

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



## HMIC Inspection Report

### Derbyshire Constabulary Major Crime

July 2008



*Derbyshire Constabulary – HMIC Inspection Report*

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## Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

## HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

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In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

## Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

## Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

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procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

## Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

## The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

### Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

### Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

## **Failing to meet the standard**

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

## **Developing Practice**

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

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## Force Overview and Context

### Geographical description of force area

The county of Derbyshire covers an area of over 1,000 square miles. It has a mixture of urban and rural areas, including former mining communities in the north east, the industrial city of Derby in the south, and the vast moorlands and countryside of the Peak District in the north west.

### Demographic profile of force area

Derbyshire has a total population of 987,000, with 422,000 households. The black and minority ethnic (BME) proportion of the population is lower than the national average at just under 5%. Almost 80% of the BME population lives in the city of Derby. Derbyshire also has a higher proportion of senior citizens than both the regional and national averages. Derby City is a unitary authority and there are a further eight borough and district councils within the administrative county. Nine crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) correspond to the nine local government areas within Derbyshire.

### Strategic priorities

For 2008/09 the force's corporate priorities are to:

<b>Deliver effective neighbourhood-focused policing</b>	... to minimise community harm
<b>Maintain low levels of acquisitive crime</b>	... to minimise volume crime
<b>Reduce violent crime</b>	... to reduce threats from major crime and dangerous offenders, particularly towards vulnerable people
<b>Maintain high detection rates</b>	... to minimise volume crime
<b>Protect people from the harm caused by terrorism and by the more serious and organised offending</b>	... to deal with organised crime and the criminality of those involved in terrorism or extremism
<b>Increase public confidence and satisfaction</b>	... to ensure continued trust in the organisation
<b>Manage our resources efficiently and effectively</b>	... to sustain organisational performance

Work on regional collaboration continues, with Derbyshire staff contributing to the work of the regional collaboration planning team and units. Regional collaboration should bring opportunities for efficiency and performance improvements across many operational policing and supporting activities in the East Midlands region, and the savings released will help to maintain front-line services.

### Force developments since 2007

The force has developed an action plan to address the areas for improvement identified in phase one of inspection activity. This action plan is subject to quarterly updating of developments and is monitored by the Chief Constable and the PA prior to discussion with HMIC.

## Structural description of the force area

Policing is delivered via an operations division, a crime support department and four territorial divisions or basic command units (BCUs) covering the areas of Alfreton, Buxton, Chesterfield and Derby. Each BCU is led by a chief superintendent and is subdivided into a number of geographically based sections. An inspector heads each section, providing local accountability. The force philosophy is based on a clear commitment to community-based, problem-solving policing, as set out in the Chief Constable's vision statement. The force is committed to placing at least one neighbourhood beat officer on every beat.

Safer neighbourhood teams (SNTs) are now in communities with over 400 members of staff committed to these teams. All of the 103 neighbourhoods have teams made up of police officers, police community support officers (PCSOs) and special constables, together with wardens and other partner agencies. Each SNT has developed local key individual networks (KINs). The purpose of a KIN is to enable community members to better influence local policing and for the force to get increased information about issues affecting local communities.

The total strength of the force, including part-time and seconded officers, is 2,111 police officers, 179 PCSOs, 1,670 police staff and 411 special constables. The command team is based at the force headquarters (HQ) at Butterley Hall on the outskirts of Ripley. The chief officer team is headed by the Chief Constable, Michael Creedon. Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) Alan Goodwin holds the portfolios for corporate development, information services, legal services and professional standards. Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) Dee Collins holds the portfolios for human resources, call handling, the Special Constabulary, learning and development and criminal justice. ACC Peter Goodman leads on operations, including divisional/territorial policing, specialist crime, specialist operations, community safety, intelligence, scientific support, level 2 crime and roads policing. Terry Neaves is the Director of Finance and Administration. The Derbyshire PA consists of 17 members: 7 councillors from Derbyshire County Council, 2 councillors from Derby City Council, 3 magistrates and 5 independent members. The chair of the PA is Janet Birkin.

## Key corporate initiatives

### Collaboration (strategic partnerships)

The East Midlands special operations unit (EMSOU) is one example of collaboration. It was set up to tackle serious and organised crime in the East Midlands. Another example is the joint air support unit serving Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. Chief Constables and the chairs of PAs from Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire are committed to working together to improve efficiency and performance in the future. Collaboration will achieve improved levels of service from within existing resources and/or similar levels of service at reduced cost. Collaboration does this while retaining local police forces and local accountability.

Following the HMIC report *Closing the Gap*, the five East Midlands forces and their PAs considered how best to identify and address gaps within protective services (serious and organised crime, major crime, strategic roads policing, civil contingencies, critical incidents and public order). New emphasis was placed on working collaboratively after the Home Office withdrew its 2005 plans to merge police forces.

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The five police forces individually and collectively identified those areas where there is the greatest need to increase capacity and capability to address protective service gaps. This assessment drew on local, regional and national data and will be updated periodically. The areas with the most urgency for improvements across more than one force are the priority for a regional programme and for significant progress by 2009.

Regional protective services work programme:

- Witness protection
- Making best use of police officers with specialist operational skills
- Domestic abuse
- Technical support to police operations
- Hi-tech crime
- Ability to tackle cross-regional and national criminality impacting on the region
- Live and cold case reviews
- Surveillance support teams

Parallel work conducted with support from consultants identified opportunities for greater productivity.

Regional productivity projects:

- Tape summarising
- Managing demand
- Managing resources
- Prisoner processing and file preparation
- workforce modernisation
- Forensics and identification
- Authorisation for specialised surveillance
- Mobile data
- Aligning policy and procedure across forces

A collaboration programme team manages the programme of regional work. The team will cost £1.13 million in 2008/09 and £1.2 million in 2009/10. It is funded jointly by the five police forces. Projects are led by chief officers from around the region. The programme is overseen by a collaboration board, comprising Chief Constables, the chairs and members of PAs. This board meets approximately every six weeks. It provides the detailed management of the programme. There is further oversight of the work through the East Midlands joint police authorities committee, which meets quarterly in public. Detailed information about the programme of regional collaboration on protective services and productivity, including work beyond 2008/09, is set out in the East Midlands regional collaboration plan.

## Efficiency

Ways in which the force is increasing its efficiency are:

**Workforce modernisation** – With over 80% of the budget being spent on police officers and police staff, people resources must be used effectively. The force is looking at opportunities to change the mix of support staff and police officers to make sure they have the right people doing the right job. Over the last two years they have redeployed 45 police officers from support roles and returned them to front-line duties.

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**Moving resources away from lower risk areas** – Some areas of policing pose less of a threat to Derbyshire than others. The force is assessing where it can better place resources to effectively manage high priority issues.

**Section review** – The force is reviewing its current force structure to find ways to release police officer resources to improve its ability to respond to public service demand.

**Making the most of technology** – The force is working on the development of mobile data technology to improve officer visibility by making processes traditionally only accessible within police stations to officers out on patrol. This has the potential to reduce bureaucracy and improve data timeliness and efficiency.

