

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Cumbria Constabulary Major Crime

July 2008



Cumbria Constabulary – HMIC Inspection Report

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Contents

Introduction to HMIC Inspections

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09
Programmed Frameworks
Major Crime
Future Programmed Inspections
The Grading Process
Developing Practice
Force Overview and Context

Findings

Major Crime

Recommendations

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical Description of Force Area

Cumbria is the second largest county in England by area and has a population of just under half a million; it remains one of the most sparsely populated counties. Its largest settlements, Carlisle and Barrow in Furness, account for only 15% and 12% of the total

population respectively, while only 19 other settlements have a population of more than 2,500.

To the west of the county is the Irish Sea and to the east lie the Pennines. Within the county is the entire Lake District National Park, part of the Yorkshire Dales National Park, part of the North Pennines, and the Solway coast and Arnsdale -Silverdale areas of outstanding natural beauty. Some 37% of the county is national park and 30% is made up of areas of outstanding natural beauty.

Running north to south through the county are the M6 motorway and the West Coast mainline railway, while the A66 trunk road crosses from west to east. Much of the county is accessible using only 'B' and 'C' roads. Ports take commercial traffic and some passenger services.

Demographic Description of Force Area

Cumbria has significant isolated and rural communities and one of the lowest black and minority ethnic (BME) populations in the country. Each year, Cumbria attracts more than 23 million visitors from all over the world, 7 million of whom stay more than one day. The static population is made up of 19% aged 0–15, 9% aged 16–24, 27% aged 25–44, 27% aged 45–64, and 18% aged 65+.

In West Cumbria, Furness and Carlisle, the local economy relies heavily on manufacturing for economic output and employment; in the Lake District and east of the county, the emphasis is on tourism and agriculture. Unemployment is only 3.4%; approximately 37% of the population is in full time employment, 14% part time, 10% self employed and 17% retired. Of those employed, 19% are employed in manufacturing, 17% in the wholesale, retail and motor industries, 11% in health and social care and 4% in agriculture.

Strategic Priorities

The constabulary's strategic priorities for 2008–11 include the following:

Working with partners to improve neighbourhood policing by:

- increasing the number of police officers working in neighbourhoods and giving them specialist training;
- improving the way community intelligence is gathered; finding out what it is that the public feels is important in priority communities and focusing, with partners, on the problems that make communities feel they are not safe;
- continuing the RESPECT campaign to promote respectful behaviour and order in neighbourhoods, and piloting shared neighbourhood management with partners; and
- continuing to support partnerships in tackling dangerous driving, targeting the most prolific offenders and improving services to young people.

Tackling serious and organised crime by:

- increasing the force's capability and capacity to tackle serious and organised crime, identifying the harm this causes and improving the way intelligence is used;
- setting up effective structures and processes for tackling organised crime groups and dealing with major crimes;
- using automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) to catch criminals when they travel; and

- focusing, with partners, on reducing the harm caused in communities by Class A drugs.

Tackling dangerous offenders and the most serious kinds of violent crime by:

- increasing the force's capability and capacity to manage dangerous offenders;
- improving the way the force protects vulnerable adults and safeguards children; and
- improving services to victims of rape, working with partners to encourage the reporting of domestic violence and, with partners, tackling the problem of alcohol related violent crime.

Making better use of front line resources and maximising productive time by:

- investing in additional police staff detention officers;
- setting up systems to make essential operational information easier to collect, find and use, and piloting mobile data systems;
- developing strategies to reduce bureaucracy and improve the way in which the force receives and handles calls for service;
- setting up information technology (IT) systems to help manage the shifts and deployment of operational police officers and police staff;
- developing the estate to ensure it is fit for purpose; and
- reducing sickness and reviewing the way that police officers on restricted duties are deployed.

Building the constabulary's strengths for the future by:

- setting targets to improve efficiency and productivity, reinvesting savings in front line policing;
- investing in finance and personnel to help the force manage resources better;
- continuing to work with other organisations to tackle shared problems and explore opportunities to share support services;
- improving the way the force manages performance;
- implementing IMPACT to manage police information to national standards;
- developing strategies to identify and develop gifted police officers and staff and future leaders in the constabulary, and implementing e-learning; and
- updating plans to maintain services in the event of an emergency.

A strategic work programme approved by chief officers ensures that the constabulary remains focused on its objectives, with progress towards their achievement being scrutinised through a continuous and rigorous performance management process at both constabulary and basic command unit (BCU) levels.

Force Performance Overview

Force development since 2007 inspections

The way the constabulary works with neighbourhoods and local partners, using networks of key people and Street Safe operations to identify what is important in local communities, has been recognised nationally as good practice.

The constabulary has continued to promote its RESPCT campaign to tackle and reduce incidents of anti-social behaviour. The number of people across the county who are worried about anti-social behaviour has fallen from 62% in 2005 to 33% in 2007.

The constabulary has achieved outstanding crime detection rates (it is now fourth in the country) and also has the highest level of confidence in policing services.

July 2008

Under the county local area agreement, the constabulary has been working to reduce re-offending across the county. Since April 2007, the re-offending rate across Cumbria has fallen by 74.5%, and the constabulary's approach has been recognised by the Prime Minister as one of the best partnership programmes of its type in the country.

Cumbria Constabulary is a major partner in the local criminal justice board (LCJB), which has been awarded 'Beacon' status – a new way of managing change in the criminal justice system.

The constabulary is working with other forces to explore how it can combine services in a number of areas to improve the capacity and capability of policing in Cumbria. Similar work is being carried out to see whether it would be efficient to share support services.

The constabulary consolidated the work begun on the HMIC improvement plan for training, which resulted in HMIC regrading the function as 'Good' in June 2007.

Cumbria's Initial Police Learning and Development Programme (IPLDP) achieved full Stage III accreditation from the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) in December 2007, making it only the third constabulary in the country to achieve this. It also won a North West region National Training Award in September 2007 – one of 16 successful entries out of 2,500 applications from the region.

As identified in its policing plan, the constabulary is implementing a strategic change programme, which will provide appropriate protective services and secure budget savings, as well as sustaining improved neighbourhood policing. The constabulary is a successful organisation, and it aims to continue its success by reshaping itself to make the best use of resources, taking a balanced approach to managing risk over the medium term and maintaining its focus on protecting communities in Cumbria from harm.

The four year programme of work to improve protective services – which includes how the constabulary deals with major crime and how it tackles serious and organised crime – is to be achieved without damaging neighbourhood policing, where the constabulary has a very high reputation. A risk based approach was adopted, which assessed the comparative risks of savings and investment options and arrived at the strategic response with the lowest combined risk. The programme underpins budgetary and planning discipline and effective performance management.

These new structures have been consolidated by the realignment of chief officer portfolios, by a new Chief Constable taking up his post in September 2007, and by the introduction of an additional post of detective chief superintendent as head of crime, in recognition of the need to apply significant focus in this area.

Major Crime

GRADE	Fails to meet the standard
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Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Cumbria Constabulary's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as its response to preventing and investigating these crime types, and to prioritising those that pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

Previous HMIC inspections have identified significant shortfalls in the way that Cumbria Constabulary deals with major crime. The force and police authority have prioritised and reallocated resources in order to substantially invest in this critical area of work and have commenced a development programme. At the time of this inspection, however, there were inadequate resources in place for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and inhibit major crime. That said, as additional dedicated resources are trained and embedded, substantial improvements are to be expected within a short period of time.

If we look at the offences in the major crime category, the force has limited threat from all the major crime types, relative to its total population, when compared to its most similar forces (MSF). In particular, relative to the MSF, the volume of life threatening and gun crime and rape is low; in terms of the offence of kidnap, the force has improved its performance and is now in line with the MSF.

From the statutory performance indicator (SPI) data contained in the table below, it can be seen that Cumbria is not under threat from any of the crime types that make up the major crime category. Investigation of these offences is on a par with peers, with detection and conviction rates consistent with those of the MSF group average. Meanwhile, the large percentage variations must be considered in the context of the small numbers of actual offences involved.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT), released on 25 September 2007, reveals (Figure 1) that Cumbria Constabulary faces a low level of demand in respect of the policing response to homicide offences, which have declined and are in line with the average for MSF peer forces. The three year trend is downward, following a 2003/04 peak (largely linked to seven offences of manslaughter which were recorded following an outbreak of Legionnaires' disease at a Barrow in Furness town centre shopping plaza).

Cumbria Constabulary – HMIC Inspection Report

July 2008



	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life threatening & gun crime per 1,000 population	0.204	0.173	-15.20%	0.278
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.080	0.040	-50.00%	0.067
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	25.00%	100.00%	+75pp*	79.94%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.100	0.020	-80.00%	0.088
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	40.00%	0.00%	-40pp*	39.06%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.261	0.200	-23.37%	0.207
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	84.62%	40.00%	-44.62pp*	59.08%
Number of manslaughter crimes per 10,000 population	0.000	0.020	Not applicable	0.016
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	0.00%	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.000	0.060	Not applicable	0.079
% of murders detected/convicted	Not applicable	66.67%	Not applicable	88.92%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	1.443	1.463	+1.39%	1.895
% of rapes detected/convicted	38.89%	31.51%	-7.38pp*	25.56%

*'pp' is percentage points.

**Most similar forces (MSF) group for Cumbria is: Cheshire, Devon and Cornwall, Kent, Norfolk, North Yorkshire, Suffolk, and Wiltshire.

