.
- Silver commanders, control room inspectors and duty inspectors are trained in critical incident management.
- All constables undertake a Streetskills training course (once a month, 20–30 front-line staff). Recently, this included a perceptual training event based around a homicide scenario. The constabulary operates a CID night car, which is available from midnight until 7am. Uniformed inspectors receive firearms bronze training, which is effectively critical incident training.
- The force duty inspector role is expected to take initial control of any critical incident, with a duty chief inspector available every Friday and Saturday night. Combined, these inspectors manage the night-time economy and ‘Street Safe’ patrols/activity. The duty chief inspector manages resources out of hours with the force duty inspector managing their direction and control.

### **Work in progress**

- During 2008 all on-call SIOs will be trained in managing kidnap and extortion incidents.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

July 2008

**Summary – The force’s performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes/cost/inputs and outputs.**

**Strengths**

- There is evidence of an effective tasking and co ordination processes, which drives the activities of the constabulary. The low volume of major crime cases negates the needs for a dedicated review team; instead, a dedicated detective sergeant forms a review team around each case. This approach works to a review policy overseen by a standing review panel. The review policy uses MIRSAP guidance as a baseline and draws upon good practice from the south-west regional major crime review group.
- At the commencement of any investigation, a logistics officer is appointed. The HQ operations planning officer performs this role for larger cases. The constabulary has a review policy for road death investigations that interfaces with the major crime review.
- For any major crime investigation, a nominated review officer working to focused terms of reference will conduct a progress assessment after seven days. The findings of each review are fully documented within the policy file. Bids for additional resources and finance can be made to the head of crime and via the ACC (operations) contingency fund.
- The SIO will always create policy to cover the operational objectives, overt and sensitive tactics, timescales and anticipated results. Budget allocations will include anticipated expenditure for overtime, expenses, hire vehicles and the like. Returns against this budget will be monitored by the SIO and the SCIS business manager, who provides a spend profile for the ACC (operations).
- During the fieldwork stage of the inspection, Avon and Somerset Constabulary were assisting the force with a major crime review. A similar arrangement exists with West Mercia Constabulary.
- The force review co-ordinator possesses strong links with centres of good practice, having formerly worked for the National Crime Operations Faculty. The constabulary supports routine attendance at training events, seminars and national working groups at all levels and has hosted a number of national seminars.
- The head of crime led a review process for UKP2, which included quarterly reports to a steering group and presentations across the country and to government departments, including the Home Office.

**Work in progress**

- At the time of the inspection, an interim review of Operation Outlook, reporting to the wider Pitt review, had just been completed by the constabulary in collaboration with the local resilience forum.
- The constabulary is undertaking a review of the review policy, which will report in due course.

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## Area(s) for improvement

None identified.

## Performance management and resilience

**Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands.**

**Collaborative agreements with neighbouring forces and agencies including SOCA exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are being developed across the South West region and are presently adequate to counter normal and some extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide partial protection for the investigative capability.**

### Strengths

- Gloucestershire Constabulary has a dedicated major incident team (MIT), which was formed after April 2004 and has since grown following a review of staffing in 2006. The MIT relies upon support from BCUs, which is made clear in its terms of reference and often involves key roles, including the SIO, case officer and exhibits and disclosure officer.
- During the fieldwork stage of this inspection, the MIT was committed on a large scale enquiry, with resources drawn from across the force area and beyond.
- The DCI for major crime also holds the portfolios of child protection and MAPPA.
- The review of SCIS, previously mentioned, is likely to recommend merging the MIT with the force major crime unit (MCU), which appears to be a logical development that will significantly enhance the skills base and capability of both functions.
- The SCIS intranet pages hold numerous investigative policies, which appear adequate and meet the operational requirement. Officers and staff can access protocols through the SCIS site.
- The training needs of specialist level 2 staff and CID personnel are monitored using an effective training requirement and forecasting approach, which caters for all roles within the SCIS environment. A detective sergeant is the force PIP manager and provides governance of the process for levels 2 and 3 personnel. A training board adjudicates on training needs requests from department heads, including the SCIS.
- Each post has a detailed role and skills profile. Public protection training is delivered in partnership with other agencies for example child abuse investigation and adult protection.
- There is one PIP level 3 investigator, with the head of crime working towards accreditation as an assessor. There are plans to accredit the superintendent for crime operations as well as the DCI for major crime/child protection investigation unit and the DCI for serious and organised crime. The constabulary recently undertook a peer review of PIP with the NPIA, with the findings being very favourable.
- A suite of specific trigger plans for major crime are available for control room staff.

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- When capacity allows, detectives within the crime department will assist BCUs in the investigation and detection of volume crime.
- The constabulary has adequate systems and processes in place to ensure appropriate response to unexplained deaths in communities and institutions Operation Star being recent example. The constabulary has a close working relationship with the Health and Safety Executive and was able to provide joint investigation evidence.
- Evidence was provided demonstrating effective liaison and support with and from neighbouring forces across the south west region. There is an informal arrangement with West Mercia Constabulary to assist with detective support for category A murders.
- POLSAs are based across the force and provide 24/7 on-call cover.
- The MIT is supported by the forensic service department, which provides a coordination role for major crime investigations. This was found to be a robust and well-managed unit.

