


Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Avon and Somerset Constabulary Major Crime

July 2008



Avon & Somerset Constabulary – HMIC Inspection Report

July 2008

ISBN: 978-1-84726-703-0

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FIRST PUBLISHED 2008

Contents

Introduction to HMIC Inspections

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09
Programmed Frameworks
Major Crime
Future Programmed Inspections
The Grading Process
Developing Practice
Force Overview and Context

Major Crime

Recommendations

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

Appendix 2: Developing practice

Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

July 2008

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

July 2008

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse

July 2008

conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical description of force area

Avon and Somerset Constabulary covers the four unitary authorities of the City of Bristol, South Gloucestershire, Bath and North East Somerset and North Somerset, together with the County of Somerset. The total size of the force area is 1,855 square miles. This represents a very diverse range of policing environments, including Bristol, which is the largest conurbation in the south west of England. Here there are high-density, inner-city areas of prosperity and deprivation and major new residential and commercial developments. By contrast, Bath is one of the country's leading tourist destinations and to a lesser extent so are the historic centres of Wells and Glastonbury. Seaside resorts include Weston-Super-Mare, Burnham-on-Sea and Minehead and there are sparsely populated areas on the Somerset Levels and Exmoor. There is an extensive motorway network with major traffic flows to the rest of the South West and South Wales, and international connections at Bristol Airport and Avonmouth docks.

Demographic description of force area

The total resident population is currently 1,530,800. The 2001 census found that black and minority ethnic (BME) groups represented 3.4% of the residents. The BME element is concentrated primarily in Bristol (8.2% of the unitary authority's total resident population), but there is a wide range of BME communities living in localities across the force area. Specifically, a large concentration of Polish people live in both the north and south of the force area. Large communities of Kurdish, Iranian and Somalian people live in Bristol and a large concentration of Portuguese people live in Chard.

The population is boosted by a substantial number of short and long-term visitors, including students attending the four universities and other higher education institutions. A great many people come into the constabulary area for work or to enjoy the leisure and entertainment facilities (particularly in Bristol). Holiday-makers either stay in the force area itself or pass through to other resorts and, as such, increase the numbers of motorists travelling through each day. All these factors result in a pronounced seasonal pattern of demand, with relatively high levels evident throughout the summer months.

The constabulary hosts significant annual events, centred on both the metropolis of Bristol and the more rural environs of Somerset with the Glastonbury Music Festival. Such events are often targeted by organised crime groups from other areas of the country and their

July 2008

intentions countered by the Constabulary's relentless commitment to disrupt and destroy offending of this nature.

In more general terms, the constabulary area is often considered as having a 'hub' status for some aspects of organised criminality, which features highly within the associated tactical and strategic assessments, as well as operational activity.

Structural description of force including staff changes at Chief Officer Level

There are six BCUs covering the force area, called 'districts' locally. In Bristol, an assistant chief constable heads the BCU as well as criminal justice for the force. The remaining five BCUs, are headed by a chief superintendent with a high degree of delegated authority. All BCUs are coterminous with local authority boundaries. A Neighbourhood Policing model operates, with all Neighbourhood Policing areas based on ward boundaries. Each area has a Neighbourhood Policing team.

Approved staffing levels across the districts range from North Somerset with 348 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff (244 police officers, 39 PCSOs and 65 police staff), to Bristol with 1,290 FTE staff (960 police officers, 94 PCSOs and 236 police staff) – one of the largest BCUs in England and Wales.

Each BCU and main operational departments has a dedicated superintendent (operations) post, whose primary role is to drive continuous performance improvement.

The BCUs are supported by the following operational headquarters (HQ) departments: criminal investigation (CID), communications, operations (including roads policing) and criminal justice. Functions have increasingly been devolved to the BCUs, the latest being responsibility for public protection and administration support.

In January 2008, the force had 3344 (FTE) police officers, 376 (FTE) police community support officers (PCSOs) and 2,269 (FTE) police staff, supported by 446 special constables.

The 2008/9 budget provides for the number of police officers to be increased to around 3,423. The current PCSO establishment will be maintained along with the recruitment of 42 additional posts funded by Bristol City Council. The special constabulary targets are under review pending funding confirmation from the NPIA and a review of deployment across the force.

All members of the chief officer group (COG) are charged with delivering performance improvement. The group comprises:

- the chief constable;
- the deputy chief constable (DCC), with portfolio responsibility including performance improvement, corporate communication, strategic alliances and diversity;
- four assistant chief constables (ACCs), with individual portfolio responsibilities including: protective services; territorial operations; citizen focus policing; criminal justice; communications; and service standards;
- the strategic director of finance;
- the director of human resources.

There is a close working relationship with the police authority, through both informal and formal authority and committee meeting structures and a wide range of other linkages such as planning/budget seminars, police authority membership of major project boards and one-to-one links between individual members and particular districts and departments.

Strategic priorities

July 2008

The strategic direction of the force was reviewed at the start of 2008 and the three-year plan includes:

- Mission: “Make the communities of Avon and Somerset feel safe and be safe.”
- Vision: “The communities of Avon and Somerset will have the highest levels of confidence in our delivery of policing services.”
- The aims of the force are to:
 - reduce crime and increase the number of offences brought to justice;
 - deliver a high quality of service according to need, to achieve high levels of customer satisfaction and be a top-performing force in all main service areas;
 - promote safety in communities through enhanced local policing provision;
 - improve public protection; and
 - increase trust and confidence in the force.

The force has a number of key corporate improvement objectives with initiatives that aim to reduce bureaucracy/streamline processes and improve performance including:

- ‘Southwest One’ a public-private partnership to transform service delivery. In March 2008, the police authority and force joined a joint venture company with IBM, Somerset County Council and Taunton Deane District Council to provide a range of business services including purchasing, accounting, personnel and administration to both councils and the force. This innovative approach offers the potential to provide enhanced internal services, along with benefits in terms of efficiency savings and improved external services;
- Enhancing the protective services capability within the force through both internal service improvements and collaborations with other forces in the region and key partner agencies;
- Continuing to deliver Citizen Focus Policing to gain an in-depth understanding of the needs and expectations of individuals and communities and routinely reflect them in decision-making, service delivery and practices;
- Progressing Workforce Modernisation within the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) as part of the national pilot area;
- A ‘root and branch’ review of the infrastructure, systems, processes and resources to ensure custody provision meets the operational needs of the force and delivers improvements in performance;
- Delivery of a new crime and intelligence system (Guardian), which is now fully embedded across the force;
- Improvement to incident management process through Operation Quest, which aims to build capacity; improve customer satisfaction; reduce bureaucracy; and create efficiency savings;
- A Change Management Executive (CME), which ensures informed decision making and was recently commended by the Audit Commission as a notable practice;
- A Mobile Data pilot, which is now live on two districts and aims to increase remote accessibility to information/intelligence and other force systems thereby improving the time that officers are on visible patrol;

July 2008

- Enhancement of the force firearms capability through a regional programme of collaboration including regional tactics and training and embedding firearms officers within other specialist units;
- A Sexual Assault Referral Centre (SARC) will open in July 2008 providing a victim focussed one stop location for victims of rape and sexual assault;
- A review of the force performance regime and other strategic forums in order to best drive and support performance improvement and quality of service delivery, including the creation of a silver detection group, focused on improving detections through process improvement;
- Delivery of a system to better capture organisational learning through the collation of 'direction and control' complaints;
- A reducing bureaucracy programme with for example continued review of force forms and an e-form pilot project;
- Delivery of the Workforce Modernisation programme, in particular within HQ CID, including the full implementation of a mixed economy workforce, with a phased approach starting during the latter part of 2008. The force 'change management executive' oversees this programme ensuring compatibility between the initiatives;
- Delivery of a number of initiatives to enhance the representative workforce including identifying candidates from under represented groups for the Police Leadership Development Scheme;
- In conjunction with the local branch of the Black Police Association, the force is also introducing the work of the National Senior Careers Advisory Service among under represented groups with the constabulary starting with BME staff.

