

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Cleveland Police Major Crime

July 2008



Cleveland Police – HMIC Inspection Report

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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical Description of Force Area

The Cleveland Police area covers approximately 230 square miles and has a population of more than 558,206. The force area is divided into four policing basic command units (BCUs), known locally as policing districts. There are four unitary local authorities within the force area (Hartlepool, Redcar and Cleveland, Stockton and Middlesbrough) and their boundaries are coterminous with the BCUs'. The force is responsible for policing a predominantly urban, densely populated area, closely resembling metropolitan authorities in socioeconomic characteristics and policing needs. There are two prisons within the force area, HMP Kirkclevington and HMP Holme House. The former prepares long-term detainees for release back into the community, while the latter, built to Category A standard, acts as a local holding establishment for more than 800 inmates. The force prison liaison officers provide a valuable function in keeping records up to date on the imprisonment and release of offenders in the area.

The Cleveland area is a major production centre for the chemical industry, which results in the large-scale transportation by road, rail and sea of hazardous substances. The chemical industry remains a key economic factor and presents the force, other emergency services and partners with a significant major incident risk. There are 37 control of major accident hazard (COMAH) sites across the area that are closely monitored and on which risk assessments are carried out.

The industrial heart of the area has a strong infrastructure that is well served by the transport network, including an international airport and the UK's second busiest seaport. The force's rural areas border the North Yorkshire Moors, offering great beauty and scope for leisure and sporting activities. The area hosts Premier League and First Division football, a marina and the Tees Barrage. The coastline includes the highest sea cliffs in England and part of the Captain Cook Heritage Trail.

Each of the four districts has town centres offering quality shopping by day and a lively night-time economy. Middlesbrough houses the University of Teesside, which supports approximately 20,000 students, and a new modern and contemporary art gallery, Middlesbrough Institute of Modern Art (MIMA), which opened in January 2007. Stockton includes Durham University's Queen's campus, where nearly 2,000 students are based within a modern waterfront location.

Demographic Description of Force Area

The Cleveland Police area accommodates a population of more than 558,206. The area is considered to be one of the most densely populated locations in the country, with 9.23 people per hectare compared with a national average of 3.5 people per hectare. In Middlesbrough, this figure rises to 25.4 people per hectare. In terms of the social and cultural diversity, the 2001 census results showed that the resident black and minority ethnic (BME) population was estimated to be 1.9%, the majority of whom live in Middlesbrough. This compares with 2.8% and 2.4% for the Tees Valley sub-region and the north-east region.

In addition to being urban in nature, parts of the area are considered to be highly deprived. All four territorial districts have large areas of socioeconomic deprivation; 34 of the 88 wards in the force area are in the top 10% of the most socially deprived wards in the country (2007

data). The unemployment rate is 3.7% compared with a Tees Valley average of 3.5%, a north-east regional average of 2.9% and a 2.1% national average.

In 2007/08 the establishment comprised 1,727 police officers, 755 police staff, 197 police community support officers (PCSOs) and 185 special constables. The force is committed to maintaining police officer numbers; officers will continue to be redeployed, where appropriate, to front-line duties, and the police family will be broadened to include more PCSOs and special constables as well as being extended through the use of community safety accreditation schemes.

The new district headquarters (HQ) in Redcar and Cleveland and Middlesbrough and new police offices in South Bank and Redcar are open. These facilities have increased cell capacity and improved working practices: they provide better access for the public and promote community policing. By outsourcing these custody facilities has enabled redirection of police officers to provide additional capacity to tackle serious criminality and the threat to national security.

The net annual revenue budget for the force (2008/09) is set at £124.62 million. Financial management within Cleveland Police is highly devolved with budgets devolved to the most appropriate level.

Staff Changes at Chief Officer Level

There have been a number of changes to the management structure of the force since the last inspection. A new assistant chief constable (ACC) has been appointed to replace the previous incumbent who moved to an adjoining force on promotion. The deputy chief constable (DCC) is due to retire in June 2008. In addition to this the assistant chief officer (ACO) finance is on maternity leave and her role is being covered temporarily by the head of finance.

Strategic Priorities

The Chief Constable's vision for Cleveland Police is 'Putting People First', which is about delivering the best service possible to the people of Cleveland, with the aim, by 2014, of being a leading force in the delivery of citizen-focused neighbourhood policing.

The force's policing plan provides details of the 2008–11 policing priorities, which have been identified as follows:

- to provide citizen-focused neighbourhood policing by applying the principles of Putting People First;
- to reduce the harm caused to our communities by drugs;
- to reduce crime and anti-social behaviour; and
- to protect the public from the threat of serious crime and terrorism.

Force Performance Overview

Force development since 2007 inspections

The force has been working closely with HMIC to improve the area identified as 'poor' in the 2006 baseline inspection and to address the highlighted areas for improvement from this

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and subsequent inspections. Action plans have been developed and good progress is being made.

The force has continued to deliver crime reduction, with an ongoing commitment, together with partners, to enhance the quality of life for all those who live and work in the force area. Detection rates in all recorded crime categories have improved and there has been significant progress in reducing crime.

During 2007/08 neighbourhood policing was rolled out to all areas of the force. This builds on the nationally recognised success of the pilot site at Hartlepool and now all communities across the Cleveland Police area have a locally based dedicated neighbourhood policing team, made up of police officers, PCSOs and partnership staff, who are clearly identifiable and known to the community. These teams have a key role to play in speaking with the local community to identify and resolve, with appropriate partners, issues of concern that affect the neighbourhood.

Developments since phase 1 inspection 2007

(NB Recommendation 1 relating to neighbourhood policing issues will be addressed in the follow-up report on this issue.)

Recommendation 2 – Protecting Vulnerable People:

HMIC recommends, as a matter of priority, that the force reviews and provides appropriate levels of administrative support for the child abuse investigation units (CAIUs).

Response:

This review has been undertaken and it has been identified that an additional four posts would be appropriate. However, budgetary constraints dictate that, as an initial step, an additional two posts are being bid for with ACPO support.

Recommendation 3 – Protecting Vulnerable People:

HMIC recommends that the force reviews the police officer staffing levels within the CAIUs in order to provide effective resilience.

Response:

The review has been undertaken and the issue of weekend working has been addressed. An additional acting sergeant post has been created.

Recommendation 4 – Protecting Vulnerable People:

HMIC recommends that regular vetting should be undertaken for staff working and applying for roles within the public protection unit (PPU) and child abuse units.

Response:

The force is still awaiting national guidance on this issue, but comprehends the value and as such has commenced local checks pending the national guidance.

Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Cleveland Police’s capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

Indicator	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.675	0.464	-31.26%	0.666
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.004
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.145	0.235	+62.07%	0.149
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	87.50%	84.62%	-2.88pp*	77.33%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.217	0.072	-66.82%	0.189
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	50.00%	25.00%	-25pp*	38.36%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.543	0.344	-36.65%	0.351
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	60.00%	47.37%	-12.63pp*	50.41%
Number of manslaughters per 10,000 population	0.018	0.000	-100.00%	0.022
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	200.00%	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.054	0.109	+101.85%	0.159
% of murders detected/convicted	100.00%	83.33%	-16.67pp*	88.61%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	2.460	2.297	-6.63%	2.311
% of rapes detected/convicted	33.82%	32.28%	-1.54pp*	27.30%

*'pp' is percentage points.

**Most similar force (MSF) group for Cleveland is Merseyside, Northumbria, South Yorkshire, West Midlands and West Yorkshire.

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From the statutory performance indicator (SPI) data contained in the table above it can be seen that murder and attempted murder increased significantly in 2007. While the former is still well below the MSF average, the latter is significantly above the MSF average, as well as being one of the highest figures in England and Wales. Other offences all fell, and are in line with other forces in the group.

The SPI data for major crime investigation indicates that Cleveland is comparable with the rest of the MSF group. Cleveland is performing at a level above the MSF average in some areas (attempted murder and rape), but below the MSF average in other areas (blackmail, kidnapping and murder).

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT), released in September 2007 (figure 1), based on data from the last five years, indicates that Cleveland faces a medium level of demand in respect of the policing response to kidnap per 10,000 population, which is above the median for England and Wales forces (figure 2).

Kidnap (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total

Figure 1





Figure 2



However, the four-year trend for the actual number of kidnaps (figure 3) is downward following a peak in 2003/4. The total number of kidnaps for the period 2000/01 to 2006/07 is the lowest of the MSF group, (figure 4).

Figure 3





Figure 4



When data for the five-year period 2000/01 to 2006/07 is analysed, there is a low level of demand from homicide (average numbers lowest in MSF) and rape (average numbers lowest in MSF). There has been a 31.3% reduction in life-threatening and gun crime between 2006 and 2007.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Cleveland has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types are initially mapped. It is currently estimated that 41 OCGs impact the force area, across all major crime types. The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified drugs, terrorism and high-risk sex offenders as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on violence, firearms, robbery and criminal use of the roads.

The force has invested suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and to inhibit major crime. Cleveland's work and regional lead in relation to honour-based violence is particularly noteworthy.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a mature process in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with Durham Constabulary in relation to firearms issues are recognised, although these are at an early stage of development.

Intelligence

The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to its major crime investigations with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- The force has a range of analysts spread across the 4 operational basic command units (BCUs) and the force intelligence bureau (FIB). In addition, there are three research assistants. This was considered adequate analytical capacity to meet the identified demand (see Work in progress).
- The analysts work proactively to develop intelligence and identify patterns and trends around major crime. Those documents produced by the analysts that were examined all complied with the national intelligence model (NIM) process. They were of a high standard, with issues of consequence identified. The product is clearly informing preventative and enforcement activity.
- The force major incident team (MIT) has an intelligence cell integrated within its structure. This is utilised to co-ordinate and develop intelligence requirements for specific investigations.
- Positive feedback was received from the senior investigating officers (SIO)s within the MIT about the quality of the intelligence products delivered by the analysts in support of major crime investigations.
- It was acknowledged that there should be an intelligence cell attached to every major enquiry, but given capacity issues this is not feasible. An assessment of the seriousness of the investigation is made from the outset to assess the intelligence potential; eg a domestic homicide compared with a gangland killing. Analytical capacity is then allocated based on the assessment.
- The force has invested in new premises at both Middlesbrough and Redcar, utilising a private finance initiative with purpose-built major incident room (MIR) facilities. There are three more MIRs at Hartlepool, Stockton and headquarters (HQ). The only concern expressed was in relation to Hartlepool, which is in the process of being upgraded. There was no feedback at all that the force does not support the MIT or any major enquiries.

Work in progress

- Following publication of the HMIC *Closing the Gap* report, the force has undertaken a review of its protective services capability. They have identified 37 posts that will be utilised to supplement their protective services capability. Four of these posts have been identified for additional analytical capability. A recruitment process has commenced and the force aims to have the posts filled on a rolling basis during 2008. In addition, there is evidence of succession planning to cover the imminent departure of two staff to the regional intelligence unit (RIU).

Area(s) for improvement

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- While additional analysts are being posted to the FIB, these staff will only bring the unit up to the historic strength that existed prior to the cost recovery measures that were introduced following the identification of the force's significant budgetary difficulties during 2004. There may be a requirement to re-review the analytical capability available to the force in the future.
- Capacity issues mean that no effective results analyses had been undertaken for any of the operations that were reviewed. This is an area that needs to be addressed when additional analytical staff become available.
- Concerns were expressed that the retention of analytical staff was problematic, with career progression perceived as being onerous. The issue was compounded by higher salaries available in surrounding forces and other agencies, resulting in the loss of 'trained' staff. While this may be a national issue, the force should satisfy itself that the salary scales it offers to its analysts, and their career progression opportunities, are competitive/attractive.
- While the analytical products being developed are of high quality, concern was expressed that in some instances too much development time was being expended and too much information being presented to investigators who do not require the detail to progress their investigations, eg problem profiles. The recently appointed director of intelligence may wish to review this area to ensure that the time available to analysts is being used to best effect.

The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force assessments of community impact to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.

Strengths

- Effective working relationships were confirmed with key partners at force level such as Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA), the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the Assets Recovery Agency. This includes the two-way flow of intelligence and information regarding major crime.
- The force supports the RIU in terms of seconding staff, particularly operational personnel, whose time is dedicated to service the analytical products flowing from this unit. HMI was made aware of good examples of regional success including an operation to combat distraction burglaries, (see Area(s) for improvement).
- Examples were provided of strong working relationships with partners at BCU level, eg Stockton. In each of the operational districts, key staff from partner organisations such as the local authority and crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) are involved directly in policing activity including intelligence sharing and prevention activity relating to the disruption of major crime.
- There is an awareness of the need for community impact assessments (CIAs) and these are primarily undertaken in the four districts under the direction of the local chief inspector. Reviews are undertaken regularly, often at the daily management meeting. HMI was aware of ongoing operations to disrupt major crime where effective CIAs were in place that were subject to monitoring on a daily basis.
- Sound and positive relationships are in place with local independent advisory groups (IAGs) who are fully involved in the development and ongoing monitoring of CIAs. A recent drugs operation within the black and minority ethnic (BME) community during Ramadan was provided as a good example of the force working closely with the IAG.

Work in progress

- The force recognises that there is a lack of consistency in terms of information and intelligence sharing with some of its key partners at a local level. The interpretation of force policy within some of the operational BCUs is compounding this issue. However, the deputy chief constable (DCC) is aware and is actively seeking to identify a solution.