### Future developments

- Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) expansion to include fixed systems operating in town centres and major road networks.
- Seeking to increase investigation of criminal lifestyles through an increased capacity for the economic crime unit.
- Increasing intervention and support services through the priority and prolific offenders' scheme.
- Developing services available for alcohol addiction.
- Working to address the link between substance abuse and violent crime.
- The investigation of domestic violence (DV) is a critical area where the force is continually looking to improve its response. Learning from the successes of two enforcement campaigns and when resources allow, the force would like to see specialist investigators dealing with all aspects of serious domestic assaults.
- Implementing the results from local research to tackle alcohol-related violence, the force is concentrating on improving the operation of the night-time economy by working closely with partners and the industry and utilising legislative arrangements when necessary.
- Bringing the safer schools initiative closer to the safer neighbourhoods work to extend the possibilities and engagement with communities through KINs.
- Acknowledging the benefits that the public have recognised in the deployment of community support officers the force will look to secure the resources to extend these valuable resources in the priority areas.
- A programmed series of internal SNT inspections has been developed to ensure the teams maintain and continue their high quality of service within their communities.
- Continued support of the SNTs coupled with greater partnership work and further improvements on crime reduction methods to help reduce volume crime.
- Identifying and implementing initiatives to support the Government's action plan for tackling violence, *Saving Lives. Reducing Harm. Protecting the Public.*  
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/violent-crime-action-plan-180208>

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## Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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### Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Derbyshire Constabulary's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.374	0.303	-18.98%	0.308
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.071	0.112	+57.75%	0.060
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	100.00%	72.73%	-27.27pp*	80.51%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.377	0.132	-64.99%	0.125
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	13.51%	84.62%	+71.11pp*	52.71%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.214	0.255	+19.16%	0.232
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	38.10%	52.00%	+13.9pp*	58.71%
Number of manslaughter per 10,000 population	0.041	0.010	-75.61%	0.023
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	75.00%	200.00%	+125pp*	82.92%
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.071	0.061	-14.08%	0.082
% of murders detected/convicted	57.14%	100.00%	+42.86pp*	91.08%

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Number of rapes per 10,000 population	2.843	2.548	-10.38%	1.944
% of rapes detected/convicted	21.51%	23.60%	+2.09pp*	23.28%

\*pp' is percentage points.

\*\*MSF group for Derbyshire is Cheshire, Essex, Gloucestershire, Norfolk, Staffordshire, Warwickshire and West Mercia.

From the SPI data contained in the table above it can be seen that Derbyshire is under threat from rape offences. The rate of offences (per 10,000 population) is significantly higher than the MSF average and is also above the national average. It should be noted that Derbyshire experienced a significantly reduced number of offences in 2007.

The SPI data also indicates that major crime investigation in Derbyshire is comparable with that of the peer forces. There are some areas where the force performance exceeds the MSF average but also some areas (in particular attempted murder and kidnapping) where the force performance is worse than the MSF average.

The NPSAT published in September 2007 indicated that Derbyshire was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to homicide, rape and kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

While OCG mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Derbyshire Constabulary has made inroads into the problem and its resident groups have been initially mapped.

The force strategic assessment reveals a clear understanding of the markets fed by serious and organised crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified level 2 OCGs, terrorism, drugs supply and gun crime as its serious, organised crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on these identified priorities.

Within the documentation overall the issues have in part been identified and addressed.

The force has invested suitable resources in the interventions needed to maximise harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and inhibit serious, organised crime. In particular, Derbyshire's role in the provision of technical support to regional and national partners is noteworthy.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a maturing process in its approach to tackling serious and organised criminality. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with Leicestershire,

**Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire and Northamptonshire are recognised, in particular the ongoing work with EMSOU and the regional intelligence group.**

## Intelligence

**Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation and equipment.**

### Strengths

- The major crime unit (MCU) has a dedicated intelligence analyst who provides resources for major crime operations conducted across the force area. The analyst works closely with major crime staff to assist in the production of analytical products. This resource can be supplemented by the use of level 2 analysts from FIB.
- FIB analysts and HQ analysts provide additional specialist products, such as those relating to violent crime, analysis of homicide, vulnerable young missing persons and sexual offences against children. This is in conjunction with ongoing work for Operation Relentless 2, which seeks to reduce the incidence of violent crime across the county.
- Out-of-hours intelligence research is available through the RTIU, which has a 24/7 research capability available to all staff, with ready access to all intelligence databases across the force.
- There is also an on-call intelligence manager at DI level providing the 24/7 force coverage.

### Work in progress

- Although the force does have sufficient analytical capability, until recently it has not been identifying intelligence on the basis of risk and threat. This change in methodology is seen as a positive development by staff but the force needs to ensure that it does not return to a more volume crime performance-focused approach as a result of tasking from BCUs or departments. This means that staff across the force must understand the need for a change in the type of work produced and that the potential improvement to harm reduction is communicated.
- All force NIM tactical documents are now based on risk and threat. This follows the risk seminar attended by senior officers and analysts in November 2007. The strategic assessment is now a risk-based document with the top 34 risk and threat areas identified. BCUs are now preparing risk/threat based assessments. Communication and guidance of the new strategy has been carried out in person by the director of intelligence and senior analyst to relevant staff. It forms part of a half-day presentation to all staff led by the Chief Constable, which is being rolled out over the next two months with the aim of maximising audience opportunities.

### Areas for improvement

- The force does carry out homicide prevention activity such as murder suppression activity and identification of near miss events that would otherwise have resulted in a homicide. The effectiveness of this work is not collated or analysed centrally. If this occurred the force could use it to identify good practice and understand the effectiveness of activity in this area of business. This is now

being actioned by the public protection board.

- Analytical capability is reduced as a result of the requirement to carry out research functions, as well as other performance and administrative type tasks, both on BCUs and within FIB. The SOCU does not have access to a dedicated analyst, although it can use other force analysts (but this capacity is similarly constrained by other responsibilities assigned to these analysts).

**Summary – The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force’s community impact assessments (CIAs) to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.**

### **Strengths**

- Along with key partners in Derbyshire, the force has signed the Derbyshire Partnership Forum information-sharing protocol. This provides a framework for information sharing across the respective organisations; it also commits partner organisations to draw up information-sharing agreements to meet specific business needs in an agreed format.
- Information sharing also takes place at the safer communities tasking and advisory group, which acts as a co-ordination group for the safer communities board. The SDRI uses data provided by each force district, statutory and non-statutory partners to produce a county-wide strategic intelligence assessment and associated control strategy. The unit also produces force and district level operational intelligence assessments for local CDRPs.
- Other intelligence-sharing forums include:
  - Derby City partnership management group;
  - Derby City partnership board;
  - local strategic partnership (LSP) strategic co-ordination group; and
  - LSP board and a safer neighbourhood implementation group.
- The force drugs market project is funded with partner agencies, analysing drug markets within the force using police and other intelligence sources. In addition to mapping open and closed drugs markets, it provides data on drug prices and purity. This intelligence is discussed at force tactical meetings and the six-monthly strategic meetings. Working with partners, all drug-related deaths are monitored through this process.
- In January 2007 an agreement with the probation service achieved the electronic exchange of information to assist both agencies in decision making around prison recalls. This agreement achieves compliance with the ACPO intelligence/information-sharing agreement and provides an effective process to deal with issues of MAPPA and prolific and priority offenders (PPOs).
- The force was able to produce documentary evidence of completed CIAs. IAG members gave examples of where they had been consulted on the impact of, and issues arising from, relevant incidents and operational activity.
- The major incident room (MIR) will make use of relevant specialists when required such as ballistic experts, interview advisers and forensic advisers.