Force Performance Overview

Force developments since 2007 inspections

Performance

A challenging agenda of performance improvement was set in the 2007/08 Policing Plan, at a time when resources available were reducing in real terms. However a number of performance improvements were achieved:

- Customer satisfaction levels continue their steady long-term improvement, in line with the high priority attached to improving the quality of service to our service users;
- Major reductions have occurred in recorded crime, with 15,800 fewer victims in total;
- Detection rates have increased, with the annual detection rate having passed the 25% mark for the first time, as well as significant increases in the proportions of rapes and hate crimes that are detected;
- There has been an 8% increase in the number of offences brought to justice, an extra 2,600 a year;
- Our communities feel safe compared with other parts of the country and are also feeling better informed about a more responsive local policing service, reflecting the rollout of our new Safer Stronger Communities model of neighbourhood policing across the force area;

July 2008

- The constabulary undertook a review of force forms, which resulted in 363 of the 877 forms in existence at the start of the review, being deleted (41% reduction). Applications for the development of new forms must pass through the 'bureaucracy gateway' in order to ensure that no unnecessary bureaucratic burdens are placed on police officers;
- The annual 3% efficiency savings target has been achieved yet again, releasing resources to deliver operational policing.

The force continues to identify further ways of improving and working in a more efficient manner. Exploring the potential offered by improved processes, collaborative working and strategic partnerships is central to its approach.

Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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Context

This element of the inspection report details Avon and Somerset Constabulary's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in

July 2008

preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening & gun crime per 1,000 population	0.383	0.321	-16.19%	0.380
No. of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.001
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
No. of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.105	0.052	-50.48%	0.084
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	56.25%	150.00%	+93.75pp*	88.87%
No. of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.529	0.098	-81.47%	0.152
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	9.88%	33.33%	+23.45pp*	32.18%
No. of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.366	0.242	-33.88%	0.269
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	39.29%	43.24%	+3.95pp*	45.33%
No. of manslaughter per 10,000 population	0.007	0.013	+85.71%	0.015
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	200.00%	100.00%	-100pp*	Not Applicable
No. of murders per 10,000 population	0.065	0.065	0.00%	0.097
% of murders detected/convicted	60.00%	110.00%	+50pp*	106.64%
No. of rapes per 10,000 population	2.626	2.365	-9.94%	2.288
% of rapes detected/convicted	22.64%	24.59%	+1.95pp*	23.67%

**pp* is Percentage Points.
**Most Similar Family (MSF) for Avon & Somerset is: Essex; Hampshire; Hertfordshire; Kent; Lancashire and; Northamptonshire.



The SPI data in the table above indicates that none of the crime types considered under Major Crime pose a particular threat to Avon & Somerset Constabulary, with performance broadly in line with the most similar family of forces. The only crime type that the force demonstrates a higher incidence of reporting than the MSF average is rape, however, the rate of offences is average when considering England and Wales as a whole.

The SPI data also indicates that performance in Major Crime investigation in Avon & Somerset is comparable to the peer forces. Avon & Somerset is displaying sanction detection rates in line with the MSF average across all crime types, with some significant improvements on yearly performance in both reduction and sanction detection. The most significant improvements in investigation have come in blackmail and murder offences.

July 2008

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool, released on 25 September 2007, revealed that Avon & Somerset faces a high level of demand in respect of the policing response to rape offences.

Rape (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS



Although in the long term Avon & Somerset are above the national average there has been a recent decrease bringing the force below the MSF average.

Avon & Somerset is bordered by 1 other force which also indicates raised demand for this crime type.

While OCG mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Avon and Somerset has an established approach that is considered as effective by the regional intelligence unit, ensuring that major crime types are thoroughly mapped. It is currently estimated that 19 OCGs impact the force area, across six major crime types.

The Force Strategic Assessment demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The Force has identified that the demand for and illegal supply of class ‘A’ drugs and distraction burglary are major crime priorities within the Force Control Strategy. The Force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on illegal drugs supply and the impact upon communities.

Within the documentation examined these issues are being identified and addressed.

The Force has invested and grouped suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a high level of sophistication in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with South West regional are recognised, albeit they are at an early stage of development.

Intelligence

Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to its major crime investigations with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- Five major crime analysts (police officers) within the major crime investigation department, managed by a dedicated police sergeant who also manages the telecoms/CCTV team, create products and provide some analysis in support of major crime investigations. They tend to be solely deployed on reactive activity in support of major crime investigation.
- Telecoms/CCTV officers are appointed on the first day of major crime investigations and are tasked to produce sequencing charts, interview charts, data analysis, merged billing and commonality and pivotal charts.
- The analysts are co-located with the remainder of the major crime function within suitable bespoke premises. Analysts receive appropriate training and the information technology (IT) provision is fit for purpose.
- Tasking of the analytical team is dependent upon the particular requirements of each enquiry and is directed by the senior investigating officer (SIO). Formal contracts between SIOs and analysts are not always created; however, co-location assists frequent dialogue, which is documented in policy books.
- The force has fully committed to the regional intelligence structure with a senior analyst and a crime intelligence analyst seconded to the regional intelligence unit (RIU) and a further senior analyst seconded to the counter terrorism intelligence unit (CTIU).
- Analysts attend quarterly meetings. Close links are maintained with the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and there have been joint workshops and training/consultation exercises including an inference development workshop.
- To quality assure intelligence products, the analyst team leader, detective inspector (DI) major crime and individual SIOs provide direct feedback to analysts on a case-by-case basis.

Work in progress

- The force will publish its murder suppression strategy (MSS) in March 2008. Relying on best practice (Notts Constabulary), it focuses on trends in a variety of categories of homicides, such as late night, alcohol-related assaults.
- The workforce modernisation (WFM) project is currently reviewing the major crime function, including analysis, telecoms support and CCTV retrieval.
- The force is near to delivering i2 analyst workstation, a 12-month development with a commercial provider. The development will enable the automatic drawing of

July 2008

intelligence from the Guardian system, a process currently undertaken using business objects.

Area(s) for improvement

- The principal analyst defines the IT requirement for the analytical function and makes procurement recommendations via the serious crime group (SCG). The force should consider how the major crime investigation unit analysts (users) might be more meaningfully consulted during this process, perhaps through the adoption of a user group approach.

Summary – Intelligence about these crime types is sought and shared through effective relationships with partners and other agencies, including engagement with minority groups. Extensive and integrated community impact assessments follow to evaluate risk.

Strengths

- The major crime team mainly relies on intelligence-sharing relationships at basic command unit (BCU) level. Although there is a force community and diversity unit, neighbourhood policing teams are the main conduits for information exchange. This information exchange is covered by memoranda of understanding and information-sharing agreements with strategic partners including health and social services.
- There is evidence that information is shared in accordance with management of police information (MoPI) principles. Multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) and domestic abuse arrangements are well established and have been tested previously.
- There are many examples of intelligence sharing between partnerships at both force and BCU level including street crime and drugs at Bristol basic command unit (BCU).
- The force has exchanged information with the Health and Safety Executive as part of a protocol relating to industrial accidents that have resulted in death.
- The major crime investigation unit is developing investigative interviewing in close consultation with two national experts. In addition, facial comparison/CCTV experts have been recently consulted in respect of one particular case.
- A dedicated officer within the force intelligence group (FIG) deals with all serious crime analysis system (SCAS) submissions. Regular use is made by SIOs of specialist databases, including CATCHEM, as appropriate.
- The NPIA is routinely consulted to provide support for seminars and learning events, including rape investigation seminars and cold case review.
- Community impact assessments on major crimes are completed by district commanders, in consultation with SIOs and usually within 24 hours. An electronic force template ensures consistency of approach.
- The force has formed strong links with the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and neighbouring forces, in particular South Wales Police. These relationships and links improve efficient and effective information exchange.

July 2008

- Information-sharing protocols exist with partner agencies including Trading Standards, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), Border and Immigration Agency (BIA) and the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP). The force meets formally with partner enforcement agencies and neighbouring South West forces at the monthly regional intelligence group meeting.
- A range of analytical products are produced by the major crime analysts, who possess no distinct portfolio responsibilities. The team were found to be highly flexible. During a major crime, the attached analyst will provide subject profiles and other investigative products including association charts, telephone analysis and sequence of events.
- The threat assessment unit (TAU) produces problem profiles that have included distraction burglary, burglary, robbery, drugs, methamphetamine, cannabis factories, metal theft, rape and homicide.
- The community intelligence system provides background intelligence on major crimes.
- Senior detectives meet with the sexual abuse investigation team (SAIT) every six weeks, when diversity and vulnerability issues are discussed. The force has also progressed partnerships to provide a sexual assault referral centre (due to open July 2008).
- The force has dedicated prison intelligence officers within five prison establishments and there are good relationships with the prison advisory service.
- All test purchase operations include a documented 'intervention and regeneration' stage after enforcement. This is developed with the BCU and considers community impact assessments.
- The force has recently adopted the West Mercia Police ILICAS (interactive court presentation IT solution) for complex cases.