Figure 1

Homicides (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total



July 2008

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Cumbria Constabulary has sought to make progress and has ensured that analysis of major crime types are partially mapped. It is currently estimated that 30 OCGs impact the force area, involving a wide variety of major crime types across level 1 and level 2.

The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a limited understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified child abuse, domestic violence, public protection, missing people and Multi-agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on repeat victims, repeat offenders, child abuse offenders and all high risk offenders. Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and addressed.

Recognising the limited capacity within this relatively small force, this inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates signs of initial progress in its approach to managing major crime, through the development of collaborative arrangements with other forces on witness protection. It must be stated that this is at a very early stage and is currently not a working option.

Intelligence

The force has insufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime and to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has yet to commit to its major crime investigations with the requisite staff, although there is accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- The force has in place a structure of analytical support – from basic command unit (BCU) based analysts and senior analysts to the central force intelligence bureau (FIB) based analysts, senior analysts and principal analysts. The growth in this area over the last year has provided clear pathways for development and progression of analytical staff, while increasing the capacity at level 1 and level 2.
- A number of analysts in the force have had specific major incident room training. As part of an investigation into a stranger rape in summer 2007, a major incident room was opened and analytical support provided by the BCU intelligence unit.
- Among the senior and principal analysts of the force, there is an on call rota to support the immediate requirements of a major investigation.
- The force has undertaken a detailed analysis of all offences of homicide and serious assaults between 1998 and 2005, and this product was used to inform organisational developments within major crime investigation. It identified that the majority of such offences were related to domestic violence and alcohol abuse, and made several strategic recommendations concerning police and partnership activity to reduce offences.
- The force has completed a problem profile as part of its force rape action plan. This included analysis of offences committed between 2005 and summer 2007. This document was commissioned to allow the force to better understand the nature of offending, and police and partnership responses, and it has made a number of strategic and tactical recommendations which are being progressed by the force.
- Results analysis is standard for all level 2 work, and the principal analyst, as head of profession, receives copies of all analytical products created in the force, in order to ensure corporate standards are maintained. This assists the force in assessing the effectiveness of analytical products and has informed ongoing strengthening of analytical structures and capacity.

Work in progress

- An analyst within the FIB is currently nominated to support the work of the confidential unit, with growth in 2008/09 allowing a dedicated analyst and researcher for this unit. An additional analyst and research post within the FIB and an analyst and researcher dedicated to public protection are being created in 2008/09 the next financial year. The combined increase of three analysts and researchers will significantly increase the analytical capability of the force.
- The FIB is in the process of restructuring to maximise the effectiveness of the newly allocated and current resources. It will form four 'desks', each with a researcher analyst and two field intelligence officers (FIOs) (with the exception of the public protection 'desk', which will have one FIO and a probation officer). Each of the other

three 'desks' will have specific links with one of the force's three BCUs, and will have responsibility for nominated OCGs and functional areas, including immigration, roads policing, drugs, serious crime and financial investigation. The structure allows flexibility through the senior tactical analysts and senior strategic analysts, who retain an oversight of their work and that of the special branch analyst and researcher.

Areas for improvement

- There has not been sufficient analytical capacity to update the homicide and serious assaults problem profile since it was completed in October 2005. The force should ensure that analytical products are produced on an ongoing basis; this should include the proactive development of intelligence and identification of patterns and trends around major crime, to clearly inform preventive and enforcement activity.
- The force provides analytical support to major incident rooms from the local BCU intelligence unit. While a number of staff have received specialist training for this role, there is limited operational exposure, and BCU analysts carry heavy workloads to support the day-to-day operation of the BCU. The force should review the planned provision of analytical staff to support major crime investigations, to ensure that appropriate support is available.

The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force's community impact assessments (CIAs) to evaluate risk following major crime are extensive.

Strengths

- An analyst has undertaken work profiling the threats posed by the residents of approved premises, and tactical briefings on these residents are produced for the local BCU officers. These products are informed by effective strategic and tactical links with the probation service and other MAPPA partners.
- The force shares information on domestic violence incidents with partners in a systematic way. Through the Multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) process there is enhanced information-sharing and joint problem solving activity to reduce the risk of further offences of domestic violence by or against individuals.
- The force has extensive community engagement strategies. These include a large number of key individuals within the community and three local and one strategic independent advisory group (IAG); this provides effective engagement with minority groups. Community intelligence from neighbourhoods is gathered and disseminated effectively through established structures.
- There is evidence of the consistent consideration and use of CIAs following major crimes. These are normally completed on behalf of the senior investigating officer (SIO) by the local policing team (LPT) inspector for the neighbourhood in question, and are regularly updated as the enquiry continues.
- Each BCU and the force produce violent crime profiles, which are updated on a regular basis. These include night-time economy violence, domestic violence and other violence as key themes, and are used to inform ongoing reduction and prevention activity, such as the RESPECT campaign and Christmas/summer domestic violence campaigns.
- The force has developed its capability to effectively gather, assess and disseminate community intelligence both internally and with partners such as MAPPA, where a problem profile has been undertaken to assess the threat to the community of potentially dangerous people and of violent and sexual offenders, in order to focus reduction activity appropriately.

Work in progress

- A recently completed problem profile on rape highlighted apparent under reporting of this crime. A university student is now assisting the force with research in this area, with a specific focus on under reporting in rural areas.
- The lead SIO has compiled statistics showing the number of suspicious deaths, rapes and serious assaults for each BCU over the six month period preceding the inspection. These totalled four suspicious deaths, 19 rapes and five serious assaults. This data will continue to be captured through the daily returns from the duty SIO, allowing the force to better understand the demands it faces from major crime investigations.
- The additional resources in the next financial year will allow the creation of a public protection desk within the FIB, consisting of an analyst, a researcher, a FIO and a probation officer. This structure will allow a more detailed focus on the production of

bespoke analytical products, informed by both police and probation service information and intelligence.

- In respect of persons with mental health issues, the Multi-agency risk evaluation (MARE) process is being developed to share information and minimise risk to the public through multi-agency responses prioritised by risk.

Areas for improvement

- The rape and homicide and serious assault problem profiles have been produced using police data only. While the problem profiles identify the fact that specific partnership engagement should take place, their completion in isolation reduces the value of the product. The force should ensure that analytical products are informed by, and shared with, relevant partners in a systematic way.
- The recent rape problem profile highlighted a number of concerns over the recording processes, which prevented detailed analysis. The lead SIO has to manually collate information about suspicious deaths and other serious crime. The force should review its recording processes for all homicide, sudden and suspicious death, serious industrial injuries, near misses and injuries to those in 'looked after' premises, and other serious crime in order to maximise the availability of that data to inform National Intelligence Model (NIM) products, which will in turn inform reduction and prevention strategies.

The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to its major crime only to a limited degree. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly patchy. Problem profiles for homicides and serious assaults, rape and violent crime are limited, with links to force and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life threatening issues.

Strengths

- The force undertook an objective review of its control strategy to better align it to the organisation's key strategic drivers, and in April 2007 amended it to reflect four key thematic areas: serious and organised criminality, community priorities, terrorism and domestic extremism, and roads policing. In October 2007, it included a fifth thematic area, public protection, which had been recognised as an organisational threat. This area includes child abuse, domestic violence, missing persons and the management of dangerous and sexual offenders, and, consequently the offence types of 'violent crime' are considered within this area, rather than (as previously) within the community priorities section of the FSA.
- The October 2007 FSA and documents supporting the control strategy provided limited analysis of sexual offences, dangerous and sexual offenders and domestic violence.
- There is a direct read across between the national strategic assessment, United Kingdom threat assessment, regional and force control strategies and intelligence requirements, which demonstrates that the force has considered the risks and threats of the crime types referred to in these documents.
- The force operations board considers the draft FSA and control strategy, and then passes this to the force performance development conference (PDC) for wider consideration, in association with force performance issues, prior to ratification and formal adoption by the chief officer team.
- The force has undertaken a detailed analysis of all offences of homicide and serious assault between 1998 and 2005, has completed a problem profile as part of the force rape action plan (which included analysis of offences between 2005 and summer 2007) and has undertaken work profiling the threats posed by the residents of approved premises.
- The force problem profile completed as part of the force rape action plan has made a number of strategic and tactical recommendations, some of which are based around the identification of vulnerable groups and locations; these are being progressed by the force.
- Extensive community profiling has been undertaken within the neighbourhood policing project, and profiles are well established.
- The force has an understanding of the threats arising from risks, thanks to analytical products. These include violent crime profiles produced by BCUs and the force that include night-time economy violence, domestic violence and other violence as key themes and that are used to inform ongoing reduction and prevention activity; and BCU and force drugs market profiles, identifying changes and emerging issues within the Class A drugs market and profiling the threats posed by the residents of approved premises.

- An analysis of current threats and a profile of future demand in the context of counter-terrorism and the threat from firearms have been used to influence organisational developments.
- The MAPPA process is used to minimise risk to the public in general, and to specific potential victims, through multi-agency responses prioritised by risk.
- A preventive approach has been developed for domestic violence. Timely risk identification and assessment procedures are in place, based on National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) guidance. They include all the risk factors identified in the 'special cases' model, but also consider a further 12 risk factors. A graded response is then generated to support the victim and to prevent re offending, with the most serious cases being referred to MARACs.