Area(s) for improvement

- The lack of effective results analysis is hampering the ability of the organisation to clearly understand and communicate the drivers that are impacting on major crime, eg homicide. There is extensive research elsewhere in the country in this regard. The force should seek out good practice and localise the product to obtain a better understanding of the drivers impacting on this area of business.

The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to its major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be adequate. Problem profiles for all major crime areas are satisfactory, with links to force and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- The FSA is produced every 12 months with 6-monthly interim reviews. A strategic intelligence group chaired by the Chief Constable meets at the six-month review point to hold individuals to account for previous actions and to task relevant items for action or development. In addition, interim assessments are undertaken by the director of intelligence at regular intervals between the six-monthly meetings. Any issues emerging are reported to the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) lead for assessment and any action deemed necessary.
- Major crime and associated precursor offences are considered within the FSA process and also feature in the final document. There is evidence that the force control strategy and strategic intelligence requirement also feature major crime as a key area of business including firearms, drugs, paedophile rings, organised violence and dangerous offenders.
- The national strategic assessment and the UK threat assessment are both considered during preparation of the FSA, as are BCU priorities and concerns. The volume and quality of intelligence being fed into the process from the BCUs are improving and this will enhance the force overview. The procedure for developing the FSA also takes full cognisance of emerging threats, and analyses both current and future demand. The most recent FSA confirms that this analysis is being undertaken comprehensively.
- All intelligence products meet the requirements of ACPO guidance. There are comprehensive control strategies, intelligence requirements, problem profiles and target profiles for all major crime areas impacting on the force. A spate of burglaries involving the theft of high-powered vehicles and also the organised theft of heavy metals are cited as good examples.
- At BCU level, 'near miss' offences are monitored by staff within the local intelligence bureau and any implications are communicated to senior officers within the district. Where appropriate, this information/intelligence is forwarded to FIB for further analysis and development.
- The force has adopted the separation/pregnancy/escalation/cultural/sexual assault/stalking (SPECSS) risk model for the identification and management of dangerous sex offenders and prevention of domestic violence.
- The leading SIO attends national conferences to assess evolving good practice and lessons learnt in terms of major crime. These are reported back to the force and adopted where appropriate.
- The force has identified its vulnerability to honour-based violence within certain ethnic communities and has responded positively by holding a national seminar and launching a telephone helpline for potential victims. It is believed that Cleveland is

the first force in the country to recognise the significance of this issue and its positive approach has the potential to develop into national good practice.

Work in progress

- The FSA is currently being reviewed to identify areas of improvement including homicide reduction and the need to take cognisance of regional issues. The force is also endeavouring to integrate the FSA with its business planning processes. The work to develop the homicide reduction strategy is currently ongoing.
- The force is in the process of implementing the Every Child Matters agenda in order to maximise its contribution to children and young people fulfilling their potential and being safe.

Area(s) for improvement

- There should be an auditable record of decision making during the strategic tasking and co-ordinating process (see Area(s) for improvement in section MC09).
- The comprehensive analysis of current and future demands cannot be complete unless the force identifies its vulnerable communities. It has made great strides identifying key risk areas such as honour-based violence, but needs to replicate this enthusiasm in relation to vulnerable communities. While the neighbourhood profiles are being developed it is essential that the force identifies such communities as soon as possible to enable an effective assessment of future risks and demand for service (see sections SO05, MC05 and list of recommendations).

Trend analysis and problem profiles are routinely shared with partners and BCUs. There is an effective trigger plan for 'hot briefing' either when there is a significant change in the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast response. Information-sharing protocols exist with key partners, such as HMRC and BIA. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information (MoPI) compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- Strong and effective partnership working was confirmed at many levels including the co-location of analysts from partner organisations within the force's analytical structures.
- HMRC, BIA and the Passport Agency were examples of agencies with good working relationships with the force. FIB staff maintain day-to-day contact through a defined single point of contact (SPOC) and protocols are in place to share information and intelligence with these agencies. Problem profiles are shared where and when appropriate. HMI was made aware of operations to combat organised immigration crime involving unlicensed and illegal workers within care homes that provided confirmation of the effectiveness of these links.
- Evidence was provided that confirms that the RIU is a 'key' partner and the effectiveness of the collaboration has resulted in reducing some of the demand being placed upon the FIB. Working through the FIB, the RIU can provide an effective conduit to manage and develop information and intelligence from other agencies.
- The force can respond effectively to either a significant change in threat level or specific intelligence in relation to major crime, with 'trigger plans' in place that can be implemented when necessary. These are supplemented by effective call-out procedures.
- The force makes effective use of all national databases including the serious crime analysis system (SCAS), Catchem, the kidnap and extortion database and Genesis. It made five submissions to SCAS in the 12-month period to the end of 2007, three of which were within the specified time frame (60% compliance).
- Confirmation was received that the force is on course for full MoPI compliance by 2010. The force action plan has been assessed as being ahead of schedule. The MoPI lead is due to visit the force to confirm progress and a peer review is also planned. There is a force policy and action plan in place for MoPI. Training in relation to this area of business has already commenced.

Work in progress

- Data-sharing protocols are in place, but currently are based locally within the four operational districts. The force acknowledges the need to move to a force-wide protocol arrangement. Representatives of partner organisations confirmed the need to develop the area of information sharing further. This is being progressed via the DCC.

Area(s) for improvement

- Concern was expressed that when the force works collaboratively with key partners such as HMRC and the BIA the objectives of the partners in terms of the investigations can differ, thereby imposing constraints on the nature and direction of the investigation. It is suggested that where such situations are likely to arise, an agreement should be reached at the outset that binds the partners to agreed objectives.

In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is incomplete, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is only partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are not identified sufficiently early.

Strengths

- The DCC sits on the North East Strategic Migration Partnership, which focuses on certain groups such as prisoners, new arrivals and asylum seekers to assess the issues facing these groups and how best to deal with them.
- CIAs are undertaken at district level both at the outset and during all major crime investigations and decisions are recorded within the SIO's policy log. The CIA is placed on the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) as a document.
- The force conducts an annual quality of life survey (via the corporate planning and performance service unit) to assess levels of public confidence and satisfaction with a range of the services it provides. The feedback is used to assess both risk and threat and is considered during the development of the FSA.

Work in progress

- Clear links with the neighbourhood policing agenda and individual neighbourhood profiles are being developed, but have yet to be completed and fed in to the intelligence system.
- As part of its strategy to manage the ongoing difficulties within the Grangetown area, the force has shown innovation by engaging an external community mediation organisation called UNITE to engage with residents with a view to seeking long-term solutions. While this approach could amount to good practice, the force needs to ensure it is evaluated effectively.