### **Work in progress**

- The Derby City partners are currently developing the first city-wide multi-agency strategic assessment. The force has assisted in this by sharing appropriate information for the end product.
- The force is developing its use of SNTs to enhance its ability to acquire information about community tensions generated by incidents and operational activity. It is training SNTs in CIAs and their use. This includes use of the KINs across the 103 safer neighbourhoods which consists of some 12,000 community

contacts.

- An operation dealing with gangs and gang culture (including delinquent peer groups) is being developed by community safety to provide prevention and intelligence opportunities linked to the safer schools project and thereby reduce harm.

**Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – The force SA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly adequate. Problem profiles for homicide and violent crime are satisfactory, with links to force and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.**

### **Strengths**

- The force maintains violent crime as a priority and, although homicide does not feature as a separate area within this section, it is included in the old-style force strategic assessment. The force has produced a homicide profile that considered issues of repeat offending in relation to violent crime and DV. Violent crime is a force and BCU priority and analysis products at both the tactical and strategic levels reflect this. Operation Relentless 2 was initiated to tackle violence across the county and analytical products to support this have been produced.
- The force is taking a different approach to identification of risk in the force strategic assessment, which commences in March 2008. It has moved away from the traditional identification of crime types and performance indicators to identify issues relating to crime, disorder and community cohesion. It now evaluates levels of risk across three areas:
  - corporate risk (eg issues of resourcing);
  - community risk (eg changes to communities such as housing development); and
  - operational risk (eg OCGs).
- This has provided a much clearer basis on which the force can make decisions about the tasking and co-ordination of resources for deployment against identified threats and risk. As a result, level 2 OCGs, terrorism, drugs supply and gun crime are identified as the top operational risks confronting the force.
- FIB intelligence analysts have conducted a number of community profiles on emerging vulnerable groups within the county. These have included profiles on specific communities and immigrants from the new accession states to the European Union. The profiles have provided an understanding of issues such as language, culture and beliefs, to assist in developing appropriate service for these communities. The force continues to identify locations, groups and communities at risk through its environmental scanning process, and these risks are highlighted in force tactical documents.

### **Work in progress**

- The new force strategic assessment process, which looks at risk and threat, subdivides violent crime to identify separate risks such as gun crime, alcohol-related crime and knife crime. This subdivision of risks will provide a more accurate picture of the different aspects of violent crime and their associated risks. The assessment of each risk within the strategic assessment includes:
  - overview;
  - summary of current activity;
  - key issues;
  - score in relation to threat and risk; and
  - resource requirements based on level of risk.

Each area also has historical desired outcomes and actions to achieve the desired outcome. This allows progress and future desired outcomes/actions to be

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monitored and managed in a balanced manner relevant to the risk/threat level.

- This process includes the addition of intelligence and analysis of precursor crimes – for example, harassment reports for DV incidents and knife-carrying. The force is developing processes to ensure more effective identification of these types of precursor crimes at the initial reporting stage. Work is ongoing with contact management to attach a QFM (qualification marker) on command and control to each incident involving weapons. Specific operations on command and control system can then be set up, making research/signal crimes more identifiable and assisting analytical searches.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Intelligence products produced do follow the requirements of the NIM, although financial investigation is not always completed for subject profiles.
- The force needs to develop a process to identify the effectiveness of the changes that have been implemented, in particular the impact of activity in reducing/mitigating the level of threat and risk posed against the force priorities.

**Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are only recently being shared with partners and BCUs. There is an emerging trigger plan for ‘hot briefing’ when there is a significant change in either the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as probation, exist. The force can in part demonstrate that it is on track to reach full MoPI compliance by 2010.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has been subject to a peer review by the NPIA to check compliance with the MoPI requirements. The peer review examined all existing force policies, which included information-sharing agreements, and these were held to be MoPI compliant.
- The MCU deals with homicide investigations and assists with serious and organised crime investigations whenever HOLMES accounts are required. It has a dedicated MoPI officer to ensure compliance with legislation and national guidance.
- The force actively monitors its performance on the reporting requirements of the serious crimes analysis system (SCAS) and has achieved 100% compliance in the last three reporting periods.
- The homicide unit provided examples where it has engaged with the National Crime Faculty to facilitate work with specialists and used the Catchem database in ongoing investigations.
- The force has a local protocol with the probation service, with information exchange available via a secure electronic system. Data from the probation service is shared through FIB, with curfew enforcement protocols in place. MAPPA nominals presenting a risk when released from prison are recorded and monitored, along with other dangerous offenders. The RTIU also deals with breached curfew orders to ensure a 24-hour response from the force to manage these risks.
- The intranet provides a central point for all staff where national good practice contained in the NPIA guidance documents can be found.

### **Work in progress**

- In conjunction with regional partners the force is developing a policy dealing with IMPACT nominal index requests.
- The force is involved in GAIN, which includes partners such as the National Health Service. This has facilitated initiatives such as the accident and emergency protocol, giving access to appropriate levels of information on victims' injuries, such as gunshot wounds. The GAIN group sits monthly and is chaired by the deputy director of intelligence. Two referrals to the Regional tasking and coordination group have been made to date.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are in a timely way.**

### **Strengths**

- FIB intelligence analysts have conducted a number of community profiles on emerging vulnerable groups within the county. These have included profiles on specific communities and immigrants from the new accession states to the European Union. The profiles have provided an understanding of issues such as language, culture and beliefs, to assist in developing appropriate service for these communities. The force continues to identify locations, groups and communities at risk through its environmental scanning process, and these risks are highlighted in force tactical documents.
- The community safety department is an active participant in the force tasking and co-ordination meetings. This ensures that identification of level 1 signal crimes within communities, and their particular significance, is taken into account when assessing new and emerging threats to communities.
- The drug market mapping exercise generated intelligence about open and closed drugs markets across the county. The work also maps any effects or changes in those markets that are brought about through enforcement, treatment or educational activity.
- Neighbourhood teams have a clear understanding of community intelligence and have identified vulnerable locations and communities. They are aware of their role in the development of the rich picture and what the process is for submitting intelligence to support this objective.