Work in progress

- Project Plinth is a partnership initiative led by the force that will enable sanitised partner information from more than 40 partners to be made available for intelligence/analytical purposes, collated through a central team that is funded by all partners.
- A protocol for deaths in healthcare settings, with a memorandum of understanding covering investigations and primacy has been agreed between the force, NHS and the Health and Safety Executive. The force ran a series of seminars to deliver professional development and disseminate learning on this subject.
- The WFM project is reviewing the covert human intelligence source (CHIS) management capability.
- A comprehensive homicide prevention strategy is being developed; this addresses homicide in its widest sense including honour killings, domestic violence, knives, kidnap and hate crime. Each of these themes has a designated lead, analytical background and proposed actions listed under prevention, intelligence and enforcement.

July 2008

- A problem profile for a major crime issued in July 2007 was reviewed and is a useful document, however, at the time of the inspection it lacked recommendations and inferences from the analysts. This is a point recognised by the FIG analytical team, who are taking steps to improve inference development including a workshop with the NPIA and support from the deputy chief constable (DCC).
- Trends in major/serious crimes are shared with partners via the strategic assessment process. Specific cases where people are identified as at risk or vulnerable are managed through MAPPA, multi-agency risk assessment conferences (MARACs), protecting vulnerable people panels and other similar fora.
- A proposed partnership-based FSA has received widespread support from chief executives and a plan to move towards this approach is being developed.

Area(s) for improvement

None identified.

Summary – The force strategic assessment (FSA) has analysed the trends in relation to its major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be equally thorough. Problem profiles examined are satisfactory with links to force and BCU-level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the level of threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- The force intelligence group (FIG) controls and monitors the FSA, which is strongly driven by the Chief Constable. The FSA is formally reviewed every six months.
- Major crime types are included within the force intelligence requirement but are not always explicit. The force, BCU and departmental tactical assessments are much clearer in this respect and also refer to operational activity in these areas.
- The FSA includes a variety of crime types, including domestic and child abuse, burglary and robbery, serious injury, gun crime and kidnap. Although specific groups of individuals, such as paedophile rings and dangerous offenders, are not explicitly referred to, cross-cutting themes and National Intelligence Model (NIM) processes are sure to identify emerging threats in these areas.
- The FSA, control strategy and intelligence requirement are concise documents. Ongoing activity to negate threats and risk are documented within the control strategy. The FSA dated September 2007 details most major crime types, including homicide and serious assaults, kidnap, sex offences, robbery, arson, domestic abuse and child abuse.
- BCU control strategies generally mirror the FSA but are tailored to local requirements and are significantly influenced by statutory partners.
- Within the FIG, a 'standards officer' supports BCUs and departmental analysts with the production of products to both force and national standards.

July 2008

- Emerging threats are identified through environmental scanning and PESTELO and are outlined within the FSA. The environmental scanning considers the national and regional threat assessments. The TAU produces the force problem profiles. The first phase of these included distraction burglary, burglary, robbery, drugs, methamphetamine, cannabis factories, metal theft, rape and homicide.
- Phase 2 of this iterative process will include grievous bodily harm, domestic violence stalking and Osman warnings. Subject profiles are developed by the same unit in both fast and slow time.
- The inaugural meeting of the force vulnerability panel took place in November 2007. Chaired by the assistant chief constable (ACC) SO, the panel is charged with overseeing the development of the public protection function and will meet three times a year.

Work in progress

- Problem profiles are commissioned and produced with each new product improving upon the last. The force should continue in its dialogue with NPIA specialists and benchmark its products with other forces.
- The force is currently developing its existing neighbourhood profiles in order to better understand the vulnerabilities of geographic communities. This, however, needs to be expanded to include those communities, either virtual or geographic, that cross neighbourhood policing team areas. This analysis should exploit information sharing with partners at level 2.
- The diversity unit has responsibility for community profiling, with the team and force intelligence bureau (FIB) developing ways in which vulnerable communities can be identified through combining community profiling work with detailed crime analysis. The force plans to hold conferences with partners every two years in order to further develop the joint FSA process.

Area(s) for improvement

- Analysts producing problem and market profiles are being encouraged to make assertions and suggest potential tactics to address prevention, enforcement and disruption. This is work in progress and will assist key leads and force champions in developing strategies and resulting action.

Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are routinely shared with partners and BCUs. There is a full trigger plan for ‘hot briefing’ when there is a significant change in the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis points to a need for a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols exist with key partners, such as Trading Standards, HMRC, BIA, CEOP and UKHTC, with Project Plinth due to expand this capability significantly. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full MoPI compliance by 2010.

Strengths

July 2008

- The force is active in the development of regional intelligence processes. The ACC Operations' chairs the regional SDO meeting and regional tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) and is a member of the regional intelligence group. The deputy director of intelligence has good working relations with his peers across the region.
- Sensitive intelligence is routinely exchanged between partners.
- The force has regional lead responsibility for tackling Class A drugs.
- A domestic violence information sharing agreement (DVISA) is in place; this supplements established agreements in line with guidance contained within the 'Working Together' document.
- The DVISA arrangements inform MARACs, independent violence advocates and specialist domestic violence courts. Processes have also been developed to ensure that such intelligence is transferred on to the Guardian intelligence system.
- The force routinely accesses specialist databases such as SCAS, CATCHEM, Genesis, National Criminal Intelligence Service and National Centre for Policing Excellence.
- The force sends its staff as delegates or participants to many national development/working groups. It has also hosted a regional multi-agency methamphetamine conference, attended by more than 300 professionals.
- The murder suppression strategy (MSS) draws together the major threats facing the force. The document has links to supporting documentation and to the FSA and control strategy.
- Where there is a significant change in the threat or need for fast-time response within a major crime enquiry, the force has processes in place, including real-time scanning by the major crime analysts.
- Major crime enquiries use proactive intelligence-gathering techniques and the products of these inform SIO tactical and investigative decision making.
- Emerging threats, linked series and investigative opportunities concerning major crimes are identified by the threat assessment unit within the FIG.
- There is good intelligence sharing with partners at level one, including local authorities, housing departments, drug and alcohol action teams and reference groups and MAPPA.

Work in progress

- In line with ACPO guidance on MoPI, the corporate information management department has undertaken a review of all information-sharing agreements for the force and its partner agencies. These will be held in a central repository that will be accessible to all staff via the intranet.
- Project Plinth will ensure depersonalised crime and disorder data is shared between the force and a number of agencies (health, education, local authorities).
- Stage 1 of Project Plinth has made sure that data sets are in a common format across partnerships, with stage 2 producing an IT solution for information exchange.

July 2008

- Plans are also being developed to work closely with HMRC at Bristol International Airport and to work with Trading Standards regarding distraction burglars and rogue traders. The force has convened a regional harm reduction forum in order to identify opportunities for multi-agency intervention and to share best practice.
- A dedicated member of the FIG has recently become the dedicated single point of contact (SPOC) for SCAS submissions.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although there is good evidence of routine intelligence sharing through MAPPA, MARACs and child death review arrangements and progress with joint strategic assessments, a more consistent approach needs to be taken in order to share level 2 intelligence with statutory partners and encourage improved crime prevention activity.

Summary – With regard to major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.

Strengths

- Community profiling within A&S is the responsibility of the force diversity unit. This unit uses a profiling methodology that incorporates the six strands of diversity and seeks to understand and map communities at BCU level and beyond. It uses intelligence feeds from neighbourhood policing teams but is more focused upon the nature of the communities rather than any aspects of vulnerability to crime, in particular major crime.
- The FSA refers to communities that are vulnerable in so far as it addresses crime types, but there is no specific reference to vulnerable communities outside of this commentary (see work in progress).
- BCUs are starting to map their communities geographically at a neighbourhood level. These feature within neighbourhood plans and profiles and are living documents. Intelligence sharing with statutory partners at this level that enhances the quality of these products. BCUs have joint strategic assessments with crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) and in support of these there is good evidence of information exchange, for example, Bristol City Council holds a database from which partnership information can be accessed by the force.
- There is clear evidence (supported by that gained in the recent PVP inspection) that there is sound information exchange, joint activity and some understanding of vulnerability among the MAPPA community.
- There is some evidence that community tension monitoring and community impact assessments are being used by analysts to inform the current limited community picture.