Work in progress

- There is currently no formal decision making matrix approach applied to determine control strategy priorities. The force is aware that these are in use in other forces and is considering their application. Additionally, the force is seeking to identify how the priorities of the public and partners can influence this decision making process.
- The force is developing a formal firearms threat assessment, which will inform future strategic assessment processes.
- Now that the force has formalised the process of recording all actual or potential threats to life on its intelligence system, SLEUTH, the force is in a position to undertake both tactical and strategic analysis of threats to life and to apply appropriate control measures to emerging threats. Equally, intelligence sharing with other forces can thus be better informed.
- While the force retains a number of strategic processes to reduce the level of major crime, including MAPPA, MARAC and MARE, the intention is to draw together all these activities to produce a homicide reduction strategy, with partnership buy in, linked to the Respect campaign, which will forge a link between these business areas and neighbourhood management.

Areas for improvement

- In October 2007, the force included public protection as a thematic area within the FSA and control strategy. The force should ensure that this headline approach is underpinned by analytical products, with strategic summaries included in the FSA and, where appropriate, with a direct read across to the BCU strategic assessment and control strategies. This will allow the force to consider all categories of major crime, including the full range of precursor offences and incidents, at a strategic level.
- The force has only recently established a systematic approach to having the force manage the recording of threats to life. The FSA should include analysis of this information, together with the threat posed by other life threatening issues, such as kidnaps and paedophile rings.
- The force should review the recording of decisions surrounding the adoption (or otherwise) of the draft force control strategy. The analysts preparing the FSA make a number of recommendations within their work, and these will affect the activity of the force if they are adopted. Formal decision making at a strategic level in the force

should accept or reject these recommendations, and the decisions should be recorded in an auditable and defensible manner.

- The force should draw together current analysis and consider tasking its growing analytical resources with producing an analysis of the current and future demand profile of major crime types and precursors to these offences including; sex offenders and potentially dangerous offenders; counter-terrorism; threat from firearms; threat to life; and vulnerable communities and locations, including near miss offences such as attacks on vulnerable victims, eg black and minority ethnic, children and women. This work will inform prevention strategies for victims, offender networks, vulnerable people and locations, and will allow the force to review resource application on an ongoing basis.

Trend analysis and problem profiles are routinely shared with partners and BCUs. There is an emerging trigger plan for 'hot briefing' when there is a significant change in either the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as the probation service, children's services, the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the drug and alcohol action team (DAAT) are highly effective. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information (MoPI) compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- The nature of the county of Cumbria means that the key members of strategic and tactical partnerships meet and speak on a regular basis; this encourages effective formal and informal dialogue, which allows enhanced information-sharing about changes in major crime threat levels.
- Should an agency managing an individual through the MAPPA process identify an increase in threat or risk, it contacts the MAPPA co-ordinator, who will call an emergency meeting to consider appropriate action to be taken to manage that situation.
- Partnership information is fully integrated and disseminated to partners through the Cumbria partnership support (CuPS) scheme, which is a jointly funded arrangement located within police headquarters (HQ). This process is predicated upon formal information-sharing agreements.
- Through the local safeguarding children board, joint agency threshold standards of risk and threat have been developed and are applied. If these thresholds are met or exceeded at any stage, then the matter is escalated to a joint agency response to protect children.
- The confidential unit is able to demonstrate the effective and timely dissemination of intelligence from a number of products in support of force control strategy priorities. Effective structures and resources are in place to respond positively and effectively to intelligence received.
- The assistant chief constable (ACC) (partnerships) has portfolio responsibility for MoPI, and the Chief Constable has met the four members of the dedicated MoPI project team to thank them for their ongoing work. The force has a robust programme and project board structure, supported by a steering group, overseeing a force action plan. A second peer review of the force was completed by the NPIA's IMPACT programme in October 2007. It found engagement with all levels of the force, and established that the development plan from the first peer review had been completed.
- MoPI training has been provided to staff alongside the training associated with the roll out of SLEUTH.
- A researcher within the FIB is tasked with scanning all crimes and incidents and with making national returns to the serious crime analysis section (SCAS) and injuries databases.
- The force has made good use of national assets: it accesses SCAS and uses NPIA to find specialist assets, including clinical psychologists, blood spatter experts and pollen examination specialists.

July 2008

- The national bulletins on kidnap and extortion are circulated to all negotiators and kidnap and extortion trained SIOs.

Work in progress

- A Cumbria crime and disorder reduction partnership (CDRP) strategic assessment is being developed by partners. To inform this process, the police currently make sanitised versions of the force and BCU strategic assessments, control strategies and intelligence requirements available to partners. The intention is that, from autumn 2008, the police's strategic documents will be produced in a manner that is complemented by, and in turn complements, the production of partnership strategic documents.
- In June 2008, the strategic public protection unit offices in the force headquarters will see the co-location of a number of key partners. With embedded probation officers, the MAPPa co-ordinator and the MARAC co-ordinator working with police colleagues in the same offices, and with open invitations to children's services and the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) to use desks within the unit, there is an opportunity for dynamic information-sharing about changes in the major crime threat.
- Three developmental areas were highlighted in the latest MoPI peer review: to expand beyond the current six business areas, to enhance the approach to the implementation of review/retention/disposal, and to build on the current internal communication strategy. The force has accepted these suggestions and incorporated them into the force action plan.
- The use and potential of the Genesis website and the skills and diversity web are being promulgated to all senior supervisory detectives through the heads of the criminal investigation department (CID) meeting.

Area for improvement

- Formal processes exist to respond to changing threat levels within child protection, and MAPPa arrangements and effective links are maintained through regular personal contact between key partners. The force should consider developing the existing arrangements into a formal trigger plan to identify thresholds and contact procedures for 'hot briefing' either when there is a significant change in the major crime threat or when the nature of the analysis demands a fast response by statutory and non statutory partners.

In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are beginning to be identified in a timely way.

Strength

- Extensive community profiling has been undertaken within the neighbourhood policing (NHP) project, and profiles are well established. The approach also includes the identification and development of contacts with key individual networks (KINs), which provide an enhanced intelligence gathering and impact assessing opportunity that the force makes full use of.
- Police and partners are aware of the various deprivation indices throughout the county and use these as indicators of where to focus activity.
- Effective strategic and tactical links are maintained between MAPPA partners to jointly assess and, where appropriate, jointly manage those individuals that present the greatest risk.
- As part of a national human trafficking initiative (Operation Pentameter 2), the force developed and acted upon intelligence surrounding potential brothels and the operation of 'gang masters' in the hotel and other industries. This helped the force to better understand the potential impact of these activities on communities and on those who work within these areas.

Work in progress

- The force has a community intelligence analyst, who links with community intelligence clerks in two BCUs. The first CDRP strategic assessments are being completed by the four CDRPs that make up the county, and these are being accessed and in future will be integrated within the FSA.
- The post of community intelligence clerk was funded by CDRPs in the South and the North BCUs and was never filled in the West BCU. A business case has been submitted to continue the provision of this function in all BCUs.
- Every neighbourhood policing team (NPT) has a dedicated page on the force intranet. Emerging communities are now being mapped in order to further develop a full understanding of emerging communities within the force.
- The force manages prolific priority offenders jointly with the probation service and outreach workers, through the Scafell Project. There is a team of three staff within each of the BCUs who jointly identify those offenders causing the most impact on CDRP priorities and manage their behaviour through offender supervision plans. The force is working with the probation service to consider how such a joint approach could be introduced to manage dangerous offenders who fall outside the MAPPA process. Having received funding from the force, the probation service and the Government Office for the North West (GONW), a joint processes review is being undertaken, which will result in recommendations for options for change.

The force maintains a strategic risk register which is reviewed every quarter by a strategic risk group consisting of members of the force operations board, strategic development and police authority, who oversees the force risk committee. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan; however, these are not robustly monitored or controlled.

Strengths

- Each manager in the force is required to identify and manage risks within their area of work as part of routine activity. If they identify the fact that any particular risk cannot be managed by them alone, it is escalated to the relevant force board for it to consider whether to include it on its risk register. In turn, if a force board is unable to manage the risk alone it is escalated to the strategic risk group, which maintains a strategic risk register. Each identified risk has a named risk owner and a series of control measures.
- Following publication of HMIC's *Closing the Gap* inspection report in 2005, the force undertook a risk analysis of all areas of protective services and developed a three year programme to address those gaps in a prioritised manner. Major crime and other protective services were regarded as the highest risks. Action plans were developed to prioritise activity in these areas. Year one saw limited major crime development, with ongoing developments planned for this and other areas in years two and three.
- The force formally reviewed its risk analysis and prioritisation process against that used by North Yorkshire Police, with broadly similar results, although, as a learning point, this highlighted the benefits of identifying collaborative opportunities early on and of costing different options.
- Following the production of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) standards for protective services, the risk analysis was updated, and the focus on year two resources (2008/09) has been changed to reflect not only changes in risk but also the financial ability of the force to provide additional resources earlier than had been planned.

Work in progress

- A force business continuity manager has recently been identified and is currently assessing the force in a prioritised manner, focusing on ACPO guidance on the 10 highest areas of risk.
- Risk 6 of the force operations board is poor corporate understanding of skills in the organisation, linking with maintenance and development of those skills, which include: SIO, the Home Office Large Major Enquiry Database (HOLMES) 2, CID, casualty bureau and senior identification manager. This risk has been allocated to the ACC (operations) to manage.