### **Work in progress**

- The force has undergone a process of mapping OCGs as part of a national effort, co-ordinated regionally by EMSOU. Work is ongoing to refresh this original snapshot of information and the results will be included in the new force strategic assessment process. This will identify new risks and threats and inform future intelligence, prevention and enforcement activity to reduce harm. OCG matrix has been developed and is reviewed monthly. FIB DCs have specific OCG ownership as do the SOCU and BCUs where applicable. Regional links are continually being developed and active submissions made to Regional intelligence group and RTTCG/GAIN groups. There are examples of specific operations where harm reduction is part of the overall operational plan objectives.
- As part of the new strategic assessment process the force is progressing intelligence analysis to identify geographical hotspots in relation to operational risk, through a combination of risk and performance information. It will then use this analysis better to target resources, taking account of level of risks in particular geographical areas.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed annually by the ACC (support), who oversees the force risk committee. Each identified risk for major crime has a current action plan.**

### **Strengths**

- The SRMG, which meets quarterly, is chaired by the ACC (support). It is attended by a range of key personnel including the force corporate risk manager. The force strategic risk register identifies and comments on the following areas of corporate risk:
  - community and partnership;
  - competition and contracts;
  - finance;
  - environmental;
  - infrastructure and assets;
  - knowledge management;
  - leadership and organisation;
  - operational;
  - people; and
  - political and compliance.
- The work is linked to issues of business continuity and the manager for this business area also attends the meetings. The risk manager sits on the force business continuity group to ensure that cross-over issues are identified and addressed jointly.
- The force has a corporate risk manager who oversees compliance with the process. Mitigation activities for each of the risks is recorded and assigned to a risk owner to deliver. New risks can be added as identified after consultation with the ACC (support).
- Currently identified risks relating to major crime are vetting policy (a new risk), physical security checks, cross-border information sharing (used inappropriately), poor response to high profile incidents and corruption (linked to vetting).

### **Work in progress**

- With the introduction of the new strategic assessment the force aims to develop the strategic risk register, linking it with the identification of the four areas of risk. The risk assessment of force NIM and other business areas has been assessed and a matrix developed. A rollout programme is in progress to link the risk register with the strategic assessment.

### **Area for improvement**

- The current risk register and management system for organisational strategic risk does not link to the strategic assessment. Neither does the risk management approach inform the level of resources or use of force assets needed to achieve agreed priorities, which means the force does not have a method to assess whether its resources in a given area are sufficient to achieve its objectives.

July 2008

**Summary –The force is fully collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Some of the operational databases are searchable from GENIE. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been fully implemented.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has both policy and processes to ensure that intelligence obtained during investigations that is on the HOLMES system is transferred onto force intelligence systems so that it can be accessed by force personnel.
- Derbyshire is the lead force regionally for the implementation of national mutual aid telephony. This means that if any of the regional forces requires telephony services – for example, to distribute incoming calls relating to a major inquiry – then this service can be provided. This includes the actioning of MIRWEB with messages electronically sent to the relevant force's HOLMES server.
- The force is able to access intelligence systems across the force using a search engine that acts as a one-stop shop to capture intelligence held on various systems such as DV offenders, DV victims and missing persons.
- The force intelligence databases are not currently linked with those of surrounding forces, but it has a 24/7 access through the real time intelligence unit (RTIU), which other forces and partner agencies can also access when required. This unit is based at HQ and has dedicated staff working around the clock to provide intelligence across force systems to both internal and external staff.
- There is a strong working relationship with the regional intelligence group and EMSOU where exchange of intelligence is effective and used to develop regional intelligence products such as problem and subject profiles.
- Intelligence collection occurs across all sections and levels of the force; this includes a mechanism to add intelligence from ongoing murder investigations onto the force intelligence system as well as being contained within the HOLMES database.

### **Work in progress**

- The force is involved in the Insight project, which seeks to understand the benefits of and barriers to collaborative policing at a regional level, specifically in relation to level 2 criminality. One objective is to exploit intelligence sources and develop intelligence integration within the context of protective services.

### **Area for improvement**

- The force does not have access to real-time intelligence from fixed ANPR cameras. This means that data analysis can only be carried out retrospectively, building in time delays for ongoing operational activity.

**Summary – The force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is efficient. (*This refers to organisational learning.*)**

### **Strengths**

- The force has a dedicated major crime review unit that carries out 7-day and 28-day reviews of homicide and stranger rapes, in accordance with the major crime review policy and national guidelines. The force provided examples of comprehensive report documents that detail the conduct of the investigation and recommendations. The reviews are commissioned by the ACC (operations). Each review has terms of reference that are agreed prior to commencement of the work.
- As well as carrying out the formal review of homicide investigations, the force's major crime review unit is also commissioned to conduct thematic scrutinies of serious crime. For example, it has recently completed a review of stranger rape investigations, which included recommendations for changes to the force policy for investigation of rape and serious sexual offences. In October 2007 the unit completed a review of DV investigations, generating examples of good practice, requirements for forward planning and a number of recommendations. This type of work is also commissioned by the ACC (operations).
- Feedback and lessons learnt from the review process are presented at DI awareness days. Other training needs are actioned as required; this may take the form of inclusion in force orders or an intranet entry, to ensure that staff are made aware of changes to policy and practices.

### **Work in progress**

- The force has six outstanding cold cases: it is currently examining three of them.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.**

### Strengths

- The force carries out tasking and co-ordinating at levels 1 and 2, supported by the appropriate NIM-compliant products. The force has adopted the national briefing model, which provides a corporate approach to briefing and debriefing – this went live in October 2007. The force tasking meetings have commissioned profiles of youth gangs, homicide and emerging communities, which have led to actions in relation to enforcement, intelligence and prevention activities.
- Tasking and co-ordination meetings at both level 1 and level 2 are informed by the control strategy and other intelligence analysis products. A covert meeting prior to the level 2 tasking meeting discusses ongoing covert operations in detail. The restricted attendance ensures that operational activity can be discussed, progressed and managed within a controlled environment. The appropriate updates are then disclosed in the more widely attended level 2 tasking meeting. The minutes of the meetings record decision making (including where a decision is not to resource an operation with level 2 resources) and results of specialist operational activity.
- The allocation of specialist resources in support of level 1 operations follows the tasking requirements as established by the level 1 tasking and co-ordination meeting. This ensures that level 1 investigations can access specialist support from the surveillance teams, technical support and financial investigations. The process is documented in the serious and organised crime standard operating procedure.
- There are also effective systems to manage immediate tasking requirements outside of the tasking meetings. The on-call superintendent can authorise deployment of resources then brief the ACC (operations) as soon as possible. The activity and result are then provided to the next TCG.
- The profiling of emerging communities within the county has included profiles on the specific communities and communities from the new European Union accession states. This work has identified new and emerging threats as well as vulnerable groups within these communities. The profiles also provide an analysis of the OCGs that impact on, and operate within, these communities. The findings are then developed through the tasking and co-ordination process with prevention, enforcement and intelligence activity identified, actioned and reviewed at these meetings. Where appropriate, problem profiles have identified individuals who have then had a subject profile developed; for example, in relation to met amphetamine supply.
- The violent crime section of the strategic assessment includes consideration of DV and dangerous offenders. Problem profiles in relation to these issues are commissioned through the level 2 TTCG, with actions allocated via the same process. The force provided examples of problem profiles that identify current and future demands in relation to major crime, including:
  - vulnerable missing persons;
  - sexual offences;
  - sexual offending against children;
  - criminal use of firearms risk and threat assessment; and
  - homicide profiles on new and emerging communities.