July 2008

- Some problem profiles, for example the murder suppression strategy, identify vulnerable groups including child victims, domestic abuse victims and drug overdose victims.
- The director of intelligence has functional responsibility for the force public protection unit. This provides a strong link between intelligence gathering and the PVP function.
- Special Branch has a dedicated community engagement team that works closely with communities, such as mosques, and that has made presentations to local neighbourhood teams giving advice and guidance on extending neighbourhood profiling to cover counter-terrorism (CT) issues.
- There is a growing understanding of community needs and vulnerabilities, which is helping to shape operational activity. The most significant example is Operation Atrium, which targets level 1 drug dealing within the Bristol conurbations and deprived inner city areas. The understanding of emerging communities is equally improving. The delivery of neighbourhood policing across the force area greatly assists these processes.

Work in progress

- Within intelligence products such as market and problem profiles, there is some reference to how crimes affect communities or groups, with other aspects of vulnerability missed. This will be enhanced when wider access to partner data is achieved via Project Plinth.
- An inaugural meeting of the force ‘vulnerability panel’ took place in November 2007. Chaired by the ACC crime and criminal justice, the panel is charged with overseeing the development of the public protection unit function and will meet three times a year.
- To date community and vulnerable location profiling has been completed led by the diversity unit in association with Special Branch (Operation Delphinus). This activity, which is further supported by community engagement teams found across the force, will eventually lead to the development of a force community profiling product.
- The dedicated sexual assault referral centre (SARC) is due to go live in July 2008. This will provide a ‘one-stop shop’ for these vulnerable victims.
- Although mapping communities at the neighbourhood level has been achieved, additional scoping of communities, in the widest sense, is ongoing led by the diversity unit. This builds on existing activity and extends to communities outside of the six strands of diversity, including young people, virtual communities, the homeless, sex workers and the business community.

Area(s) for improvement

- A force lead for community profiling aligned to the intelligence function is needed in order that the complementary yet different requirements of this crime type and diversity profiling can be taken forward.
- There is some limited predictive analysis and environmental scanning within the FSA to identify future vulnerabilities and emerging communities, for example the methamphetamine action plan, CT and cannabis factories. This needs to be strengthened.

July 2008

- Once communities have been mapped, their vulnerability to organised criminals and major crime needs to be fully analysed, firstly in order to identify intelligence gaps, and subsequently to inform enforcement and preventive activities.
- A vulnerability matrix should be developed that prioritises actions and activities and focuses these upon the most vulnerable areas and where activity can have the most impact. This matrix should have a scoring system that can subsequently be used to measure the outputs against actions and inputs.

RECOMMENDATION 1.

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop corporate systems and processes which effectively measure and assess harm and threat to local communities.

Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed every six months by the chief officer group, who oversees the force risk committee. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan, which is robustly monitored or controlled.

Strengths

- A strategic risk register is managed by the force planning manager. The register is compiled using department and functional risk registers, which inform the force register. These are comprehensive and include a scoring mechanism, which accommodates the cost to the force of risks being realised.
- An escalation process and scoring criteria enables higher risks to be included in the force risk register. At the time of the inspection there was no major crime or serious organised crime risks recorded at force level.
- The HQ criminal investigation department (CID) is piloting a risk register, which contains 21 business and operational risks across a variety of risk areas and functions including IT, resourcing, succession planning, operational compromise and the emergence of significant crimes such as crystal methamphetamine.
- Each risk on the departmental register includes an action and an owner and shows the history of mitigation activity and contingencies. Departmental registers are monitored at quarterly meetings and actions are highlighted using the red, amber, green system. At the meetings rigorous assessment of actions occurs. Against each risk, the force considers action to transfer, tolerate, terminate or treat. Actions appear to be resourced appropriately.
- Risk identification and management is a key part of the force 'planning for success' process and is reviewed monthly within departmental management meetings. Emerging risks are identified and added to the risk register.

Work in progress

- From April 2008, the force policing plan will show actions taken against risks identified within the force register.

July 2008

- The force has recently undertaken a review of its risk management process to ensure that it is fit for purpose.

Area(s) for improvement

- Given the importance of this crime type the departmental risk pilot should consider capacity and capability issues as standing items.

Summary – The force is creating ways of collaborating with other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Most of the force operational databases are searchable from the FIB and RIU. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been fully implemented.

Strengths

- A new bespoke force-wide incident and intelligence system was introduced in early 2006 (Guardian). In the future, linkage with Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) and automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) will be developed.
- There are established links with other law enforcement agencies and effective relations developed with SOCA. Using incentivisation funding, the force has purchased the services of an HMRC officer who is sited within the financial investigation office and gives access to the Gateway intelligence system.
- Within the public protection unit on each of the BCUs, there are strong links with MAPPA partners and good information sharing. This is not achieved through interoperable systems because the A&S probation service does not have full access to the Violent and Sex Offenders Register (ViSOR) (see areas for improvement).
- Force intelligence group (FIG) staff have access to all force IT systems, including HOLMES, ViSOR, firearms licensing and ANPR, and a number of external systems. The IT systems are used to aid investigations and identify trends and patterns for inclusion within various intelligence products. Within the FIG, there is a desk system where staff act as SPOCs with external agencies and forces.
- HOLMES (version 11c) is networked within the confidential network domain across the force. A practical solution has been developed to counter the lack of interoperability between HOLMES and the criminal intelligence system (Guardian), where major crime and serious and organised crime enquiries have a dedicated intelligence cell. A category within HOLMES is created for local intelligence and the 5x5x5 system is used to disseminate this to Guardian. Where appropriate, local intelligence officers are attached to these enquiries.
- Generally the force considers that there is only limited value in the general intelligence held within both current and historic HOLMES databases. A risk-based approach is adopted whereby some intelligence is considered but the view is that historic intelligence is often 'spent'.
- Neighbouring force databases can be accessed via the intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking (IMPACT) nominal index system that is available to the FIG. At the RIU/CTIU, the force makes its own databases available and in turn can access those of its neighbours.

July 2008

- Examples were provided demonstrating where the force has undertaken effective linked HOLMES investigations with other forces, including Operation Pentameter II and Operation Padme. Additionally, the major crime review team (MCRT) has copied accounts from other forces to inform its investigations. CASWEB is accessible and is regularly tested.
- There has been significant investment in both mobile and static ANPR cameras and evidence of cross-force operation (Utah) that has included partners such as the Department for Work and Pensions, HMRC and the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency. All mobile ANPR units are managed through the roads policing department and can be tasked through the NIM tasking processes.
- The force has managed a number of operations using both mobile and static cameras and was able to provide many examples where ANPR has been used to good effect. It was evident from interviews that ANPR is regularly considered as a tactic to address criminality. Interoperability with other forces and with national law enforcement databases is more than evident.
- The force has developed a practical solution to access and search disparate force databases with the establishment of a team of control room staff trained to undertake live time searches (AiLIST). The TAU accesses a variety of systems in order to produce analytical products and identify OCGs.

Work in progress

- The force has recently appointed a dedicated IT administrator for IBASE. Analysts report that the data accessibility is good and their IT requirements are well catered for.
- The force is piloting inter-operability of a national intelligence system. The Plinth initiative aims to create an IT platform to enable data sharing between the force and partners' databases. It has rationalised its information-sharing agreements and memoranda of understanding and now seeks to develop the IT solution (see MC05).
- The planned HOLMES server upgrade should provide a better capability.
- The force has made considerable progress towards effective interoperability of IT systems including a combined intelligence and crime system (Guardian), utilisation of the ASSIST database and is one of the national leads on the IMPACT programme. The development of the SAP platform within the *SouthwestOne* shared services initiative should effectively address inter-operability of IT systems.

Area(s) for improvement

- A decision has been made not to recover historic intelligence from HOLMES on to Guardian; a policy should be created specifically in respect of TIEs.

Summary – The force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is effective.