Area for improvement

- In addition to the force operations board's risk register, the force could add value to the risk management process by developing departmental/unit risk registers. This is particularly relevant in respect of major crime, for which detailed assessments should be made of risks/threats faced by the force and for which specific action plans should be drawn up to address all identified risks.

The force is not collaborating fully with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. The force currently shares intelligence and data with the regional intelligence unit (RIU). Its HOLMES systems are not interoperable.

Strengths

- The force has recently introduced SLEUTH as its intelligence system. This allows full access (with appropriate security filters) to all intelligence held by the force.
- The force retains a confidential unit to receive, evaluate and disseminate sensitive intelligence. This is line managed by the detective chief inspector who has responsibility for special branch, the technical support unit (TSU), covert human intelligence source (CHIS) handling and Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) management. Effective use is made of the various access levels on SLEUTH to provide appropriate protection for sensitive intelligence and its sources.
- The force recognises the lack of interoperability between HOLMES 2 and the force's intelligence system. As part of the major incident room (MIR) process, an FIO is appointed to co-ordinate intelligence links between BCU and the enquiry team. .
- The FIB detective inspector attends the Borders intelligence group and has effective relationships with colleagues in the forces on the English/Scottish border. Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) databases are shared and/or cross populated. In the near future the RIU is to receive a terminal allowing interrogation of Scottish intelligence information.
- There is an effective working relationship with SOCA, allowing regular two way intelligence sharing to take place.
- The force works in support of Border and Immigration Agency activity, with an FIB officer accompanying its staff on investigations to seek out intelligence and crime detection opportunities.
- Regular contact is maintained between the force and HMRC through telephone and face-to-face meetings, and this allows the police access to the full range of data held by HMRC (within the prescribed legislative framework) that is needed to support all areas of policing activity.
- As part of proactive operational activity, use is made of ANPR reads from fixed and mobile cameras, and within reactive operations significant intelligence has been gleaned from the interrogation of relevant databases.
- Recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been allocated to relevant key stakeholders within the force, and some are being addressed in partnership with other agencies.
- The FSA includes a review of the utilisation of the IMPACT Nominal Index giving visibility on the use of this important facility. The latest assessment noted increased use of these checks by the force's public protection units.
- The force can demonstrate Data Protection Act compliance, having a letter from the Information Commissioner providing registration until 18 September 2008.

Work in progress

- There is limited interoperability between information technology (IT) systems in the force. STAN is a search tool that allows analysts to identify where information is, but then staff have to research disparate systems. Further SLEUTH products are being rolled out and these will improve interoperability in due course, and allow the force to extract and exchange data between systems to aid investigations and identify trends and patterns around homicide.
- An IT solution will shortly be delivered that will allow analysts to access HOLMES 2 from their desktops. This, taken together with the drive to increase the use of HOLMES 2 in major crime enquiries, will increase the volume of intelligence obtained from major crime investigations.
- The force has identified £16,000 to upgrade the ANPR back office facility (BOF) to ensure continued compatibility with the national infrastructure, and a further £8,000 to upgrade hardware in the vehicle fleet.
- SLEUTH includes functionality that allows an officer to request an ANPR marker when an intelligence report is submitted, and it will directly create such a marker through connectivity to the BOF. This functionality is part of the ongoing SLEUTH roll out to the force.
- The force has a community intelligence analyst, who links with community intelligence clerks in two BCUs. The first CDRP strategic assessments are being completed by the four CDRPs that make up the county, and these are to be accessed and in future will be integrated within the FSA.
- Stronger relationships with primary care trusts (PCTs) are being developed to inform analytical work, such as seeking information about general localities where the ambulance service has responded to drug overdoses.

Areas for improvement

- The force does not have access to other forces' IT systems: any enquiries are progressed by telephone, through relationships that have been built up between staff in separate forces. While the RIU provides a platform for formal data-sharing, the force should consider seeking direct access to the IT systems of both Lancashire Constabulary and Merseyside Police, with reciprocal arrangements being created.
- The force should seek ways to maximise the potential of HOLMES 2 within major investigations and to allow the more effective oversight and dissemination of intelligence from the incident room to mainstream analytical products. This could be through the development of an IT solution to allow searches across disparate systems.

The force has a case review policy that is generally applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is currently being reviewed.

Strengths

- The force's policy on review of major crime applies to murder, attempted murder, serious sexual assault and other serious crimes. It was approved in August 2005 and fell due for review in September 2007. Under the policy, in cases of undetected crimes the SIO submits a self assessment pack to the head of crime after 21 days, and at the 28 day mark the ACC (operations) appoints a review officer and sets the terms of reference for the review. All historical unsolved cases of major crime fall due for review on an annual basis, with the results of that review being passed to ACC (operations).
- The force policy on the review of major crime was applied as part of a recent enquiry with ACC (operations) appointing a review officer and team to review what was at that stage an undetected offence of rape. This review made a number of recommendations, which have been accepted.
- A researcher within the FIB is tasked with scanning all crimes and incidents and making national returns to the SCAS and injuries databases.

Work in progress

- The force identified, through a review that; its major crime review policy needed updating, that there were no staff trained to complete major crime reviews, that there was a lack of specialist interview skills and the requirement to develop and implement a major crime investigation policy defining resource levels for categories of major crime investigations. The force fully embraced these findings and was actively pursuing a course of action to address these issues.

Area for improvement

- The force retains a number of undetected serious crimes. At the time of the inspection, it was drawing to the centre all such enquiries for oversight by the lead SIO in the force. While a number of investigations have been reviewed over time, the constabulary had a lack of trained officers and staff to undertake these reviews.

Recommendation 1

The force should ensure that all undetected major crime enquiries in the force have been identified and are subject to review, against appropriate terms of reference, by a suitably qualified and operationally exposed review team in line with the ACPO/National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) Murder Investigation Manual.

- In respect of historical unsolved cases of major crime, a number of forces have developed expertise in prioritisation and identification of lines of enquiry, and have developed expertise in the general review process through exposure to a significant volume of reviews through their major crime review teams. The force should benchmark against the policies, practices and procedures employed by dedicated major crime review teams.

The force's tasking and co-ordination process functions cohesively to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. The documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The force has undertaken a detailed analysis of all offences of homicide and serious assaults between 1998 and 2005, and has reviewed other key performance indicators to inform organisational developments within major crime investigation. The force has a low exposure to major crime, as shown by the data in this report. In particular, relative to the MSF, the volume of life threatening and gun crime is low.
- Recognising operational security issues, the force level 2 tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) is split into a closed and an open monthly meeting, with both being chaired by ACC (operations). Each week there is a protective services command unit tasking meeting, where the current tasking of specialist level 2 assets is reviewed (these include both crime and operations support capabilities).
- As required, ACC (operations) will consider requests for support to major crime investigations outside the formal tasking framework, while being personally aware of both current level 2 requirements and pressures on BCUs. In one recent case the SIO approached the duty ACC, who directed support from BCUs with immediate effect to resource the major incident room.
- Formal minutes are prepared and circulated for the open level 2 TCG meeting, while the closed tasking receives a PowerPoint™ presentation update on ongoing work, and a record is kept of decision making on one paper record of the meeting.
- Requests for level 2 assets, including ANPR, surveillance, investigative and analytical support, are made to the TCG using a standard template. This form is used to record whether a request is to be serviced or declined, and includes the rationale for the decision. Once adopted, a record is kept of the aims, objectives and any constraints imposed.

Work in progress

- There is currently no formal decision making matrix approach applied to determine control strategy priorities. The force is aware that these are used by other forces and is considering their application. Additionally, the force is seeking to identify how the priorities of the public and of its partners can influence this decision making process.

Area for improvement

- While the analytical products produced for the TCG process make recommendations based upon intelligence and performance issues, and while the minutes record decisions made, it is not always possible to identify the rationale for the prioritisation of resources within the process. To ensure defensible decision making the force should consider including not only the decision but also the rationale behind it within the records for both the open and the closed TCG process.

Due to a lack of specific and focused training, the force's awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is limited.

Strengths

- All staff in force have received formally structured diversity training, and some specialists have received training on the radicalisation process for international terrorists, while others have attended a two-day conference to enhance their understanding of the Islamic faith.
- All force family liaison officers (FLOs) are invited to quarterly development days and, as part of this, many have received an input from colleagues in Lancashire constabulary on the diverse community needs they can encounter as FLOs.
- The family liaison coordinator and an FLO involved in Operation Lund, the Morecambe Bay cockle picking tragedy, shared their experiences, including the associated cultural issues, at an FLO development day.

Area for improvement

- No formal training has been provided to staff to give them an awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations. The force should explore opportunities to provide focused inputs to key staff, which might include master classes involving inputs from members of the IAG and other specialist areas such as honour based violence.

Prevention

The force has an independent advisory group, and this is always used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- There is routine use and involvement of IAGs to inform policy and direction of activity. There is a strategic IAG, whose members have a formal opportunity to comment on developing policies in respect of police activity. Each BCU also has an IAG, which performs similar roles with a more local focus. An IAG is formed of individuals who represent the community. It actively seeks to continue to develop its membership to better reflect all the strands of diversity within the county.
- IAG members provide an on call rota, being available to give advice on tactical issues at any time. During a rapidly developing counter terrorist operation, a gold group was formed, and IAG members were an integral part of that group and expressed the view that their opinions were actively sought and meaningfully considered.
- There is evidence of IAGs being involved in advising the police both in respect of proactive operations to target organised criminality, and in response to offences of violence within the Polish community. In the latter case, a detective inspector had meetings on a fortnightly basis to discuss aspects of the investigation and receive advice.