Area(s) for improvement

- The full range of analysis is undertaken for specific operations where communities are profiled and particular issues identified and monitored, or for thematic issues such as honour-based violence. However, this is not comprehensive or embedded in the organisation and the force is not proactively identifying all vulnerable communities and the threats they face from major crime. This in part may be due to the shortage of analytical capability, which should be addressed in the near future, and the completion of neighbourhood profiles, but the identification of vulnerable communities is an area of business the force needs to develop with some vigour (see recommendation in section SO05).
- While the FSA reflects the potential impact of various diverse communities on the force it does this in general terms. This needs to be developed to identify particular communities and assess the specific threats that might arise. The influx of migrant workers from Eastern Europe was cited as an area where the force needs to develop a better understanding.
- While there has been some good work undertaken involving the Rich Picture initiative the force has yet to map all its vulnerable communities and then to identify

what risks and threats they may be subject to for all the major crime areas. This piece of work will need to be effectively driven to ensure the force has as comprehensive an assessment as possible of future demands and likely high-risk areas.

The force maintains a corporate risk register, which is reviewed every month by the strategic development group (SDG) chaired by the assistant chief constable territorial (ACC (T)). Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan, which is robustly and effectively monitored.

Strengths

- Confirmation was provided that there is a corporate risk register in existence, which is reviewed monthly by the SDG and quarterly by the police authority. SOC and major crime feature within the document when appropriate. The issues can be addressed corporately and/or as a specific issue to be addressed by the crime management service unit. The register itself was physically examined by HMIC staff, who confirmed that ownership of the risk is allocated to specified post holders. They are held to account for the actions to mitigate risk at regular intervals by the ACPO team.
- As well as the corporate risk register, all service units also have their own departmental risk registers; both of these utilise the threat matrix provided by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA).
- The force provided an example of a potential corporate risk within the major crime arena where a successful control measure was applied and the risk mitigated. This arose after concerns were expressed by the ACPO team about the disappearance of three female street sex workers over a five-year period. An external agency (Dream Policing) was commissioned to review the investigations. This confirmed the force's assessment that the crimes were not linked and therefore the risk that a predatory serial sex offender was targeting such women within the force area was discounted.

Work in progress

- The force has identified the implications of MoPI and its ongoing development of the integrated records information system (IRIS) system as representing a risk to the organisation. The IT issue was highlighted specifically by many front-line staff as inhibiting the effective delivery of their duties and responsibilities. The force is alert to the issue and is adopting control measures to mitigate the impact.

Area(s) for improvement

- The issue of risk and what is being done to ameliorate it does not appear on senior management team meeting agendas. This should be corrected and a standing item placed on the agenda of each BCU and service unit meeting.

The force is creating ways of collaborating with some other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems. The force currently shares intelligence and data with CDRPs and the RIU. Its HOLMES systems are not interoperable.

Strengths

- The force has adopted the NICHE RMS data warehouse concept as an overarching means of linking all of its different IT systems together. Staff acknowledge that the principle is sound, but there are a number of significant issues to be resolved (see below). The system links crime, command and control, property, custody and intelligence. Standalone systems such as HOLMES and ViSOR are currently not linked (see Area(s) for improvement).
- Intelligence collection is input by all staff on to IRIS apart from that contained within HOLMES and ViSOR. It is therefore accessible for analysis and dissemination dependent upon access levels.
- While other force intelligence systems cannot be interrogated directly, there is evidence of effective protocols or memorandums of understanding that enable the transfer of intelligence by effective communication between the relevant FIBs. Joint intelligence cells are established when the need arises.
- Staff from the CDRPs confirmed that they are able to share intelligence with the force and in some of the BCUs and also to obtain police generated information (see previous Work in progress in section MC04).
- Both data protection act (DPA) and information security responsibilities sit within the professional standards department (PSD) structure and the force can demonstrate effective DPA register compliance. The DPA register is reviewed annually with a notification document being produced. This is then published on the force intranet.

Work in progress

- There is effective use made during major crime investigations of the automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) fixed sites within the force area. This will be enhanced further when the back-office function (version 2.2) is implemented during December 2007.
- The force is working in collaboration with other forces to develop a consistent method of identifying and managing the intelligence on OCGs. Standards for intelligence handling should result from this work and will influence the design of future processes.
- Confirmation was received that all the findings/recommendations from the Bichard Enquiry have been incorporated into the MoPI action plan under the direction of a superintendent. The action plan is reviewed regularly by the ACPO lead and is currently ahead of schedule for full compliance by 2010.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force is currently unable to link HOLMES and ViSOR directly to other force systems, but there is a facility within the NICHE IRIS structure for a special projects box that has restricted access, which would enable this to be undertaken. The adoption of this approach would enable the more effective co-ordination of intelligence by the FIB. This approach is currently being used by the organised crime unit (OCU) to enhance the flow of intelligence from their unit to the FIB. The force should explore the possibility of utilising this facility to link intelligence within HOLMES to the FIB.
- The force contends that it is dealing proactively with the difficulties identified within its main IT systems that support operational business delivery. However, strong messages were received from front-line staff that these problems continue to impact on their ability to deliver an effective service. They are resulting in considerable frustrations among staff who feel their genuine concerns are currently not being addressed proactively enough.
- Though a strategic group exists and reports being alert to the problems outlined above, there is a lack of a corporate ‘champion’ who owns the problem and co-ordinates all activity. A model already exists within the implementation of neighbourhood policing where a senior member of police staff co-ordinates all activity and reports directly to the ACPO lead. The force would benefit from a similar approach for this major IT project.

RECOMMENDATION 1

HMIC recommends that a corporate ‘champion’ should be appointed to oversee development of IRIS and ensure co-ordination of all activity. In addition, the strategic group should be supported by two user groups; firstly an end-user group comprising front-line staff, and secondly a technical group to advise on potential IT solutions. The strategic group should have senior representation from the four BCUs and the HQ service units.

July 2008

The force has a case review policy that is generally applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is effective.

Strengths

- The force has a policy that requires the review of major crime investigations in line with national and ACPO guidelines, but it acknowledges that, being a small force, staffing levels limit its ability to review all major crime enquiries exactly in accordance with major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) guidelines. In those instances where it is not feasible to conduct structured reviews the force adopts a pragmatic and innovative approach by drawing together a major incident advisory group (MIAG) comprising the head of crime, leading SIO(s), the head of the PSD (where appropriate) and other staff who can bring specialist skills or knowledge, eg telephone data analysis. This affords the opportunity not only to review progress but also to look forward and plan the investigative strategy with the SIO for the case in question. The process is not only dynamic but was also reported to provide an effective means of review.
- When the force does not have sufficient internal capacity to undertake cold case reviews, it uses external consultants (Dream Policing) to conduct the necessary actions. The service provided is reported as being professional and effective. In addition, other neighbouring forces would be considered to undertake this work should the need arise, although this has not been necessary to date.

Work in progress

- Regular debriefs of all major investigations do not currently take place. The force recognises the benefit to be drawn from such an approach and the newly appointed SIO will commence a formal, quarterly process to capture and disseminate learning.