July 2008

Strengths

- The force has a dedicated major crime review team (MCRT). The review process is independent and reports to the authorising officer. The review team is appropriately resourced and is being augmented by staff that have hitherto been engaged in the cold case review of historic rape cases.
- Historic rape cases have been fully scoped with two reviews outstanding. Exhibits have been forensically re-examined. All cases have been entered on HOLMES with policy files completed on each. Police Standards Unit funding has assisted this process with the activity delivering convictions.
- A comprehensive review policy and guidance document (with a flowchart) is available to staff on the force intranet and includes best practice and learning points. The policy requires the MCRT to conduct progress reviews, within designated timescales, for all live undetected homicides, stranger rapes and fatal fail-to-stop collisions, as well as other major and serious crime according to identified need. Support is also being given to another force in the region to undertake a review of an ongoing murder investigation.
- A detective superintendent oversees a hot debrief of all detected homicide investigations, ideally within seven days of a suspect having been charged. This focuses on identifying good practice and innovation, specific challenges, lessons learnt and areas for improvement.
- At the heads of CID meeting, the detective chief inspector (DCI) MCRT presents lessons learnt from these formal reviews. He also 'dip-checks' and invariably gives immediate and written feedback directly to practitioners where appropriate.
- The force uses its innovative major crime administration IT system to provide automated prompts as progress reviews become due.
- The MCRT routinely monitors all rape cases reported within the force, using the Guardian system where it exists. SCAS submissions by FIB staff inform this process. The MCRT DCI reviews all rape investigations at seven days. This is followed at 14 days by a self-inspection by the SIO (sometimes supplemented by peer review). If the investigation is still live at 28 days, the MCRT DCI conducts a further full review.
- Learning from debriefs is regularly circulated within electronic bulletins and via the best practice and recommendations spreadsheets held on the MCRT intranet webpage. The force shares this best practice with its regional partners.
- As part of professionalising the investigative process (PIP) level 3 training, SIOs give formal presentations to peer groups outlining their investigations and learning.
- The periodic review of historic unsolved homicides was evident, with records dating back to 1949. All have been fully risk assessed and reviewed against the Stealth template. Two cases have been given Stealth funding and 50% of all cases have been placed on the HOLMES system. The outstanding cases remain subject to periodic review dependent upon the nature of evidence available and forensic advancements in line with review processes and templates.

Work in progress

July 2008

- A scoring matrix for historic unsolved homicides has been developed and will be used to prioritise cases.

Area(s) for improvement

None identified.

Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process functions cohesively to deliver suitable responses to manage the threat from major crime. Major crime documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historic, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The force has an efficient tactical tasking and co-ordination process to robustly manage major crime activities. All performance management structures were subject of significant revision some 12 months ago upon the appointment of a new DCC.
- There is strong leadership and supervision by the head of crime department, who chairs a bi-weekly panel that reviews cases prior to their consideration at tasking and co-ordination. Senior detectives attend this meeting in which all major crime investigations are peer reviewed. There is also consideration given to staffing, finance and resourcing issues.
- Fast-time reactive major crimes are appropriately resourced and are overseen in the initial stages by the on-call detective superintendent. All homicides are 'pre-funded' dependant upon the category. BCUs are allocated these funds and are responsible for their disbursement. Crime enquiries that are developed by analytical product or are informed by intelligence are elevated to the tasking and co-ordination meeting through managerial interventions, which follow NIM principles.
- Meetings request NIM products as appropriate and identify intelligence gaps. There are good examples of intelligence products that address major crimes.
- Major crime analysts have looked at precursor offences as part of the recently produced homicide prevention strategy. Precursor crimes and crimes of significance are monitored by the FIG, AiLIST staff and the SAIT (who populate a separate sex offences database.)
- Where appropriate trigger plans initiate action and call-out processes.
- At the early stages of any major crime enquiry, a documented process considers and monitors resourcing arrangements, including staffing, finances and specialist support services. Dedicated resource managers and the use of IT solutions assist this process through to review. Decisions whether to resource or not are recorded with their rationale on policy files, minutes of meetings and funding request documents.
- The bi-weekly meeting chaired by head of crime now considers prospective resource issues arising from forthcoming trials.

Work in progress

July 2008

- The force is developing both the quality of its analytical products and the expertise of its analytical staff. In particular, it is improving its predictive capability and has delivered a presentation on this subject within an NPIA-led seminar.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force should consider analysis of activity against crime reduction measures and the homicide prevention strategy. This should be used to measure outcomes, identify best practice and inform future tactical decisions and ideally involve regional and local partners at level 2.

Summary – Due to relevant and adequate training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is appropriate.

Strengths

- Diversity issues are well embedded within PIP training, including race, religion and sexual orientation issues being addressed within scenarios.
- Family liaison officers (FLOs) receive refresher training that includes emerging issues such as diversity needs. Where appropriate, each enquiry is allocated an FLO from the major crime team or from a BCU, based upon the needs of the victim, witness or family member.
- The majority of training courses provided by the training school have some diversity elements in so far as this relates to the course content. Examples include interview training and sexual assault training.
- All members of the force are required to complete eight hours’ computer-based training by March 2008 (seven modules of diversity accessible from the NPIA internet site).

Work in progress

- From April 2008, all staff will be assessed against national diversity occupational standards during the performance development review process.

Area(s) for improvement

- Accepting the evidence presented by the force, the diversity team, in conjunction with the learning and development unit, should scope the diversity training needs of major crime staff to provide a structured approach that meets their training needs.

Prevention

Summary – The force has a newly formed force-wide independent advisory group (IAG) supported by local IAGs at BCU level. These are frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

July 2008

Strengths

- A tiered system of IAGs exists that includes an equalities advisory group at force level (chaired by the DCC) and IAGs on each district. These groups have been used effectively to aid the communication process between the force and the communities it serves, and have provided SIOs with valuable and often critical feedback.
- The force can access specialist community resources – the details of which are held on the force intranet and local divisional databases.
- Local IAGs are well attended (Bristol has 18 members); they receive monies from BCUs and have written terms of reference.
- The diversity unit involves the equalities advisory group within the scrutiny process by which it develops its policies, and a major crime IAG is convened in every case of homicide.
- IAG members attend gold groups as appropriate. The force praised IAG involvement in a gold group relating to an Independent Police Complaints Commission supervised complaint, in which their influence helped to maintain community relations. Other sound examples involve the recent terrorist arrests (Operation Ricotta), where the IAG assisted to ensure community communication and understanding, and a money-laundering crime involving Jamaican criminal gangs.
- The appropriate district commander, together with the community safety team, completes community impact assessments in all homicides cases.
- Community contact officers from the local BCUs are on call 24/7 and contact IAG members as appropriate. The IAG member will discuss community impact assessments but will not be given a copy. IAGs report that they are updated with progress.
- As stated previously IAGs are convened immediately after homicide offences are committed. These IAGs are regularly held throughout the investigation to ensure community concerns are listened to and progress of the investigation is conveyed to the IAG. Examples of this practice were provided.

Work in progress

- The force is seeking to improve its liaison meetings with chief executives of local authorities (in terms of timing and information flows) to better enable them to understand major and serious crime issues.
- The force has initiated a force-wide IAG and the inaugural meeting was held on 7 February 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force does not routinely vet all its IAG members. The force should consider whether this approach allows it to fully exploit opportunities afforded by IAGs without compromising operational security and benchmark its approach against that of forces within the South West region.

July 2008

Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to ensure that the impact of any escalation of an incident of major crime incident is kept to a minimum. The inspection team found that ‘golden hour’ principles were fully understood and tested across call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- The force maintains an overarching business continuity plan that encompasses all districts and departments. A range of permanent operational orders including homicide, counter terrorism, firearms and kidnap and extortion supports this force plan.
- The force has a major incident guide on the intranet, which provides structured guidance for the management of any emergency or critical incident, including special arrangements for the involvement of one or more emergency services or partners. The force has sufficient control room capacity and is well versed in adequately respond to such incidents.
- The force has a mobilisation plan. It provides the response to any significant event that necessitates the use of supporting resources in escalation over and above the capability of local policing.
- The force operates a gold, silver and bronze command structure with formal on-call arrangements for SIOs and crime scene investigators. Other key roles on call-out rotas include telecoms SPOC, detective inspectors, HOLMES managers and the major crime investigation unit for Osman issues. There are less formal arrangements for all other specialisms and roles. The inspection team found an adequate specialist capability in force to respond to major and serious and organised crime, with adequate flexibility contained therein.
- Supervisors within the crime screening team review all serious offences ensuring that golden hour principles are followed. The force TAU also scans the command and control system and will flag crimes and incidents with advice and guidance in a similar way.
- It was evident from group interviews that there is a good level of understanding of golden hour principles amongst staff. Control room staff are knowledgeable, well trained and are assisted with ‘drop-down’ aide memoirs and trigger plans for key crime types.
- The force follows the guidelines on major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) and will invariably consider the use of HOLMES as an information management tool.

Work in progress

None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

None identified.

Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending were found to be analysed adequately.

Strengths

July 2008

- There is analysis of the current and future demand of major crime types and precursors to these offences. The homicide problem profile (July 2007) takes consideration of a variety of threats, including bladed weapons, firearms offences and domestic and child-related homicides.
- The force has a good understanding of the threats arising from identified risks within the FSA and the market profiles that have been produced which address most key crime themes.
- Analytical work on precursor crimes has been completed by FIG analysts who have portfolio responsibilities and provide a clear understanding of the risks posed by a wide variety of major crimes, including kidnap, domestic abuse and prostitution.
- Dangerous offenders are managed by a dedicated team led by a detective inspector who engages in both preventive and enforcement activity and is assisted by other specialist units.
- The force firearms intelligence group meets regularly to discuss analytical patterns and trends.
- The force level 2 tactical assessment document is forward looking; it includes threat levels and emerging crime types and considers community tension indicators. Analytical products will be requested from analysts where knowledge gaps exist.
- Domestic abuse risk assessment is completed using the SPECS PLUS system, which has been reviewed and updated to meet local needs. Cases assessed as being high or very high are automatically considered for inclusion within the MARAC process.
- Prevention strategies for victims, vulnerable people and locations are implemented, for example commercial burglaries and cash centres. Furthermore, the force has undertaken high-level media campaigns for drugs and knife crime.
- There is good information and intelligence sharing regarding MAPPA offenders between all concerned partners.

Work in progress

None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- The contribution to predictive/preventive analysis made by the major crime team analysts was minimal because their core role is seen as supporting live major crime enquiries. Accepting that some dialogue occurs through analysts meeting processes, the force should consider whether major crime analysts could make a more meaningful contribution to such activity.

Summary – The force’s policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff and partially understood and fully implemented. Examples of joint/regional/cross-border/multi-agency operations are extensive.

Strengths

- The force has a detailed threat to human life policy that is accessible to all staff via the force intranet system and is subject to frequent update. It has been revised

July 2008

following recent case law and includes a risk assessment matrix grading system and a menu of options.

- Osman warnings are a central feature of the murder suppression strategy and recorded upon a secure database. All warnings are reported to the homicide working group meetings.
- The MSS links with partner agencies. A good example includes activity to prevent domestic abuse where a double-decker bus is deployed, particularly at night, as a safe haven for victims where they can speak to paramedics, street pastors, police and police community support officers.
- The MSS collates risks arising from numerous sources for example child protection and domestic abuse into a simple document that informs the FSA.
- In all Osman cases, a detective inspector undertakes the initial risk assessment. Where the risk is judged to be medium or high, an SIO is allocated. Decisions and preventive tactics are recorded.
- The force cited an example of preventive work after a drive-by shooting, in which it worked together with HMRC, prison service and other partners. Deployments of police and partners were made to ensure prevention/disruption and to provide visible re-assurance to communities.
- The force has a hot tasking policy to respond to threat to life or drug recovery opportunities. Osman warnings are reviewed every 28 days or sooner if the SIO deems necessary. Where listed on Guardian, these reviews are automatically prompted.
- There are many examples of cross-border and partnership activities and operations that have prevented or disrupted major crimes, eg Operation Rolo.

Work in progress

- A central secure Osman warning database is maintained and managed at the major crime investigation unit. This arrangement needs to be reviewed to ensure that repeat victims can be identified 24/7. Some nominals and addresses are blind flagged to the Storm or Guardian databases.

Area(s) for improvement

- Cross-border arrangements are not contained within the force threat to life policy. Decisions whether to transfer the risk to the force where the victim resides will be made after discussion between both police forces, but this process needs to be documented.
- During the fieldwork phase of the inspection, awareness of the policy including the use of the Osman warning as a tactic was understood by many of the interviewees, but knowledge was not comprehensive. This is a common thread across the region and one that requires constant examination to ensure that the understanding of call handlers, control room operators and, in particular, new first responding officers is continually improved.

July 2008

Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by dedicated covert resources. The force operates to a policy that is promulgated to and understood by staff. The force is collaborating with other forces and partners in this area, including the South West region collaboration programme.

Strengths

- The force has a dedicated witness protection capability. This is adequately resourced when measured against current demands and is effectively managed.
- A witness protection policy and procedures have been published and are available on the force intranet. The witness protection team provides a tier 1 response and advice regarding risk assessments and threat reduction mechanisms, including witness assistance.
- The SCG and major crime investigation unit, together with the BCUs demonstrated a detailed knowledge of witness protection developments and options.
- The force is recognised across the South West region for its lead status in respect of witness protection issues and leads on a collaboration project.
- The force has consulted with other forces across the country in order to further identify and implement good practice.
- The force is willing to assist other forces with witness protection issues and fast time incidents.

Work in progress

- The DCI at the major crime investigation unit is undertaking development work across a range of witness protection issues.

Area(s) for improvement

None identified.

Summary – The force has an effective system for monitoring the impact of preventive and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The force undertakes a threat assessment process in respect of all serious and organised criminals at level 2, supported by a threat matrix that is used to prioritise activity.
- The level 2 control strategy recognises the need to monitor for signs of organised hate crime and actively monitor for tensions between communities. The strategy sets out clear intelligence requirements across crime, public safety and protective service functions seeking to better understand the effects of acquisitive crime, drug markets and radicalisation.

July 2008

- The force has a range of policies concerning repeat victimisation, hate crime and 'near repeats'. Safer neighbourhood teams use the neighbourhood profile templates in order to identify individuals, groups or communities who are at risk or are more vulnerable to crime. These are then 'accessed' in order to give enhanced services and to prevent crimes. Community engagement officers also monitor community tensions and trigger crimes.
- The force is currently developing its existing neighbourhood profiles in order to better understand the vulnerabilities of geographic communities, and this is being expanded to include those communities either virtual or geographic.
- There is good evidence of BCUs sharing intelligence with partners and the data will inform community mapping; however, this tends to focus on volume crime and public safety issues. Local MAPPA arrangements are sound and, although vulnerable communities are considered, a wider mapping process has yet to be developed.
- Data about the impact of neighbourhood policing is provided through a group of 900 respondents who are surveyed on a quarterly basis. The results are considered by the citizen focus policing programme board in order to drive service delivery improvements.

Work in progress

- The national threat/vulnerability matrix to score OCGs is being used and further developed as a measurement tool.
- The force is in the process of defining how best to manage Safer Stronger Neighbourhood intelligence and developing a process to ensure that anti-social behaviour data is more readily available to all staff.
- The force needs to scope its vulnerable communities and should develop intelligence exchange with partners (particularly at level 2) in order to better inform this process.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force should develop processes that measure the effects of prevention activity and incorporate these within the current performance improvement meeting (PIM) framework.

RECOMMENDATION 2.

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop intelligence sharing processes with partners and review its internal processes to ensure all functions within the force contribute to tackling major crime.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that relevant professional standards issues were always considered in the operational planning for major crime works. There is effective security activity taking place to ensure that members of staff are appropriately vetted, commensurate with exposure. A comprehensive strategy to support this activity has yet to be articulated.

July 2008

Strengths

- The force has a number of security policies and strategies in place, including an internal fraud prevention strategy. These are regularly reviewed and are circulated as appropriate upon the force intranet.
- The force has a robust approach to officer integrity and uses a variety of proactive tactics in order to monitor and identify opportunities for corruption or recruitment of officers by criminals. Where suspicions are raised, PSD routinely undertakes 'ethical interviews' with officers and their line managers.
- PSD officers give presentations to probationers regarding integrity issues and the force is engaged in an active drug-testing regime.
- Operational security of level 2 investigations is the responsibility of the SIO, with operational security work routinely undertaken. PSD is adequately resourced to undertake such activity.
- The force proactively targets police corrupters.
- There are adequate arrangements in place to protect the integrity of covert assets such as staff, buildings and vehicles.
- The force maintains a confidential hotline for officers and staff to make referrals.
- The force maintains a centralised vetting unit. Vetting arrangements for major crime staff are appropriate including re-vetting arrangements for staff who change roles.
- There is regular testing regarding information security, with recent results being positive.

Work in progress

- Vulnerable roles will be subject of routine drugs testing. The force is working to expand the internal drug-testing programme to other key roles, such as armed response vehicle personnel and drivers, and is considering random testing of other key groups based upon risk and safety considerations.
- The force is rightly reviewing its information exchange practices in light of recent high profile losses.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force holds a vacant post for an operational security officer, which is presently the subject of a recruitment process. Once employed, the force should consider developing an operational security strategy via the operational security officer role.
- PSD should develop self-inspection matrices that can be used by managers to test the integrity of systems and processes.
- The force should review its current unrestricted access to the PSD offices in light of its information storage systems.