**Work in progress**

- The force has produced a new tasking and co-ordination policy in accordance with the latest NPIA guidance, and the policy is currently subject to race equality scheme consultation.

**Area for improvement**

- Some specialist units are represented at the TCG but are not directly linked to the tasking process. For example, the hi-tech crime unit prioritises activity through its own internal risk matrix; although effective, this does not necessarily accord with organisational priorities.

**Summary – Due to appropriate training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.**

**Strengths**

- Diversity training is delivered to all first-line and countersigning managers. Officers are trained in risk assessment and problem solving, including CIA. SNT training provides more detail on community impact issues, and is delivered to all neighbourhood staff. FLOs are trained to ensure compliance with the issues that arose out of the Macpherson report.
- Senior investigating officer (SIO) development profiles require the SIO to evidence their competency in dealing with diverse communities for the level 3 national occupational standard.
- Community impact documents are completed for all major crimes to ensure that communities are treated fairly and with respect during enquiries. The force provided an example of SNT officers being seconded to a major operation because of their specialist knowledge of communities in a particular geographical area.
- The force policy and procedures for the management of serious crime is available on the intranet. It gives clear guidance as to the roles and responsibilities of police officers and police staff in the investigation of major crime. Although there is no specific reference to PIP level 3 it states that the head of department crime support is responsible for the selection of the SIO dependent upon the skills of the SIOs and the category of the homicide enquiry. There are four PIP level 3 accredited SIOs.
- Evidence of the use of IAGs and KINs for major crime enquiries in relation to diversity issues was provided by the force – a particular example involved a murder victim and subsequent suicide victim from different religious backgrounds. The IAG and KINs provided advice and guidance on potential community tensions and how these could be mitigated against.

**Work in progress**

- None identified.

**Area for improvement**

- Specialist staff posts should be assessed to identify whether additional relevant diversity training, such as dealing with bereavement in different cultures, should be part of their skills profile.

## Prevention

**Summary – The force has an IAG and key individuals and this is frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.**

### Strengths

- The five IAGs, KINs and other support networks are used to gauge community tensions in relation to high-impact crimes and investigations, as well as to assist decision making by the force. They are also provided with information on crime trends and performance data. The force-wide strategic IAG has an independent chair elected on an annual basis from within the group. The terms of reference and induction process have been reviewed and updated. Individual members continue to be engaged for advice on critical incidents and by planning and policy groups in areas such as crimes in action, service delivery and the M1 road-widening scheme. They also attend force training exercises such as those for negotiators and firearms officers.
- KINs are being established on the force's 103 neighbourhoods; they will complement BCU-based community contact networks maintained by BCU community safety units, such as the Derby City advisory group.
- The force engages with a number of prevention campaigns – for example, 'gun safe' – with the education department, which works with partners to introduce gun-crime awareness in identified schools. It also promotes the natural born leaders scheme, which is a positive young people's leadership programme.

### Work in progress

- None identified.

### Area for improvement

- The force should consider the use of IAGs to review force policy and partnership arrangements for diversity. This would provide a community view of how these areas are implemented and whether they are meeting community needs.

**Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were sufficiently understood by call-management staff and first responders.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has a number of strategy and policy documents covering separate areas relating to major crime and serious and organised crime, including the homicide unit. The documents demonstrate how the force homicide research and analytical cells support the investigation of major crime.
- The use of the HOLMES system is outlined in an operating practice and procedures document and in a force policy on the deployment of FLOs, to ensure that this complies with the existing ACPO family liaison strategy.
- The force control room staff had been trained in issues relating to kidnap and extortion incidents.
- All control room inspectors are firearms silver commanders and available on duty 24 hours a day; they will take control of potential critical incidents until a formal gold, silver, bronze command structure can be implemented. This is achieved through use of the call-out lists available electronically.
- The command and control system provides access to contingency plans to deal effectively with incidents of major crime. Control room staff and first responders are aware of the ‘golden hour’ principles contained within the 2005 practice advice on core investigative doctrine. This ensures positive action in the period immediately following a report of crime.
- The force has systems and processes to ensure that appropriate staff are called out to investigate major crime. These include call-out rotas for identified specialists in area such as homicide, rape and firearms offences. Crime scene managers and crime scene co-ordinators assist SIOs to implement their scene management policy.
- The force employs a full-time forensic trainer who delivers inputs to all training for investigation staff including PCSOs, call-handling and custody staff, to ensure that they understand the principles of scene and evidence preservation.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area for improvement**

- The control room staff have not recently been tested on their response to a report of a kidnap incident. It should be part of the wider kidnap and extortion investigation training that is ongoing in specialist units. The contact management centre has received input regarding their response by the force champion for kidnap. The requirement for a ‘cold call’ for a crime in action will be included within the force crime in action plan. This will be facilitated with the SOCA regional lead on kidnap and extortion.

**Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.**

**Strengths**

- The violent crime section of the strategic assessment includes consideration of DV and dangerous offenders. Problem profiles in relation to these issues are commissioned through the level 2 TTTCG, with actions allocated via the same process. The force provided examples of problem profiles that identify current and future demands in relation to major crime, including:
  - vulnerable missing persons;
  - sexual offences;
  - sexual offending against children;
  - criminal use of firearms risk and threat assessment; and
  - homicide profiles on new and emerging communities.
- At level 2, Special Branch also retains its own intelligence analyst who produces dedicated profiles, while BCU-based SNTs gather community intelligence for profiles on terrorism and OCGs.
- The force has also developed a response to the emerging problem of vulnerable adults dying as a result of neglect. This type of death often goes unreported to the police, but is increasingly now being identified by, for example, the degree and type of bed sore that might, without proactive intervention, be seen as non suspicious.
- The force has previously carried out a review of a firearms supply investigation on behalf of the NFIC. This provided enforcement and intelligence opportunities about the supply of illegal firearms. A significant number of nominals were identified for some type of enforcement activity and for intelligence debriefs.
- The force is involved in GAIN, which includes partners such as the National Health Service. This has facilitated initiatives such as the accident and emergency protocol, giving access to appropriate levels of information on victims' injuries, such as gunshot wounds. The GAIN group sits monthly and is chaired by the deputy director of intelligence; two referrals to the RTTCG have been made to date.
- The community safety department is an active participant at the force tasking and co-ordination meetings. This ensures that the significance of level 1 signal crimes affecting communities can be taken into account when gauging new and emerging threats to communities. Where required these are developed into problem profiles; for example, for Operation Relentless 2 to combat violence including town centre drink-related crime.