Area(s) for improvement

- The current limited capacity within the FIB means that results analysis is not being undertaken routinely; however, it is anticipated this will be achieved when staffing levels are increased. When this is achieved the force needs to ensure that the flow of information from the four operational districts is enhanced to facilitate effective analysis.

The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The force has an effective tasking and co-ordination process at all levels, with all the required documentation produced in accordance with NIM guidance other than effective results analysis (see below). The main level 2 tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) is held monthly and chaired by the ACPO lead for major crime and SOC, at present the DCC.
- Documentation examined during the inspection identified that, despite capacity issues within the FIB, the force is able through its NIM strategic documents to assess progress since the last assessment, examine the current picture in relation to major crime and make an assessment of where future demands are likely to be.
- Specialist policing activity, in support of major crime investigation, is recorded within an action register, and feedback is provided to the level 2 TCG regarding the use and effectiveness of specialist operational resources.
- The force accepts it has to exhibit flexibility within the NIM process when responding to issues of corporate risk by responding to single strand intelligence and applying professional judgement, which occasionally dictates actions outside of the formal NIM process.

Work in progress

N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- There is an absence of comprehensive minutes relating to the level 2 TCG process, although minutes do exist for a resource meeting held in relation to level 2 on a weekly basis. There is also an action register produced that records ownership, activity, operational name and a brief description of activity undertaken. What is missing, in the absence of a comprehensive set of minutes, is an explanation of the rationale behind any decisions. While the force is confident that it could defend any decision and what has informed it, the addition of some form of documentation (minutes) would not only formalise the process but also provide an audit trail, should the need arise.

Due to inadequate training, the force's awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is limited.

Strengths

- Positive feedback was received from staff working within the crime management branch of the force about the high standard of training being delivered via the SIO and the MIT. No deficiencies were reported by staff working within the major crime area, confirming that they were appropriately skilled to conduct their roles and responsibilities.
- The force has made a conscious decision to invest its efforts in developing a cadre of SIOs at detective sergeant (DS) and detective chief inspector (DCI) level. The SIO undertakes development days and acts in the capacity of adviser to his more junior colleagues.
- Family liaison officers and negotiators have been provided with a handbook that addresses diversity issues that staff should be aware of when dealing with minority communities. The handbook was described as informative and useful.
- Utilising the services of a professional media company, the force has produced two DVDs regarding HOLMES room procedures and major crime investigations. These are used to brief staff at the start of an investigation. A third DVD in the series has been developed dealing with initial scene attendance by front-line officers (golden hour). All of these products are of high quality and have been recognised by the NPIA as representing national good practice.

Work in progress

N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- While positive feedback was received regarding the crime training being delivered via the crime branch, staff were critical of training provided by the force training school, which was reported as requiring development regarding both quality and content. The assessment identified gaps between what is being undertaken in the HQ service units, the four operational BCUs and the force training department. There was little evidence that the courses that staff within the crime branch were attending were being quality assured, unless they attended other 'accredited' police establishments that specialised in crime training. The force needs to ensure that training being delivered locally within branches or BCUs accords with corporate standards and is effectively quality assured to mitigate any potential risk to individual officers and the force.
- Staff reported having received ethics training and diversity training some years ago. There was recognition among those interviewed that changes in society are occurring, eg the influx of Eastern European migrants, and that there was an absence of effective inputs regarding the implications of this migration for major crime investigations. The force needs to ensure that any training given to staff involved in major crime investigations raises their awareness of diverse community needs.

Prevention

The force has an IAG and key individual network (KIN) and these are frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- There is an effective IAG structure with groups at both corporate and district level. Very positive feedback was received about all the groups and their contributions regarding community consultation, advice and guidance. A good example is Stockton where KINs are used to good effect with involvement at various levels to influence future direction and address current issues.
- The force has demonstrated its commitment to the IAGs by holding a development session early in 2007. In addition, two members of the force-level IAG are critical incident trained, with a 24/7 call-out procedure in place for major incident response.
- There is regular contact with the force IAG and an effective working relationship between the chair and the head of crime. These relationships proved both effective and essential following the London bombings in July 2005 when extensive CIAs were undertaken.
- The chair of the force-level IAG confirmed that the force is willing to listen and to act upon advice with much goodwill and commitment exhibited up to and including the Chief Constable.

Work in progress

- The IAG is working with neighbourhood officers regarding emerging communities. It is, however, considered that there may be an opportunity for more involved scoping of community groups, as ward profiles are developed as part of the neighbourhood policing agenda. Such profiles could provide invaluable assistance to an SIO when a major crime occurs.
- There are good community links, but the force has acknowledged that more work is needed to build links with hard-to-access groups, eg females from the Asian community.

Area(s) for improvement

- Given the good working relationships between the force and the IAGs it may be appropriate for the force to consider involving the IAGs as part of its gold command structures when appropriate. This approach has been used effectively in other parts of the country but has not, to date, been adopted within Cleveland.

July 2008

Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- The inspection confirmed that the force has contingency plans in place regarding a full range of major incidents and that these can be initiated on a 24/7 basis via the force communication centre and the ‘on-call’ duty silver commander.
- Communications room staff work from a series of electronic dropdown menus that specify action to be taken and questions to be asked when seeking information from callers reporting major or potentially major crime. One of these menus relates specifically to ‘golden hour’ criteria.
- The force communications room senior supervisor has access to sealed plans to respond to ‘trigger’ incidents. These can be accessed when appropriate to assist in the effective management of such incidents.
- It is the practice of the force communications room to assess learning from their response to major incidents. This is undertaken through professional development days and using their internal quality assurance processes to both assess learning and communicate it internally to staff within the room.
- The MIT has staff dedicated to key roles within the MIR who can be called out at short notice. The force provides an example where, in March 2007, following a murder in the Stockton BCU, a full HOLMES incident room was established within two hours.

Work in progress

N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- The initial response to any potential major incident is dependent on an early assessment by the first staff at the scene and the duty inspector or silver commander. Concern was expressed by some staff that the consistency of decision making during the critical first hour can be variable. Examples cited related to unwillingness on behalf of some supervisory officers to arrange for the call-out procedure to be invoked when dealing with vulnerable missing from homes (MFHs). In general, when dealing with a homicide, the response was considered appropriate; however, for other potential major crimes the response was reported as being more variable. The force needs to ensure that supervisors are fully aware of their obligations when dealing with such incidents and err on the side of caution to mitigate any potential corporate risk.

The guidance covering threat to life is accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint/regional/cross-border and multi-agency operations exist.