Work in progress

- Due to limited opportunity for IAG advice in operational activity such as a major crime, the involvement of IAGs and their ability to add value is a developing process. Opportunities are sought for their involvement outside the current level of policy formulation and operational plan development.

Areas for improvement

- The force should consider the structured involvement of IAG members at forums, such as FLO development days, to enhance understanding of a variety of cultural issues and to foster links between co-ordinators and IAG members that can be drawn upon in the future to provide advice, where required, when working with families from the wide variety of faiths.
- The IAG members would improve their input to gold group meetings and operational briefings if they were provided with appropriate training and input on major/serious crime, force processes and procedures, and the force's expectation as to their contribution at the various stages of operations.

Embryonic contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- The force has recently drawn together a number of on call rotas for supervisory detectives to provide a force wide rota consisting of a duty SIO, duty detective inspector and an on duty night detective constable for the force.
- The SIO rota comprises HQ based detective superintendents and chief inspectors. They are on call for a seven day period, which mirrors that for the detective inspector are formed of BCU and HQ based posts.
- Recognising the varying skills and experience of individuals, the force has identified certain categories of incident that will always be escalated to a duty SIO, while the threshold for escalation of other incidents will be subject to agreement with the duty detective inspector.
- The force incident manager (FIM) has ready access to the night detective constable, duty detective inspector, duty SIO, negotiator co-ordinator, crime scene investigator (CSI), crime scene manager (CSM) and other key staff through call out rotas and/or contact sheets.
- The duty SIO obtains resources for each major crime investigation by, in the first instance, drawing upon staff from within the host BCU. If that proves insufficient, staff can be obtained from the remaining two BCUs. Depending on the requirement, this could be a rapid request arranged through the dark hours, or involve a formal bid to the duty ACC. In any event, the ACC (operations) will subsequently review the staffing levels and provide appropriate resources from within the BCUs, balancing the competing demands on each.
- A Sudden and Suspicious Death Procedures document was agreed by the force operations board in 2004 and updated in April 2007. It provides sound guidance to all staff involved in the early stages of responding to an unexplained or suspicious death, and provides more detailed guidance on the general method of approach (including supervisory structures) for a number of categories of death, including: murder, sudden infant death, work related death, drugs related death, poisoning and agriculture related death.
- The force has placed considerable emphasis on professionalising the investigative process (PIP) level 1 training for uniformed sergeants and constables. Some 650 officers have completed it and a further 50 are working towards accreditation.
- There is a protocol providing guidance to SIOs dealing with incidents within HM Prison Haverigg (available through force IT systems) and there is awareness within the BCU of operating protocols. Police relationships with the prison have recently been revised to maximise working relationships at all levels.

Work in progress

- Although a response is available, there was some confusion over what stage and for what purpose senior detectives and SIOs should be involved, with the night detectives deferring to local detective sergeants. The alignment of the night detective constable to the detective inspector from that BCU is designed to remedy this

inconsistent approach, and the force is monitoring application of the new on call arrangements.

- The lead SIO in the force is the detective superintendent in charge of the major crime and operations support. That SIO supervises a detective chief inspector, who oversees the force crime operations section, which contains staff dedicated to level 2 proactive operations. Growth in the financial year 2008/09 will create a force major crime investigation team (FMIT), reporting to the detective chief inspector and consisting of a detective inspector, two detective sergeants, a dedicated HOLMES manager and administrative support.
- With the growth in the organised crime section these staff will be available to support the force in the early stages of major crime investigations. The intention is that they would deploy to support the SIO and would subsequently be bolstered – and, as the enquiry stabilises, replaced – by BCU based staff.
- A programme of critical incident training is being rolled out to BCU sergeants throughout the force in support of the critical incident policy.
- To improve responses to rape, a programme of training is planned for communications staff, help desk staff, student officers and trainee investigators. The number of sexual offences trained officers will also be rationalised, with more focused training being provided and a PIP qualification pursued.
- The force is in the process of developing a major crime investigation policy, which will formalise the process of identification of resources from individual BCUs by the duty SIO when that SIO is drawing together investigative resources for major investigations.

Areas for improvement

- The inspection team found an inconsistent approach to the initial preservation and management of crime scenes. The force should review the training of all uniformed constables and sergeants to ensure that scene preservation skills are at an appropriate standard in all areas.
- Call handling staff, including FIMs, have not had golden hour, kidnap and extortion training, or any other critical incident training. While the communications trainer seeks to provide new staff with some awareness during their initial training, this approach is not systematic. The force should review the training needs analysis already completed and support this with the oversight of other force specialists. This should inform a focused period of training for staff in a manner commensurate with their specific functions.
- The Sudden and Suspicious Death Procedures document should be reviewed and updated to reflect changes in the on call structures and investigative responsibilities within the force. While it already provides a ready source of advice and guidance for responding to a number of scenarios, the review document should be enhanced to incorporate responses to unexplained deaths in communities and institutions such as hospitals, military establishments and care homes, and should include awareness of the impact of corporate manslaughter.
- The force has produced a guidance document setting out procedures for the police investigation of drug related deaths. This provides greater detail than the Sudden and Suspicious Death Procedures document. These two documents provide

July 2008

contradictory advice in some respects, particularly surrounding supervisory involvement. The force should invest in one guidance document, setting out responses to the wide variety of sudden and suspicious deaths that may be encountered. This document should be widely promulgated, and the force should consider including it as an appendix to a major crime investigation policy, making sure that co-ordinated reviews of both are undertaken.

- There is no formal documented and accessible procedure governing the escalation of resources to deal with a major incident. Staff are selected on the basis of who is available, rather than in accordance with a rational mobilisation plan. The development of such a plan would clearly outline roles and responsibilities both at HQ and BCU levels, and would minimise the abstraction impact on BCUs, allow buy in from BCU commanders, and ensure that the appropriate level of resourcing is applied to effectively manage the incident.

The policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff and is reasonably understood and implemented. All senior officers in the force have been involved in discussion and consultation, and they fully understand this new policy. Examples of cross-border and multi-agency operations are abundant.

Strengths

- Compared to its MSF group, the force area has had low levels of life threatening and gun crime, and as such Cumbria is one of the safest counties in the country in which to live.
- The force, through the Resolve programme, has invested in resources to increase its capacity and capability to target serious and organised crime, to counter-terrorism and to manage public protection issues, with the clear aims of making Cumbria a safer place in which to live.
- The inspection team found a considerable degree of awareness of threat to life issues among staff, with examples being provided of the dynamic and timely management of a number of threats to life.
- Staff working within the confidential unit demonstrated a good level of awareness of the management of threat to life issues
- The force recognises that, as the police activity nationally to target organised crime groups becomes more focused, criminals may look to exploit areas of weakness. In partnership with other police forces, the constabulary has conducted a number of investigations targeting travelling criminals who live within (or impact upon) its area and those of other forces. This ongoing activity, while specifically targeting organised crime groups, sends a clear message that Cumbria is a hostile place for criminals and serves as a key major crime prevention tactic.
- An assessment of the force's capability to manage kidnap and extortion events has been completed in a structured manner. A number of tactical issues have been identified and were being addressed. Plans are in place to increase the number of SIOs who are currently kidnap trained. Currently there are a number of Red Centre trained negotiators, and training for the remainder will be completed in 2008.
- The force has arranged for SOCA to provide training to key members of the organisation on kidnap and extortion.
- The force undertakes proactive responses in support of the routine management of dangerous offenders (such as lifestyle surveillance of MAPPA subjects) to fully inform the joint risk management processes and allow appropriate preventive action.
- In respect of approved premises within the county, the force worked with the probation service to develop protocols governing the profile of residents, in order to block certain categories of resident that the force would find disproportionately challenging to manage because of the threat of the criminal use of firearms.

Work in progress

- By including domestic abuse and stalking, the force has recognised that there is scope to include its activity to protect vulnerable people within the management of threat to life processes. In its management of registered sex offenders (RSOs), through a structured process with senior officer scrutiny, the force considers the

July 2008

need to make the criminal history of an RSO known to specific individuals, such as a new partner with children. In the case of individuals regarded as presenting a significant risk of domestic violence, the force is considering extending this approach to, for example, the new partner of a repeat offender.

The force lacks a witness protection capability that is supported by dedicated covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by, key staff. The force is collaborating fully with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- In May 2005, the force produced a draft witness protection policy, which, although never formally adopted, forms the basis of witness protection activity. In the three years up to the inspection, the force had instigated witness protection processes on three occasions. On these occasions, specialist services were provided by another force on a cost recovery basis, and this arrangement is still in existence.
- Senior detectives in the force demonstrated a good awareness of witness protection issues.
- The inspection team identified a witness protection case from another force area that was being effectively managed through the local BCU.

Work in progress

- The force has considered witness protection issues in depth and clearly recognises the need to formalise its approach. Following benchmarking and cost benefit analysis, the force undertook to seek formal collaborative arrangements. At the time of the inspection, plans were well advanced to form a multi-force witness protection unit.