**Work in progress**

- The force is developing an organised crime mapping exercise with the regional intelligence unit. It is working to update the threat and risk scores on a monthly basis, in order to identify the effects of any enforcement activity that has been carried out. This will identify over time any reduction in the threat levels of OCGs.

**Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – The force’s policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of regional cross-border multi-agency operations are abundant.**

**Strengths**

- The force life at risk policy has recently been reviewed: the draft will be subject to wide consultation prior to implementation.
- Staff at all levels were aware of the policy and had received an input on duties and responsibilities following the murder of Tanya Moore, which was the subject of an IPCC investigation.
- The life at risk policy risk assessment section covers:
  - events (what happened);
  - issues relating to the threat;
  - intelligence system checks;
  - responses;
  - threat management strategy; and
  - monitoring and ongoing risk management.
- The policy clearly sets out the responsibility for officers in the case to manage risk until they hand over responsibility to an appointed inspector or superintendent. This handover must be documented and the receiving officer must open a decision log on accepting responsibility. This is available to all staff via the intranet.
- As well as demonstrating the requirements in relation to Osman warnings (relating to real and immediate risk to life), evidence was produced of effective responses when the threshold has been lower but where official action has contributed to the risk as established by the Van Colle test (when a vulnerable witness was murdered after a force had rejected his request for protection).
- The force also provided examples where the threat to life policy has been applied to manage risks arising from professional standards investigations.
- The force has been involved in a joint operation, in collaboration with the four other East Midlands forces, to identify offenders of distraction burglaries by using the ANPR system. This has proved successful, although there is currently a question over its sustainability.
- The force has carried out a review of the availability of firearms within the county on behalf of the NFIC, which has generated enforcement and intelligence-gathering options to tackle the illegal supply of firearms.
- Derbyshire is part of the East Midlands ACPO region, which has expanded its collaborative work significantly in the last three or so years. EMSOU was established in 2005, funded by the five forces and national resources. Together with the regional intelligence unit it constitutes the regional TCG, chaired by a Leicestershire ACC. This group meets at six-weekly intervals to allocate resources and direct activity, informed by the tactical and strategic assessments produced by EMSOU. These assessments are based on products from all five regional forces and identify cross-border threats and risk.
- The force is involved in GAIN, which includes partners such as the National Health Service. This has facilitated initiatives such as the accident and emergency protocol, giving access to appropriate levels of information on victims’

injuries, such as gunshot wounds.

### **Work in progress**

- The force is developing analytical products to profile gangs and gang culture, as well as mapping OCGs operating in the county. This includes identifying and learning from similar work in metropolitan and other areas, to assist in the assessment of current and future impacts of major and serious crime.
- As a result of the death of Tanya Moore at the hands of her partner, staff are identifying even very low-level risks as potential life at risk; for example, when threats are made from a distance by a person with no obvious means of carrying out the stated threat. The approach is 'better to record than potentially miss a risk issue'. Although positive that all known threats are being dealt with, the force is starting to ensure that the response and management strategies are appropriate.
- The force is in the process of refreshing the threat to life policy, incorporating a new style risk assessment to improve the consistency and accuracy in determining the level of threat achieved. As part of this review the force is examining access to archived files, which are available electronically in the BCU system. Although some details of the incident and intelligence are available on other force systems, full access would provide decision makers with access to all previous decisions and their associated rationales.
- The force lead for homicide reduction is the detective superintendent for major crime. A homicide reduction strategy covering the areas of enforcement, intelligence and prevention has been completed in consultation with a number of other portfolio holders. It is included on the public protection board as an agenda item and is work in progress.

### **Area for improvement**

- Staff are aware of the need to identify 'life at risk' situations but few have been trained in dynamic risk assessment inputs; staff were confident, however, that they would recognise 'life at risk' issues and gave appropriate examples of this. In order to address the stated overuse of the life at risk policy where other intervention strategies may be more appropriate the force could consider improving risk identification training for staff. Life at risk policy training is part of the Derbyshire refresher course, which is targeting all officers up to and including inspector.

July 2008

**Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by on-demand covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by, dedicated staff only. The force is partially collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.**

### **Strengths**

- In 2007 FIB – which has the strategic lead for witness protection – reviewed, revised and implemented the protected persons policy. This identifies the circumstances that would trigger the necessary action to support witnesses under threat, and the roles of particular staff.
- The force is also involved in the regional working group for witness protection, which is chaired by a detective chief superintendent from Northamptonshire. This forum develops working practices on intelligence handling and issues of witness protection. The force maintains active contact with regional partners and other witness protection officers. Information is collated on an electronic database, which ensures active management of those subjects. The force has a process to ensure that senior managers are contacted and able to manage critical issues as and when they arise; this reduces the threat of compromise. Monthly management meetings are used to monitor all witness protection subjects.
- Derbyshire maintains regular contact with forces in relation to witness protection activity within the county. A system is in place to deal with any critical issues that may arise without compromising the witness or their location. Monthly management meetings monitor all witness protection issues including requests for involvement in the management of resident protected witnesses from other force areas. Information is collated on an electronic database, which ensures active management of those subjects.
- The force provided examples to demonstrate an understanding and knowledge of the legislation and procedures required for witness protection.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area for improvement**

- Some staff had very limited knowledge of witness protection issues but they were very cognisant of the force threat to life policy, and all knew that they should contact a critical incident manager in the event of an issue arising. This is good practice but not all critical incident managers – although versed in the threat to life policy – had received any input on witness protection specifically. Although their knowledge does not need to match the level of specialist officers, given their management responsibility it would be appropriate to enhance their skills in areas such as this and link it to risk assessment training.

**Summary – The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.**

### **Strengths**

- The force does use customer satisfaction surveys to compare the levels of crime in communities. Comparisons are made with levels of satisfaction both pre- and post-operational activity within geographical locations.
- Some results analysis was carried out for Operation Relentless 2, combating violent crime in the county. This examined the effectiveness of the operational activity in reducing crime levels.
- Level 1 crime trends are monitored by divisional and HQ analysts, providing an opportunity to identify hotspots in acquisitive crime and other crime categories through exception reporting. This monitoring is reported at daily management meetings and the monthly tactical meetings. If a long-term trend becomes apparent then the levels of harm will be assessed at the force strategic meeting, and it may be adopted as a force priority. An example of how the force tackles an identified increase in crime is an operation countering street robbery. The force action plan included activity to:
  - identify and target persistent offenders and groups;
  - provide a professional response to the offence of street robbery;
  - provide a focus on robbery investigations in Derby division;
  - reduce vulnerability of members of the public to attack; and
  - provide a visible and effective deterrent to offending in identified locations.
- Combined with the force performance monitoring and management regime, this enabled the force to guide activity to reduce harm caused by this type of crime.
- The community safety department is an active participant at the force tasking and co-ordination meetings. This ensures that the identification and significance of level 1 signal crimes within communities (seen by this department as part of ongoing work) is taken into account in the recognition of new and emerging threats to communities.