Strengths

- There was evidence that Osman warnings are used to good effect within the force and there was knowledge among operational staff of both the need for the warnings and the means by which they should be administered (both verbally and in writing). No issues were raised by operational personnel regarding the delivery of such warnings.
- Firearms suppression and disruption tactics are understood and have been used effectively in many parts of the force area where armed response vehicles (ARVs) have been deployed to prevent escalation of potentially volatile situations and the use of Osman warnings proved effective to assist in overall suppression.
- While there was no evidence of a current force policy covering this area (see Work in progress), previous guidance had been sufficient for staff to have a good knowledge of the identification of persons at risk and the correct procedures to undertake.
- The SIOs confirmed that any use of Osman warnings are documented in their policy books.
- The force operates a joint firearms training facility with Durham Constabulary. Firearms officers from both forces train together and are deployed in joint operations when the need arises.

Work in progress

- HMI was made aware of the innovative use of Osman warnings by targeting the perpetrators of gun crime in parts of the force area, used as part of a range of activity put in place to reduce tension and prevent escalation.
- There is no documented threat-to-life policy in existence that draws together all aspects of preventative and disruptive activity. However, this is currently being developed by the head of the OCU as a matter of urgency. This will afford the force greater protection and reduce the risk of litigation, while also providing officers with a consistent corporate approach to be applied when threats to life are notified.

Area(s) for improvement

- There is no corporate process to monitor the number of Osman warnings (and repeat warnings) issued across the force area. A corporate system needs to be put in place to more effectively identify trends and any areas of concern. Threats to kill figures for the last/latest financial years are as follows:
 - 01/04/06 to 31/03/07 = 50
 - 01/04/07 to 14/01/08 = 61

July 2008

The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by dedicated covert resources. The force operates a policy that is understood by dedicated staff and other key posts. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- The force has operated a witness protection team for the past five years, staffed by detective constables (DCs) who are 'dedicated' to this responsibility full time and have a thorough understanding of all the requirements of the role. The officers work in plain clothes and undertake their work separate from any other officers or force responsibility.
- The director of intelligence makes an assessment of each individual case being considered for witness protection, but the final decision regarding access to the scheme rests with the DCC. Staff within the unit then maintain regular contact and dialogue with subjects who are on the scheme.
- The force policy is in place and effective and understood by senior staff (see Area(s) for improvement).
- The scheme is operated as part of the FIB with criteria for admission subject to a protocol that is based upon ACPO guidance. While there have been no new entrants to the scheme in the last 12 months, the force has effective placement arrangements with other forces across the country and good working relations on an individual basis. This enables effective operations to be put in place and monitored.
- While the administration of the scheme is not a specific responsibility of the SIO, he regularly briefs 'junior' colleagues on witness protection procedures. All DCIs and detective inspectors (DIs) within the force know what is involved and the procedures to be followed. DSs are provided with an input on witness protection as part of their 'in house' training (see Area(s) for improvement).
- The force's witness protection staff also have responsibility for the 'welfare' of protected witnesses from other force areas who have been relocated within the force area. They maintain regular, covert contact with such persons.

Work in progress

N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- There is a perception that general awareness of witness protection among BCU front-line officers is low. A focus group of DSs and DCs, who were interviewed, reported having no contact with the witness protection team and were unsure of where to go if they needed to access the service. While there is little need for all operational staff to be aware of the scheme, it would be beneficial if the force targeted DSs, in particular, to make them aware of how to access the scheme, if required.

- There is no national guidance currently available in relation to witness protection, and this may be an issue that could be taken up by the ACPO lead for this business area.

The force has a limited system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The force considers that CIAs and the assessment of confidence in communities is the responsibility of the four operational districts with the neighbourhood chief inspectors taking the lead.
- The role of the neighbourhood teams is vital to this area of work, as is the involvement of the police community support officers (PCSOs) who have developed KINs that can be utilised to make an assessment of the impact of criminal activity on the community.
- The district IAGs are also utilised as a 'sounding board' by the relevant management teams to assess the impact of activity. The response to the London bombings was cited as a good example of this joint activity.

Work in progress

N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- The force acknowledges that it has not yet mapped all of its communities, which is an integral and ongoing aspect of the development of its neighbourhood policing agenda. Until such time as this work has been completed, it is difficult to assess the impact that its preventative and enforcement activity within the area of major crime is having on particularly vulnerable communities. The force should prioritise the development of suitable indicators to assess the 'harm' imposed by major crime once communities have been mapped (see recommendation in section SO05).
- While the force monitors confidence levels in communities on a regular basis through annual surveys there was no evidence that any indicators have yet been developed that could be used on a more regular basis in response to major crime investigations. The force may wish to consider using indicators to monitor the levels of confidence especially in what are likely to be protracted major crime enquiries.

July 2008

The inspection found evidence that the force sometimes considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a comprehensive policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The force PSD has responsibility for protecting the organisation from the threat of corruption and infiltration by the criminal fraternity. There is a covert integrity unit situated within the PSD structure together with a force vetting unit. The force's data protection and information security officers are also located within the PSD.
- There is good physical security in place within the crime management branch with staff aware of the need to protect information and intelligence.
- There is regular contact between the force SIOs and the head of the PSD in relation to the staffing of major crime enquiries. Staff within the MIT are vetted to the appropriate level.
- Ongoing, proactive checks are undertaken by the PSD with regular audits and checks of the force computer systems to identify unauthorised access or misuse of data and information. At the time of the inspection three members of staff were under investigation for allegedly accessing information inappropriately.
- There is a range of force security policies and protocols in place covering this area of business and a force vetting policy is in existence that is consistently applied.

Work in progress

N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- Confirmation was received that the focus of the covert integrity unit within the PSD is on important but nonetheless lower level activity. This is primarily a resourcing issue within the unit. The force may wish to consider the value of undertaking proactive integrity testing when resources allow.

Enforcement

Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, but with insufficient use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command groups (see section MC06).

Strengths

- The ACPO lead for this area of business is the DCC; however, the ACPO team comes together collectively to assess response to major crime and to allocate resources through the level 2 TCG process.
- The chair, vice chair and lead member of the police authority are briefed regularly regarding performance within this area of business.
- Robust governance arrangements are in place within the police authority, with major crime being considered by the strategic and performance policing panel. The police authority's panel arrangements are now more streamlined and effective and are reported to be working well.
- Regular briefings take place between the lead member of the police authority and the head of crime to ensure the authority is kept fully informed of progress and ongoing operations. The authority member is satisfied these briefings assist in bringing informed opinion to authority decision making.
- A gold group is not normally established for the management of major crime; however, in the case of the problems in Grangetown such a group was established, which included the chair of the police authority in his role as a local councillor.

Work in progress

- The three members of the police authority mentioned above are currently vetted to an appropriate level, but the chair is considering being vetted to a higher level in order to assist the force further.

Area(s) for improvement

- Given the good working relationships between the force and the IAGs it may be appropriate for the force to consider involving the IAGs as part of its gold command structures when the need arises. This approach has been used effectively in other parts of the country, but has not been adopted to date within Cleveland.