Area for improvement

- The force does not currently have in place a formally endorsed and operational witness protection policy. Once the force's approach to witness protection is finalised, it should formalise this within a force policy document that is promulgated in an appropriate manner to all officers and staff in the organisation.

The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are fully used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The force has a well developed neighbourhood policing programme, which has resulted in developed community profiles being produced. These profiles are updated following regular contact with key individuals as part of KIN surveys where local community priorities are identified, supported by Street Safe initiatives in focused areas.
- The force has invested in community intelligence training and has posted special branch officers to each BCU as part of the development of the Richer Picture initiative. There is a force community intelligence analyst and clerks in two of the three BCUs. On this basis, the force is well positioned to identify changes to the threats of harm that the communities are being exposed to.
- The force has an IAG in each BCU and an overarching strategic IAG that assists the force in measuring and assessing the harm and threat to local communities. IAG members have been involved in gold group meetings, where their views and opinions are meaningfully considered. Members have been involved in briefings for operations to dismantle/disrupt OCGs and have a formal opportunity to comment on developing policies.
- The force makes use of CIAs, KINs, Street Safe and community intelligence to monitor harm and the police's impact on that harm during operations.
- The ACC (operations) chairs a quarterly force PDC, and each BCU has rigorous performance management regimes in place, which identify any trends in crime patterns. In this way, the force is able to swiftly identify changes to signal crimes; these might, for example, show an increase in drug use and more serious violent crime, which could indicate OCG activity.

Work in progress

- While the completion of CIAs is regarded as routine business for the force, some formal community impact training has been provided to two LPTs by the NPIA; this training has yet to be evaluated.

Areas for improvement

- While the force does complete some formal results analysis and reviews the impact of proactive activity through the TCG process, it should consider identifying a range of indicators to measure harm in communities and should monitor these in order to understand the impact of preventive and enforcement activity.
- The force displays commitment to the IAG at chief officer level and is supporting the development of members by providing training, bringing experience and offering inputs to the IAG's regular meetings. The IAG members would improve their input to gold group meetings and operational briefings if all of them were provided with appropriate training and input on major/serious and organised crime, force processes and procedures, and the expectation of the force as to their contribution at the various stages of operations.

The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a comprehensive security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted, commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The professional standards department (PSD) has accountability for data protection and information security. An information security team is in place within the PSD, with accountability for delivering both Government Protective Marking Scheme (GPMS) and ACPO community security policy. Over the past year, the constabulary has completed 11 infrastructure health checks.
- A quarterly marketing campaign highlights the force's confidential contact system, via phone and email, which encourages the provision of information or concerns about corruption, while a document, *Raising Standards*, has been provided to all staff.
- The PSD is split into an intelligence and an operational arm, and the head of the PSD is a member of the force's closed tasking meeting and chairs a PSD TCG to manage the work of all the PSD assets.
- All level 2 proactive operations have a dedicated operational security officer (OPSY) allocated from the outset. When staff are drawn in to support proactive force operations they are subject to appropriate checks.
- A vetting policy was introduced in April 2007, and a dedicated vetting officer has been in post for over two years. There is a risk based approach to vetting, and a number of sensitive posts require the ongoing vetting of staff on a regular basis.
- The inspection team noted that the force displayed a robust approach to the security of intelligence by having effective dissemination of intelligence through the confidential unit, together with the use of a tiered approach to the briefing and debriefing of operations that include certain sensitive issues.

Work in progress

- The force is developing an audit strategy, which will take account of its approach to OCG and other vulnerable areas, such as public protection.
- A service level agreement is being developed between the serious and organised crime teams and the anti-corruption element of the PSD.

Areas for improvement

- There is scope to increase the number of staff in the PSD in order to improve resilience and provide dedicated analytical support, and in response to the new auditing potential offered by SLEUTH, which may well lead to an enhanced level of intelligence.
- An OPSY is appointed from the start of every proactive operation. As the proactive capability of the force increases, it should review the number of OPSYs in the force.

Enforcement

Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriate use made of independent advisory groups and community membership of gold command support groups.

Strengths

- There is a rigorous ACPO lead from ACC (operations), who has a detailed knowledge of this business area and has been instrumental in developing and driving the force strategy against major crime in a systematic manner through business planning processes.
- ACC (operations), who was formerly an experienced SIO, considers requests from the lead SIO for resources to undertake major crime investigations and is able to balance these requests against ongoing BCU demand, given his knowledge of the relevant ACPO/NPIA doctrines and practical experience.
- In respect of a recent enquiry, ACC (operations) took the opportunity to personally review the policy log of the SIO, and the inspection team noted that individual SIOs value his oversight and support of their work.
- The police authority is fully supportive of the force's plans to increase the capability and capacity of protective services, and has agreed significant financial investment over a three year period. This will include an increase of some 70 staff, uplift in forensic services provision and accommodation upgrades.
- The police authority has effective arrangements in place to oversee the various ongoing projects to develop level 2 resources, particularly for major crime and serious and organised crime. These include formal reports and presentations given by chief officers.
- The chair of the police authority is the nominated link member, and he speaks to the chief officers on a regular basis. He has been an observer at a recent early morning briefing for a level 2 OCG operation involving other forces led by Cumbria Constabulary, and both he and the police authority chief executive were involved in the gold group for a counter-terrorism operation. All members are vetted to the Non Police Personnel vetting standard.
- The force has prepared and trained for response to critical incidents in partnership with other agencies, and it manages such responses through gold group support structures, initiated at the direction of an ACPO officer. A key aspect to such responses is the completion of CIAs, and the gold group meetings include members of the IAG.

Work in progress

- The Chief Constable has recognised the skills and knowledge set of ACC (operations) in respect of a number of protective services. Through an ongoing set of presentations on command team planning days, he is sharing this expertise with colleagues.

July 2008

- A senior detective has presented to the police authority to help build its knowledge and awareness of protective services.
- Currently arrangements are in place to scrutinise performance through regular performance update meetings, briefings and the chair's personal attendance at operational briefings and gold groups; however, it is accepted that performance indicators for some aspects of protective services, including major crime and serious and organised crime, need to be developed further in order for the force to be effectively held to account. The deputy clerk to the police authority is involved in the development of performance indicators for protective services.
- The force vetting officer is working with an officer of the police authority to progress more detailed vetting of certain members.
- The force is still working with the authority to determine the best method of oversight and engagement in major and serious and organised crime, to ensure that they are able to drive service improvements in a meaningful way. Options being considered include extending the oversight function currently performed by the chair to a small number of other members, who would form a small working group to scrutinise protective services operations and performance.

Area for improvement

- Senior officers within the force meet and update police authority members on operational matters on a regular basis. These staff should be mindful of the current vetting limitations of police authority members.

July 2008

The ACPO lead is fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime, and the head of crime is awaiting training. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, CIAs and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The lead ACC has experience as an SIO within a metropolitan force, is ACPO disaster victim identification lead and has completed the Management of Serious and Series Crimes course, and so is well placed to undertake the role of officer in overall charge (OIOC).
- The force has prepared and trained for response to critical incidents in partnership with other agencies, and manages such responses through gold group support structures. A key aspect to such responses is the completion of CIAs, and the gold group meetings include members of the IAG.

Work in progress

- The force has submitted bids for the training of three senior detectives in the management of linked and series crime and this will enhance the capacity of the force.
- Although the completion of CIAs is considered routine business for the force, some formal community impact training has been provided to two LPTs by the NPJA; this training has yet to be evaluated.

Area for improvement

- The force has not completed any specific exercises or training in how to respond to serial offenders and series crimes, and there are no formal collaborative agreements with other forces or private providers to support the force at times of exceptional demand.

Recommendation 2

The force should undertake a review of its capability and capacity to respond to serial offenders and series crime, developing and exercising a mobilisation plan to enhance its response.

Performance Management and Resilience

The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, cost, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- The force has been proactive in developing an ambitious approach to performance management in respect of major crime within the remit of the protective services command unit (PSCU). The PSCU has in place a departmental plan with some initial high level performance indicators. At the present time, the indicators in parts of the performance framework remain basic, and the force acknowledges that what is in place is just a starting point and remains work in progress.
- The forensic budget arrangements include a specific element for serious crime and associated DNA submission. Forensic submissions are approved through an appropriate line management structure and, in the case of major investigations, following detailed discussion with the SIO in line with the forensic strategy.
- The lead SIO regularly checks the policy books of other SIOs and confirms with them what activity they have undertaken over periods of on call work.
- The force contributed to a peer review of a suspected honour based killing with colleagues from Lancashire Constabulary and Cheshire Constabulary.
- The head of crime is a member of the Safeguarding board and MAPPA strategic management board (SMB) and other senior detectives are members of CDRP management boards. Accordingly, they are well positioned to maintain an oversight of lessons learnt with a partnership setting including Part 8 Reviews and in respect of domestic homicides.
- A formal review was completed of one operation, with terms of reference set by ACC (operations). It produced four recommendations: that the major crime review policy be updated, that major crime review training be provided, that tier 3/5 interview skills provision be made, and that a major crime investigation policy be developed.
- Operational debriefs and results analysis are routinely completed for proactive operations to target serious and organised criminality.