July 2008

Enforcement

Summary – The governance arrangements for major crime investigations in the force are wholly effective with consistent use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command groups.

Strengths

- Rigorous ACPO lead from the dedicated ACC crime and criminal justice is in place. The force has a clear strategic intent and resource commitment with regard to major crime capability and capacity.
- Performance management of major crime issues is undertaken through the PIM, which is chaired by the DCC and holds officers and staff (including the ACC) accountable for all aspects of performance.
- The police authority is intrusive in its approach to major crime and has two lead members who are seen as specialists in this regard. The police authority performance and audit committee reviews major crime performance. An authority officer was a former force analyst and provides specialist advice to other members.
- The force regularly uses gold support groups and invites independent community (IAG) members, partners and voluntary groups. There are many examples that evidence use of this process.
- The ACC regularly visits the major incident room in support of SIOs and enquiry teams. Policy books are reviewed and specific decisions made by the ACC will be signed. The review template for major crimes includes the opportunity for the ACC to record that policy documents have been reviewed and to make comments about issues concerning resources or reputation.

Work in progress

- The ACC and director of human resources jointly chair the WFM project that is currently being implemented within the major crime department. Outcomes from this are recorded 1, 3 and 5yrs CID re-engineering plan.
- The chief officer group is presently reviewing how best to support and develop these officers senior detectives/leaders.

Area(s) for improvement

- In light of the current approach to vetting gold group and police authority members the force should review its policy in respect of access to information in order to be assured that it is maintaining effective operational security.

July 2008

Summary – The ACPO lead or head of department is trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime. Support is available from staff trained for critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The Chief Constable, the ACC crime and criminal justice, the DCC and the head and deputy of crime are trained in major linked series crime and have experience of investigating linked offences.
- Support within the golden hour is available 24/7 from SIOs and other officers trained in critical incident command (on-call superintendents).
- Intelligence obtained as result of community tension monitoring and the completion of community impact assessments is used by analysts to produce analytical management of products that inform SIO/chief officer decision-making.
- On-call arrangements across the force give access 24/7 to specialist advice regarding community matters at BCUs and centrally.
- There is a 24/7 superintendent PACE/critical incident rota accessible through the force control room. This rota is supported by other specialist functions such as firearms operations, public order, negotiators, PSD, welfare and media. BCUs also have their own on-call rotas including DI and intelligence officers.
- There has not been a recent appointment of an officer in overall command (OIOC) because the need has not arisen; however, this would be the Chief Constable.
- The AiList team within the command and control room has access to information including best practice advice, standard operating procedures as well as intelligence from a variety of data sources that inform and guide early responses at major or critical incidents. This is an effective system and worthy of consideration by other forces.
- Management interventions (including meeting structures and NIM) and work by analysts across the force are likely to identify linked series crimes.

Work in progress

- The force possesses linked crime co-ordinators whose role is to focus upon forensic outcomes and developing packages. In addition, the scientific investigation unit has an established forensic intelligence team. In order to broaden the approach taken to forensic intelligence/analysis, the force is seeking to merge these functions via a project, which is presently being scoped.

Area(s) for improvement

- During the review process described above, the force should consider how the linked crime co-ordinator role can be enhanced, perhaps to add value to the forensic research approach taken to priority crime.

July 2008

Summary – The force’s performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes and cost and some inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- The force manages performance on major crime investigations via a range of meetings that include the force PIM and the unit heads weekly management meeting, chaired by the head of crime.
- A range of performance measurements, key performance indicators and other data, such as financial and human resources data, is considered at these meetings. The Swallow IT system also provides performance data. The tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) monitors spends against profile and the intended outcome of any enquiry.
- At the outset of a major crime enquiry, a budget will be set. In the case of homicide, each major crime category has a pre-designated overall spend limit in accordance with MIRSAP.
- The MCRT ensures, where necessary, effective reviews of ongoing investigations. Lessons learned and best practice is highlighted to SIOs to consider. More general learning is outlined at meetings, fed into training products or is publicised upon the force intranet.
- There are many examples of reviews, either at the end of an enquiry or trial and include a wide range of police functions that have been involved in the enquiry for example forensics, intelligence and surveillance. The learning from these, although immediate for the people involved, is captured organisationally within changes to standard operating procedures, policies and guidance on the crime support intranet site.
- The force can evidence numerous examples of learning applied from external inspections and reviews.
- The force investigative standards intranet site contains best practice, legislation and process guidance. A dedicated officer within the HQ CID team routinely updates this and force policy as well as scanning for new guidance and legislation. At the time of the inspection this post was vacant.
- The force holds a series of professional development days; these are highly valued by staff and provide the opportunity for interesting or challenging cases to be reviewed and the learning from each shared more widely.

Work in progress

- There have been recent improvements in the allocation of a major crime devolved budget, which now includes most of the real-time spends within an investigation including overtime, agency staff, fleet and hire vehicles.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although the force has improved its understanding of the costs associated with significant elements within a major crime enquiry, a more detailed breakdown of spend should be considered in order to assist efficient decision making.

July 2008

Performance management and resilience

Summary – The inspection teams found sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands.

Collaborative agreements exist with SOCA and regional forces and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide extensive protection to the investigative capability.

Strengths

- The force has sufficient dedicated resources (personnel and infrastructure) to respond to predictable demands for major crime enquiries. There are some abstractions from BCUs, including HOLMES indexers and staff for outside enquiry teams, but this is recognised and accepted by the force as routine (see areas for improvement).
- There are maximum abstraction rules for BCUs and resources will tend to be taken from other crime departments in the first instance.
- There is new, purpose-built accommodation at Kenneth Steel House in Bristol where flexible office space allows for the establishment of up to four major incident rooms.
- Twenty-four-hour, call-out procedures (both formal and informal) are in place for appropriate staff. This additionally covers specialist staff such as scenes of crimes, telecoms SPOCs and FLOs.
- Unexplained deaths are dealt with in accordance with the force sudden death policy, providing a tiered response to such matters.
- The force maintains an expertise and understanding of corporate manslaughter. There is a work-related death protocol with the Health and Safety Executive and there are examples of its use. A memorandum of understanding exists between the force and the Health and Safety Executive, NHS and primary care trusts for deaths in healthcare settings.
- A variety of specialist skills are available within the major crime investigation unit including telephony and CCTV analysts. Additionally, a succession planning exercise has mapped out likely retirements over the next five years to identify gaps and current training needs. The force has a specialist chemist officer.
- It is evident from group interviews of officers and staff that call handlers, control room staff and their supervisors are trained and skilled in receiving information and deploying first responders to potential major crimes and critical incidents effectively. Furthermore, group interviews of first responders and their supervisors showed a sound level of knowledge of effectively handling the golden hour, and escalating where necessary. A booklet giving advice regarding decision making in critical incidents has been issued to first-line supervisors. Duty inspectors are trained in house-to-house and golden hour activities and have been issued aide memoirs.
- The SAIT is well resourced and deals with all rape victims 16 hours per day, 7 days per week. The SAIT has been extremely successful in delivering improved and

July 2008

enhanced victim care and has helped increase rape detection figures and reduce attrition rates.

- National PIP training is adopted at all levels.
- Call handlers and front-office staff have been given bespoke crime training, for example dealing with victims of sexual assault and how to make effective intelligence submissions.
- Uniform supervisors training includes detailed crime inputs from CID trainers including commencing policy books, disclosure and road death investigation.
- The force has a long history in and remains the regional lead for detective sergeant and SIO training. Its courses cater for external students.
- Minimum standards of investigation and trigger plans are in place for some major crimes, for example distraction burglary. Front-line officers have been given training and learning resources inputs (CD) in this regard.
- There are significant financial investigation resources both centrally and at BCU level. These have stretch targets and are mostly self financing being funded by POCA seizures.
- Covert resources continue to be developed.