July 2008

The ACPO lead and the head of the crime department are fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime and critical incidents. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training in critical incident command, CIAs and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The DCC is both SCIMITAR (large-scale public disorder) and linked and series crime trained. The head of crime and the SIO are both very experienced, and have undertaken all the necessary national courses required to manage major crime enquiries.
- A successor to the incumbent SIO, who is due to retire in the near future, has been identified and is working alongside the outgoing officer.
- The FIB conducted two kidnap exercises during the course of 2007 with another in the planning stages for 2008 that will involve a wider participative group. The force also partakes in both counter-terrorist table top and remount level exercises.
- The head of crime and SIOs have all undertaken professionalising the investigative process (PIP) level 3 training and are highly experienced and well versed both in the need for and in undertaking CIAs. Should advice be required in relation to partnership issues the excellent working relationships with partners ensures this is available as and when required.

Work in progress

- Given the lack of high-level investigative experience within the existing ACPO command team it is likely that the force would have to seek the assistance of another force in the event of an OIOC being required to manage a linked or complex series of crime.

Area(s) for improvement

- Concern was expressed about the number of ACPO officers who have had direct exposure to major crime enquiries. The benefit of such officers undertaking formal training such as SCIMITAR and linked and series crime courses is appreciated by SIOs. A view was expressed by the DCC that it would be particularly beneficial if ACPO personnel have the benefit of direct exposure to these complicated investigations. (NB this comment is not exclusive to Cleveland and raises a possible national issue.)

The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, cost, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- While the force has a policy that requires the review of major crime investigations in line with national guidelines, in those instances where it is not feasible to conduct structured reviews that comply with MIRSAP, the force adopts a pragmatic and innovative approach by drawing together a MIAG comprising the head of crime, SIO, the head of PSD (where appropriate) and other staff who can bring specialist skills or knowledge, eg telephone data analysis. It affords the opportunity not only to review progress but also to look forward and plan the investigative strategy with the SIO for the case in question. The process is not only dynamic but was also reported to provide an effective means of review.
- The progress of all major crime investigations is reviewed weekly by the DCC and the head of crime. Decisions are made relating to the continuation or otherwise of various investigative tactics, eg the use of surveillance teams and whether investigations should be terminated.
- All the work of the MIT is 'costed' with the central business unit monitoring spend inclusive of forensics on an ongoing basis. There is a force contingency of £800,000 for this financial year to service major crime investigations.
- When cold case and independent reviews of major crime investigations occur, the use of either external organisations such as Dream Policing or SIOs from other forces within the region could be considered should the need arise.
- A good working relationship exists with the special case prosecutor within the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Meetings to discuss investigation/prosecution strategies are described as constructive and challenging.

Work in progress

- Regular debriefs of investigations currently do not take place. The force recognises the benefit to be drawn from such an approach and the incoming SIO is keen to commence a formal, quarterly process to capture and disseminate learning.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force acknowledges that staffing capacity limits its ability to undertake formal reviews of major crime in accordance with MIRSAP guidelines in every case, although some are undertaken. The approach described in the immediately foregoing and following sections should assist in overcoming this gap.

Performance Management and Resilience

The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with SOCA and Durham Constabulary exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide partial protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- The MIT is headed by the detective chief superintendent (head of crime) who is supported by a range of other officers of various ranks and specialist police staff.
- The MIT is largely self sufficient, but it can call upon additional resources from the operational BCUs when this is deemed necessary. Staff within the MIT are multi-skilled and can provide all key roles to service MIRSAP requirements, up to and including tier 5 interviewing. All of the force SIOs are trained to PIP level 3.
- The force has recently upgraded two of its MIRs under private finance initiative (PFI) arrangements; the facilities provided are described as first class. The two remaining MIRs within the Hartlepool and Stockton BCUs are undergoing refurbishment. The MIT also has direct access to an MIR within its office accommodation at force HQ.
- A state-of-the-art sexual abuse multi-agency referral centre (SARC) has recently been opened in Middlesbrough. This services the whole force area.
- The leading SIO has extensive experience of leading non-homicide investigations. The ENRON power station explosion involving the Health and Safety Executive and the investigation of deaths in care homes were cited as examples of the force involvement in high-profile or suspicious deaths. In such cases the MIT provides the full range of services to the relevant BCU.
- Effective working relationships are reported with both Home Office pathologists and the forensic science service in terms of their involvement in major crime investigations. No areas of concern were highlighted. An identical situation was reported in terms of the willingness of other forces within the region to share specialist resources.

Work in progress

- The force has indicated that it wishes to develop 'career detectives' and also to have succession planning in place to assist with this aspiration.
- While it is recognised that designating the crime managers within the operational districts as SIOs has the potential to conflict with their primary day-to-day responsibility, the force has taken a conscious decision to develop these senior detective officers professionally in this way. Feedback from partners indicated they preferred this approach as it provided local knowledge and continuity. However, concern was expressed that there is the potential for district performance in relation to volume crime to suffer while the crime managers are acting in the capacity of SIO.

July 2008

This is a difficult balance to maintain and one that the force will need to keep under review.

- Though HMIC very much applauds the force's commitment and foresight to provide additional staff to bolster its protective service capability, it is recognised that the process of transferring staff into these specialist areas cannot be achieved by direct transfer of personnel. It is important that the process is managed carefully to ensure that the performance of the operational BCUs does not suffer as a result of the inevitable drawdown of experienced criminal investigation department (CID) staff.
- Though it was described as a challenge to provide an analyst to every major crime investigation, the force is usually able to achieve this position. The current recruitment process for additional analysts should enhance resilience.
- Confirmation was received that the casualty bureau is operating on HOLMES v12 and that the MIT will migrate to that version during December 2007.
- Confirmation was received that during 2007 the force registered 70 enquiries with SOCA. In addition, it contributed to five of the nine SOCA priority assessment areas.

Area(s) for improvement

- A perspective was expressed that it would be advantageous to develop ACPO officers on a regional basis, ie introduce an interchange of staff between forces to assist in their professional development regarding the management of major crime (this is potentially a local/regional/national issue).
- When the force has to operate a full HOLMES suite, additional staff can be called in from districts or other departments to supplement MIT staff within the MIR. However, there has been no HOLMES refresher training for at least three years, meaning that non-MIR staff have to spend a considerable amount of time refreshing themselves on the latest version of the system. The force should introduce refresher training for HOLMES as a matter of priority.

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Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through an infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Regional support, eg body recovery dogs, are delivered through written collaborative agreements that are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of specialist assets across a range of major crime offences.

Strengths

- A robust infrastructure exists in force in terms of specialist resources to support major crime investigations, eg ANPR, a surveillance team that is soon to be increased as a result of the force's review of protective services capability, technical support unit (TSU), police search of area (POLSA) and experts in telephones analysis. It also has a well-equipped and innovative TSU. These resources are viewed as being an integral part of force business.
- Where specialist assets are not readily available within force, protocols exist to obtain these resources from surrounding forces, eg body recovery dog from North Yorkshire Police. These arrangements are described as being effective and providing the resources needed to service demand.
- Similar arrangements exist in terms of servicing test purchase operations where collaborative arrangements are in place with other forces.
- Specialist resources to support major crime investigations are allocated via the level 2 tasking and co-ordinating process. Their ongoing use is reviewed weekly at a level 2 resource allocation meeting.
- HMIC is satisfied that given the level of threat and the size of the force the infrastructure and other arrangements that are in place are robust.