Work in progress

- The force is developing the performance framework around specialist assets, and recognition is being given to the need for both quantitative and qualitative indicators. Funding has been approved for the creation of a performance analyst post in PSCU, which will be tasked with continuing to develop the performance management framework.
- The force recognised that the review policy for major investigations required updating and that staff were not appropriately trained to conduct reviews of such investigations. Accordingly, early in 2008, a number of senior detectives received formal review training from an external provider, following which the force intends to revisit and amend the major investigation review policy.
- The force is to commence costing of individual homicide/major crime investigations. The SIO – in the only incident which has required an MIR opening in the last year –

July 2008

held regular meetings with the finance manager to establish the costs of the various aspects of the investigation. This will become a template for activity in future cases.

- For a while there was a fall off in the heads of CID meeting, which draws together all the senior detectives in the force but meetings have recommenced and this is the forum for identifying learning issues and disseminating good practice to SIOs and their deputies.

Area for improvement

- The force lacks a systematic approach to identify learning from past events and use that learning to drive development in major crime investigation. With the planned growth in the next financial year of the force's major crime investigation team, the force should develop systems to debrief all officers and staff involved in homicide and major crime investigations as a matter of routine. This, together with learning from past events such as judicial hearings, inquests, Part 8 reviews and national issues, should be systematically assessed and, in an auditable way, should feed organisational developments in policy, practice, procedures and training.

The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands, although this requires the drawing of investigative resources away from BCUs, with a consequent negative impact, particularly when for prolonged periods of time. The force has insufficient investigative capability to deal with extraordinary levels of need and lacks formal collaborative agreements to provide additional skilled resources.

Strengths

- Within the force's strategic planning processes, significant work has been undertaken to maximise the ability of the force to provide neighbourhood policing and protective services by securing an affordable infrastructure. Focused activity, driven by the command team and supported by the police authority, has allowed the force to make substantial investments in protective services provision.
- The force has a structured three year plan to improve protective services provision. This inspection took place towards the end of year one, and the team found that additional resources were already in place, with a structured plan to further build capacity and capability to investigate major crime. Thanks to the support of the police authority, the force was able to bring forward some aspects of year three of the plan into the second year.
- The ACC (operations) has direct responsibility for both BCU and level 2 activity; as part of this role, he is required to be in a position to manage the impact of extended exceptional demand on the force. The force retains contingency funds within budgets, and operational reserves approaching 5% of annual expenditure are retained by the police authority.
- The force is aware of the need to maintain investigative skills at level 1 while it builds level 2 capability. Accordingly, as part of its workforce planning processes, the crime training functions were enhanced through a PIP training project team, the funding of training provision for new roles was identified and the training was costed, and future recruitment for some specialist roles will be opened up beyond the force.
- The force has placed considerable emphasis on PIP level 2 training for investigators and, at the time of the inspection, every reactive detective constable and every member of BCU drugs teams was accredited, and some of the intelligence development and level 2 assets were also accredited. This programme continues, with the force now providing 24 training places a year.
- Each BCU has a supervisor managing the CSIs. All these supervisors and a number of CSIs are trained as CSMs.
- The constabulary has no tier 3 or tier 5 interview trained staff and currently relies on informal arrangements to access tier 5 interview co-ordinators from other forces, as required.
- The force has identified MIR facilities at the force headquarters and in both the West and the South BCUs, and there is scope to increase HOLMES 2 terminal capacity in cases of exceptional demand through the use of various training facilities within the force area.
- North BCU does not currently have MIR facilities since it had to relocate to temporary premises following the flooding of Carlisle police station. The new build police station will contain MIR facilities. Though there were logistical challenges, the

July 2008

force has conducted a major investigation in North BCU by making use of a forward facility for investigation teams in a local police station, while the HOLMES 2 functions were undertaken at force headquarters.

- A number of IT staff are trained to set up new incidents on HOLMES 2, which is being systematically upgraded to the latest version, and the equipment in each room is tested and maintained by a dedicated member of staff, who, in the next financial year, will move to the dedicated role of HOLMES manager.
- The force has a formal collaborative agreement for Greater Manchester Police (GMP) to provide back office facilities for the provision of a casualty bureau, which has been tested as part of a recent national exercise.
- MIRWeb and CasWeb are used by the police service to run major crime enquiries and casualty bureaus after major incidents, with nationally linked IT systems enabling forces anywhere in the country to support another force in taking high levels of calls from the public. There has been significant investment in the training of staff in Cumbria Constabulary for both CasWeb (with 52 staff currently trained) and MIRWeb (with 60 staff currently trained), and further training courses for both planned in 2008.
- The force has a number of crime FLOs working in each of the BCUs. They can be contacted on an ad hoc basis as required, and their contact details are available on the force intranet. FLO provision is sufficient, although there is no specific call out rota. There is a smaller cadre of sexual offences trained staff who are exercised for the role.
- The lead SIO meets on a regular basis with the three HM coroners, pathologists and local authority representatives. This forum allows a consistent approach to activity across the force area, which is informed by regular meetings of the coroner's officers.
- There are formal mutual aid agreements, linked to joint training, of specialist firearms assets within the North West region.
- The force retains its own surveillance capability, and there is a formal arrangement for support from the regional counter-terrorism unit surveillance team and informal arrangements with other forces.
- The force has effective TSU provision and supplies its skills to neighbouring forces – and as part of national operations when required.

Work in progress

- An MIR skills audit is currently being undertaken throughout the force. This will inform the training plan for 2008/09. This is being supported by having the individual with responsibility for HOLMES moved to the FMIT structure and becoming dedicated to this role in the near future.
- A draft policy developed in 2004 sought to define categories of major crime incident, define staffing levels required from each BCU and enforce the use of HOLMES 2 for all Category A/B murders. Other documents place the onus on BCU commanders to retain sufficient trained staff to investigate major incidents and include reference to specific MIR skills, but do not define the minimum staffing levels. The force is now

developing new guidance, which clearly defines the numbers of trained staff to be retained for each discipline as part of the major crime investigation policy.

- The constabulary has no tier 3 or tier 5 interview trained staff. Tier 3 courses have been planned for delivery in the next financial year, and these will provide two officers per BCU and two within HQ. Once tier 3 training has been completed consideration will be given to provision of tier 5 training.
- The force has volunteered to pilot the Managing Dangerous Offenders course being developed by the NPIA.
- In recognition of the lack of use of HOLMES 2, a presentation is to be given to all SIOs to ensure that they understand how to maximise the potential of HOLMES 2, with particular regard to its use in smaller scale enquiries.
- Following review of PIP3 accreditation, the force recognised the need to apply added focus to replace staff who are retiring or have moved to uniformed operational roles in the organisation. Three experienced detective chief inspectors are receiving bespoke inputs on portfolio completion and will be subject to accreditation consideration by the head of crime, lead SIO and a crime trainer at the earliest opportunity. That will then increase the number of accredited SIOs in relevant roles to five.

Areas for improvement

- The force does not have an FMIT involving dedicated investigative resources within the accepted definition. It has chosen to resource major crime investigations using a dedicated SIO, staff from organised crime investigation teams and BCU resources. Although in an operational context this may be appropriate for the needs of the force, chief officers should keep this arrangement under critical review.
- The force is developing its approach to major crime through a change programme, and, understandably, the force's focus is on maximising the potential of resources through operational activity supported by analytical products. Once this work becomes 'business as usual', the force should ensure that investigative policy/trigger plans, 24-hour call out procedures, a knowledge of skills base, workforce succession planning, training/learning and development plans are all developed and maintained.
- At the time of the inspection, the force did not have tier 3 or tier 5 interview trained staff. While plans are in place to train a number of officers in tier 3 interviewing, and consideration is being given to tier 5 training, the force must recognise that it is not only training but also operational exposure that maintains and enhances skills. The force should consider developing a collaborative approach which might include Cumbria Constabulary officers, across various functions within crime investigation, undertaking focused attachments to other forces in such a way that it can keep specialist training up to date and current.
- There are no formal collaborative arrangements for the provision of staff to support investigations beyond the capability or capacity of the force. The force should consider developing such arrangements either with other forces or with private providers.
- The drawing of resources from BCU and level 2 proactive teams to conduct major crime investigations will have an impact on performance, particularly if the abstractions are long-term or frequent in nature. Having identified that this is the

July 2008

approach for the relatively low volume of major crime investigations, the force should introduce a formal monitoring of abstraction levels, contrasting this with performance delivery, to allow it to monitor the impact of this approach in a structured manner.

- The inspection team noted a mixed level of training and operational exposure in supervisory detectives in the force, with individuals being appointed to role prior to completion of all aspects of training and accreditation. The force should review the timeliness of training provided to senior detectives and ensure that appropriate oversight of inexperienced officers is demonstrably maintained.
- There appears to be reluctance on the part of SIOs to use HOLMES 2. This is based on the lack of appropriately trained staff, on trained staff not being operationally employed, on abstraction problems caused by releasing these staff and on the lack of knowledge of the potential that HOLMES 2 provides in small scale enquiries. It is essential that HOLMES 2 is used as a means to effectively manage major enquiries in accordance with national guidance.

Recommendation 3

The force should consider the resourcing of a dedicated HOLMES team or, as a minimum, a robust approach to the use of HOLMES 2, as identified in the major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) manual 2005, allowing the effective mobilisation of appropriately trained staff into key roles without adverse impact on BCU operational capacity. These staff should be deployed within an agreed standard operating procedure, which clearly defines when HOLMES 2 is to be used in both proactive and reactive investigations.