### **Work in progress**

- The force has commissioned a detailed programme of work to investigate and understand the drivers of public satisfaction, confidence and fear of crime. Two surveys have been commissioned. The first, called the VISION survey, has been developed to evaluate the success of Safer Neighbourhoods in identifying and tackling local priorities, specifically focusing on satisfaction and confidence in the local police. This survey will be undertaken twice a year using the KINs as respondents with results being available at the SNT level allowing for local action plans to be developed. An online version of the survey is available on the force website for members of the public to complete as well. The second survey, called the FOCUS survey, has been developed to understand the drivers of fear of crime. This will be undertaken on a rolling monthly programme with a target sample size of 4,000 respondents. Results will be made available at the postcode sector level allowing for local action plans to be developed. Both pieces of work will be co-ordinated through the citizen focus programme board.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Results analysis is limited in its use, mainly addressing performance problems – for example, changes in numbers of crimes. It is not used to identify opportunities for organisational learning or capture what success looks like.
- The force does not currently identify possible harm measures relevant to communities specifically on homicide, although it would be able to identify risk factors through partnership working and with the IAGs.
- Homicide prevention work is managed through BCUs and is not co-ordinated centrally. The work should have an identified champion or strategic lead to co-ordinate and drive activity, to ensure that the force maximises the opportunity for harm reduction in this area.

**Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a developing policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.**

### **Strengths**

- The PSD has a proactive approach to maintaining high ethical standards within the force. This has been evidenced by high profile operations to identify corrupt staff and ensure that they are dealt with appropriately, in some cases being required to resign from the service or dismissed.
- In relation to serious and organised criminality work many staff are already vetted to a security cleared level.
- All staff were aware of the requirements of operational confidentiality and have signed confidentiality agreements in connection with operational activity in which they are involved.
- The PSD is actively involved in the tasking process and contributes to the covert tasking meeting so that security issues can be discussed and addressed with managers. The PSD also produces a strategic and tactical assessment for the head of crime support to highlight force risk and enforcement action.
- The PSD is involved in anti-corruption initiatives and gave examples of data systems that are scrutinised to ensure that they are being used in line with force policies and legislative requirements.
- The confidential unit working with regional partners such as EMSOU is tasked with the effective protection of sensitive assets that are deployed on operational activity.
- The major crime review team has conducted operational reviews on behalf of the PSD and the department has worked with external partners to identify corrupt officers who have subsequently been arrested.
- The force crime intelligence system is fully auditable and is proactively monitored by the anti-corruption unit. Other force systems such as HOLMES and PNC are also integrity tested by the anti-corruption unit.
- The command and control system is not auditable but the anti-corruption unit can monitor activity where intelligence suggests any misuse.
- The department has two dedicated analysts who can provide intelligence products to ensure that an operational activity is targeted effectively.

### **Work in progress**

- Security vetting is a continuing process; 250 high-risk posts have been identified throughout the force and a prioritised programme to vet these staff is being undertaken.
- The force recognises that vetting is needed not just for new appointments but when staff move positions. A new system is in place to conduct vetting before any sensitive post is filled.

**Area for improvement**

- Currently, vetting is only reviewed on a needs basis – for example, when a risk is identified or in line with the minimum standards as set out in national vetting guidance. There is no requirement for staff in sensitive posts regularly to sign a statement that no changes in circumstances have occurred in, for example, the previous 12 months. This type of approach would enable the organisation to raise the issue of continued security vetting with staff in sensitive posts on an annual basis, rather than every five years as in some current cases.

## Enforcement

**Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.**

### Strengths

- PA involvement in major crime is led by nominated members for specific areas – for example, public protection, serious and organised crime and major crime. Where required, gold groups are convened and headed by the ACC (operations); IAGs inform gold groups when investigations involve the management of community and family concerns.
- The PA receives one- to three-year organisational business plans, which include a financial assessment of costs.
- The authority receives regular updates on both capital and revenue budgets, which include spending on major crime and serious and organised crime. There is also reporting against the force performance framework, together with briefings on completed and current major and serious and organised crime operations.
- PA members are vetted to the appropriate level.
- Senior officers provide operational briefings to PA members on the impact of serious and organised crime investigations on both the force and communities. Consideration of serious and organised crime also forms part of the overall force budget planning process as required by the PA.
- The PA has a constructive relationship with the crime support department and requests briefings on areas that cause concern in relation to effectiveness and/or efficiency. Members have also been to visit EMSOU to gain insight into its capacity and capability to tackle serious and organised criminality.
- The ACC (operations) has introduced a system of management and performance meetings to ensure that senior managers of BCUs and specialist departments are held accountable for the delivery of results in the force priority areas.
- Scientific support performance is monitored through the collection of data on scene attendance and submission turnaround times. In order to manage costs the force has trialled alternative forensic service providers.

### Work in progress

- The PA has recognised the need to receive more comprehensive information in relation to major crime and serious and organised crime, and how these relate to harm reduction. It is currently working with officers on the development of a suitable process, which will include improved forecasting of spend against budgets.
- Although there is no separate formal governance in respect of major crime by the PA there are PA leads for the crime support department who are active in developing understanding of the issues relating to this area of business. The chair of the PA has visited the crime support department and all PA members have received a comprehensive briefing in order to raise awareness of relevant issues.
- The PA is involved in the new strategic assessment process that identifies force

priorities based on analysis and understanding of threat and risk.

**Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

July 2008

**Summary – The ACPO lead and the head of crime are not yet trained in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, CIAs and policing in partnership.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has three SIOs trained in the management of linked and serious crime. MIRs and the MCU are structured to support work on crimes of this nature. The head of crime support is PIP level 3 accredited.
- Specialist training is provided through nationally accredited training courses. There is a system of continuous professional development, with events held in force to update officers' skills in areas such as siege management and kidnap and extortion investigations.

### **Work in progress**

- Both the ACC (operations) and head of crime support were due to attend linked crime series training in 2008.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – The force’s performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of inputs and outputs.**

**Strengths**

- The force is aware of the potential for specialist departments to slip into self-tasking because of the length and complexity of serious crime investigations. As a result, the force set up the covert tasking process, which prompts detailed discussions on appropriate task assignment. This reduces the danger of ‘mission creep’ and focuses outcomes on force priorities. Each business area has a tasking and co-ordination process to assess all current operations, which informs the covert tasking meeting.
- The force has established a new process to inform the force strategic assessment, control strategy, tasking and prioritisation of activity. This process has moved away from the identification of priorities by crime type to assessment of risk and threat. One of the areas covered is operational threat and as a result of the process, level 2 OCGs have been identified as posing the greatest threat to the force; this will be reflected in force priorities and tasking accordingly.
- This new assessment of risk and threat was compared with the data supplied by the NPSAT, and the latter NPSAT reflected the force’s own analysis.
- The force currently collects data on inputs and outputs relating to activity against OCGs such as numbers and types of deployments, convictions, sentences and confiscation orders secured. Where elements can be costed specifically these are managed against the identified budget.
- The regional heads of performance management meet to compare and contrast current performance and identify new working practices to improve links between intelligence and performance information.