Work in progress

- See section MC22 regarding force plans to increase staffing within the area of protective services (inclusive of some aspects of specialist resources, eg surveillance capacity and ANPR).

Area(s) for improvement

N/A

The force has an independent on-demand case review team that is generally deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is effective.

Strengths

- While the force has a policy that requires the review of major crime investigations in line with national guidelines, in those instances where it is not feasible to conduct structured reviews that comply with MIRSAP, the force adopts a pragmatic and innovative approach by drawing together a MIAG comprising the head of crime, SIO, the head of the PSD (where appropriate) and other staff who can bring specialist skills or knowledge, eg telephone data analysis. It affords the opportunity not only to review progress but also to look forward and plan the investigative strategy with the SIO for the case in question. The process is not only dynamic but was also reported to provide an effective means of review.
- Where the force does not have sufficient internal capacity to undertake cold case reviews, it uses external consultants (Dream Policing) to conduct the necessary actions. The service provided is reported as being professional and effective. In addition, other forces in the region would be considered to undertake such reviews should the need arise.
- The force provided an example of a potential corporate risk within the major crime arena where a successful control measure was applied and the risk mitigated. This arose after concerns were expressed by the ACPO team about three unsolved, historic, murders of known sex workers. An external agency was commissioned to review the investigations. This confirmed the force's assessment that the crimes were not linked, and therefore the risk that a predatory serial sex offender was targeting such women within the force area was discounted.
- The force operates with a well-regarded 'self-contained' crash and collision investigation unit that is staffed by very experienced and highly trained specialist investigators. The services of this unit are used routinely to review/conduct investigations into fail-to-stop crashes and collisions, particularly those where there is the potential for the incident to result in a fatality. This unit can call upon the MIT for specialist support where necessary.

Work in progress

- Regular debriefs of investigations do not currently take place. The force recognises the benefit to be drawn from such an approach and the new SIO is keen to commence a formal, quarterly process to capture and disseminate learning.

Area(s) for improvement

- Limited capacity within the FIB means that no results analysis is being undertaken. However, if this is to be achieved when staffing issues are resolved the flow of information from the districts needs to be enhanced in order to facilitate any analysis.

The inspection found that the force was predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the *Murder Investigation Manual (MIM)* and MIRSAP.

Strengths

- As indicated in section MC20 above, the DCC who could potentially be called upon to assist the force's SIOs is trained in both linked and series crime and large-scale public disorder. While the majority of SIOs have not been placed in the position of having to seek ACPO assistance, confidence was expressed that if this became necessary all relevant support would be provided.
- The senior SIO, head of crime and the focus groups all confirm that the force largely complies with the ACPO MIM and MIRSAP guidelines. The only anomalies are with regard to review procedures (see section MC 24) where for pragmatic reasons they operate outside MIRSAP requirements, and the downloading of intelligence from HOLMES to IRIS (see Work in progress).
- Force policy requires the commissioning and ongoing completion of a policy book, by the SIO, in all major crime investigations (per MIRSAP and MIM requirements). This includes the rationale and decision-making process adopted by the SIO not to pursue specific lines of enquiry during the course of an investigation, as well as the creation of separate policy logs explaining the processes applied to sensitive issues/decision making.

Work in progress

N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- In order to improve its procedures to transfer intelligence from HOLMES to IRIS, the force, through the development of HOLMES 2020 software (next generation/version of the system), should keep abreast of potential technical solutions that are likely to arise through enhancements to the software.
- The force acknowledges that transfer of intelligence from HOLMES to IRIS is an area for improvement. While it is actively seeking a workable resolution to this problem, it may wish to consider introducing a performance development review (PDR) directive for MIT staff to populate IRIS with transferable intelligence. Quantifiable compliance could then be monitored by supervisors.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

HMIC recommends that a corporate ‘champion’ should be appointed to oversee development of IRIS and ensure co-ordination of all activity. In addition, the strategic group should be supported by two user groups; firstly an end-user group comprising front-line staff and secondly a technical group to advise on potential IT solutions. The strategic group should have senior representation from the four BCUs and the HQ service units.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACC (T)	assistant chief constable territorial
ACO	assistant chief officer
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition
ARA	Assets Recovery Agency
ARV	armed response vehicle

B

BCU	basic command unit
BIA	Border and Immigration Agency
BME	black and minority ethnic

C

CAIU	child abuse investigation unit
CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CIA	community impact assessment
CID	criminal investigation department
COMAH	control of major accident hazard
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CRISP	cross-regional information sharing project

D

DAT	drug action team
DC	detective constable
DCC	deputy chief constable
DCI	detective chief inspector

DI detective inspector
DS detective sergeant
DPA Data protection act
DSU dedicated source unit

E

ECU economic crime unit

F

FIB force intelligence bureau
FIMU force intelligence management unit
FIO field intelligence officer
FSA force strategic assessment

G

HMI Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HMRC Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
HOLMES Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HQ headquarters

I

IAG independent advisory group
ICT information and communications technology
IMPACT intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking
IRIS integrated records information system
IT information technology

J

JARD joint asset recovery database

K

KIN key individual network

M

MAPP multi-agency public protection

MAPPA multi-agency public protection arrangements

MFH missing from home

MIAG major incident advisory group

MIM *Murder Investigation Manual*

MIMA Middlesborough Institute of Modern Art

MIR major incident room

MIRSAP major incident room standardised administrative procedures

MIT major incident team

MoPI management of police information

MSF most similar force(s)

N

NIM national intelligence model

NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency

NPSAT National Protective Services Analysis Tool

O

OCG organised crime group

OCU organised crime unit

OIOC officer in overall charge

OSC Office of Surveillance Commissioners

P

PCSO police community support officer

PDR	performance development review
PFI	private finance initiative
PIP	professionalising the investigative process
PNC	Police National Computer
PND	Police National Database
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2004
POLSA	police search of area
PPU	public protection unit
PSD	professional standards department

R

RART	regional asset recovery team
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
RIU	regional intelligence unit
RMS	records management system

S

SARC	sexual abuse multi-agency referral centre
SCAS	serious crime analysis system
SDG	strategic development group
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SOC	serious and organised crime
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SPECSS	separation/pregnancy/escalation/cultural/sexual assault/stalking
SPI	statutory performance indicator
SPOC	single point of contact

T

TCG	tasking and co-ordination group
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TSU technical support unit

V

ViSOR Violent and Sex Offenders' Register

W

WPS witness protection scheme