- The force has effective processes, supported by developed IT systems, to manage all aspects of deployment and welfare oversight of roads policing FLOs through a trained force co-ordinator. While the crime FLO intranet site does detail all FLOs and indicates their availability through a traffic light system, it lacks the functionality and detailed deployment recording used for roads policing. Each BCU has a nominated family liaison co-ordinator, although in one area they were awaiting training for this role. The force should seek to replicate the IT processes, level of central oversight and support to individual officers involved in roads policing incidents by nominating a force co-ordinator for crime FLOs.
- Records are not currently kept to monitor the number of unexplained/sudden deaths and the percentage undertaken as enquiry or investigation. The force should compile and analyse this data in a systematic manner and undertake activity to ensure the quality of the outcome of such investigations.

Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through an infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Elements of test purchase and TSU are delivered through verbal collaborative agreements that are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.

Strengths

- The force has in place a series of specialist assets, which are effectively tasked and appropriately trained, allowing it to deal professionally with the covert gathering of intelligence, with appropriate approval of surveillance techniques and technical support that uses up to date equipment and tactics.
- The force retains a CHIS handling capability. Test purchase and undercover operatives are available through informal collaborative approaches between forces. A confidential unit has been established to firewall intelligence from the various sources.
- The force has addressed witness protection issues by buying in services, as required, from another force.
- One SIO is nominated as the kidnap champion, and others are also kidnap and extortion trained.
- All specialist assets are accessed through the level 2 TCG process, which deals with conflict of demand and allows the appropriate resourcing of investigations. Urgent requests are addressed by the ACC (operations) outside the TCG process when required.

Work in progress

- The force has recognised that, to support its increasing focus on managing serious and organised criminality in a proactive manner, the requirement for surveillance activity will increase. Accordingly, in year one of a three year development programme, a dedicated surveillance unit has been created. Staff in the unit have had various levels of training within a formalised development programme and once fully operational, this will further increase the surveillance capability of the force, but will also reduce the abstraction burden on other areas of the force.
- The force is active and forward looking in developing collaborative approaches with forces in both the North East and North West ACPO regions, together with Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary. While many of these approaches are beyond the scope of this inspection, relevant activity includes joint working with another regional force on test purchase operations (with consideration being given to formal collaboration with that force and a further force), North West region's serious and organised crime capability development, support for surveillance activity to and from various forces, witness protection services (bought in from a force, with a collaborative venture planned), and ongoing shared driver training with Lancashire Constabulary and Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary.

Area for improvement

- There are no formal collaborative arrangements with other forces or private providers to deliver all aspects of covert investigations. However, effective working relationships exist at ACPO level with both North East and North West regional forces and other partners, and this allows the force to undertake proactive

operations, including test purchase and surveillance. The force should consider the development of formal collaborative arrangements to underpin the already evident effective working relationships that are enjoyed.

The force has an on demand case review team that is generally deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is in development.

Strengths

- The force has a low volume of homicide and major crime investigations, and so there are small numbers of such investigations that require formal review. At the time of the inspection, all unsolved major crime enquiries were being identified and drawn to the centre. These included one homicide, two rapes and a robbery. These enquiries had been subject to reviews through time, but with the establishment of an FMIT all enquiries were to be drawn to the centre for ongoing ownership and formal review, with particular regard to forensic opportunities.
- The force policy on the review of major crime was applied as part of a recent enquiry, with ACC (operations) appointing a review officer and team to review an undetected offence of rape 12 days into the investigation. The review team consisted of experienced detectives and a CSM from within the force, and it conducted a methodical review of the investigation. During the review process, the offence was detected and ACC (operations) directed that the work should continue to identify learning points and best practice for the force.
- This review identified compliance with MIRSAP and the Murder Investigation Manual. It looked at a number of areas of the investigation, including: suspect parameters, scene identification, search parameters, interview strategies, forensic strategy resource levels and the media strategy. It made a number of recommendations, which have been accepted.
- The force has a cadre of road death SIOs, including a number of roads policing inspectors, sergeants and experienced constables. Details of all fatal road traffic collisions are retained on a corporate spreadsheet, which allows good oversight of the detail and progress of investigations. The roads policing inspectors review every fatal road traffic collision after 72 hours and then after 28 days, recording that these reviews have been completed on the spreadsheet.
- A fail to stop road traffic collision generates an initial response from a road death SIO, who, in due course, either passes responsibility for the enquiry to a crime SIO or else receives appropriate support from the crime SIO as the enquiry continues. Accordingly, policy would require that all such incidents should be reviewed in the same manner as in other major crime investigations.
- In addition to the formal review process, the lead SIO acts as critical friend, and others provide informal peer review of ongoing enquiries at all stages of the investigation.

Work in progress

- In response to the review of an enquiry, the force has invested in external training of a number of senior detectives and road death SIOs in a formal review process which, once completed, will allow the force to use trained staff to undertake reviews.

Area for improvement

- The force has limited exposure to the undertaking of formal reviews of major crime investigations. It should consider whether collaborative opportunities should be

exploited in respect of the undertaking of formal reviews of major crime investigations.

The inspection found that the force was predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the Murder Investigation Manual and Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures.

Strengths

- The force has developed and applies the intelligence processes and products based around the ACPO guidance on the NIM.
- The ACC (operations) ensures that MIRSAP and the Murder Investigation Manual are applied by his SIOs through ongoing updates. When considering resource level, based on experience there is a flexible approach to the application of MIRSAP.
- As evidence of the force's commitment to compliance with ACPO and other standards, the inspection team noted that the force had taken the opportunity to seek support from trained staff within other forces and partner agencies to undertake activity that was beyond the capabilities of the force.
- Policy files are completed for every major crime investigation, and these include decisions not to pursue a line of enquiry; separate policy files are created for sensitive decisions.

Area for improvement

- While years two and three of the Resolve programme will see an increase in level 2 resources (which will allow greater focus on compliance with national standards, such as the engagement of a dedicated RIPA manager), no specific audit and inspection functions are included outside the normal supervisory chains of command. Using a risk based approach, the force should consider inviting a peer review of specific aspects of activity on a rolling basis, with scope to reciprocate. Not only will this allow the force to test compliance with ACPO and other national standards, but it will also provide an opportunity to share learning and good practice.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

The force should ensure that all undetected major crime enquiries in the force have been identified and are subject to review, against appropriate terms of reference, by a suitably qualified and operationally exposed review team in line with the ACPO/National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) Murder Investigation Manual.

Recommendation 2

The force should undertake a review of its capability and capacity to respond to serial offenders and series crime, developing and exercising a mobilisation plan to enhance its response.

Recommendation 3

The force should consider the resourcing of a dedicated HOLMES team or, as a minimum, a robust approach to the use of HOLMES 2, as identified in the major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) manual 2005, allowing the effective mobilisation of appropriately trained staff into key roles without adverse impact on BCU operational capacity. These staff should be deployed within an agreed standard operating procedure, which clearly defines when HOLMES 2 is to be used in both proactive and reactive investigations.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	Assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	Automatic number plate recognition
ASB	Anti-social behaviour
ASBO	Anti-social behaviour order

B

BCU	Basic command unit
BIA	Border and Immigration Agency
BME	Black and minority ethnic
BOF	Back office facility
BTP	British Transport Police

C

CCJB	Cumbria Criminal Justice Board
CDRP	Crime and disorder reduction partnership
CHIS	Covert human intelligence source
CIA	Community impact assessment
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CROP	Covert rural observation post
CSI	Crime scene investigator
CSM	Crime scene manager
CTU	Counter terrorist unit
CuPS	Cumbria partnership support

D

DAAT	Drug and alcohol action team
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DSU Dedicated surveillance unit

F

FIB Force intelligence bureau

FIM Force incident manager

FIO Field intelligence officer

FLO Family liaison officer

FMIT Force major investigation team

FSA Force strategic assessment

G

GMP Greater Manchester Police

GONW Government Office for the North West

GPMS Government Protective Marking Scheme

H

HMI Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HMRC Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

HOLMES Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

HQ Headquarters

I

IAG Independent advisory group

IPLDP Initial Police Learning and Development Programme

IT Information technology

K

KIN Key individual network

L

LCJB Local criminal justice board
LPT Local policing team

M

MAPPA Multi-agency public protection arrangements
MARAC Multi-agency risk assessment conference
MARE Multi-agency risk evaluation
MAST
MIR Major incident room
MIRSAP Major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MoPI Management of police information
MSF Most similar force(s)

N

NCPE National Centre for Policing Excellence
NHP Neighbourhood policing
NIM National Intelligence Model
NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency
NPSAT National Protective Services Analysis Tool
NPT Neighbourhood Policing team
NSPCC National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children

O

OIOC Officer in overall charge
OPSY Operational security officer

P

PCT Primary care trust
PDC Performance development conference

PIP	Professionalising the investigative process
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
PPU	Public protection unit
PSCU	Protective services command unit
PSD	Professional standards department
PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland

R

RART	Regional asset recovery team
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
RIU	Regional intelligence unit
RPU	Roads policing unit
RSO	Registered sex offender

S

SAR	Suspicious activity report
SCAS	Serious crime analysis section
SGC	Specific grading criteria
SIO	Senior investigating officer
SMB	Strategic management board
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SPI	Statutory performance indicator

T

TCG	Tasking and co-ordination group
TSU	Technical support unit