### **Work in progress**

- The SCIS department review aims to strengthen the management of PIP and crime training.
- The constabulary is working with a private organisation to provide six additional police staff investigators within the MIT from January 2008.
- The constabulary is aiming to strengthen the process by which FLOs are released in support of major crime investigations.
- The force photographic department provides on-call cover for CCTV and crime scene video (which includes a 360 degree capability), with additional training for crime scene investigators planned.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- With a number of small bespoke reviews of functions apparent, the constabulary should consider widening the SCIS review in order to provide a comprehensive assessment of the entire level 2 environment.
- The SCIS review should strongly consider the potential for merging the MIT and MCU capabilities.
- The SCIS review should consider the role of the FLO, its status within the organisation and the number available for deployment.
- The SCIS review should seek to improve the delivery and availability of HOLMES training.
- The constabulary should consider how it might routinely analyse sudden or unexplained deaths, making use of all available data.

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- Should it remain a standalone function, the constabulary should seek to enhance the perceived status of the MIT.

**Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through an infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Elements of covert policing are delivered through written and verbal collaborative agreements, which are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.**

### Strengths

- The *Vision 2010* policing plan, BIG review and Waterwells HQ development represent the force response to *Closing the Gap*. Capacity and capability within the SCIS department have undoubtedly improved as a result of these processes, with significant investment apparent by the police authority.
- Clear evidence was provided to demonstrate the availability of specialist assets, and these resources are seen as an integral part of force business.
- There are adequate out-of-hours, on-call systems, both formal and informal, for the contact and deployment of specialist staff. These arrangements are constantly tested in real-life events. Access to specialist resources is dynamic, timely and reliable.
- Within the major crime unit, the inspection team examined the provision of a range of specialist functions including surveillance, source-handling units, financial investigation, economic crime investigation, ANPR capability, hi-tech crime investigation, forensic investigation, investigation of crimes in action, witness protection, investigation management and case preparation.
- Search teams and POLSAs are sourced through the operations department, with levels 1 and 2 support readily available. Collectively the specialisms examined appeared to be adequately resourced and trained, with the ACC (operations) having developed the capability in his former role. Mutual aid is also invoked in times of high demand.
- The operations department provides regular support to levels 1 and 2 operations, with resources being used in pre-planned activity to target individuals using the road networks and ANPR operations including Utah.
- The Waterwells HQ site has state of the art major incident support facilities, thoroughly tested during Operation Outlook (flooding). The dedicated MIT has the capability for multi-incident rooms at Waterwells, which can provide sufficient HOLMES and back office support to SOSCB investigations if required.
- There is bespoke accommodation and equipment with the constabulary aiming to enhance the facilities further.
- SIOs clearly consider and deploy ANPR when appropriate.

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- There are adequate out-of-hours, on-call systems, both formal and informal, for the contact and deployment of specialist staff. These arrangements are constantly tested in real-life events. Access to specialist resources is dynamic, timely and reliable.
- Financial and economic crime investigation falls within the remit of the ECU. There is a dedicated team which investigates level 2 offenders and offences, and financial investigators located on BCUs who have responsibility for dealing with level 1 crimes and SARS.
- The constabulary is an active member of the south-west collaboration programme, which has received demonstrator site status and funding from the Home Office to meet protective service targets for high risk areas by 2009.

### **Work in progress**

- During 2007 there has been significant investment by the constabulary in strengthening certain of its specialist capabilities, this remains work in progress.
- During 2008, all on-call SIOs will receive additional training in certain of its specialist capabilities.
- Contingency plans for a small number of specialist functions are being updated, overseen by a small steering group, which has met twice.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The constabulary should review the current policy for calling out the MIT.

**Summary – The force has an on-demand case review team that is generally deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is in development.**

### **Strengths**

- The constabulary has a major crime review policy, which employs MIRSAP as its baseline and draws on good practice from the south-west regional major crime review group. Volume in major crime review is comparatively low.
- A scoring matrix is applied to historical cold case reviews, with review teams reporting to a review panel comprising the head of crime, detective superintendent operations and major crime intelligence staff. The lead for cold case review is the DCI operations (SCIS), who acts as SIO and has considerable experience in this field.
- A debrief template is used to conduct the hot debrief process; this is followed by a meeting of key staff which reports to the monthly senior detectives conference. Important findings will be referred to the monthly force operations conference.
- Three cold case reviews were examined providing evidence of robust management and the application of complex forensic and investigative techniques.

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- Having commenced a major crime review the nominated review officer, working under focused terms of reference, should conduct a progress assessment after seven days. A formal review will be carried out at 28 days, with a template for the review focus included within the policy book. The constabulary has a review policy for road death investigations, which interfaces with the major crime review policy and is applied to the majority of cases.
- An operation examined demonstrated research with Lancashire Police in respect of work-related deaths and corporate accountability. Other examples include research conducted with the national legal database and the national injuries database.