**Work in progress**

- The force has introduced a crime support tasking and co-ordination meeting to link separate business areas together and monitor large scale investigations ongoing across a force.

**Area for improvement**

- The force does not currently include a financial review of individual operations as part of the tasking process, although budget management processes are in place.

## Performance Management and Resilience

**Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with SOCA and EMSOU exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide partial protection for the investigative capability.**

### Strengths

- Derbyshire currently has eight detectives who have successfully completed the core stage of the national SIO development programme. These officers will be assessed to confirm that they are occupationally competent before being accredited on the national PIP level 3 register.
- There are 22 tier 5 interview trained advisers who can be called upon for major crime investigations. These officers were trained alongside officers from Nottinghamshire Police on a nationally accredited course.
- The force has 225 PIP level 2 investigators, who are compiling evidence to confirm that they meet the national occupational standard on a continual basis.
- The force PIP project board is chaired by the ACC (support), and an implementation group ensures that issues such as registration, succession planning and training are identified and actions taken to address them.
- The force used the MIRWEB system to assist in the extraordinary caller demand generated as a result of the murders in Suffolk in 2007. The force also tests this system on a regular basis to ensure the system and staff are ready to be put into operation when required. The force is represented on a national forum to improve working practices, and was recently involved in the national exercise to evaluate call-taking response in the event of several national major incidents occurring on the same day.
- The force has sufficient accommodation at HQ and on BCUs to set up and run MIRs. Some of these facilities are used for other purposes when not required for a major incident but staff are aware that this is their primary function. The force employs appropriate physical security to ensure the confidential nature of enquiries is maintained.
- The scientific support unit can call on six crime scene managers and four crime scene co-ordinators to assist major crime enquiries. The fingerprint bureau has an on-call facility.
- There are 64 FLOs available to be deployed for crime and Road Traffic Collisions investigations. They are co-ordinated through the major incident support team supervisor. SIOs have been trained in the use of FLOs and have ready access to them when they are required.
- The collision investigation unit comprises 1 inspector, 3 sergeants, 15 constables and 2 police staff vehicle examiners. The officers in the case are trained SIOs for road collisions and deal with all fatal and life-changing RTCs.
- The command and control system provides access to contingency plans to deal effectively with incidents of major crime. Control room staff and first responders are aware of the 'golden hour' principles contained within the 2005 practice

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advice on core investigative doctrine. This ensures positive action in the period immediately following a report of crime.

- Unexplained deaths are all referred to an investigative supervisor of inspector level. An initial assessment is made and appropriate resources assigned.

**Work in progress**

- None identified.

**Area for improvement**

- The force has a level covert forensic specialist but there are no level 2 trained crime scene investigators (CSIs) to complement overt evidence-gathering at major and serious crime scenes.

**Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Elements of test purchase and undercover operations are delivered through written collaborative agreements, which are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.**

### **Strengths**

- The SOCU structure manages the deployment of specialist resources – for example, conventional and technical surveillance and intrusive deployments in support of specialist investigations. The deployment of assets through the tasking and co-ordinating processes at both level 1 and level 2 ensures sufficient flexibility to allow for hot tasking as required.
- The technical support unit has access to new, purpose-built accommodation and is capable of providing a comprehensive range of services, as required by the SOCU. This unit is co-located with EMSOU, under the same manager. This structure provides additional capacity for both force and region when needed.
- The force has access to a comprehensive range of covert tactics and specialist services for both serious and organised crime and major crime investigations. In addition to its own resources, it has effective relationships with EMSOU and SOCA, as well as regional forces.
- The force has a dedicated surveillance capability and is able to call on other law enforcement agencies and regional partners if it is subject to exceptional demand.
- There are sufficient surveillance teams available for operational deployment.
- The force has dedicated source handling units on each territorial division and a level 2 unit within the force intelligence directorate. Staff involved in this type of activity are trained to the appropriate national standard and at level 2 there is a dedicated controller.
- The force has a level 2 dedicated source unit with, if required, access to undercover assets managed by EMSOU. The force was able to provide examples of this type of deployment and demonstrate that intelligence is managed through the confidential unit and a specific operational syndicate to improve security arrangements.
- A written protocol is in place between the five East Midlands regional forces, namely the East Midlands regional information and co-ordination centre (EMRICC). This collaboration was developed to maintain communication and co-ordination across the region, thereby providing effective identification and deployment of the necessary resources to a mobilisation event, which will include either a spontaneous incident or a pre-planned event, either in or outside the region. EMRICC has been activated on four occasions – for example, following the disappearance of Madeleine McCann from Portugal in May 2007 and more recently an operation concerning the widening of the M1 motorway through the region. An ACPO lead is appointed on each occasion to direct EMRICC.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

**Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

## Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

### A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition

### B

BCU	basic command unit
BME	black and minority ethnic
BOFF2	system linking ANPR to real-time intelligence operations

### C

CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CEOP	child exploitation online protection
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CIA	community impact assessment

### D

DC	detective constable
DCC	deputy chief constable
DI	detective inspector
DV	domestic violence

### E

EMRICC	East Midlands regional information and co-ordination centre
EMSOU	East Midlands special operations unit

### F

FIB	force intelligence bureau
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FLO family liaison officer

**G**

GENIE general information enquiry system (search engine)

GOEM Government Office for the East Midlands

**H**

HMI Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HMRC Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

HOLMES Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

HQ headquarters

HMPS Her Majesty's Prison Service

**I**

IAG independent advisory group

ICCO Interception of Communications Commissioners Office

IPCC Independent Police Complaints Commission

**K**

KIN key individual network

**L**

LSP local strategic partnership

**M**

MAPPA multi-agency public protection arrangements

MCU major crime unit

MIM Murder Investigation Manual

MIR major incident room

MIRSAP	major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MIRWEB	call-handling system
MoPI	management of police information
MSF	most similar force(s)

**N**

NCF	National Crime Faculty
NFIC	National Firearms Intelligence Cell
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NPSAT	National Protective Services Analysis Tool

**O**

OCG	organised crime group
OSC	Office of Surveillance Commissioners

**P**

PA	police authority
PCSO	police community support officer
PIP	professionalising the investigative process
PNC	Police National Computer
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2004
PPO	prolific and priority offender
PSD	professional standards department

**Q**

QFM	qualification marker
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**R**

RIG	regional intelligence group
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
RIU	regional intelligence unit
RTC	road traffic collision
RTIU	real-time intelligence unit
RTTCG	regional tactical tasking and co-ordination group

**S**

SA	strategic assessments
SCAS	serious crimes analysis system
SDRI	safer Derbyshire research and information unit
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SNT	safer neighbourhood team
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SOCU	serious and organised crime unit
SPI	statutory performance indicator
SPOC	single point of contact
SRMG	strategic risk management group

**T**

TCG	tasking and co-ordination group
TSU	technical support unit
TTCG	tactical tasking and co-ordination group