Work in progress

- The constabulary is currently one of the national demonstration sites for WFM. This should create staff efficiencies and reduce staff abstractions from other teams and BCUs. Most CID departments are being considered and data gathering and scoping of a business plan are in progress. A human resources plan is due in July 2008.
- The force is delivering an interview advisers course with a PACE advisers course planned for 2008.
- All superintendent SIOs are trained to PIP level 3, with DCI SIOs undergoing the same process.
- The training department is developing a great number of crime-related courses for a wide range of staff at all levels, including CHIS, cognitive interview, FLO, child abuse and specially trained officers' courses.
- Current PEACE advisers are being additionally trained to become PACE advisers.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although broadly accepted, the routine abstraction of resources from BCUs to assist with major crime enquiries should be formalised, in order that individual learning and organisational benefit from each event is maximised.

July 2008

Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is found to be highly effective. Elements of covert operations are delivered through written and verbal collaborative agreements, which are thoroughly sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive use of these assets across a wide range of offences.

Strengths

- The force has the largest covert operations unit within the region.
- It has excellent partnership arrangement with South Wales Police.
- The unit is well resourced, well trained and its covert security arrangements stand scrutiny.
- Covert operations staff give training inputs to others, give advice and guidance regarding live cases and have good links with partner and statutory agencies and the Crown Prosecution Service.
- This unit is tasked to a variety of major crimes, including MAPPA, murders and domestic abuse.

Work in progress

None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

None identified.

Summary – The force has a full-time and dedicated case review team that is deployed to current and historic major crime review cases and in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is efficient.

Strengths

- The force has a dedicated MCRT and a separate cold case review team (although the latter has limited staff and is being merged). These are under the line management of the detective superintendent in charge of the force authorities' bureau effectively maintaining a sterile corridor.
- The MCRT reviews all live undetected murders, stranger rapes, unsolved road collision deaths and other crimes referred to it. Latterly the existing cold case review team undertook significant work in respect of undetected stranger rapes and as a result there are now just two outstanding cases.
- The major crime review policy has four review stages: self-inspection, progress review, thematic review and cold case review.
- A current situation report is compiled in respect of ongoing murder investigations by the SIO. Senior managers and the MCRT monitor these reports, with considerable peer support evident.
- The force has review policies and a review framework for both volume and serious crimes. These are clear and outline timescales and an escalation process for the

July 2008

review of undetected cases. The reviews will use template guidance where appropriate, eg stranger rape, self-inspection and an internal inspection guide (used by DCIs).

- Detected murders are reviewed using a hot debrief template.
- The learning and best practice identified through debrief is recorded upon the 'major crime review good practice matrix', which is available on the force intranet.
- The force has developed a process of cost benefit analysis. It is a dynamic process that evaluates operational activities against impact and harm.
- Operational plans have milestones included, which prompt timeliness of activity and a managerial review process.
- The force level 2 advisory panel scrutinises costs of operations and activities, for example a recent review of surveillance costs.
- Each district has access to a dedicated crime department detective superintendent in order to give crime investigation oversight, guidance to local SIOs and some review capability. These divisions are formally visited at least once a year; otherwise as crime dictates.
- All category 'A' homicide and some of the more complex category B murders are directly investigated by superintendent SIOs.
- There is a crime department monthly resource and finance meeting that addresses more strategic personnel and finance issues.
- The review team also oversees arrangements for the review of long-term outstanding missing person enquiries and seeks national best practice in this regard.
- Each rape case is given a very early review before being allocated to a SAIT officer. At this time, an investigation strategy document is completed.
- A scoring matrix for historic unsolved homicides has been developed and will be used to prioritise the review of individual cases. This work will soon commence now that additional resources have been transferred to the MCRT. All unsolved homicides have been fully risk assessed and reviewed against the Stealth template. Two cases have been given Stealth funding and 50% are on HOLMES.
- Some review of rape offences and the production analytical product has been done by Operation Solace. This has informed preventive work.

Work in progress

- An operational security officer post has been agreed and joint funded between PSD and the FIG. A recruitment process is presently under way to fill this post.
- The Swallow IT system is used to manage CHIS deployments and aspects of performance. This system is being rolled out across the divisions.

Area(s) for improvement

None identified.

July 2008

RECOMMENDATION 3.

Her Majesty’s Inspector recommends that the force should introduce a process to monitor unexplained and sudden deaths should be introduced, which will allow the early identification of patterns and links.

Summary – The inspection found that the force was fully compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the Murder Investigation Manual (MIM) and MIRSAP.

Strengths

- As part of the formal force review process, MIM and MIRSAP guidelines are considered for compliance. The results of recent reviews have been favourable.
- Policy files are completed for every major crime and where HOLMES is used policy files are recorded within it.
- Decisions not to pursue lines of enquiry and the rationale are fully documented within policy files. Where the TCG process directs lines of enquiry, policy logs are updated and limited rationale is included within the TCG minutes.
- Sensitive decision making will be recorded on paper files and will be added to HOLMES at the close of an enquiry.
- During the fieldwork phase, the inspection team checked and can verify that appropriate ACPO manuals of standards and guidance, both hard copy and electronic versions, are adequately circulated and easily accessible to appropriate users.

Work in progress

- The force has found difficulty filling all MIRSAP recommended major incident room roles due to lack of staff, however, it has now trained and deployed an additional ten major crime investigation unit detective constables as HOLMES managers.
- The current WFM work will also critically examine major incident room roles and major crime capabilities. Additional work is being done by the homicide working group.

Area(s) for improvement

None identified.

Recommendations^[J5]

Recommendation 1

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop corporate systems and processes which effectively measure and assess harm and threat to local communities.

Recommendation 2

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop intelligence sharing processes with partners and review its internal processes to ensure all functions within the force contribute to tackling major crime.

Recommendation 3

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should introduce a process to monitor unexplained and sudden deaths should be introduced, which will allow the early identification of patterns and links.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

A&S	Avon and Somerset
ACC	Assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	Automatic number plate recognition
ARV	Armed response vehicle

B

BCU	Basic command unit
BIA	Border and Immigration Agency

C

CDRP	Crime and disorder reduction partnership
CEOP	Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre
CHIS	Covert human intelligence source
CID	Criminal investigation department
CME	Covert method of entry
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CROPS	Covert rural operations post
CSI	Crime scene investigator/investigation
CT	Counter-terrorism
CTIU	Counter terrorism intelligence Unit

D

DCC	Deputy chief constable
DCI	Detective chief inspector
DI	Detective inspector
DVISA	Domestic violence information sharing agreement

July 2008

F

FIB	Force intelligence bureau
FIG	Force intelligence group
FIU	Financial investigation unit
FLO	Family liaison officer
FSA	Force strategic assessment

H

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HQ	Headquarters

I

IAG	Independent advisory group
IIU	Intelligence investigation unit
IMPACT	Intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking
IT	Information technology

K

K&E	Kidnap and extortion
KPI	Key performance indicator

L

LCJB	Local criminal justice board
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M

MAPPA	Multi-agency public protection arrangements
MARAC	Multi-agency risk assessment conference

July 2008

MAST	Mobile armed surveillance tactics
MCRT	Major crime review team
MIM	Murder Investigation Manual
MIRSAP	Major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MoPI	Management of police information
MSF	Most similar force(s)
MSS	Murder suppression strategy

N

NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NPSAT	National Protective Services Analysis Tool
NSLEC	National Specialist Law Enforcement Centre

O

OCG	Organised crime group
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P

PACE	Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984)[NEED DEFINITION]
PDR	Performance development review
PIM	Performance improvement meeting
PIP	Professionalising the investigative process
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
PSD	Professional standards department

R

RIG	Regional intelligence group
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
RIU	Regional intelligence unit
ROG	Regional operations group

S

SAIT	Sexual abuse investigation team
SAR	Suspicious activity report
SCAS	Serious crime analysis system
SCG	Serious crime group
SDO	Senior detective officers
SGC	Specific grading criteria
SIO	Senior investigating officer
SMART	Specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, timely
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SPI	Statutory performance indicator
SPOC	Single point of contact

T

TAU	Threat assessment unit
TCG	Tasking and co-ordination group
TSU	Technical support unit

U

UC	Under cover
UKHTC	United Kingdom human trafficking centre

V

ViSOR	Violent and Sex Offenders Register
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W

WFM	workforce modernisation
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July 2008

Appendix 2: Developing practice

Major Crime Administration System – MCAS

The force has developed a secure, integrated intranet based Major Investigation Administration System that records all Major Investigations, requiring oversight and governance by MCIU. This IT solution has created a single database and a recording system allowing for all relevant managers including ACPO / Head of CID / SIO / MCIU staff, when appropriately authorised, to access, complete and view all relevant Major Investigation information.

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