### **Work in progress**

- Working to the DCI operations (SCIS), a DS within the MIT is dual tasked with the HOLMES management and major crime review functions. After a period of secondment, this officer is now dedicated to her role. The sergeant is presently reviewing the review policy, with a proposal to bring the cold case, major crime and serious and organised crime review functions closer together, which appears to be a logical development.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The constabulary evidenced a developing approach to major and serious organised crime review. This is an area for improvement and, if necessary, investment to ensure that MIRSAP and best practice are fully adopted in a robust and systematic approach.

## **Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force is predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the Murder Investigation Manual and MIRSAP.**

### **Strengths**

- Homicide investigation protocols and linking are understood by the chief officer group and SIOs. The head of crime and the head of the PSD have been trained in the management of linked and serious crime and a strong team of SIOs supports the head of crime.
- The major investigation team MIT terms of reference (February 2005) are detailed and explicit in describing the roles and application of force resources in response to critical incidents. Within the terms of reference, numerous references are made to the application of doctrine and associated force policy, for example, MIRSAP, criminal procedure and investigations act (1996), human rights, investigative interview and risk assessment.
- The constabulary has recently purchased an M3 server, which will strengthen its capabilities across a range of functions.
- The application of MIRSAP is highly flexible. The review mechanism employed within the constabulary makes strong reference to MIRSAP and legislative compliance.

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- Policy files are completed for all major crimes, with good evidence of the application of MIRSAP doctrine and positive and negative lines of enquiry.
- Strong evidence of the operational security of buildings and documents was evident throughout the inspection.

**Work in progress**

None identified.

**Area(s) for improvement**

None identified.

**RECOMMENDATION 5.**

**Her Majesty’s Inspector recommends that the force should develop a systematic review process or system that rigorously identifies learning and measures the effectiveness and efficiency of operational tactics.**

## Recommendations

### Recommendation 1

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should review both the capacity and efficient use of analytical support dedicated to the Level 2 intelligence function.

### Recommendation 2

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should continue to develop intelligence sharing processes with partners and review its internal processes to ensure all functions within the force contribute to tackling major crime.

### Recommendation 3

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should enhance its processes and systems in order to effectively identify and develop organisational learning opportunities.

### Recommendation 4

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that BCU intelligence systems and processes should continue to be enhanced in order to provide more focus and emphasis on the Level 1 contribution towards tackling major crime and serious and organised crime.

### Recommendation 5

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop a systematic review system that rigorously identifies learning and measures the effectiveness and efficiency of operational tactics.

## Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

### A

ABC	Activity-based Costing
ABE	Achieving Best Evidence
ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
APA	Association of Police Authorities
ASB	Anti-social Behaviour

### B

BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic Command Unit
BME	Black and Minority Ethnic
BIA	Borders and Immigration Agency (now United Kingdom Borders Agency)

### C

CAIT	Child Abuse Investigation Team
CDRP	Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
COG	Chief Officer Group
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service

### D

DC	Detective Constable
DCC	Deputy Chief Constable
DCI	Detective Chief Inspector
DI	Detective Inspector
DS	Detective Sergeant

DDA Disability Discrimination Act

DV Domestic Violence

DV Domestic Violence

**E**

ECM Every Child Matters

**F**

FTE Full-time Equivalent

**G**

HMI Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HQ Headquarters

HR Human Resources

**I**

ICIDP Initial Crime Investigators Development Programme

ICT Information and Communications Technology

**K**

KPI Key Performance Indicator

**L**

LSCB Local Safeguarding Children Board

**M**

MAPPA Multi-agency Public Protection Arrangements

MARAC Multi-agency Risk Assessment Conference

MSF Most Similar Force(s)

MIT Major Investigation Team

**N**

NBM Neighbourhood Beat Manager

NCPE National Centre for Policing Excellence

NIM National Intelligence Model

NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency

**P**

PACT Police and Communities Together

PCSO Police Community Support Officer

PIM Performance Improvement Meeting

PIP Professionalising the Investigative Process

PPAF Police Performance Assessment Framework

PPU Public Protection Unit

**Q**

QoSC Quality of Service Commitment

**R**

RSO Registered Sex Offender

**S**

SARA Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment

SCAS Serious Crime Analysis Section

SDVC Specialist Domestic Violence Court

SGC Specific Grading Criteria

SMB Strategic Management Board

SMT Senior Management Team

SPI Statutory Performance Indicator

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SPP Special Priority Payment  
SSN Safer Stronger Neighbourhood

**T**

TTCG Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Group

**V**

ViSOR Violent and Sex Offenders' Register

**Appendix 2: Developing practice**

(Operation Laser) Sexual Offenders DNA Database, including the review and collation of data held force systems and sex offenders with links to the Gloucestershire area.

Force contact Detective Superintendent Kinsella at Force HQ (0845 090 1234).